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August 25, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Secret No Foreign Dissem gulf~p 1EYUE East Asia Secret UFO August 25, 1975 No. 0758/75 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 No Di ssern Abroad 'ir-r ckground Use Onlu/Controll d Dissem Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminsal Sanctions Classified by 010725 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: ? 58(1), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: Date Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/?Yft:"DP79T00865A001600190002-4 This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. August 25, 1975 Cleansing the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 VIETNAM South Vietnam: The First Three Months. . . . 18 ANNEX--The Two Koreas: An Economic Appraisal. . . 26 Approved For Release 2001 /0&1 I.i -- DP79T00865A001600190002-4 25X6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/0C:DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Laos: Cleansin the Lao Army The Lao communists over the past few weeks have been implementing a careful plan to re-educate Lao army officers who did not flee the country following the collapse of the coalition. The officers, par- ticularly those with past close connections with the r-~ US, have been humiliated, and many have been trans- () ported to communist towns deep in the hinterlands for indoctrination. There is no evidence that any have been executed or physically abused, but the conditions in some of these areas resemble concen- tration camps. The First Phase: Re-education Seminars In late June and early July many Lao army offi- cers 'and some civilian officials were required to attend training seminars at local military facilities to learn the new "political realities." The ex- (J periences of about 250 officers who attended a semi- nar at Chinaimo Camp near Vientiane seem typical. -1 The participants spent part of their day digging / ditches, learning how to construct grass huts, and tending vegetable plots. The remainder of the day was taken up with lectures by Pathet Lao cadre on the new Lao political situation. Soviet and Chinese personnel also made presentations. the participan s in the Chinaimo seminar were stripped of all badges of rank and other insignia and each was given responsibility for a specific garden plot. All call one another "comrade" and learn to break into applause on cue from instructors. described the site as like a concentration camp an reported that the senior communist political officer went so far as to ask for assistance in Tying oarnea wire rences an installing security lights. August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001NLWQRPIr-RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001 /0 V9 tFDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Movement to the Hinterlands The communists in late July began moving groups of officers and others to Sam Neua, the Plaine des Jarres, or elsewhere deep within parts of Laos long under communist domination. Particiraants were us- ually given little notice. The participants at the Chinaimo seminar were hustled out of Vientiane so quickly that they were not allowed tD bid farewell to their families. As a result of these swift moves, many of the officers' wives believe they will never see their husbands again. Several officers, who were warned, managed to slip across the river. No officer has yet returned from these seminars in the hinterlands and we have no information on the fate of the participants. The sessLDns are supposed to last from two to three months, but most Lao expect it to be considerably longer. many will remain for more than grasp and accept the communist teachings will be al- lowed to return to Vientiane, but some will remain to work at posts in the hinterlands. a year. most of those who fully This re-education effort probably serves several communist purposes. One important goal almost cer- tainly is to keep a close watch on the officers while 1::he remainder of the coalition is demolished. The movement of most officers far from their homes pre- cludes their flight and ensures that they will not be in contact with potentially troublesome elements in Vientiane or across the Mekong in Thailand. The communists probably also hone that some of the officers will demonstrate a willingness to co- operate in the new order. Technicians and capable ,gust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001 /0~W l .gDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/OSRC- j1jbP79T00865A001600190002-4 middle grade officers and civilian personnel are in short supply in communist ranks. Reformed officers O could be put to good use either in Vientiane or with communist units in the back country. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/M QDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/,gp"RSi RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Celebrations have begun in Vietnam commemorat- ing the 30th anniversary of the August revolution Of 1945 which led to the establishment of North Vietnam on September 2. The communists took over in South Vietnam on April 30, but this part of the country has been under virtual martial law for the past three months with the military exercising almost exclusive control over the daily tasks of administration. It is possible that the communists will use the September 2nd anniversary celebrations Lo announce the formation of a civilian government For the South or provide some indication when that transition will occur. Beyond this possibility, ~iowever, the communists are not expected to make many additional commitments on the South's future, =speciall_y regarding reunification. What the first 100 or so days cf communist r:ontrol of Vietnam has most clearly shown is that the goal of formal reunification will be pursued gradually and in accordance with no preconceived timetable. The impatience for some indication of how soon that will occur seems to be greater out- side the country than among the Vietnamese them- selves. For a people who maintain they have been fighting for centuries to reunify their country, a few more months or years is of little consequence. The first three months have also shown that ,the Vietnamese may have underestimated some of the problems confronting them following the victory. The rapid collapse of the Saigon government put the communists in an exposed position administratively. A recent joint article by Hanoi's defense chief and his deputy confirms that North Vietnam's objectives until the latter part of March were considerably 'store limited than total victory. The last minute 'tigust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/0#(0@; jC RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/ RIJADP79T00865A001600190002-4 decision to go all out--made on March 25--did not permit Hanoi to do much political homework before assuming administrative control of the South. Many of the initial communist actions were makeshift and had little resemblance to firm policy decisions or sound administrative judgment. In the ensuing weeks, the communists have begun to concede publicly that the business of putting the country back into working order would likely be a long and difficult task and that instilling the proper dedi- cation to the revolutionary cause among the southern population as a whole might require lengthier and harsher forms of persuasion than the communists probably originally anticipated would be necessary. Reunification There is little likelihood that the goals of a socialist and collectivized south reunited with and dominated by the North, will be moderated. In their public commentary, both North and South Vietnamese l communist officials have made it clear that de facto reunification occurred with the surrender of Saigon. These statements, in addition to other indications, have also clearly established that the North Vietna- mese are in control and that Hanoi is calling the shots. For example, in early May a military manage- ment committee was established in Saigon headed by a North Vietnamese general, and during celebrations on May 19 commemorating Ho Chi Minh's birthday, the fourth-ranking member of the North Vietnamese Politburo was publicly identified as the individual in charge of party and military affairs in the South. It became evident that for the time being Vietnam would be one country under the umbrella of the Communist Party, but with "two governments." The communists probably will decide on formally reunifying the country when they are satisfied the bulk of the problems with security and the economy in the South are under control. The most likely August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/(DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001hTpFtRDP79T00865A001600190002-4 format for achieving formal reunifice.tion would be to hold a plebiscite. Such a forum ..n itself argues for a deliberate pace since the communists must be certain that the "free" choice of the': people will be properly expressed. quality of_Li.fe The communists have conceded in the public media that their most serious problem is sE:!curity. Re- sistance to the new regime is mostly from former government soldiers fearing for their lives, reli- gious groups philosophically opposed to the communists, ethnic groups which traditionally have resisted any sort of Vietnamese domination, and robbers and bandits stealing to survive. None of this resistance activity appears organized and it s unlikely to present any long-term threat to com- ;xiunist control. But it is a thorn it. the side of the communists and unquestionably is an important factor compounding the other problem. confronting the new regime. Second on the list of problems is the economy, which the communists admit is in sad shape. Actions taken so far appear to be makeshift--for example, banks were secretly reopened, but no new money has been printed. Living conditions in Saigon and throughout the rest of the country apear to have deteriorated somewhat, but there are as yet no indications of mass starvation or widespread epi- demics. People in the cities are being encouraged to return to the countryside to resume farming in the wake of tentative indications that food shortages may occur later this year. The communists lack the fertilizers, machinery and spare parts, fuel, and high yield rice stocks to become self-sufficient in food and probably will not be able tc offset these shortcomings by expanding farm acreace. August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001, PMjpl f -RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001 /08. cP DP79T00865A001600190002-4 The communists appear to have begun efforts to mobilize non-communist members of the population to attack these various economic and social prob- lems. A recent Saigon municipal congress of the / National Liberation Front was held in July and is the best sign to date that attempts are being made to intensify such efforts on a national scale. The of National Liberation Front is the Vietnamese Com- munist vehicle for mobilizing widespread non-com- munist popular participation to implement party policy. The Foreign Scene Just as the Vietnamese communists have adopted a deliberate timetable for internal consolidation in the South, they appear to be in no great hurry to expand the new regime's diplomatic points of con- tact with the outside world. From all appearances to date, Hanoi is unlikely to sanction full ambas- sadorial representation in Saigon in the near future. Most nations probably will be invited to send an ambassador to Hanoi and that ambassador will also be accredited to the southern regime. Others, espe- cially Hanoi's communist allies and western nations such as France, may be permitted to send a charge d'affaires to Saigon. This would give the appear- ance of independent diplomatic status for the southern regime for the near term, and once formal reunifica- tion is announced, the accreditation could easily be converted to consular status. Several countries, especially the two big com- munist allies, have complained about not being per- mitted early official access to Saigon. The French have also been especially irate, feeling that the Vietnamese falsely led them to believe they would be the first western country to have relations with the new regime. So far, however, the communists have permitted no foreign missions into the South, August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001 /0> ' R*f DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/AfDP79T00865A001600190002-4 although since assuming power, they have agreed to exchange ambassadors with over 8C countries. Hanoi has nonetheless encouraged the southern regime to expand its diplomatic activity and to be accepted as a separate member of the: world com- munity. It certainly had to approve Saigon's ap- plication for separate admission to the UN and endorse the Saigon request to be adLitted to the nonaligned group of nations. The latter move unquestionably is tied to Hanoi's attempt to assure as much third-country support for the recent UN bids as possible--without relying exclusively on its communist backers. The commt.nists have reacted with predictable harsh rhetoric about the US Security Council veto of the bid for dual UN membership. But in fact, the numerous public state- ments by Vietnamese communist officials to the effect that a de facto union of the north and south has already been accomplished did little to strenghten the case for two truly independent Vietnamese states. If the process of reunifica- tion continues to proceed smoothly, the issue of dual membership for North and South Vietnam could become a dead issue before long. (CONFIDENTIAL) ,,.gust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001 /0 /~- kiDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08"ORJP79T00865A001600190002-4 Authorities in Rangoon have been engaged in a new get-tough campaign against lawbreakers in recent weeks. The effort, which began shortly after the student and labor disturbances last June, has centered on political dissidents and economic criminals. Last month, the crackdown was broadened to include hundreds of "bad characters"--vagrants, squatters, and petty thieves. Penalties are also becoming more severe. Stu- dents and workers found guilty of participating in the disturbances are now being given stiffer sentences than those involved in similar disorders last year. Some students have received eight-year jail terms, while workers got up to 16 years. Even petty crimi- nals are summarily sentenced to terms of up to six years, and traffic laws are being strictly enforced. Charges of corruption, neglect, and indiscipline have been levied on several hundred low level govern- ment officials. Although the regime normally turns a blind eye to black market operations, raids have been made on Rangoon warehouses and nearly 100 small private industries in the capital have been closed for reselling raw materials purchased from the government. Hard-line elements in the army apparently are behind the tough tactics. The military has admin- istered Rangoon directly since the riots last Decem- ber, and soldiers, rather than police, are now making house to house searches in lower class suburban areas. Army patrols are again stopping long-haired youths on the streets and giving them free haircuts, as they did in December. The authorities had originally acted with con- siderable restraint in dealing with the most recent August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/0?8/W{ *r 1 DP79T00865AO01600190002-4 LA -13 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 SECRET disturbances in Rangoon. Senior officials met with student and worker groups to explair the government's policies. The regime has been unwilling or unable, however, to come up with new solutions to alleviate Burma's underlying economic ills, and authorities apparently have concluded that they must use force to keep the situation from getting cut of hand. ;CONFIDENTIAL) August 25, 1975 -24- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 SECRET 25X6 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08A 9 P79T00865A001600190002-4 The Two Koreas: An Economic Appraisal The economies of both South anc North Korea agave been damaged by global recession/inflation and will be unable to maintain the rapid growth rates of the early 1970s. The South must counter rampant domestic inflation, rising unemployment, and a huge trade deficit. Even though the North has begun repaying overdue debts, its international credit rating is in shreds, and its ambitious pro- gram to buy advanced industrial equipment has been badly set back. Economic Comparisons South Korea and North Korea are bitter eco- nomic rivals. Both economies have c:rrown rapidly in recent years and are among the most advanced of less j developed countries (LDCs). The North has drawn on hydro- iron ore erior natural resources--coal ! su , , p electric power--to build up a formic:lable heavy in- dustry. The South has drawn on advanced technology and equipment from the West and has made marked pro- gress in shipbuilding, petrochemica:..s, petroleum re- fining, electronics, and most consurier goods. South Korea also is developing a multibil_.ion dollar nu- clear power base while North Korea':;; nuclear program is still in the talking stage. Neither is self-suf- i:icient in agricultural production. South Korea an- nually imports about one fourth of .ts food needs, while the North periodically enters the international market for grain following poor crop years. Industry North Korea's industrial output--roughly 40 per- cent of GNP--is claimed to have near-'.y doubled between ,rqust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08dd c IFP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001 /C@J ) DP79T00865A001600190002-4 1970 and 1974. Real annual rates of growth prob- ably have been nearer 10-12 percent than the 17 percent claimed. Much of the increase is due to the completion of Soviet projects begun in the late 1960s. To date most of the plants purchased from Western Europe and Japan have yet to come on line. 3 Output consists primarily of heavy industrial goods such as steel, nonferrous metals, fertilizer, ce- ment, and heavy machinery. Light industry barely keeps pace with the subsistence needs of the popu- lation. North Korea has just begun to develop a petrochemical industry and generally its industrial technology is inferior to that of the South. South Korea's industrialization has been extra- ordinary, especially so when most of the peninsula's NORTH and SOUTH KOREA: Industrial Production Index: 1660=100 10 1 1 1 I a I I I I I I i i i i 1 i 1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 5669048-75 August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA- DP79T00865A001600190002-4 SECRET mineral and electric power resources are in the North. Adopting the Japanese model of growth through trade, the South Korean rate of manufacturing pro- duction. rose during the 1960s at nearly 20 percent a. year. During the first half of the 1970s, the tempo increased to 30 percent per annum. As a con- sequence, industrial output in 1974 represented 30 i n percent of GNP, compared to less thann 15 percent 1.962 when President Pak assumed power.~. South Korea produced much larger amounts of consumer goods than the North and the technological levej. of much of in- dustry compares favorably to that of Japan, Western Europe, and the US from which modern equipment has been purchased. South Korea is the third larges-:: petroleum im- porter among the LDCs and these imports have had a damaging impact on its balance-of-payments deficit. i:n 1974 higher prices pushed the fuea_ import bill to 0 about $730 million, up from $186 million in 1973. The oil price crunch has reinforced the government's ambitious plans to go to nuclear power to offset the higher oil costs and also make the country more :.elf-sufficient in energy resources. Seoul has com- mitted itself to the acquisition of eight nuclear plants costing several billion dolla::-s. These plants are expected to reduce South Korean dependence on 'il for energy generation by :L981 from two thirds to about one half of total consumption. North Korea, with abundant hydroelectric and r:oal resources, has been little affe(.-ted by increased v) oil prices. Almost all of its petroleum supply of nearly two million tons in 1974 was obtained from the USSR and China at favorable prices. Operations have begun at North Korea's first petroleum refinery and when it reaches full capacity, this two-million-ton refinery should make the North nearly self-sufficient t,n oil products at its low level of consumption. A ivlust 25, 1975 -28- Approved For Release 2001/af8 bfc DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/06MflbP79T00865A001600190002-4 Agriculture Even with South Korea's natural advantage of greater arable land and superior crop yields, it has consistently remained a relatively large im- porter of food grains, stemming in part from neglect and also from population pressures. The South's larger and more advanced agriculture sector was finally surpassed by industry in 1973 as the main contributor to GNP. By the end of 1974 the agri- cultural share had slipped to 23 percent, compared to nearly 40 percent in 1965. Seoul's third and fourth (1977-81) five-year development plans have put greater emphasis on self-sufficiency in agri- culture through greater use of chemical fertilizer and more intensive farming techniques. Even so, South Korea probably will continue to import several million tons of food grains yearly during the rest of the 1970s--2.7 million metric tons were imported in 1974 against 7.3 million tons produced domesti- cally, yielding only a 73 percent self-sufficiency rate. Pyongyang has recently claimed that its six- year plan agricultural goal of seven million tons* of grain was attained in 1974, two years ahead of ?O schedule. Though this figure is no doubt exag- gerated, grain output probably did reach a peak level. Last year the weather was favorable and fer- tilizer supplies were up. Nevertheless, prospects for attaining the eight million ton goal set for /g1975 seem out of the question. Judging from weather conditions, the grain harvest may fall short of re- quirements and imports may be needed. Given Pyong- yang's current poor credit standing, grain imports on credit may be difficult to arrange. *The North Korean data are in terms of unprocessed grain and may include tubers, soybeans, and lentils. August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/0 C!lA'DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/OISRC- Recent Problems The economic race between the two Koreas has been interrupted by the world economic slump. South Korean exports have plummeted because of weak demand in US and Japanese markets, which last year accounted for 65 percent of for-eign sales. Meanwhile, imports of capital goods, food, and petroleum have remained high. Seoul's trade defi- cit soared from nearly $500 million in 1973 to more than $2 billion in 1974. An even larger gap is Forecast for 1975 because of sluggish foreign de- mand and inflated import prices. South Korea Total Non-Communist 1970 . 803 80 2 1971 1,018 245 5 ?972 541 245 75 1973 499 315 165 1974 2,072 655 545 1975 (est.) 2,200-2,400 N.A. N.A. At the same time, declining world prices for b ietals, North Korea's principal exports, contributed to a sharp deterioration in its trade balance. Pyongyang overextended itself and attained a credit rating ranked by one international banker as on a par with Chile and Upper Volta. Since last fall, the North has been unable to meet payments on many of its obligations to the West and is $200 to $300 Million in arrears. This is the first time a commu- inist country has defaulted on a large scale with non- communist trading partners. Japan and several coun- cries in Western Europe have suspended government :,gust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/01gr]RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/05M. Pit guarantees for shipments to North Korea, and some firms have delayed exports of equipment until over- due payments are made. Last month North Korea made payments of $10 / million to Japanese companies covering debts more , than six months in arrears and signed refinancing agreements with several West European banks. These cover only a portion of Pyongyang's overdue pay- ments and simply postpone the settlement day. Defense Spending Both Koreas spend a high percentage of their national budgets on defense. The North Koreans have an active defense industry and produce much of their own ground force and naval equipment. Pyongyang does not produce its own aircraft, how- ever, and still relies heavily on the USSR and China for more sophisticated weaponry. The North has done little military shopping in Western markets. South Korea is dependent almost entirely on imports for its military equipment. During the next five years, Seoul will spend $2.5 to $3 billion for new weapons systems. Seoul recently imposed a /off-defense tax to help finance future domestic produc- tion and co-production efforts. These efforts would [(p be concentrated on items such as artillery, heli- copters, and tanks. The South Koreans have indicated their will- ,! in ness to deal with suppliers other than the US. I President Pak wants C to acquire the best available weapons at the best price, from whatever source. The South Koreans plan to use short-term loans, repaying them through funds ~(o raised by the defense tax. August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/%fM RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001 /0~/ 3 DP79T00865A001600190002-4 Unit South Korea North Korea South Korea North Korea South Korea North Korea Population Million 28.3 12.2 31.3 14.2 33.6 16.0 Industrial pro- 1960 = 100 162 195 441 332 991 622 duction index Foreign trade Billion US $ 0.5 0. 4 2.9 0.7 11.3 1.8 (two-way) Grain (polished) current prices Million tons 7.0 3. 25 7.5 3.6 7.3 5.0 Electric power Billion kilowatt 3.2 13. 4 9.2 16.5 16.8 21.0 Anthracite Coal Hours Million tons 10.2 12. 8 12.4 21.8 15.3 28.3 Iron ore Million tons 0.74 5. 0 0.6 6.5 0.5 9.5 Crude steel Million tons 0.18 1. 2 0.48 2.2 1.9 3.4 Chemical fer- Thousand tons N.A. 158 594 320 757 555 ili t i t t t) t zers Cement (nu r con en en Million tons 1.6 2.4 5.8 4.0 8.8 5.5 Textiles (exclud- Million square 218 270 340 400 594 470 ing yarns) f R d l meters cloth Milli 1 3 e ine petro eum on tons . products Motor vehicles Thousand 0.85 8.9 17.6 19 32 44-54 (trucks, buses, autos, tractors) o( The South apparently is determined to press forward with its ambitious defense program, but any major foreign arms purchases soot;. will only add loo Seoul's difficulties in financing its growing trade deficit. outlook Since the major part of the expected current .- .ccount deficit has already been covered, South Ai gxust 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/ .p ky f DP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08 ! - P79T00865A001600190002-4 3 7 l/ )I Korea probably can stave off serious economic pres- sures this year. If export earnings do not soon be- gin to turn up sharply, Seoul will be forced to look to its largest creditors--the United States and Japan--for large scale debt relief. Moreover, ris- ing inventories, high rates of inflation, and in- creasing hard currency deficits may require the South to reduce purchases abroad and curb domestic consumer and producer demand, steps that would ac- celerate the already rising unemployment rate. In any case, South Korean growth rates are likely to decline in 1975 and 1976 from the 8.2 percent real increase achieved in 1974. The decline in growth rates in the North may be smaller than the decline in the South over the next year because Pyongyang depends less on foreign trade, and much of its trade still is with the USSR and China. Nevertheless, North Korea's reputation as a poor credit risk already is affecting indus- trial imports, and the North would have severe dif- ficulties in obtaining large additional credits. Over the longer term, North Korea's present credit problems will reduce chances of obtaining credit to purchase new plants from the West, thus, delaying the resumption of rapid industrial growth. On the other hand, the South with superior tech- nology and growth potential, once Western markets recover, probably will resume high rates of growth. (SECRET) August 25, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/0W U RDP79T00865A001600190002-4 25X1A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01600190002-4