SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600030002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 18, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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SOVIET UNION -EASTERN EUROPE
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August 18, 1975
Soviet Visitors to Romania 1
Romania: Potential Market for
US Chemical Equipment 3
Soviets Retreating on Electric Power
Deal with West Germany. 4
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In a conversation between Romanian and American
diplomats in Moscow, the Romanian said that his coun-
try was the only Soviet European ally Brezhnev has
never officially visited and that Gromyko has not
officially visited the country since shortly after
his appointment in 1957.
If what is meant are formal, bilateral visits
accompanied by all the usual protocol, then this
assertion is correct. In the decade since Ceausescu
assumed power, however, both Brezhnev and Gromyko
have visited Bucharest for various multilateral
meetings and have also stopped briefly in the
Romanian capital when passing through. Their last
recorded visits were in 1971, when Gromyko attended
a Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting in February
and Brezhnev pulled into Bucharest station in April
en route to Bulgaria. On the latter occasion
Ceausescu was not on hand to greet Brezhnev. This
snub was probably in retaliation for one by Brezh-
nev the year before. At that time, the Soviet party
chief was to head a delegation to Bucharest for the
signing of the long-delayed Soviet-Romanian friend-
ship treaty. Two days before the visit Brezhnev
developed a diplomatic illness and could not travel.
(The same day he was to arrive in Romania, Brezhnev
attended a soccer match in Moscow.) In 1968, Brezh-
nev, Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko stopped in Iasi
en route to a Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia, prob-
ably to determine whether Romania would support
Moscow's stand against Dubcek's "Prague spring" in
Czechoslovakia. By that time, however, Brezhnev
was undoubtedly well aware of the futility of trying
to influence Ceausescu--having attempted but failed
to swerve Ceausescu from his nationalist course
during a "secret, unofficial" visit to Bucharest in
May 1966, and at a combined Warsaw Pact - CEMA ex-
travaganza in Bucharest in July of the same year.
August 18, 1975
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In reviewing the travels of other high Soviet
officials to Bucharest during the past decade, it is
apparent that Soviet Premier Kosygin is the most
frequent visitor. In recognition of a slight im-
provement in relations with Bucharest--or perhaps
to put pressure on Ceausescu--the Soviets did send
Kirilenko to the Romanian party congress last
November. The Romanian party program, however, caused
the temperature to drop again, and the Kirilenko
visit was the last Soviet attempt to use personal
diplomacy to chance the independent attitude of the
Romanians.
August 18, 1975
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Romana.a,: -~ote}itia,l x~a~k.et
or US C emica~~quipment
US ,sales of chemical,. equipment and tecY~nology
to Romania should increase, as , a ,result of ;congres-` ~"
sional approval this month of most?favored-nation
tariff status for Romania.,. In addition ~0 lower
. i '.f a
tar.f.fs;;,or~;-.many items., .Romania is now .,eli.gi'ble for'.;
Export Impart Bank credits that will make"possible"
increased purchases of chemical equipment and ""
technology for its most dynamic industrial branch.
Bucharest has, made .no major?,purchases ~ of , Chem-
cal :equipment and technology tYiis year, ,but order's
from Western countries from 1970 through,-1974 were,'
worth.:at least $ 36.0 -million . Mha 1 F"lorescu; ' "n%iri=
,j ister of the chemical industry, 'earlier-this year
indicated interest in purchasing US equipment and
technology estimated to cost as much as X360 mil-~"
lon.for,.a proposed refinery and .petrochemical com-
plex q~1 the .:Black Sea,. ~ _
Other needs incJ.ude equipment and technology
_ .- - - .,
for coal. gasification and liquefaction, natural ~a
separation,'aromatics. eXtxa~tion, and,`producton b~
`~ drugs. Bucharest plans to allocate 17 percent of
the country's total industrial investment to the
chemical industry through 1980, hoping to achieve
a growth of 60-$O percent. Major emphasis will be ,
on petrochemistry, with continued growth in ferti-
lizer output. ~'or the 1976-80 plan 'period, large`
increases are projected in plastics and synthetic
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fibers (nearly 100 percent), synthetic rubber
(150-170 percent), fertilizers (58-68 percent),
and pesticides (100 percent). Western equipment
and technology will be necessary to achieve this
growth.
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Soviets Retreating on Electric Power
Deal with We's't Germany
The plan to supply electric power to West Berlin
and West Germany from a proposed nuclear power plant
on the Soviet Baltic coast continues to run into dif-
ficulty. A Berlin official has reported that the
Soviets wish to back out of the deal because they have
failed to obtain the approval of East Germany and
Poland.
For the past two years the USSR has been nego-
tiating with West Germany for the purchase of a 1,000-
megawatt nuclear power plant to be built at Kaliningrad
and paid for with electric power produced by the plant.
At West Germany's insistence, the transmission line
to deliver the electricity would be routed through
Berlin so as to avoid any possible disruption of the
supply of power to West Berlin.
East Germany has been delaying progress on the
deal by withholding approval of the passage of the
line through Berlin.
The price to be charged by West Germany for the
nuclear power plant and the price to be charged key
the Soviet Union for the delivery of electricity
also remain unresolved.
While the Soviets are doing little to break
the stalemate over the Kaliningrad power plant, they
do not seem to want the project to perish. Their
August 18, 1975
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present negativism, including the assignment of
blame to the Poles and East Germans, may be in-
tended to secure better terms, rather than to kill
the deal altogether. Continuing differences be-
tween the Soviets and West Germans over other
Berlin issues may also be influencing Moscow's
attitude.
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August 18, 1975
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Confidential
Confidential
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