MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001700050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 3, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A0017000500TA Secret
No Foreign Disrem
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Top Secret
140
SC No, 08355/75
September 3, 1975
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No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classtfed by 010736
Exempt from general deciasst(kation schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
468(11, (2). and (3)
Automatically dectassI1ied on:
Date lmposstble to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Qatar: Winds of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nigeria: Tighter Press Control . . . . . . . . 5
China-Tanzania: A Major Investment
for Peking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sri Lanka: Trotskyite Party Ousted
from Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sept 3, 1975
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Qatar
Winds of Change
Since independence in 1971, the ruling al-Thanis
of Qatar have prided themselves on their ability to
keep a grip on the levers of power in spite of con-
flict within the sprawling and quarrelsome family and
of some signs of discontent in the population. As
Qataris become more exposed to foreign influences,
however, a realignment of forces that cuts across
family, class, and ethnic lines seems inevitable at
some point.
Although the Qatari political scene is outwardly
calm, tensions between classes and between ethnic
groups are a headache to Emir Khalifah who seized
power in a palace coup in 1972. The ruler's promulga-
tion of a rent control law last February, for example,
was a popular measure among tenants but it alienated
wealthy landlords. Many landlords, including influen-
tial members of the al-Thani family, are ignoring the
law and are insisting that their tenants pay increased
rents.
Hostility between indigenous Qataris who are not
members of the large al-Thani clan and Qataris of
Iranian origin simmers beneath the surface. In both
groups, resentment of al-Thani rule is not uncommon.
Members of both groups find their ability to rise in
the various ministries limited by the al-Thanis and
expatriates above them who block promotions.
Non-citizen Arabs in Qatar who aspire to the
added security that would come with citizenship are
frustrated by the government's extremely restrictive
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naturalization laws. They resent, moreover, the gov-
ernment's policy of easy entry for Iranians and South
Asian workers who are mainly interested in making
money and are more easily controlled than the politi-
cally activist Arabs.
None of these disgruntled groups are sufficiently
powerful or numerous to pose a threat over the short
term to al-Thani rule nor have any significant clan-
destine radical organizations been identified in Qatar.
The more immediate threats to Emir Khalifah's
hold on power stem from within the al-Thanis. Khali-
fah's style of one-man rule is making him increasingly
unpopular among members of the family. He recently
drew much criticism from the al-Thanis by allowing,
without consulting his kinsmen, the ousted emir to
return to Qatar from exile in Dubai. Moreover, younger
members of the family are being alienated by the
ruler's retention
Adding to differences in the family is the Emir's
failure to face up to the problem of naming a Crown
Prince. The Emir is reluctant to act because he
believes the appointment of a Crown Prince would trigger
an open struggle for power among the three main branches
of the family. If an open conflict among the al-Thanis
develops over the succession, two of the main contenders
will be the commander of the armed forces and the com-
mandant of the police force, the Emir's son and nephew,
respectively. Also to be reckoned with in the power
equation are the large mercenary forces employed by
the feudal-like al-Thani sheikhs. Made up of bedouin
retainers recruited in Saudi Arabia, the mercenaries
are bivouacked in garrisons on the farms of al-Thani
notables. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
Sept 3, 1975 4
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Nigeria
Tighter Press Control
The new military regime is moving to assert
more effective government control over more than
100 newspapers and periodicals published in
Nigeria. The press, whether owned independently
or government controlled, has retained considerable
freedom during most of the nine years the
military has run the country; in the past year it
had become increasingly critical of military
rule.
The federal government recently announced
that it had taken 60 percent ownership in the
independent Daily Times, the largest and most
influential paper, and the second largest paper,
the New Nigerian. The latter is published by a
company jointly owned by Nigeria's six northern
s-cates,.
A national news agency and a new federally-
owned newspaper will be set up soon, according to
regime's director of information. Both projects
were included in the five-year plan introduced last
April by former head of state General Gowon.
The information director said that the news agency
would become the sole source in Nigeria for national
and international news. The new paper will
replace the former official organ of the, central
government, the lackluster Morning Post, which was
shut down earlier this year.
The new regime's view of the press was outlined
at a press conference last month by Brigadier
Obasanjo, the armed forces chief of staff and the
number two man in the government. He said the press
has a dual role of publicizing government views and
activities as well as disseminating news and that
it should avoid sensationalizing sensitive national
issues.
Nigerian editors and publishers can be expected
to resist government pressure to parrot the official
line. For now, they are likely to behave circumspectly
for fear of provoking even tighter clamps on press
freedom. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Sept 3, 1975
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_-rkoNstni?:rtt joz? 1-ekina
Festivities surrounding the formal completion
of the five-year, $402-million Tan-Zam railroad
project in Dar es Salaam this fall and the probable
attendance of a high-ranking Chinese delegation will
bring into focus Peking's heavy investment in Tanzania.
President Nyerere's government is, in fact, the
leading African recipient of Chinese economic aid
and the second leading recipient worldwide of military
assitance from Peking.
The Chinese will maintain a significant aid
program and large numbers of personnel in Tanzania
well beyond ribbon-cutting ceremonies on the Tan-
Zam line. Although the arrangements are not yet
final, several hundred technicians will probably
stay on to assist in operating and managing the
railroad. The continued presence of about 300 Chi-
nese now working on several small rural development
and construction projects and of some 750 Chinese
military advisers also seems assured. Under a $74-
million agreement signed by Peking and Dar es Salaam
last year, the Chinese have also agreed to construct
two rail spurs into coal- and iron-rich areas in
northwestern Tanzania and to help develop these
resources.
Despite its scope and expense, the Chinese
effort in Tanzania is not aimed primarily at short-
term economic and political goals within the country
itself. On the economic front, the Tanzanians
have little that China needs in terms of raw materials
and the Tanzanian market is a minuscule one for
the Chinese. Politically, Peking certainly values
Dar es Salaam as a reliable diplomatic ally and is
undoubtedly pleased that Nyerere has borrowed from
rtie Chinese model for his own domestic programs.
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Such gains, however, could probably have been
achieved with much less expense, and Peking clearly
views its considerable investment in Tanzania in
terms of the long haul and the larger African--and
Third World--context. On this broader plane, Peking
has attempted to create in its aid program in
Tanzania a model demonstrating to other African
.and developing countries China's willingness to extend
generous and politically untied aid without any
danger of foreign subversion or interference in
internal affiars. To this end, the Chinese have
applied themselves to their aid projects in Tanzania
with unusual energy--particularly the Tan-Zam project,
which will be completed well ahead of schedule--while
carefully avoiding any impression that they are
pressing for direct influence over the country.
Peking, in fact, has gone so far to limit the impact
of its large presence on the domestic scene in
Tanzania as to provoke some criticism from Tanzanian
officials. The low key Chinese approach has had the
overall effect, however, of building trust and allaying
suspicions both in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in the
region.
The establishment of durable relations between
Peking and Dar es Salaam has also given the Chinese
an important leg up in their competition with Moscow
for influence with regional black nationalist
movements. Peking has long acted as Tanzania's agent
in training and equipping various guerrilla groups.
This direct Chinese access and backing from the
influential Nyerere were instrumental in gaining
Peking the inside track with Samora Machel's forces in
Mozambique. The Chinese are moving in a similiar
manner to develop a strong position in Rhodesia, where
Peking long backed the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) and has recently stated its willingness to train
and equip the joint forces of the African National
Council--an umbrella organization which has absorbed
ZANU and other Rhodesian nationalist groups. The
breakdown last week of talks between Council leaders
and Salisbury and the increased possibility that
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guerrilla operations might resume in Rhodesia have
played comfortably into Peking's hand.
While China is on the whole probably satisfied
with i+he returns from its commitment to Tanzania,
the relationship has not been without its strains.
Strident Chinese calls for "armed struggle" in
southern Africa and repeated warnings that efforts at
compromise between black nationalists and the
white-minority governments were "political deceptions"
leave little doubt over Peking's displeasure with
Nyerere's--arid Zambian President Kaunda's--support
for talks between Salisbury and the Rhodesian
nationalist groups. Peking has also had to
draw the line on continued requests for arms from
Dar es Salaam and can only view as ingratitude
Tanzanian questioning of the quality of equipment
already delivered. Tanzania's acceptance of $74
million of Soviet military assistance in 1974 undoubtedly
increased Chinese irritation. Peking has been willing
to play down such frictions, however, and this is
another measure of the central role Tanzania has played
and will continued to play in China's strategy in the
area. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Sept 3, 1975
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Trotskyite Party ousted from Cabinet
Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike's expul-
sion from the cabinet yesterday of representatives
of the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party, her
principal partner in the governing coalition since
its formation in 1970, will not threaten her gov-
ernment's support in parliament. Bandaranaike's
Sri Lanka Freedom Party holds a comfortable majority
on its own. The third and smallest party in the
former coalition, the Moscow-oriented Communist
Party, will retain its one cabinet post.-
With the Trotskyites out of the government, the
Prime Minister may be more receptive to recommenda-
tions of her moderate advisers, but she probably
will not abandon her socialist and welfare-oriented
domestic policies. She almost certainly will con-
tinue Sri Lanka's nonaligned foreign policy.
The cabinet shuffle--the country's first in
five years---was touched off by a. dispute between
the two parties over which one would exercise minis-
terial control over tea plantations the government
plans to nationalize. The two parties were able to
smooth over differences in the past, in part because
the leftist party has been reluctant to lose the
influence and patronage it had accumulated as a mem-
ber of the governing coalition. This time Bandaranaike
apparently had enough of inter-party bickering, she
may want to avoid such distractions while she prepares
for the nonaligned summit conference to be held in
Sri Lanka next August.
The Trotskyites have considerable strength in
urban areas where the party's support among labor
unions is concentrated. More radical elements in
the party may eventually try to cause trouble for
the government--possibly through labor unrest--but
so far there is no evidence the party plans any early
move in retaliation for its expulsion from the cabinet.
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Bandaranaike has named cabinet ministers from
her own party to fill the three posts vacated by
the leftist party. Justice Minister Felix Bandaranaike,
a distant relative of the Prime Minister and a leading
moderate in the cabinet, has been given the important
finance portfolio. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Sept 3, 1975
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Top Secret
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