CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600050002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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rc~))UITT HOUE
Chinese Affairs
DOS review(s) completed.
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Top Secret
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August 19. 1975
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August 19, 1975
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China, Korea and the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Reappearance of Lo Jui-ching . . . . . . . . 6
Army Day in the Provinces. . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Signs of Indecision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Military Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A Line on Chang Chun-chiao . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Fertilizer Production Behind Schedule. . . . . . 20
Early PRC Container Service Problems . . . . . . 24
ANNEX: Mao vs. the Commanders . . . . . . . . . 25
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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China, Korea, and the UN
F7 I
Peking and Washington are on opposite sides
of the Korea issue again this year at the United
Nations, but there are indications that the Chinese
are persuaded that they can convince the North
Koreans of their loyalty without becoming involved
in a bitter confrontation with the US.
Concern over the effect a confrontation in the
UN might have on President Ford's planned visit
to China later this year, as well as Peking's
interest in encouraging a reduction in tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, probably accounts for
Chinese sensitivities on this score. Nevertheless,
Peking will provide strong support for North Korea's
case in the UN in order to protect its equities in
Pyongyang.
Chinese press coverage of South Korea's
unsuccessful application for admission to the UN
set the tone for Peking's role in the UN debate
on Korea later this fall. Chinese press accounts
relied exclusively--until after the August 6 vote
on Seoul's application--on replays of North Korean
propaganda, and Pyongyang's most vitriolic language
was excised.
I The Chinese also ignored Pyongyang's claim
that South Korea is a "puppet regime" that does
not represent the South Korean people and North
Korean assertions that Seoul could not survive
without US military protection. Moreover, Pyongyang's
demand that the US immediately withdraw its troops and
weapons from the South was excised from Chinese ac-
counts.
Peking media waited until the US vetoed North
and South Vietnam's applications for admission to
the UN before commenting directly on the Korea
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question. On August 11, referring to the US
vetoes as "unreasonable," NCNA summarized UN
Ambassador Huang Hua's comments on US attempts to
link the "completely irrelevant" South Korean
application with those of the two Vietnams.
According to the NCNA account, Huang said
that China "cannot but express regret" at US
attempts to make a "package deal" and suggested
that the US, as a result, would "only land itself
in greater isolation." Huang's sorrowful rather
than angry criticism of US support for South Korea
was considerably less harsh than the language
he employed last year during UN debate on the Korea
issue.
The Chinese have also displayed a degree of
selectivity in their support for the pro-Pyongyang
draft resolution that was announced last week.
On August 12, NCNA ran a summarized version of a
North Korean statement on the resolution. Peking's
summary deleted most of Pyongyang's arguments for
removing US troops from the South and for replacing
the armistice commission with a peace treaty between
the "real parties," a reference to North Korea and
the US. The deletions point up Peking's interest
in softening criticism of the US and, probably,
in retaining some form of armistice guarantees.
In fact, the possibility of a lapse in the
armistice arrangements has concerned the Chinese
for some time.
Chinese media have also softened Pyongyang's
harsh criticism of the pro-Seoul resolution
introduced last month by the US and others.
August 19, 1975
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As they have for some time, the Chinese are
walking a narrow path between their strategic
objectives on the Korean Peninsula and their
desire to maintain the warmest possible ties with
Pyongyang. From Peking's viewpoint, there is
undoubtedly some advantage to a continuation, at.
least for the time being, of a divided Korea and
a strong US presence in the South. Chinese
leaders are probably persuaded that a dissolution
of the UN Command that neglects provisions for an
alternative peace-keeping mechanism could disrupt
the status quo and lead to a scramble for influence
in Korea.
If early estimates of the outcome on the UN
Korea vote this year are correct, both resolutions
will be approved. Neither, however, is likely to
be implemented soon. Peking almost certainly will
be pleased with that development, since it would
probably result in no major changes in the Korean
situation. F7 I
August 19, 1975
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The Reappearance of Lo Jui-ching
Christopher J. Szymanski (x20616)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The attendance of Lo Jui-ching, formerly PLA
chief of staff, vice premier, and high party offic-
ial,,at the Army Day celebrations in Peking on July
31 is the most startling reappearance of a Cultural
Revolution purge victim since that of Teng Hsiao-
ping in the spring of 1973. Purged in late 1965, Lo
reportedly tried to commit suicide following Red
Guard harassment and heavy press criticism that linked
him with the disgraced Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-
ping.
The story behind Lo's purge has never fully
emerged, but the likeliest explanation is that his
emphasis on defense preparedness and professionalism
in the army came into conflict with the Mao - Lin
Piao emphasis on guerrilla warfare and political in-
volvement. His reappearance would thus indicate a
further step in the PLA's disengagement from domestic
politics, a step that was instituted after Lin's
abortive coup attempt in 1971.
Lo's current state of health is unknown, but
since he is about 70 years old his future role may
prove more symbolic than substantive. On the other
hand, past ceremonial appearances of those purged
during the Cultural Revolution have often preceded
their reappointment to major positions, and Lo may
be slotted for a substantive job high in the mili-
tary hierarchy.
Lo in 1965: The escalation of the Vietnam war
in 1965 confronted Peking with strategic problems:
how to assist Hanoi; whether China might be invaded;
how China should defend itself. Two answers surfaced
publicly--one by Lo, the other by Lin Piao.
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In an article in Red Flag in may 1965 commem-
orating the defeat of Germany in World War II, Lo
advocated primary reliance on professional military
methods:
--preparations against the eventuality
that "imperialism may suddenly impose
a war on us" should include planning
not only for small- and medium-scale
warfare but also for large-scale war-
fare, including nuclear weapons;
--China should adopt a strategy of "active
defense," concentrating superior forces
to destroy the "enemy's effectives";
--victory requires close integration of
the armed forces and the civilian popula-
tion, coordination on the battlefield,
and close cooperation among the different
armed services, the ground forces being
primary.
Lo apparently further maintained that China should:
--prepare to resist invasion, even if this
would divert the PLA from domestic polit-
ical activities;
--rely more heavily on regular ground
forces, particularly the infantry rather
than local militia units;
--prepare defense positions and rapidly
improve air defenses in the south
against a possible US air strike;
--greatly increase allocation of resources
to the defense sector.
Lo's military views, although apparently widely
accepted within the Chinese military, were in direct
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opposition to Mao's and Lin's advocacy of a polit-
ically active PLA and primary reliance on a guer-
rilla defense strategy. In a September 1965 article,
"Long Live the People's War," which attracted wide
attention, Lin argued that, as had been the case in
the Chinese revolution, the Third World "countryside"
would surround and overcome the developed "cities."
Lin's principal point was that in Vietnam, China,
and the Third World countries Peking and its allies
should rely mainly on guerrilla warfare rather than
attempt to engage in modern technological warfare.
To meet the enemy on his own terms was foolish, he
argued.
Lo had also castigated "US imperialism," but
his foreign policy stance seems to have accorded
with the general position of the central leadership
at the time. In retrospect, it appears unlikely that
his position centered on an active anti-American
stand or that he had pro-Soviet leanings. Rather,
his purge in late 1965 was probably the result of
major differences in military doctrine with the Mao-
Lin group.
Lo in 1975. Lo's advocacy in 1965 of heavier
defense allocations took place at a time when Peking
perceived a heightened military threat from the US.
He may well hold different views today, when that
danger is no longer perceived, and when stepped-up
defense efforts might conflict with the present
emphasis on developing China into a "modern, in-
dustrialized socialist state" by the end of the
century. Chou En-lai proclaimed this goal at the
Fourth National People's Congress last January.
In other ways, Lo's 1965 views conform to
several aspects of Peking's current policy. His
argument that the PLA should give primacy to its
purely military functions accords with Peking's
steady efforts since the fall of Lin Piao in 1971
to get the armed forces out of civilian political
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and economic activity. Further, his stress on mili-
tary professionalism--carrying the implication that
technical training is important and that politicization
should not be overstressed--parallels the current
"rational" emphasis in Chinese economic planning.
In sum, Lo's rehabilitation may be another
step in the gradual strengthening of the "moderates"
at the expense of the "leftists" which has occurred
since Lin's fall.
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Army Day in the Provinces
Army Day turnouts were marked by the unexpected
absence of leading military district (MD) personnel.
While eight of the eleven military region commanders
publicly appeared in their provinces, only two mili-
tary district-level commanders, from Kwangtung District
and Peking Garrison, appeared in place. The appear-
ance of some military district personnel outside
their home provinces and the recent appointment of
a new MD commander and political commissar in Chekiang
suggest that a shift in military personnel at the
district level may be under way.
All of the transferred personnel also held
party positions in their home provinces--Yang Ta-i,
who appeared in Liaoning, was formerly MD commander
and party secretary in Hunan, while Ho Kuang-yu,
the new MD commander in Kansu, was a deputy party
secretary and MD commander in Kweichow. Several
other lower level MD personnel who previously held
party posts were among the other military men
transferred.
The major shift, however, was the transfer of
Wang Chia-tao to Liaoning where he appeared sixteenth
on the turnout list. Wang, who has not appeared in
Heilungkiang since 1974, lost his posts as first
party secretary and MD commander in the transfer.
Turnouts this year were rather large, with most
provinces holding simultaneous rallies in several
locations. Provincial party leaders were conspic-
uously present, and in most cases the leading party
representative delivered the keynote address.
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The party's primacy was also reflected in the
holiday propaganda. Among the themes stressed were
the leading role of the party, the importance of
studying Mao's instruction on theory, unity, and
stability, and the need to increase production.
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Province
Anhwei
Chekiang
Fukien
Pi-Ting-chun Fuchou MR
commander
Liao Chih-kao, lst secretary
Heilungkiang Chang Lin-chih, party
secretary
Hopeh
Hupeh
Liu Chien-hsun, 1st
secretary
Yang Chung-yi, deputy
MD commander
Kuo Chih, party
standing committee
Chang Ping Hua, 2nd secretay
Wang Yu-hua, deputy MD
commander
Yang Te-chih, Wuhan MR
commander
Chao Hsin-chu, 1st secretary
Inner Mongolia "responsible persons"
"responsible persons"
Chang Wen-pi named
new MD commander
July 22
Wang Chia-tao, 1st
secretary, appears
in Liaoning
extensive party
turnout
Chao delivers the
keynote address
Hsien Heng-kan, 1st
secretary, appears on
August 7, with new
MD commander at con-
gress of demobilized
servicemen; Han Hsien-
chu MR commander ap-
pears on August 10
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ARMY DAY TURNOUTS IN THE PROVINCES
Turnout Led By
Wang Kuang-yu, party
secretary
"responsible persons"
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Province Turnout Led By Comment
Kiangsi Pai Tung-tsai, 1st secretary She Chi-te, party
secretary and long
time Fuchou MR man
appears in Fukien
Kiangsu "responsible persons" Ting Sheng, Nanking
MR commander, does
not appear
Kirin "responsible persons"
Kwangsi
"responsible persons"
Wei Kuo-ching, 1st
secretary, appears
in Canton in his
role as MR 1st polit-
ical commissar
Kwangtung Hsu Shih-yu Canton MR Chang Ching Yao
commander MD commander
Wei Kuo-ching 1st political appears
commissar
Chao Tsu-yang 1st secretary
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Liaoning Li Te-sheng, MR commander
Tseng Shao-shan, deputy
MR commander
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Shanghai Wang Hung-wen
Ma Tien-shui, party
secretary
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Shantung Pai Ju-ping, lst secretary
Tseng Ssu-yu, MR commander
Mao Yuan Hsin ap-
pears in fourth
place; Wang Chia-tao
and Yang Ta-i, Hunan
MD commander appear
Wang identified with
Vice Chairman Mili-
tary Affairs Commis-
sion but title dropped
in rebroadcasts
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Province Turnout Led By
Shensi
Sinkiang
Szechuan
Tibet
Ma Hsi-sheng, RC vice chairman
Wu Heng-sheng, deputy MD
commander
Yang Yung MR commander
Tsao Ssu-ming, 1st polit-
ical commissar
Liu Hsing-yuan lst secretary
Chin Chi-wei MR commander
Tien Pao, party secretary Jen Jung, 1st sec-
retary, does not
appear
Tsinghai Li Ping, secretary
Sining MPC
August 19, 1975
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Signs of Indecision
Although Peking seems to be dealing forcefully
and effectively with major issues such as the
military and the economy, there appears to be some
confusion or hesitation over how to handle a few
lesser issues.
On Army Day, NCNA in an English-language broad-
cast identified party leader Wang Hung-wen as a
vice chairman of the party's Military Affairs Com-
mittee, an unusual position for a civilian. Teng
Hsiao-ping, the only other civilian known to be a
vice chairman of the committee, has never been
publicly identified as such. Even more unusual,
subsequent broadcasts and publications failed to
mention Wang's military title.
What prompted Peking to switch is a mystery.
The outside world learned of Wang's new title through
the initial release, and rumors of his new position
had circulated within China for some time.
Last March, Peking announced the conclusion of
preparatory meetings for the national congresses
of China's mass organizations--the Women's Federa-
tion, Trade Union, and Youth League. The announce-
ment indicated that the congresses themselves would
be held after "due preparations," and some provinces
began to select delegates. This process came to a
sudden halt, however, and no further preparations
seem to be under way.
The congresses could have been pushed to the
back burner by the meeting this summer of party
and military leaders in Peking, but that meeting is
now over. Factionalism in the provinces may also
be contributing to the delay, as well as the major
economic push throughout the country. Both fac-
tionalism and the emphasis on the economy, however,
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were facts of life when the preparatory meetings
were held last winter. It is now an open question
whether preparations for the congresses can be com-
pleted this year.
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A third development is Peking's apparent back-
pedaling on conversion to the Pinyin system, China's
own method for Romanizing Chinese names. A State
Council message announcing that China would convert
to the Pinyin system on September 1 was prepared for
release last May. Within hours, however, NCNA was
told to delay indefinitely the release of the mes-
sage. It is clear that the Chinese had second
thoughts about adopting the Pinyin system.
To date, Chinese officials have been unable to
confirm that the system would go into effect on
September 1. In fact, several officials have been
vague about whether the system will ever be adopted.
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Military Notes
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The Army Day turnout in Peking indicates that
the PLA has become increasingly conscious of the
technical and doctrinal aspects of warfare. The
two most heavily represented PLA groups were the
National Defense Science and Technology Commission
and the military academies. The ranks of both the
commission and the academies have increased signif-
icantly in the past two years. Although some of
the rise represents no more than the filling of
slots vacant since the Cultural Revolution, the
number of leaders in these two categories identified
during national celebrations now dwarfs the other
military groups.
The namelist further suggests that the commission
'has a new head. Liu Hsien-chuan, former Tsinghai
~~ leader who has appeared in Peking for the past
,Iseveral years, did not head the commission group.
Chang Ai-ping, a veteran Science and Technology Com-
mission official, won this distinction. Liu may
have been transferred to Shantung. A poorly heard
radiobroadcast listed a person whose name sounded
.like Liu's as a deputy commander of the Tsinan
Military Region in May.
The academy bloc now includes notables such
as Hsiao Hua, a former head of the PLA's General
`Political Department, and Chang I-hsiang, who used
to head the Railway Engineering Corps.
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A Line on Chang Chun-chiao
Chang Chun-chiao is one of the few Chinese
leaders with important positions in the party,
government, and military bureaucracies. His mili-
tary duties as chief political commissar respon-
sible for political indoctrination of the troops
are fairly clear. His precise party and govern-
ment responsibilities are less clear, but scattered
bits of information allow for some tentative
judgments.
P
litb
b
th
d t
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o
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o
e
Chang has long seeme
member in charge of liaison with foreign communist
parties, and he appears to continue these duties.
In addition, as a vice premier in the government
his responsibilities in foreign affairs appear to
have broadened to include the non-communist world
as well. He recently hosted the Tunisian prime
minister and the President of Gabon.
Last month, accompanied by the minister of
culture, Chang met with two cultural delegations,
suggesting he may be moving in on Chiang Ching's
turf. In addition, he met a press delegation.
Taken together, these appearances suggest he has
important propaganda responsibilities on behalf of
both party and government.
The party and government have separate propa-
ganda vehicles, but all are controlled ultimately
by the party. There is some evidence that links
IChanci with People's Daily
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uin June, Lu Ying, w o worked on t e Shanghai
newspaper Liberation Daily when Chang headed the
paper, was identified as "chief leading member"
of People's Daily, suggesting that Chang's presumed
protege is editor-in-chief of the party's official
newspaper.
Given Chang's party position as a member of
the Politburo's elite Standing Committee, he appears
to be the highest ranking party official with
propaganda responsibilities. Yao Wen-yuan also
appears to be involved in propaganda work, but he
is outranked by Chang and would have to defer to
him. Moreover, the government's propaganda outlet,
the New China News Agency, would also come under
Chang's purview.
Propaganda work would seem to mesh well with
Chang's other duties. Since he is charged with
setting out the correct party line for the military,
it seems logical for him to do the same for the
party and government media.
This is not to suggest that Chang's duties
tare restricted to propaganda work. He still seems,
for example, to be the most likely candidate for
party secretary general. Propaganda duties, how-
lever, would give Chang considerable stature as a
party theoretician, a comfortable position to be in
iwhen succession time roles around.
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Fertilizer Production Behind Schedule
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China is behind schedule in production of
chemical fertilizer. Peking expected output to
be 35 million tons in 1975, the last year of the
fourth five-year plan, but production will reach
only about 80 percent of this goal unless it is
increased dramatically during the remainder of the
year. Any boost in output would be too late for
use on this year's principal crops.
Fertilizer production got off to a good start
early in the current plan period. Output--mostly
from the rapid expansion of small plants--increased
from 18 to 25 percent annually during the early
1970s. This spectacular rate of increase could
not be sustained, and only a minimal gain was
achieved in 1974. Recent announcements by Peking
indicate that the increase this year will fall far
short of the additional 10 million tons needed to
meet its goal.
China's fertilizer imports have also lagged.
Imports last year were reduced by one third be-
cause of skyrocketing prices and Peking's shortage
of foreign exchange. Purchases were cut back even
more during the first half of this year. Peking
has recently signed, or is negotiating, new con-
tracts in response to falling fertilizer prices.
Much of this fertilizer, however, will be delivered
too late for use this crop year.
More high-quality chemical fertilizer will be
required to support any substantial increase in
agricultural output. The supply situation will
not ease, however, until the 13 nitrogen fertilizer
plants purchased from the West become fully opera-
tional in the late 1970s. Until then, Peking will
look to more intensive utilization of organic mate-
rials'to ease the current shortages of chemical
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Early PRC Container Service Problems
Peking's first attempt at containerization has
pointed out deficiencies in China's internal trans-
port system. The joint Sino-Japanese container
service was inaugurated in September 1973 and ex-
panded during the last half of 1974. Vessels in
this trade call at Yokohama, Osaka, and Kobe in
Japan and at Tientsin and Shanghai in China.
China lacks the specialized equipment and
internal transport network needed to use the con-
tainer service efficiently. The Chinese do not have
proper handling equipment so that they must rely on
ships' cranes and forklift trucks to move containers
in port areas. Cargoes are consolidated at the ports,
and often only a fraction of the container's capacity
is used because of inexperience in managing containers.
Low clearance along China's rail and highway networks
further reduces the benefits of containerization.
Improvements in the system and those scheduled
for the next five year plan should alleviate the
problems. The Chinese are equipping port facilities
at Shanghai, Tientsin, and possibly Canton for
handling small numbers of containers. The installa-
tions at Shanghai and Tientsin--two of China's major
ports--will use specialized container-handling equip-
ment, some of it manufactured in Japan and the US.
Containership berths may be available at these two
ports by the end of this year.
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Nine of China's eleven regional military com-
randers have reappeared since Army Day, despite
the apparent determination of Chairman Mao to
send several of these men into political disgrace.
The showdown apparently took place at a meeting
in Peking earlier this summer. It seems that the
rest of the leadership set Mao's wishes aside in
the face of several compelling reasons for taking
!the pressure off the military commanders.
Not the least of these is the elusive unity
that the Chinese have tried to achieve for the
past year. The removal of some of the commanders,
especially those who sit on the party's ruling
politburo, would imply that the leadership remained
divided even as Peking was taking firm measures
to put a sto to "bourgeois factionalism" in the
rovinces.
n article in the
Curren issue o e ag warns that party com-
mittees cannot lead "hundreds of thousands" of
people unless the members of the committees are
united. This warning applies equally as well to
~!I the politburo as to lower level party committees.
I add t' th d k 't 1 h
n i ion
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, e propagan a ma es i s ear
a
unity means not only that warring factions must
try to work together but that civilians and the
military must work out a harmonious relationship.
Moreover, the military is the single most
powerful interest group in the party, and it is
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crucial for Peking to maintain good relations with
this group. As the recent events in troubled
Chekiang Province have shown, the military remains
an important instrument.for maintaining order.
The decision to send troops into Chekiang's
factories to restore order and get production mov-
ing again was taken only after a series of other
measures were unsuccessful.
Chekiang's problems, although more explosive
and more persistent than in other areas, are
basically not very different from the kinds of
factional rivalries that exist in other provinces.
It is therefore conceivable that similar distur-
bances could flare up in other provinces if Peking
does not use a firm hand in Chekiang as an example.
The cooperation of the military has been essential
and could be needed again. Peking would not want
to risk alienating the military by purging com-
These arguments, which may well have been made
on behalf of the commanders during the meeting in
;Peking this summer, probably cut no ice with Mao.
The Chairman seems to have a personal interest in
,discrediting the commanders, an interest that
,,reflects directly on his prestige.
A case in point is where to put the blame for
former Defense Minister Lin Piao's accumulation of
power. If the commanders cannot be held responsible,
and therefore deserving of punishment, then the
lion's share of the guilt rests with the man who
named Lin defense minister, and that is Mao. The
attacks on the commanders for being supporters of
Lin have long served to deflect public attention
from Mao's own close association with his now-
disgraced former heir. Letting the commanders off
the hook on the pro-Lin charge is not at all in
Mao's interest.
There probably is an element of vendetta in
lMao's apparent hostility toward the commanders.
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These men clamped down hard on Mao's Red Guards
during the Cultural Revolution. Although he may
have been persuaded at the time that such moves were
necessary, Mao has been blamed for the instability
that has grown out of the Cultural Revolution, and
.each rehabilitation of a Cultural Revolution
victim is a further repudiation of the entire
movement, At this r)c)Jnf-.1
---[Mao cannot hope to justify
tnat episode. e could gain a measure of personal
satisfaction, however, by seeing some of the com-
manders removed from office.
Finally, there is the issue of Mao's personal
control over the military. As party chairman,
Mao is the titular commander in chief of the PLA,
but he has apparently argued that he should have
real control. A June 7 People's Daily article
seemed to set out the Chairman's position. The
article, using historical analogy, claimed that
political and military power must be concentrated
in the hands of "the supreme representative of the
central political organs." Reinforcing this notion
of one-man rule, the article noted that the
"supreme representative" was a specific individual.
The article concluded that history had vindicated
the Legalist approach that soldiers must "obey
orders without question," and went on to quote an
ancient Legalist who wrote that "soldiers must not
have private friends." In the current context, this
could have been a complaint by Mao that the military
sought allies among other civilians in the leader-
ship in an attempt to escape Mao's wrath.
A response to the People's Daily article seems
to have been carried in the PRC-controlled Hong
Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao on June 30. The article
is not known to have been carried in any national
mass circulation publication inside China, sug-
gesting that it touched some very sensitive nerves.
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The delicate point may well be the comparison of
the Confucian and Legalist methods for controlling
the army that seems to be a clear reversal of the
position taken by People's Daily.
In the view of Ta Kung Pao--which has followed
a consistent "Chouist" line--the notion that "the
;king's wish was law and his words were decrees
;which must be obeyed without question" was the
Confucian, i.e., wrong, view of how to control
the military. The correct line was that advocated
by the Legalists, who argued that the armed forces
should be controlled through the "rule of law."
The "rule of law" seems a clear repudiation of the
People's Daily argument for one-man rule.
The Defense Ministry banquet on the occasion
of Army Day provided another indicator of Mao's
current status vis-a-vis the military. The NCNA
account of the banquet referred to Mao as the
founder and commander of the army, but this accolade
was not repeated by Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying
in his actual remarks at the banquet.
The issue of who is credited with command of
the army is, of course, a particularly sensitive
one given the history of the Lin Piao affair. Lin
was accused of trying to usurp command from Mao.
Until his fall in 1971, Lin was cited as directly
commanding the PLA while Mao was acknowledged as
the founder. In 1972, Mao was referred to as the
founder and commander of the PLA in the media and
in Yeh Chien-ying's speech at the Defense Ministry
banquet. The same formulation was followed in 1973.
In 1974, there was an obvious change that
seemed to be in accord with Mao's declining influ-
ence over military affairs. By this time, the
Chairman had left Peking after his efforts to
continue the anti-Confucius campaign against the
regional commanders had been rebuffed. Both Yeh's
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toast and the NCNA account referred to Mao only
as the great leader of the Chinese people. Thus
Mao's treatment in the media on Army Day this year
is better than last, but well short of his previous
high. This formulation is a tacit admission
that the Chairman's apparent effort earlier this
summer to establish his personal control of the
military and influence the fate of the regional
commanders did not succeed.
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Taken together, it seems that despite his
failing health, Mao is able to assert himself on
issues that are important to him. Clearly, the
status of the regional military commanders is one
such issue. Had it not been for Mao's personal
interest in resolving this issue, it is entirely
possible that the party would not have called the
commanders to Peking this summer. Considerations
more important than Mao's personal views enabled
the commanders to remain in office. This was a
loss for Mao but a victory for unit and stability.
I
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Late July- Serious flooding in parts of northeast,
early August north, southwest, and south China dis-
rupts transportation and threatens
crops.
August 3-16
August 6
August 7
August 8
Chiao Kuan-hua.
Congressional delegation headed by
Senators Percy and Javits visits
China, meets with Teng Hsiao-ping and
Sierra Leone for Mauritania.
Delegation of the Chinese People's
Association for Friendship with For-
eign Countries led by Yang Chi leaves
visit to China.
Ethiopian agricultrual study mission
arrives in Peking.
Sri Lanka military delegation led by
Lt. Gen. Don Sepala Attygalle begins
August 9 Chinese bank delegation leaves
Tanzania for Zambia.
August 9-12 Burmese Foreign Minister U Hla Phone
in Peking on "friendly" visit, meets
with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping
and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua.
August 10 Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
meets with Ethiopian aviation delega-
tion. F -1
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping meets
with People's United Party delegation
from the Seychelles Islands.
August 19, 1975
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August 10 Lanchou Military Region Commander
Han Hsien-chu appears in his region
for the first time since December
1973.
August 12-17
August 14
on August 16.
North Vietnamese economic delegation
led by Vice Premier and Politburo
member Le Thanh Nghi hosted in Peking
on official visit by Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien; meets with Chou En-lai
Minister Han Nien-lung.
North Korean "special envoy" and
Foreign Minister Ho Tam makes stop-
over in Peking on return to Pyongyang
from Moscow; greeted by Vice Foreign
August 15 Sino-Japanese fisheries agreement
signed in Tokyo by Chinese Ambassador
Chen Chu and Japanese Foreign Min-
ister Miyazawa.
Chinese People's Liberation Army
veterans delegation departs Peking
for Algeria to attend celebration of
20th anniversary of Algeria's veterans
day.
Sino-Japanese agreement to open con-
sulates in Osaka and Shanghai, respec-
tively, signed in Peking by Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Japanese
Ambassador Ogawa.
August 15-19 Cambodian delegation led by Deputy
Prime Minister Khieu Samphan in China
on official visit; meets with Chou
En-lai on August 16; signs "economic
and technical cooperation" agreement
with China on August 18.
August 17 Thai trade mission led by Commerce
Minister Thou at Chittawira arrives
in Peking.
August 19, 1975
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