SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001400300001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
Niz
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
1(0
July 30, 1975
No. 0751/75
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
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July 30, 1975
Yugoslav Party Criticizes Portuguese
Leftists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Albania Rebuffs Soviet Overtures . . . . . . . . 2
Romania: The July Plenum. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Yugoslav Party Criticizes Portuguese Leftists
Komunist, the official Yugoslav party weekly,
has openly stated Belgrade's misgivings about dis-
unity among the leading "progressive" forces in
Lisbon and placed the bulk of the blame on the
Armed Forces Movement.
The weekly argues that "it would be wrong
and dangerous" to give exclusive credit to the
Armed Forces Movement for "progress" and simul-
taneously to denounce the socialists as reaction-
aries. The article mildly raps the socialists,
however, for "incorrectly" assuming that they have
a monopoly on democracy.
The Yugoslav party asserts that there is much
more at stake than a narrow squabble between Por-
tuguese factions. To support this conclusion,
Komunist listed such related concerns as the po-
tential impact of events in Lisbon on the post-
Franco period in Spain, the activities of the
French and Italian left, and the de-colonization
of Angola.
Belgrade has long held serious reservations
about trends in the Portuguese revolution--parti-
cularly the radical programs that the Portuguese
Communists espouse. In essence, the Yugoslavs
would prefer to see Portugal remain a stable mem-
ber of NATO, especially as the Soviets seek to
tighten their control over the Warsaw Pact.
The Yugoslavs' decision to publish their view,
despite their earlier sermons on the evils of for-
eign meddling in Portugal, probably reflects Bel-
grade's realization that nobody is abiding by their
advice.
July 30, 1975
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Tirana has forcefully restated its complete
disinterest in closer cooperation with Moscow and
the Kremlin's loyalist East European allies. An
authoritative article in Zeri i PopuZZit, the party
daily, also serves notice on any members of the
leadership who may favor closer cooperation with
Moscow.
In a commentary laced. with vitriol, Tirana has
responded to what it calls the "flatteries" and
"pressures" of the Soviets and other "revisionists,"
who seek, by offering economic advantages, to seduce
Albania into changing its strongly anti-Soviet stance.
The article claims that the Albanian people are
determined "to make any sacrifice"--as they have
done in the past--to preserve their freedom and in-
dependence, including relying on their own capabil-
ities to bolster economic development.
The timing of the commentary is significant.
The article probably is intended to rebuff Moscow's
reported interest in normalizing relations with
Tirana Given signs of a
continuing challenge to anian leader Hoxha, the
article warns pro-Soviet comrades to abandon hope
for closer cooperation with Moscow or else face
the consequences. The commentary stresses that
compromising the country's policy to promote trade
and obtain favorable credits will not cure the
country's economic ills. Former defense minister
Balluku, who was ousted from his post in July 1974,
and his sympathizers may well have supported this
position.
The commentary, released on the eve of the
Helsinki summit, provides a timely rationale for
Albania's abstention from the European security
talks. Tirana, having repeatedly described the
July 30, 1975
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talks as a "superpower charade," has used this
occasion to rebuke the secret diplomacy of coun-
tries who willingi ut their national interests
"u for auction "
July 30, 1975
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Romania: The July Plenum
There was a certain malaise about the party cen-
tral committee plenum on July 21-22 that suggests
some policies of party chief Ceausescu came under
criticism. The Romanian leader responded by seeking
to shift the blame for difficulties in the economic
sector as well as in the flood control program to a
number of national and local officials. Although no
one lost his job at the plenum, the stage appears to
be set for future personnel shifts.
The Romanian leader's obsession with meeting
the goals of the current economic plan ahead of
schedule despite the damaging effects of the coun-
try's recent severe floods has probably increased
his vulnerability to critics. There is no evidence
of organized opposition, but Ceausescu's main speech
to the plenum struck a rare defensive pose by
juxtaposing his regime's "miraculous" economic ac-
complishments with the "reservations and scepticism"
of some members of the leadership. This highly
unusual admission follows recent rumors of friction
between unnamed members of the party's powerful
political executive committee over Ceausescu's
decision to increase prices earlier this month and
the growing behind-the-scenes role of his wife,
Elena, in party and state affairs.
Ceausescu's remarks also suggest that he thought
it prudent to give greater consideration to the views
of others in the leadership before calling for changes
at the plenum. A number of personnel shifts may,
however, still be made. Ceausescu called for
"decisive action" against a number of local officials
for their failures during the floods. A prime target
is Virgil Trofin, a well-known Ceausescu critic and
the party first secretary of Brasov county.
July 30, 1975
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Much of Ceausescu's speech turned out to be a
pep-talk heavily laced with references to the need
for better party organization and tighter discipline.
With this goal in mind, the plenum reorganized the
Supreme Council for Economic and Social Development,
parceling out specific responsibilities to the
fifteen members of the party's political executive
committee.
The 1976-80 five-year plan, as outlined by
Ceausescu, holds out little hope of relief to the
already hard-pressed Romanian worker. For instance,
in contrast to popular expectations, there will be
no shortening of the six-day work week. Ceausescu
called for further belt tightening and indicated
that some of the economic goals spelled out at the
11th party congress last November have been raised.
Ceausescu also announced tighter import restrictions
in what seems destined to be a vain effort to balance
the nation's payments position by the end of the year.
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