STAFF NOTES: EAST ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A001800110001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 13, 2001
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 22, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
File:
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00865AO0180011
Top Secret
East Asia
Top Secret
September 22. 1975
SC No. 00509175
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No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
September 22, 1975
Sihanouk in Phnom Penh. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Cabinet Clues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
JAPAN
Tokyo Disappoints Third World . . . . . . . . 6
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Cambodia: Sihanouk in Phnom Penh
The initial warm welcome Prince Sihanouk re-
ceived when he arrived in Phnom Penh on September 9
has been followed up by a round of ceremonial func-
tions at which the Prince has been accorded full
honors as "head of state." The day after he arrived,
the cabinet paid a call on Sihanouk, and he presided
over a cabinet meeting. The Prince has also been the
guest of honor at receptions, an "artistic soiree,"
and a mass rally sponsored by the "people" and
the armed forces at the Phnom Penh sports stadium on
September 12. He has also entertained Chinese Am-
bassador Sun Hao.
The speeches of communist leaders on these oc-
casions have congratulated Sihanouk for his "patri-
otic activities." In a speech on September 9, Deputy
Prime Minister Khieu Samphan expressed "warmest
thanks" to the Prince for "fulfilling revolution-
ary tasks on the international scene." In a later
speech Samphan continued his praise saying that the
contributions of Sihanouk and Prime Minister Penn
Nouth had raised the international prestige of Cam-
bodia and its revolution to "great heights." However,
the communists have not mentioned Sihanouk's future
travel plans, nor have they divulged any specifics
concerning his future role in Cambodian affairs.
Communist speakers have used Sihanouk's arrival
to emphasize once again their victory over US "impe-
rialism" and the Lon Nol "clique." They have also
referred several times to the resolutions passed by
the special national congress held in late April.
That congress decided on the retention of Sihanouk
as titular head of the government and also set the
lines of the new Cambodia as independent, neutral,
democratic, unified, classless, and having terri-
torial integrity--Phnom Penh's usual propaganda
themes.
September 22, 1975
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While using the arrival of Sihanouk to portray
their victory in glowing terms, the communists un-
doubtedly recognize that they have a long way to go
before they achieve their goals. In his speech to
the mass rally, Khieu Samphan said current recon-
struction efforts only are the "beginning" and he
noted optimistically that Cambodia will soon have a
"brand new outlook." Samphan and other communist
leaders have said recently that their government has
only "fundamentally" solved the problem of "popular
livelihood" and that food is sufficient rather than
abundant--oblique references to continuing food
shortages.
The speeches delivered at the rally by "repre-
sentatives of the army, people, and women," the
frequent references to the National United Front
and the Royal Government of National Union, and the
absence of references to the "revolutionary organiza-
tion"--the euphemism for the Khmer Communist Party--
attest to the emphasis the communists are placing
for the time being on maintaining the appearance of
a broadly based government. Almost all of the
speeches have referred to "solidarity," and the com-
munists have gone out of their way to include
Sihanouk in the facade of unity. On September 9,
Khieu Samphan lauded the Prince for having "person-
ally joined the forces of unity" in building the
revolutionary society. These sentiments may be
designed to reassure the Prince that he has a role
to play as a symbol of unity and as an international
figure. The communist leadership no doubt is also
aware that its allies, especially the Chinese, as
well as friends in the nonaligned world are probably
following the leadership's treatment of the Prince
closely.
For his part, Sihanouk's public response to his
reception has been equally warm. At a reception on
September 9, the Prince said he was happy to rejoin
September 22, 1975
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told a member of his entourage before he left Peking
that he regarded his own future as "highly uncer-
tain" and had no alternative to visiting Cambodia
to judge the situation himself. Behind the osten-
sible warmth on both sides, the relationship between
Sihanouk and the communists undoubtedly remains un-
easy, and the Prince is almost certainly assessing
the limitations on his movements and duties to
determine how much scope the communists will allow
him. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
the Cambodian "family" and to share in the "sweet
and the bitter forever" with his friends, but he,
too, has not mentioned his own future activities.
He has confined his remarks to congratulations on
the military victory and emphasis on Cambodia as an
example to Third World countries seeking "salvation
and liberation."
September 22, 1975
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Cambodia: Cabinet Clues
Radio Phnom Penh's account of a Royal Govern-
ment of National Union cabinet meeting on September
10, presided over by Prince Sihanouk, has provided a
few clues concerning the positions of some members
of the Cambodian leadership.
Several ministers delivered reports. Deputy
Prime Minister for National Defense Son Sen reported
on the "military situation" and on the "management
and organization" of the army. The fact that Phnom
Penh listed Son Sen's "detailed" report first and his
delivery of the welcoming address when Sihanouk ar-
rived in Cambodia suggest that Son Sen probably plays
a key role in the apparent triumvirate that includes
the other deputy prime ministers--Khieu Samphan and
Ieng Sary. Although Samphan retains his title as
army commander in chief, he does not have a military
background, and his participation in military affairs
may be secondary to overall policy and administra-
tive roles.
Other reports presented at the cabinet meeting
dealt with post-war economic recovery. Information
and Propaganda Minister Hu Nim reported on the
"people and production." Although Phnom Penh had
not mentioned Nim since mid-May, his re-emergence
at Sihanouk's welcome ceremony and his report at
the cabinet meeting indicate that he is an active
member of the government.
In contrast, the broadcast of the cabinet meet-
ing did not mention Interior Minister Hou Youn. Like
Khieu Samphan and leng Sary, Youn formerly held a
portfolio in the Sihanouk government and was a leader
in the communist insurgency. However, Phnom Penh has
not referred to the interior minister since the com-
munist take-over, and the continued omission of his
name and title suggest that he may have been down-
graded in the hierarchy.
September 22, 1975
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Other ministers who presented reports were
Minister of National Economy and Finance Koy Thuon,
who spoke on industry and commerce, and Minister of
Public Works and Telecommunications Toch Phoeun,
who reported on the "status of communication lines."
Both individuals are long-time communists. Phnom
Penh's highlighting of their reports is additional
evidence of the high priority the communist leader-
ship places on economic recovery and development and
suggests that they are among the more important mem-
bers of the government. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DI SEEM)
September 22, 1975
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Japan Disappoints Third World
Tokyo is surprised and dismayed over the
unusual public self-criticism by Toshio Kimura,
head of the Japanese delegation at the recently
concluded special economic session of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Kimura-, who was foreign minister
under the Tanaka regime and is a ranking Diet ex-
pert on foreign affairs, delivered a speech at the
special session that represented a vague expression
of Japanese willingness to "study" the problems
dividing the developed and underdeveloped nations
and contained little in the way of meaningful pro-
posals.
But in an emotional outburst to Japanese press
representatives after the speech, Kimura reportedly
called his speech "really disgraceful," claiming
that it jeopardized the trust of the Third World
and created the "impression" that Japan was one of
the most conservative among the developed nations.
According to Kimura, his speech was "gutted" by
tight-fisted Finance Ministry bureaucrats, who op-
posed any specific suggestions as to how Japan
might lend greater assistance to the Third World.
The extent to which Kimura's views are shared
by other elements in the government is not clear.
During his tenure as foreign minister, Kimura tried
hard to cultivate an image as a friend of the Third
World, and he must have been rather galled at the
derisive reaction from some in the UNGA audience to
his speech.
By bringing the controversy out into the open,
Kimura may hope to put pressure on the Finance Min-
istry to be more forthcoming on Third World matters
in the future. Kimura reportedly intends to urge
Prime Minister Miki to insure that Japan makes an
effort to redeem itself at the UN Conference on
Trade and Development in May.
September 22, 1975
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Since Kimura's role as chief delegate to the
special UNGA session was only a one-shot deal--
Foreign Minister Miyazawa will address the regular
UNGA session which just convened--he is relatively
free to speak out. At this stage, Kimura is not
really going anywhere in the party anyway. He was
forced out by the party's right wing as foreign min-
ister when Miki succeeded Tanaka; the right was
suspicious of Kimura's efforts when he was foreign
minister to improve relations with China, North
Korea, and the Third World. Although Finance Min-
ister Ohira obviously was not happy with Kimura's
remarks, Kimura's public criticism of Finance Min-
istry bureaucrats will probably earn him the secret
admiration of some fellow party members, who have
traditionally distrusted the bureaucracy. (CONFI-
DENTIAL)
September 22, 1975
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