STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001800290001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Dissem
2~11TITT HOUE50
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Handle via COMINT Channels
Top Secret
September 29. 1.975
SC No. 00515/75
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No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
September 29, 1975
The Zarodov Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Yugoslav-US Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Groundwork Laid for Tito-Ceausescu
Meeting Next Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Romanians Feted in Peking--Again . . . . . . . .
11
Czechoslovakia: Campaign
Against Dubcek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Editor's Note: The author of the September 26 Staff
Note item entitled Soviet Dissent: Names in the News
was
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The Zarodov Meeting
Nearly two weeks have passed since Brezhnev and
Konstantin Zarodov met in Moscow, but opinions con-
tinue to differ over the implications of that remark-
able event. Most observers see a message in the
meeting for West European communist parties, with
Brezhnev throwing his support behind a tougher line
on the issue of cooperation between communist and
non-communist parties. Some, but not all, observers
see a message directed particularly at the Portuguese
communists. There seems general agreement that the
meeting has implications for the European Communist
conference, but disagreement as to whether it will
anger the more independent-minded parties--and thus
make the road to a conference even more difficult--
or whether the Soviets have chosen to make a state-
ment unilaterally and thereby remove one of the con-
troversial issues from the conference agenda.
There is even less agreement on what implica-
tions the meeting may have for broader Soviet policy--
including Soviet policy toward the US. Today we run
three related articles, one noting the unusual as-
pects of the meeting, and two others commenting on
the question of whether or not it has broader im-
plications.
Some Unusual Aspects
It is virtually unprecedented for Brezhnev to
grant a publicized audience of the sort he had with
Zarodov on September 17. His reported meetings with
Soviet officials over the past five years or more
have been confined to important working conferences
or ceremonial occasions such as anniversaries or
awards. His reception last week of a group of
Stakhanovites in connection with the 40th anniversary
of the movement was a typical example. He does meet
with local. officials when out on junkets around the
country, but this is not a parallel, and there was no
ceremonial. reason for the Zarodov meeting.
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The fact that Zarodov is a key figure in an
ideological controversy only makes Brezhnev's meet-
ing with him the more noteworthy. As noted before,
he usually leaves the field of ideology to Suslov,
and it is quite out of keeping with Brezhnev's
political style to associate himself with an extreme
stance publicly. He runs an open office and sees
people of all ranks and political stripes, but these
meetings are not publicized, and he has sought gen-
erally to accommodate opposing views and find a com-
promise position in private while standing above
the fray in public.
Soviet press treatment of the event spotlighted
it to an unusual degree. The announcement was car-
ried on the front page of Pravda under a headline,
"A Conversation with Comrade L. I. Brezhnev," that
was apparently intended to attract attention. The
same announcement has also appeared on the front
pages of the four republic newspapers (Belorussian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian) available in
Washington thus far. (CONFIDENTIAL)
The Foreign Policy Pulse Seems Normal
It is hardly long enough since the Brezhnev-
Zarodov meeting to draw an indelible picture of the
meaning or significance of that event. Still, a
number of things have happened over the intervening
days, and they tend to argue against the case that
Brezhnev's embrace of Zarodov symbolized a signif-
icant, or early turn toward tougher Soviet policies.
--Brezhnev himself seemed to be back in the
balancing business only a few days after
praising Zarodov, when he saw the US astro-
nauts in the Kremlin. Given the hoopla that
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had surrounded the joint space mission, Brezh-
nev probably could not have avoided greeting
the astronauts. But still, he did not seem
anxious to pull any stops either. A Soviet
audience would probably view the lengthy
television coverage of the Brezhnev-astro-
naut session as a sign of normality in US-
Soviet relations.
--A similar sense of normality emerges from
Foreign Minister Gromyko's UN speech. It
has the usual good words about the benefi-
cence of detente, the Soviet Union's major
contribution to this "main feature" of the
international scene, and has some unexcep-
tional words about the importance of US-USSR
summit meetings, and other efforts to improve
relations. Gromyko also went relatively
easy on the "opponents of detente," making
mention of their invidious work but without
naming any names or dwellinq on their threat
to the "main feature." It might be possible
to read a domestic angle into Gromyko's refer-
ence to "all those" who oppose overtly or
"semi-overtly" the "policy line" on detente,
but it is more likely that he was referring
to critics in the US or elsewhere in the
West.
Gromyko also took the occasion to make what may
be the leadership's first public prediction concern-
ing the coming party congress. He said that the
congress "will" confirm and develop the foreign
policy line, but he seemed to balance that promise
a bit by saying that those who struggle for "social
progress" etc., can continue to count on the USSR's
active support.
--Gromyko's remarks on the Middle East in
his UN speech and, more importantly, his
three-hour session with Israeli Foreign
Minister Allon, do not give evidence of
September 29, 1975
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any new tough policy that would match Mos-
cow's displeasure with Sinai II. Indeed,
Israeli press accounts of the Allon meeting
indicate that Gromyko is prepared to go
along with Secretary Kissinger's proposal
for informal, multilateral Middle East
negotiations. True or not, the very fact
that Gromyko saw Allon indicates that Mos-
cow is not about to associate itself firmly
with the Arab rejectionists. In short,
there seems to be little evidence of dis-
continuity in Moscow's Middle East policy.
--Moscow is going ahead with the visit by
Portuguese President Costa Gomes this week.
This is more important than most visits,
and could even be directly related to the
Zarodov affair, because of the centrality
of Portugal to the ideological debate in
Moscow. The Soviets are, in effect, putting
their stamp on the sixth provisional govern-
ment, despite the fact that that government
represents a major setback to the Portuguese
Communists. Their way has been made easier
by the fact that Cunhal has been compelled
to go along publicly with the government,
but nonetheless it is not hard to imagine
that there were those in Moscow prepared
to argue against receiving the Portuguese.
The piquancy of the situation will be in-
creased if Costa Gomes is accompanied by
his foreign minister, Melo Antunes. It
was the latter who has been criticized by
the Soviet media for leading the fight
against the Portuguese Communists. It is
not inconceivable that one reason that Brez-
nev saw Zarodov and thereby made a gesture
toward those favoring a tougher line on
Portugal, was to clear the way for a Portu-
guese visit that would otherwise be inter-
preted as a major victory for the pragmatic
approach to Portugal. (CONFIDENTIAL)
September 29, 1975
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Yugoslav-US Relations
Yugoslav media, responding to directives from
top party leaders, are becoming decidedly more favor-
able toward the US and more critical of the Soviets.
The new trend reflects both growing differences
between Belgrade and Moscow and Yugoslav determina-
tion to reduce ideologically satisfying--but polit-
ically disadvantageous--attacks on the US. Tito
wants to maintain good relations with Washington
so long as tensions with Moscow continue and par-
ticularly as the succession period looms on the
horizon.
In late 1971, Tito began a political rapproche-
ment with Brezhnev that lasted until early 1974,
when the Soviets were discovered giving aid to pro-
Soviet subversives in Yugoslavia. Throughout this
period, Yugoslav media took a harsh anti-US stance
that sometimes exceeded the sharpest Soviet criticism.
Yugoslav party
leaders began to press for a more critical public
stand against Moscow in January of this year. In
June, Tito lent his personal authority to the drive.
He criticized a select audience of publishers for
failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation
in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and explicitly ordered
a tougher line on Soviet affairs.
Belgrade is currently accusing Moscow of fail-
ing to take a constructive attitude toward the prob-
lems of the Third World, using the Sinai accords to
divide the Arabs, and trying to dictate policy to
foreign Communist parties. In one exceptional case,
a Yugoslav newspaper even criticized Soviet accounts
of assassination attempts against President Ford as
"conjuring up an atmosphere in America" that en-
courages such actions.
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Meanwhile, Secretary Kissinger's speech to the
UNGA and the US role in negotiating the second Sinai
accords have been given unusually favorable press
treatment. The Yugoslavs are taking care, however,
to couch all their compliments in terms that leave
no room for doubting Belgrade's continuing commit-
ment to nonalignment. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DIS-
SEM)
September 29, 1975
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Groundwork Laid for Tito-Ceausescu
Meeting Next Month
The stage has been set for the first bilateral
summit between Tito and Ceausescu in over a year.
The two leaders will meet sometime in late October.
Arrangements for the meeting were made by
Romanian Premier Manescu during talks over the week-
end with his Yugoslav counterpart, Dzemal Bijedic,
and later at Tito's island retreat on Brioni with
the Yugoslav President. Both sides assessed the
talks in effusive terms and heralded the good pros-
pects for a Tito-Ceausescu meeting.
During their last meeting in July 1974, Tito
and Ceausescu agreed to set aside temporary differ-
ences over the Middle East--specifically Romania's
recognition of Israel--and to re-emphasize their
common opposition to Soviet moves in the world com-
munist movement and in the Balkans. Subsequent
Yugoslav contacts with Ceausescu have been handled
primarily by Tito's principal subordinates, Stane
Dolanc and Edvard Kardelj, who will play major roles
in any collective leadership after Tito goes.
The atmosphere for the October talks seems
especially favorable in view of recent Romanian co-
operation with the Yugoslav internal security serv-
ices in bagging one of the most dangerous emigre
leaders of pro-Soviet subversives in Yugoslavia.
Few substantive details on Manescu's talks
have been released, but both sides are forecasting
that annual bilateral trade will treble to around
$1 billion by 1980. On the political side, it is
safe to assume that Premier Bijedic outlined for
Manescu his plans for a trip to China--the first
ever by a Yugoslav Premier--early in October. (CON-
FIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
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Romanians Feted in Peking--Again
The visit of Major General Gomoiu, Romanian
deputy defense minister and head of the military's
higher political council, to Peking is sure to ir-
ritate Moscow.
At a reception in Gomoiu's honor on Sunday, the
Chinese toasted the "profound and revolutionary
friendship" between the two countries in their com-
mon "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and
hecfemonism"--the last a codeword for Soviet efforts
to dominate the international Communist movement.
Gomoiu responded by underscoring the "fundamental
interests of the two peoples." He lauded the army's
role in defending the Chinese revolution and in
safeguarding the nation's independence and sover-
eignty. The Romanian characterized his talks as a
new contribution to cooperation between the armed
forces of the two countries.
Four years ago, similar toasts during Ceausescu's
visit to Peking touched off several months of Soviet
pressure on the Balkans, including a well-orchestrated
campaign against an alleged "pro-Peking, anti-Soviet,
Tirana, Bucharest and Belgrade axis."
Gomoiu is the latest of a number of high-level
Romanians who have traveled to Peking this month.
Ilie Verdet, the party secretary for cadre affairs
was there from September 5 to 9. Josef Banc, the
party secretary for economic affairs is currently
in China, along with Major General Dumitru, the
head of Romanian military intelligence. (CONFIDEN-
TIAL)
September 29, 1975
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Czechoslovakia: Campaign Against Dubcek
Prague has launched a propaganda campaign which
appears intended to demonstrate to critics at home and
abroad that domestic dissidence is minimal.
The regime recently began to release letters
attacking Dubcek that were ostensibly written by in-
dividuals who were purged in the aftermath of the
"Prague Spring." The letters seek to show that the
former leader enjoys little support among the half
million former party members.
On September 17, for example, the party's hard-
line ideological weekly, Tribuna, published a letter
by Jiri Cvekl, a former party member. The letter
is a comprehensive attack both on Dubcek as a person
and on the political philosophy of the Prague Spring.
Another, attributed to Vaclav Simecek, who served
on the party presidium in the 1968-69 period but
was subsequently expelled for his "right-wing" ac-
tivities, constitutes a significant endorsement for
the Husak regime.
In addition to "proving" that support for Dubcek
is dwindling, letters of this sort imply that those
who were expelled from the party, but now realize
the error of their ways, can expect rehabilitation
and perhaps even a return to the party. Dubcek and
his remaining friends, however, are viewed as guilty
of both "subjective" and "objective" treason, and
are beyond the pale. (CONFIDENTIAL)
September 29, 1975
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