MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001700170002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
12
No. 0851/75
September 8, 1975
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No Foreign Dissem/Background Use only
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
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Malagasy Republic: Quick March to the
Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ethiopia: Review of Foreign Policy . . . . . . 4
Sep 8, 1975
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Malagasy Republic
Quick March to the Left
President Didier Ratsiraka, who came to power
in mid-June, is moving ahead with his program for
the transformation of Malagasy society along socialist
lines--with little regard for practical consequences.
tribution. Vie company has been a favorite whipping
On August 29 the government announced the nationali-
zation of the country's largest trading company, the
French-owned Compagnie Marseillaise de Madagascar,
which has long dominated export-import trade and dis-
boy for Malagasy politicians; nationalization may help
Ratsiraka politically. at least for the short run.
25X6
Ratsiraka, who as foreign minister was the
architect of Madagascar's nonaligned policy, on
September 6 delivered the last of nine broadcasts, in which
he read a 130-page statement charting his program of
"revolutionary socialism."
Ratsiraka pledged that the state will take over
all means of production; social services will be
expanded; land not worked by its owner will be con-
fiscated and distributed to the peasants; rural coun-
cils will be responsible for administering agriculture
production; secondary school graduates must put in
18 months compulsory national service; and the army
will carry out civic action programs to develop the
country's infrastructure.
Ratsiraka has his work cut out for him. Peasants,
who make up over 85 percent of the population, have
for decades resisted efforts to get them to supplement
subsistence agriculture with cash crops. Establishing
(Continued)
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of local councils in rural areas was a major objective
of the military governments which preceded Ratsiraka,
but viable organizations capable of administering
modern agricultural production do not exist on the
local level.
3
In the early 1970's, foreign-owned plantations
produced over one-third of the country's agricultural
exports, even though they made up only a small part
of the land in agricultural use. Nationalization of
foreign agricultural enterprises, coupled with nationali-
zation of other foreign firms, is likely to reduce the
revenues available to Ratsiraka, at the very time he
has increased popular expectations of improved social
services. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Sep 8, 1975 3
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Ethiopia
Review of Foreign Policy
During the year since Haile Selassie was deposed,
the ruling military council has made no dramatic
changes in Ethiopia's foreign policy. The new regime
has worked to develop somewhat closer relations with
communist countries, but not so close that Addis
Ababa's pragmatic nonaligned stance has been compromised.
Nor has the council altered Ethiopia's basic policy
toward Washington; US military equipment is deemed
essential to the regime's survival. The Ethiopians'
sensitivity to their reliance on the US, however, has
led to a great deal of friction in carrying out the
assistance program.
The Ethiopian-US relationship is an uneasy one,
characterized by frustrations on both sides. The US
has found it difficult to deal with the nationalistic,
often divided, and seemingly headless ruling group.
Most members of the council seem interested in or
resigned to maintaining ties with the US because of
dependence on US military assistance and training.
The outbreak of serious fighting against the Eritrean
rebels, and the age of most key items in the military
inventory, has impressed upon the council Ethiopia's
almost total reliance on the US for military aid. For
many council members, however, the US is tainted by
its long and close relations with the old regime.
Radical members of the council would like to sever
almost all ties with Washington.
The majority of the council takes the position
that Washington's forthcomingness to arms requests
is the best indicator of the US attitude toward the
regime. This has led to considerable friction; the
Ethiopians consistently ask for items that are not
readily available and cannot be delivered in the
desired'short time-frame. Many of the difficulties
between Ethiopian officials and US representatives in
(Continued)
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Addis Ababa stem from problems related to US security
assistance procedures, rather than from differences
over substantive issues. The ultimate cause of these
problems is stress within the council, caused
partly by those who would like to see the US-Ethiopian
relationship destroyed, and partly by other council
members who either fail to grasp the basic concepts
of the security assistance program or are suspicious
of US motives.
US problems have been eased somewhat by Addis
Ababa's shift in recent months from emphasis on US
grant aid to a significantly higher level of military
procurement on a cash or credit basis. Ethiopia
views such cash or credit transactions as the first
steps toward self-sufficiency in defense finance and
procurement. The country's reasonably good foreign
reserve position should allow the trend to continue.
Ethiopia is likely to acquire only limited mili-
tary supplies from other countries. It is doubtful
that either the Soviet Union or China would be willing
or able to meet Ethiopia's needs. Yugoslavia has
provided a small amount of military equipment. Ethiopia
has reportedly discussed military purchases with some
West European countries, or with private European firms.
Addis Ababa has a highly favorable attitude
toward US economic development programs. The dialogue
between US representatives and government officials
has improved greatly over the past six months. AID
officers report that the closeness and quality of their
relationships with top-level officials concerned with
rural development are better than during the Haile
Selassie era. In the past, the US had to deal with
a handful of dedicated civil servants who were unable
to move the political structure toward needed changes;
now the political structure has adopted policies that
mesh more closely with US assistance objectives.
The council--probably responding to the demands
of its more radical members--has attempted to balance
Ethiopia's ties with the West by giving more attention
(Continued)
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to relations with communist countries. To be sure,
this is not a reversal of the previous regime's
policies; Haile Selassie had already moved the country
toward closer relations with the communist world.
Thus far the socialist-oriented military council has
made no significant new economic or political commit-
ments to the East.
Ethiopian military delegations this year have
visited the Soviet Union, China, and a number of
East European countries. The delegations probably
studied their hosts' economic development strategies
and discussed possible aid projects. The council,
however, has not adopted any particular foreign model
as a guide for its promised far-reaching internal
changes. As far as we know, most of the visits
resulted in only general promises of expanded trade
and aid.
Ethiopia has drawn down only a fraction of the
credits extended by the Soviet Union in 1959 and by
China in 1971. Addis Ababa remains dissatisfied with
Moscow's unattractive terms and conditions. Soviet
relations have also suffered because of Moscow's
military aid to Somalia, Ethiopia's traditional enemy.
The Chinese recently began work on a large road
project in northern Ethiopia that will use some of
the credits granted in 1971.
Most of the East European countries are apparently
reluctant to become too deeply involved with Addis
Ababa at this time, although an Ethiopian representa-
tive probably concluded an agreement for limited
Yugoslav military assistance during a visit to Belgrade.
Ethiopia's relations with most Arab countries
are strained because of support given to the Eritrean
rebels by Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other Arab govern-
ments. Addis Ababa has not made a point of its irrita-
tion with the Arabs, however, believing that Ethiopia's
objectives are better served by maintaining a dialogue.
(Continued)
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The Ethiopians realize that most Arab countries, des-
pite their material and financial aid to the Eritreans,
do not go along with the rebels' goal of complete
independence. Addis Ababa wants to be in a position
to encourage that point of view. Some Arab countries
apparently have been influenced by Ethiopia's warning
that Arab support for Eritrean separatism could harm
Afro-Arab relations, because it would violate the
strong African position against altering national
boundaries.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and other
moderate Arab states favor some kind of scheme involving
a federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The moderate
Arabs are worried that an independent Eritrea might
be governed by a leftist regime obligated to the more
radical Arab countries. They believe such a regime
would be inimical to their interests in the lower Red
Sea.
Ethiopia gives perfunctory verbal support to the
Arab position on a Middle East settlement. At the
OAU summit, however, Ethiopia voted in favor of the
moderate resolution adopted by the summit on the
aeli representation in the UN.
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Ethiopian-African relations will be reviewed in
the next issue of the Staff Notes.
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