SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600160002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 22, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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August 22, 1975
USSR-Portugal: Zarodov and the Problem
of Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Czechoslovakia: Repercussions of
Helicopter Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PUBLICATION OF INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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USSR-Portugal, Zarodov and
the Problem of Portugal
On August 8, Pravda reprinted an article by
K. I. Zarodov concerning Lenin's analysis of the
abortive 1905 revolution in Russia. The article
has attracted considerable attention, particularly
in Western Europe, for its implications for the
West European communist' parties, for the Foviet
Union, and even for Brezhnev himself.
Zarodov begins; "It is the summer of 1905.
Russia is engulfed in the flames of revolution.
All classes and parties are on the move." He
goes on. "Seventy years have passed, but Lenin's
work) reads today as if it referred to events
developing before our very eyes.' Clearly, Zarodov
is referring to Portugal.
Zarodov's line is tough, orthodox Leninism.
He emphasizes that a communist party must maintain
its hegemony, its separateness from. other parties,
and its commitment to lead the revolution. It
is precisely this hegemony-, he says, that makes
it possible for a communist party to apply the
"specific levers' that turn a "democratic revolu-
tion' into a "socialist revolution."
Zarodov is scornful of `modern conciliators'
who believe that gaining control of the 'levers of
power" is the final act of the revolutionary pro-
cess, which comes after some kind of 'referendum"
that expresses the will of the majority. Leninists,
Zarodov says, know that the popular majority is a
political, not an arithmetic, concept! i.e., the
Communist party expresses the will of the majority,
whatever the ballot box results may be.
Zarodov is providing an ideological rationale
for Cunhal's tactics in Portugal. It justifies
the Portuguese Communist party's infiltration of
the state machinery and the military establishment.
It sanctions the assertion of Communist control
over the unions, the shut-down of Republica, and
the use of violence against the party's opponents.
At the same time, the article is not an unqualified
endorsement of Cunhal's tactics. Some of Zarodov's
observations can be interpreted as guarded criti-
cism of the Portuguese Communist Party.
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Zarodov's wider purpose is open to different
interpretations. His article first appeared in the
July issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism, of
which he is the senior editor. It was written at
a time when the Portuguese Communist party was in
reasonably good shape, when it appeared to have an
excellent chance of achieving power in Portugal
despite its poor showing in the April election, and
when its heavy-handed tactics were being openly
criticized by the Italian Communists and other
West European parties politically embarrassed and
discomfited by their Portuguese colleagues' naked
display of power.
Hence, it is possible that Zarodov's purpose
was to tell the Italians and others that it was
they, not Cunhal, who were the apostates and indeed,
that the Portuguese situation might serve as the
model for the coming to power of Communist. parties
in West Europe.
Zarodov may also have had an internal audience
in mind. His article can be interpreted as part of
an ongoing debate among Soviet theorists on the
appropriate strategy and tactics of non-ruling Com-
munist parties during the current stage of the 'crisis
of capitalism.` In placing his emphasis on the
'hegemony' of Communist parties, Zarodov is refuting
theorists who have given heavier weight to the unity
of action between the Communist and other parties.
In reprinting the Zarodov article, Pravda seers
to be intervening on the side of the hardliners, thus
raising the question of whether there has been a
fundamental switch in T?oscow away from countenance
of the quasi-constitutional approach to achieving power,
as exemplified by the Italian Communists, toward a more
orthodox approach exemplified by the Portuguese.
One problem with this thesis is timing. When Zarodov
was writing his article the Portuguese'Communists were
riding high when Pravda reprinted it, the Portuguese
party was under violent attack and in mortal danger.
It is hard to believe that the Soviets would commend
to the West European Communists and the world Communist
movement an orthodox revolutionary model at exactly
the time when the leading exemplar of that model totters
on the brink of disaster.
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It would take some fast, and probably unconvincing
footwork, for Moscow to araue that the reaction
against Cunhal is an example of what would happen to
the Italians and French Communists if they were on
the brink of gaining power. Cunhal has clearly been
playing a different game than Berlinguer or Marchais.
One alternate hypothesis is that Pravda's message
was more modest- that the West Europeans and others
should not interpret a defeat for Cunhal as vindica-
tion of their own approach to achieving power.
It is also possible that Moscow reprinted
Zarodov in Pravda merely as a token of its rsolidar-
ity' with the beleaguered Portuguese comrades. The
Soviets always feel themselves under some obligation
to protect their revolutionary credentials. The
Zarodov article may have been viewed as sounding a
militant note after the European security conference,
and while Moscow prepares for a European communist
party meeting.
The Soviets are making a valiant effort to
have it both ways. Thus, their line on Portugal has
consistently supported Cunhal's grab for power even
while it supports the unity of action by the Communists
and other parties. And thus Zarodov's boss, candidate
Politburo member Ponomarev, last year wrote a widely
discussed article on the lessons of Chile that empha-
sized the importance of controlling the levers of
power, but last month was extolling the appropriate-
ness and importance of maintaining relations between
Communists and Social Democrats. Indeed, Ponomarev,
and his superior, senior ideologist Suslov, were
speaking at a conference commemorating the 40th
anniversary of the popular front.
This is not to say that the situation in Portugal,
and Zarodov's article, do,not raise questions about
the relationship between detente and the prospects
for revolutionary change. The supporters of the
current Soviet detente policy have cited Portugal
as a case where revolutionary progress has been
possible as a consecruence of detente. If the
Portuguese Communists come to a bad end, those who
are less enamored of detente will have gained
another string to their bow.
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Czechoslovakia: Repercussions
Of H'e i'copter Inca ent
Prague is sharpening the tone of its commen-
taries on the recent helicopter violation of Czech-
oslovak airspace (Staff Notes, August 21).
A Czechoslovak Interior Ministry spokesman on
August 21 said an investigation shows that the
escape "was prepared by the military and security
bodies of the Federal Republic of Germany." He also
claimed that the helicopter was armed with a machine
gun and that a Czechoslovak border guard was wounded.
The Czechoslovaks are continuing to harp on the
Helsinki agreement in their protests. A recent
domestic broadcast asked why such incidents should
continue in view of the Helsinki agreement, and
Prague has used the incident to accuse the West of
being the first to violate the spirit of Helsinki.
The most recent commentary self-righteously claimed
that Czechoslovak border forces avoided taking
"sharper action" against the helicopter in order
to avoid endangering the lives of vacationing citizens
in the area and to avoid killing those who boarded
the helicopter.
Meantime, the West German Foreign Office has
informed the US embassy that it regards the Czech-
oslovak protest as "definitely moderate." Bonn in-
tends to delay a formal reply in the belief that all
concerned would like to see the incident blow over-
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August 22, 1975
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PUBLICATION OF INTEREST
Appearances of Soviet Leaders, January-June 1975,
A (CR) 75-29, UNCLASSIFIED. T is publication pro-
vides a record of the known appearances of selected
Soviet public figures. Coverage includes members
of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, deputy
chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, and
leading officials of the Ministr of Defense.
Copies ma be obtained from
August 22, 1975
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