LATIN AMERICA TRENDS

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CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0
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21
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December 21, 2016
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Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Secret Ou M Latin American Trends State Dept. review completed Secret September 10, 1975 No. 0526/75 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 c)D Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. CONTENTS September 10, 1975 Chile: Clampdown on the Universities Regionalism: With and Without the US . . . . 4 Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Cuba: Provinces to Disappear . . . . . . . . 7 Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely . . . . . . 9 Stalemate in Surinam . . . . . ... . . . . . . 11 Chile: Church Again Blasts Regime . . . . . . 13 Cuban Chronology for August 1975 . . . . . . . 15 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Chile: Clampdown on the Universities The pattern of arrests and dismissals of univer- sity personnel and students over the past month sug- gests that a massive purge is unfolding. The latest round of detentions has struck a damaging blow at the universities' capacity to function usefully in Chile's educational system. A government-directed shakeup of the administra- tion of the University of Chile is apparently under way. A new vice-rector has been named to head the eastern campus in Santiago, a focal point of the student and faculty dissent. More faculty members have been discharged at the Catholic University in Santiago, where conflict again erupted last week. Only three or four members of the 15-man political science faculty now retain their jobs. Press sources claim that the dismissals stemmed from plans to hold a seminar on "the crisis of democracy in the world" which was to have included participation by former President Eduardo Frei. The majority of those arrested at the Catholic University were members of Frei's Christian Democatic Party. While high level Chilean officials, including Pres- ident Pinochet, have alleged that the expulsions and arrests were prompted. by illegal political activity on the campuses, there is some evidence that a more probable reason was the government's intention to replace dis- senters with government supporters. The number of per- sons jailed or ousted from the universities is not clear. Meanwhile, many appeals for writs of habeas corpus sub- mitted on behalf of those still being held have been re- jected by the courts. The wives of some professors in custody have denied the government's charges and have told US Embassy of- ficers that their husbands were not political activists September 10, 1975 SECET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 SECRET but victims of personal grudges. Some charge that dis- gruntled colleagues--seeking promotions or bitter over losing their jobs--have fingered others as Marxists. So far, the government has been vague about the specific nature of its charges, which has reinforced questions about the legitimacy of its actions. The US Embassy says the over-all effect has been the trampling of university autonomy and deteriorating morale in the educational community. Representatives of the University of California, which has an educational exchange agree- ment with the University of Chile, are concerned about the continued existence of educational freedom in Chile and are considering terminating the exchange program. Whatever may be the government's intentions in moving against the universities, it will further damage Chile's image abroad and have a negative effect on hopes for a meaningful liberalization of its security restric- tions. September 10, 1975 -3- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Regionalism: With and Without the US Increasing involvement in international confer- ences has given the Latin American governments a broader context in which to examine and sharpen the focus of their own special interests. The Latins' experiences in various UN activities and especially their connnection with the Group of 77 and the nonaligned movement have convinced them of the value of solidarity with other blocs with similar problems and aspirations. At the same time, the Latins have become more conscious of themselves as a region and have a clearer sense of how they can meet certain needs on a regional basis. Despite the poor results of most regional and subregional experiments of the past, the Latin Americans are taking a new look at the poten- tial benefits of the OAS and the proposed Latin American Economic System (SELA), the former with and the latter without the US. At broad, global forums, the Latins have seen their interests diluted in the flood of grievances from less developed areas and they have also seen the intensity of the Latin cases fade alongside the bitter determination of the participants in the Middle East and other politi- cally divided areas. While the Latins value the concept of a new international order and other third-world prin- ciples and agree with the tactic of mass lobbying, they are also aware of specific economic and political goals that might be better served by efforts within the regional community. Playing on this theme, the new and energetic secre- tary general of the OAS, Argentina's Alejandro Orfila, is winning converts to his conviction that the pan- American forum can be a key court for the presentation of Latin American positions, propositions, and complaints to September 10, 1975 -4- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Washington. Orfila strongly advocates a de-Latinization of the OAS procedures, which after years of juridical disputation have become mired in minutiae. Orfila evidently has sold his practical approach to Mexican President Echeverria, one of the OAS' strongest critics. Echeverria has instructed his delegates to back Orfila fully in the effort to revitalize the OAS and take the lead in bringing greater decisiveness and rationality into the organization. Echeverria has also contacted his rival for Latin leadership, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez, to ask for Venezuela's cooperation with Orfila. Both Mexico and Venezuela seem ready to increase their financial support of the OAS as well. Working committees have begun assembling in Panama to labor over the statutes and principles of SELA, which will be the subject of a full Latin and Caribbean con- ference there beginning October 15. SELA--a brainchild of Echeverria and Perez--is slowly developing accept- ability in the rest of the hemisphere as a forum in which the Latins can marshal their assets in practical business schemes. In SELA, they can cope with differences in size and development among the countries by means of special privileges for the poor. Gradually, SELA is emerging as the vehicle by which the Latins can find the consensus with which they hope to challenge the US at the OAS. The many Latin American barriers of cultural division, regional rivalries, and differing political and economic systems will remain as formidable as they have been in the past. But Latin advocates of regional cooperation are increasingly confident that the lessons of old failures and the new momentum for altering international relation- ships will lift them over these hurdles. September 10, 1975 -5- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout Continues President Somoza continues to orchestrate his counterattack against Jack Anderson's published al- legations of Somoza's abuses, including AID fund mis- use. The major daily Novedades-?-owned by Somoza--has headlined and praised Ambassador to the US Sevilla- Sacasa for his efforts to rebut the charges. The Nicaraguan Government has also quickly released a US State Department note, in reply to a formal request from Sevilla-Sacasa,stating that no official documents were given to Anderson and that there are no claims regarding illegal expenditures of AID funds by any Nicaraguan government organization. Other aspects of the counterattack have included the firing of Somoza's press secretary and increased censorship of La Prensa. This daily is owned by op- position leader Joaquin Chamorro, who Somoza believes to be the source of information for Anderson's columns. Somoza is also beginning efforts to have his rubber- stamp congress stage an official show of support. Because the original Anderson articles were seen by few in Managua, the Nicaraguan strongman allowed Novedades to publish laundered translations of the columns. However, given that his selective editing may be exposed and that his continued public campaign may spark another column by Anderson, Somoza may find that he has succeeded only in generating further embar- rassment for himself. September 10, 1975 -6- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Cuba: Provinces to Disappear A specially administered area in eastern Cuba may be the forerunner of a new political-administra- tive subdivision designed for adoption throughout the country. The new jurisdictional structure could be introduced as early as next year, but the timing prob- ably depends on popular acceptance of the new concept. Cuba currently comprises six provinces, which themselves are divided onto 59 regions and 416 munici- palities. The draft constitution now under study de- fines Cuba only in terms of regions and municipalities and makes no mention of a provincial level of public administration. This treatment of the highest tier of government below the national level matches the ambi- guity of previous cryptic indications of structural changes, suggesting that the Castro regime was sending up trial balloons to test popular receptivity to the demolition of a sociological feature having deep his- torical roots. The matter was finally brought out more clearly by Castro himself on July 26, when he explained that the reorganization was required by "social and political reality." The Tunas territorial subdivision in Oriente pro- vince gives a hint of the new system. The territory is made up of three of the province's 13 regions, and con- sists of 6,664 square kilometers with a population of 382,000 people--compared to the province total of 36,601 square kilometers and 3,008,000 people. The territory is governed from a key regional transportation center for the area, and its governor is Faure Chomon, a member of the Cuban Communist Party Secretariat, who was shifted to the territory in late 1970. Using the Tunas territory as a guide, the new political-administrative structure is likely to consist of between 20 and 25 units at the regional level. Be- cause no information is available on the subdivision of September 10, 1975 -7- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 SECRET the Tunas territory itself, however, no valid conjecture can be made about the reorganization at the municipality level. Whatever the breakdown, the impact will be con- siderable. The structures of the party, several of the mass organizations, and some government ministries are based largely on the provincial political-administrative boundaries, and major changes in these entities would have to be made to accommodate the new system. September 10, 1975 -8- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 SECRET Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely Peronist legislators have side-tracked Radical Party efforts to investigate the financial dealings of President Peron and former social welfare minister Jose Lopez Rega. The controversy was touched off by press reports in mid-August that President Peron had diverted about $800,000 from Peronist welfare funds to her late husband's estate. Spokesmen for Mrs. Peron blame the improper transfer on her lawyer--former Interior Min- ister Benitez--and claim that she is taking steps to correct the mistake. Other Peronists, however, have attempted to defend the action by noting that the check was intended to cover a portion of the inheritance due the sisters of Peron's former wife Evita. They also argue that only a fraction of the amount congress ap- propriated to Juan Peron two years ago in restitution for property confiscated during his overthrow in 1955 had been put into his account. The Radicals claim that their repeated requests for a full accounting of the amount budgeted for restitution have not been answered by the government. The Radicals have been fairly low-key in their ef- forts to launch an inquiry. Their proposal, which would set up a special investigatory commission, suggests a calculated effort to gain favorable publicity for the party while avoiding an uncontrolled escalation of the debate on political corruption. The Peronists have nevertheless responded to the disclosures with great apprehension, probably out of fear that a thorough in- vestigation would reveal extensive misuse of government funds by Mrs. Peron's administration. September 10, 1975 -9- SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A001700220001-0 Approved For Release 2008/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700220001-0 SECRET Because the problem of gr