SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 21, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Confidential
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. review completed
HiC
Confidential
August 21, 1975
No. 0756/75
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August 21, 1975
CSCE: Back to the Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Polish Commentary on Accords with West
Germany: Ineptitude or Conspiracy? . . . . . . . 2
Prague Protests Violations of
Czechoslovak Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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CSCE: Back to the Basics
The Soviets have issued an authoritative inter-
pretation of CSCE that, not surprisingly, returns to
concepts they stressed in the Geneva negotiations.
In an article in Pravda on August 20, the So-
viets pay lip service to the idea that the ten
agreed principles of interstate relations are equal,
but they give special attention to the principle of
inviolability of frontiers. Pravda disputes claims
that the principle, which was a central Soviet ob-
jective during the negotiations, benefits the East
more than the West, arguing that it is vital for
all the nations of Europe.
The article gives low priority to conference
provisions concerning human contacts. It seems to
imply that improvements in these areas will result
from, rather than advance, detente. During the nego-
tiations the Soviets were unable to get wording to
this effect incorporated in the conference document.
The article also observes that cooperation in the
field of human contacts must be subject to the "laws
and traditions of each state"--another formulation
the Soviets tried, but failed, to have inserted in
the final text.
A major purpose of the article seems to be to
disabuse the domestic audience of any notion that
publication of the full text of the conference docu-
ment in Pravda and assertions by Brezhnev and others
that Moscow would fulfill its conference obligations
means that the conference will lead to meanincrful
change in their daily lives.
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.Polish Commentary on Accords with
West Germany: Ineptitude or Conisp ac
Recent Polish press commentarie?; distorting
the accords that party First Secreta_y Gierek and
West German Chancellor Schmidt reach.d in Helsinki
will provide fuel for those West Germans who op-
pose the agreement. Bonn is seeking clarifications
and if not satisfied is likely to deI Lay signing the
agreement as scheduled in October. If the agree-
ments are not implemented,Gierek wilL lose not only
=considerable personal prestige at hone but also a
Large amount of badly needed West Gee--man hard cur-
rency. Moreover, unless Gierek is axle quickly to
=correct the impressions left by the commentaries,
serious questions will be raised aboat his strength
within the leadership.
The commentaries, described by a Polish Foreign
ministry official as "incorrect," ar; puzzling be-
cause for two weeks the Polish press; had made no
mention of the accords. Unofficiall(, the Poles ex-
plained that they did not want to je)pardize ratifi-
=cation in Bonn.
After Bonn insisted that Polish; reticence was
hurting hopes for ratification, Warsaw began to
dribble out the details. The commentaries and offi-
cial explanations have, however, further perturbed
,Test German diplomats, because they ,nave raised is-
sues that Bonn thought had been resolved.
Karol Malcuzynski, a well-known and reportedly
influential writer, on August 19 was the author of
the most controversial commentary. nlriting in Trybuna
Tudu, the party daily, he implied that the Poles do
not view the accords as a full settlement of all
their wartime claims. Although he aided that the
agreement was a "compromise," thus suggesting that
the Poles had given up certain claims, the fact that
he raised the issue at all suggests to the Germans
that additional Polish demands may be forthcoming.
August 21, 1975
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The Schmidt government firmly believes--and must be
able to convince parliament--that both sides recog-
nize that these accords are the final settlement of
all wartime claims.
The West German embassy immediately asked the
Polish Foreign Ministry for clarification of Mal-
cuzynski's article. A deputy foreign minister claimed
that the inaccuracies occurred because many high
party and government officials were on vacation. He
promised that the false impressions would be quickly
corrected.
We concur with the US embassy's opinion that
the Pole's remarks are a very weak excuse. If Polish
journalists in fact received poor guidance, we should
see corrections within the next week. If clarifica-
tion is not quickly forthcoming, it will suggest that
there are elements in the Polish leadership who want
to embarrass Gierek--and who have enough clout to get
away with it.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Prague Protests Violations
of Czechoslovak Airspace:
Prague has formally protested v.olations of
Czechoslovak airspace on August 15 arid 17 by hel-
icopter pilot Barry Meeker, who allecedly brought
out a total of seven East German ref:_gees on his
two flights.
On August 19, Deputy Foreign Minister Spacil
delivered to the West German charge E. "firm pro-
test" against the "flagrant violatior." of the
Czechoslovak border by the helicopter that had
taken off from and returned to West Germany. Spacil
also spoke to the Austrian ambassador. In this case,
however, the ambassador was simply tc,ld that Prague
was calling for an emergency session of the Czech-
oslovak-Austrian border commission t1.at had been
formed to examine such incidents. Tie ambassador
described his conversation as "low Key."
Although Prague has thus far chc-sen to ex-
ercise considerable restraint, its protests and
media coverage have set the stage for a more angry
reaction should circumstances warrant.. Prague
radio has already denounced the flights as "crim-
inal actions" and commented that just. as the world
is welcoming the results of the Helsinki summit,
Hone can only express profound indignation and
concern at such international banditry."
Prague could be preparing to us?. this incident
as a pretext for continuing its internal repression
of dissidents and also for dragging its feet in
implementing expanded East-West conte.cts provided
for in "Basket Three." By publicizing the fact that
security police are interrogating one of the two
escapees who was left behind, the rec-ime may be
preparing the Czech public for a new round of de-
nunciations of the enemies of dete
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Confidential
Confidential
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600120001-2