Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 16, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 20, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00865A001600110001-3.pdf399.24 KB
25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22S9T00865A001600110001-3 25X1 USSR Pessimistic About Situation in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 25X1 General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos Could Portend Policy Moves . . . . . . . . . 6 Buy British Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 25X1 The Bavarians Know What Is Really Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Communist-Socialist Collaboration at Center of Italian Political Debate . . . . . . . . 15 August 20, 1975 -i- Approved For Release 2005/08/2 } P179T00865A001600110001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/2f)l33gq431I779T00865A001600110001-3 25X1A USSR Pessimistic About Situation in Portugal The Soviets yesterday published an authorit- ative article on the situation in Portugal. Un- like previous Soviet commentary, the Pravda article expresses Moscow's views directly, rather than putting them in the mouths of the Portuguese Communists or others. The tone of the Pravda article is defensive and pessimistic. As -ti pressure on the Portu- guese Communists has increased, expressions of confi- dence about the course of events have given way to increasing criticism of what the Soviets term "out- side meddling." The Pravda article draws the analogy between the situation i Pn ortugal and events in Chile just before the overthrow of former president Allende that was first sounded by the Soviets in a broadcast to Hung- ary on Friday. Pravda goes on to criticize NATO, the Western press, Western economic organizations, and "international social democracy." The Chinese also are dragged into the cast of evildoers; they are accused of cooperating with "international reaction" by fomenting discord in An- gola and the Azores. Pravda charges that leaders of the Portuguese Socialists are providing a rallying point for re- actionaries by attacking the Communists, but Moscow was more critical of the Socialists just after they left the government. Indeed, Pravda again calls for concerted action by the Armed Forces Movement, the Communists, Socialists, and other left progressive forces. August 20, 1975 -3- Approved For Release 2005/08/22S}tPN9T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22SAR9T00865A001600110001-3 Pravda offers no practical advice and provides no clues about what, if any, action the Soviets themselves might take in support of the Portuguese Communists. Moscow would clearly like to see the Portu- guese Communists recover from their present isola- tion, but there is little indication the Soviets believe their exhortations will have much practical effect. They may, in this article, be preparing an ex- planation for an eventual collapse of the Communist position in Portugal, placing the blame primarily on 25X1 the Socialists and the West. Hungarian Statement The Hungarian party yesterday issued a short statement that had been clearly coordinated with Moscow. In the statement, the Hungarian party: --Expressed shock at the increasingly organized attacks against "democratic" developments in Portugal. --Cited cooperation of all "democratic and anti-fascist forces" as the best defense. --Assured "the Portuguese Communists and the anti-fascists" of Hungarian solidarity. Statements such as this provide a cheap and easy way for the Soviet and the East European par- ties to display their support of the Portuguese Communists; the Hungarian statement will probably be followed by others from Eastern Europe. I I August 20, 1975 25X1 -4- Approved For Release 2005/08/2ftek379T00865AO01600110001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22sfLA79T00865A001600110001-3 25X1A General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos Could Portend Policy Moves The meetings which General Franco is holding this week with his designated successor Prince Juan Carlos have sparked speculation that an important political announcement is pending. It could come at a cabinet meeting scheduled for Friday. Speculation stems from the unexpected nature of Juan Carlos' sudden visit to Franco at his vacation retreat in northwest Spain. Franco customarily meets with his cabinet several times during his long summer vacation, but this is the first time Prince Juan Carlos has interrupted his own vacation to join Franco at La Coruna. The prince, who just visited Franco there last month, is scheduled for three days of talks with Franco, but government officials refuse to disclose any details. Franco has given no indication that he is ready to turn over his powers to the prince, although there has been speculation that such a move could come as early as October. Such rumors crop up periodically, but there is a wide range of possible topics for the talks--many of which will reportedly be taken up at the cabinet meeting. --Possible cabinet changes; rightists have re- portedly been pressing Franco to replace Prime Minister Arias. Arias has been under- cut by Jose Solis Ruiz, Franco's recent appoint- ment as minister secretary general of the Na- tional Movement. --Base negotiations with the US; Spanish negotia- tors have taken a hard line in the ninth round of talks that began this week. The possibility has been raised of asking the US to withdraw August 20, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/08/22fM- 7 9T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/223FJ79T00865A001600110001-3 from all its facilities in Spain except the naval base at Rota if Spain's desire for a NATO connection cannot be met. --Counter-terrorist measures; tough new regula- tions are planned that are likely to draw a hostile reaction from Spain's European neigh- bors. --The recent military arrests; Franco may want to sound out Juan Carlos on the handling of the officers arrested for their political activities. Some of those arrested were re- portedly classmates of the prince the military academy. F77 I 25X1 August 20, 1975 Approved For Release 2005/08/2ft t79T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 20051081225 9T00865A001600110001-3 25X1A Buy British Campaign A recent series of appeals to "Buy British" by Trade Minister Peter Shore reflect growing pressure on the government to protect British jobs from foreign competition. Shore is concerned about increasing imports of goods that directly compete with those produced domestically. He has promised to look into allega- tions that foreign goods are being "dumped" into the UK and to take action where charges can be confirmed. The trade minister has been careful to balance his views by reiterating the government's opposition to import controls. The success of Labor's economic policy rests heavily on an export-led recovery and import controls would risk damaging retaliation from abroad. There have been reports that Shore is considering the merits of an official advertis- ing campaign urging consumers and industries to use more British-made goods. The government may look on such a campaign as a way of reducing political pressure for the imposition of selective import controls. Trade unions and left-wing Laborites favor the use of import controls to curb unemployment which is already at a record level. Last week the economic committee of the Trades Union Congress recommended that the government be pressed to adopt selective controls as soon as possible. The unions are especially concerned about the effects of imports on the textile, automobile, television tube, and electrical appliance industries. Pressure from the labor movement to buy British could have an effect in the selection of August 20, 1975 -8- Approved For Release 20051081223j 1 RJ9T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22s of RT9T00865A001600110001-3 certain weapon systems. The British army, for example, would probably like to purchase the helicopter mounted Franco-German anti-tank guided missile, Hot. Instead the army could end up purchasing the inferior British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Hawkswing missile because of union pressure and the government's desire to set an example to buy British. Furthermore, an unequivocal recommenda- tion by a bipartisan parliamentary committee that the army purchase another Franco-German anti-tank missile--the Milan--may run into opposition from the politically powerful unions. Workers at one BAC plant recently recommended that the company produce a modified version of an existing British mi ssile for ce of the Milan. F__ August 20, 1975 -9- Approved For Release 2005/08/2~E~MPjpr9T00865A001600110001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08?hQ&, P79T00865A001600110001-3 O'L 25X1A The Bavarians Know What Is Really Important Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk has re- quested the West German ministry of the interior not to go through with plans to schedule next year's Bundestag election on either October 3 or October 31. Merk's objection to the first date is that it falls within the three week period when Munich hosts the world's biggest beer-bust, the "Oktoberfest." Merk believes--and he is probably correct--that many thousands of people will be traveling to or from the Oktoberfest on October 3, and might not vote. The Bavarian official objects to the second date because November 1 is a legal holiday in many parts of West Germany, and tens and even hundreds of thousands of West Germans will take advantage of a three-day weekend to travel. Again, they might not vote. One would not be surprised if the federal auth- orities see the merits of Merk's arguments, and sched- ule the election sometime between October 3 and 31. August 20, 1975 -1R4 - Approved For Release 2005/0C C-RDP79T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/2 E6R. 79T00865A001600110001-3 25X1A Communist-Socialist Collaboration at Center of Italian Political Debate Italian government and party leaders are still grappling with the consequences of the Communist Party's unprecedented gains in the June regional and local elections. The main controversy centers on the continuing trend toward closer relations between the Communists and the Socialist Party, which is pledged to support the Moro government in parliament. Since the elections, the Socialists have shown a clear preference for alliance with the Communists in the new regional and local governments. The Socialists, who gained moderately in the elections, now share power with the Communists in most major Italian cities, 5 of the 20 regions and nearly a third of the 94 prov- inces. Socialist leader De Martino has rebutted criticism from partners in the national government--the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans--by maintaining that he is against a Socialist-Communist coalition at the national level. Such an alliance would not control a majority in the present parliament, but that could change after the next national elections which must be held no later than 1977. De Martino drew additional fire from the other governing parties last week by signing a joint communique with Communist chief Berlinguer on the situation in Portugal. August 20, 1975 -15- Approved For Release 20051081221 M9T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/2 FE79T00865A001600110001-3 The communique called for a political agreement in Portugal between the "democratic" parties-- including the Communists--and the Armed Forces Movement. It was the joint signature by De Martino and Berlinguer, more than the document itself, that drew criticism. Although the Communists and Socialists have consulted discreetly on policy matters in recent years, they have not issued joint communiques since the dissolution of their common "front" in 1957. Berlinguer scored a major plus by persuading one of the governing parties to sign the communique. That will help him deflect the renewed criticism he has come under as a result of his party's recent signing of a joint communique on Portugal with the Soviets. The communique seemed to give stronger support to the Portuguese Communists than Berlinguer has in the past. On many occasions, he has publicly stated his disapproval of Portuguese Communist strategy. De Martino, on the other hand, will be able to point to the less-than-revolutionary language in the document he signed with Berlinguer to bolster his argument that Italy's Communists are developing into a legitimate national party. The Socialists have used this line to help justify growing collaboration with the Communists. The Socialists, meanwhile, have spelled out what they regard as a suitable successor to the Moro government, which is almost certain to be replaced before the end of the year. Although still opposed to giving the Communists any cabinet positions, the Socialists desire an arrangement that would allow the Communists to participate indirectly. August 20, 1975 -16- Approved For Release 2005/08/2A -.R P79T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08W2' ~` P79T00865A001600110001-3 Last week, the Socialists pointed to the regional administrations in Lombardy and Campania as models for the next national government. Although the Communists are excluded from the center-left governments formed by the Christian Democrats and Socialists in those areas, the two parties have agreed to negotiate formally with the Communists on the regional legislative program. August 20, 1975 25X1 -17- Approved For Release 2005/08hF,~'EP79T00865A001600110001-3 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600110001-3