SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001700120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 5, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Top Secret
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Top Secret
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Se tember 5 1975
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September 5, 1975
Soviet Commentary
on the Defeat of Japan. . 1
Poles Clarify Position on
Schmidt-Gierek Agreements 4
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Soviet Commentar on the
De eat of Japan
The Soviet treatment of the 30th anniversary of
the end of [~Torld War IT in East Asia not surprisingly
plays down the role of the West and exaggerates the
role of the USSR in the defeat of Japan. Defense
Minister Grechko's order of the day says flatly that
the Soviet contribution was decisive. Grechko ac-
knowledges the contribution of the "allies and Asian
national liberation movements," but only Mongolia is
specifically mentioned.
Another major theme is the importance of Japan's
defeat for the national liberation movement in Asia,
particularly in Korea and China. A Pravda article
that was apparently written by the chief of the
Foreign Ministry's First Asian Division, Mikhail
Kapitsa, reiterates the long-standing Soviet claim
that the USSR delivered Manchuria to the Chinese
Communists and that the arms the Soviets turned over
to the Chinese were instrumental in the Communist
victory in 1949.
Other Soviet propaganda on the anniversary has
gone even further in stressing the contribution of
the Soviets to the Chinese Communist victory. A
Red Star article on August 26 spells out the number
of arms turned over to the Chinese after the Soviets
occupied Manchuria and attacks Mao for trying to
minimize the significance of this aid. Another
article in Literary Gazette on September 3 implies
the USSR provided "massive help" to the Communists
throughout the course of the civil war. The Soviets
did provide some aid to the Chinese Communists, but
it was not massive, and Moscow continued to deal with
the Nationalists almost to the eve of the Communist
victory in 1949.
September 5, 1975
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In Grechko's order,. he expresses satisfaction
that Moscow's relations with Japan are developing
in a spirit of "good neighborliness." The Kapitsa
article, however, suggests otherwise. It treats
Moscow's territorial dispute with Japan in such a
way as to imply that Moscow will never compromise,
and it attacks "certain circles" in Japan for
impeding progress toward better Soviet-Japanese
relations. -The article's toughness toward the
Japanese may stem in part from anxiety that Japan
will agree to include an anti-hegemony clause in
its proposed peace treaty with China. The Soviets
clearly regard conclusion of such a treaty as a
significant setback to their interests in Asia.
September 5, 1975
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Poles Clarify Position on
Foreign Minister Olszowski has reassured the
West German ambassador in Warsaw that there are no
differences in interpretation of the Gierek-Schmidt
acc rd reached last month at Helsinki.
Olszowski maintained that the 120,000 ethnic
Germans allowed to emigrate will be destined for
the Federal Republic, not East Germany or any other
country. In addition, Warsaw does not intend to
redefine any provisions of the accords. When ques-
tioned about Polish press commentaries that had
caused West German concern, Olszowski claimed that
they were based on misinterpretations. He said he
had been on vacation and thus had not been able to
explain the agreements to important journalists.
Although this explanation is plausible, we can-
not exclude the possibility that Warsaw floated the
reinterpretations to test West German reactions on
in the
d d
own
the emigration issue, and then backe
face of Bonn's growing concern. In any case, we
do not expect Warsaw to pose more difficulties on
l months
.
the accords, at least for the next severa
September 5, 1975
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