SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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9~1~T KOH~
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Tap Secret
172
October 3, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
October 3, 1975
European Communist
Conference Prospects Fade. . . . . . . . . . . 1
East Germany Suspends
Relations with Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Czechoslovakia: Reconciliation
for the Ostracized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Hungary: Preparing the People . . . . . . . . . 6
Iranian Premier Visits Czechoslovakia. . . . . . 8
Soviet Activity in Asia
(August 29 - October 1). . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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European Communist Conference Prospects Fading
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In an effort to revive the rapidly fading pros-
pects for convening a European Communist party con-
ference this year, the Soviets and East Germans
have called a meeting of the conference drafting
group on October 81 25X1
This group, which first met in East Berlin
on February 17-19 and then on April 8-10, is charged
with drawing up the conference's final document.
Throughout its proceedings, however, the group has
been paralyzed by sharp differences between the
"centralists" led by Moscow and the "independents,"
including the Yugoslavs, Romanians, Spaniards, and
Italians. In an attempt to get around this prob-
lem, a subcommittee divided evenly between the two
groups was created to hammer out the concluding
document, but during its meetings from mid-April
through mid-July no progress was made, and it was
finally adjourned sine die.
For the past three months no drafting meetings
of any sort have been held as the two contending
factions have hardened their positions and reviewed
their strategy. On the Soviet side, stinging
denunciations of Maoism and "opportunists" willing
to make political alliances with "bourgeois" parties
rather than adopt a revolutionary path to power
appeared in August in Kommunist and Pravda, respectively.
The Yugoslavs and West Europeans have responded with
sharp counterattacks in their own media. The Soviets
and East Germans, recognizing the depth of the dif-
ferences between the two sides, concede privately
that no conference is likely this year and some re-
ports say they are reconciled to putting it off until
after the Soviet party congress next February. 25X1
if t e
meeting is not held before the Congress, the whole
project could become a dead letter for at least two
years.
October 3, 1975
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In an attempt to get a conference on track
again, the Soviets have given up pushing for a
program of common action binding on all partic-
ipating parties and have opted instead for a state-
ment of principles with some binding provisions.
This, however, is still unsatisfactory to the
Romanians and other "independents," and the Soviets
are toying with a vague, non-binding declaration
to avoid sinking the conference project. Soviet
party secretary Katushev's sudden arrival in
Bucharest on Wednesday may be an effort to put
pressure on the Romanians to soften their position.
Moscow is no longer insisting on references
to its leading role in the international communist
movement and may be willing to delete references
to "Maoist" support of opponents of detente if this
threatens the holding of the conference. The stick-
ing point is the attitude to be taken by the con-
ference toward the social democratic parties in
Western Europe. If the choice comes down to describing
them unqualifiedly as "progressive," and therefore
suitable political allies, as the "independents"
wish, or scuttling the conference, Moscow will choose
the latter. The depth of Moscow's commitment to
its position, spelled out in the Zarodov Pravda
article in August, was underscored by the publicity
given Zarodov's meeting with Brezhnev last month,
and this does not augur well either for next week's
meeting of the drafting group or the European Com-
munist conference project as a whole.
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East Germany Suspends Relations with Spain
East Germany suspended diplomatic relations
with Spain yesterday afternoon. The action was
foreshadowed when East Berlin recalled its ambas-
sador on September 27th "as an expression of its
strong protest against the executions of the five
Spanish patriots." East Germany is the only War-
saw Pact country that has had full diplomatic--
as distinct from consular--relations with Madrid.
The action was almost certainly taken at Moscow's
behest, and may have been arranged during Foreign
Minister Gromyko's brief visit to East Berlin
earlier this week.
October 3, 1975
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Czechoslovakia; Reconciliation for
the Ostracized
Prague now appears to be holding out the possi-
bility that those who were purged in the wake of the
"Prague Spring" could return to the party ranks if
they are willing to recant and "work for socialism."
The rehabilitation of almost half a million
former party members has reportedly been a central
issue in a major dispute that has pitted hard liners
against moderates in the top party leadership. The
hard liners fear that any relaxation of ideological
vigilance could eventually result in a return to the
deviations of the "Prague Spring," while the moder-
ates argue that selective rehabilitation would aid
the sluggish Czechoslovak economy. Party leader
Husak reportedly favored rehabilitating members with
technical expertise as early as 1970, but he has been
forcefully blocked by the hard line faction of party
secretary Vasil Bilak.
In an interview last month, however, Bilak re-
marked that the majority of those former party mem-
bers who did not pass their reliability clearance
checks "are trying to make up for past mistakes and
errors by honest work" and that "many believe that
with the passage of time they will be readmitted to
the party." These remarks have subsequently been re-
peated in the party press, which labeled the interview
"a document of extraordinary importance" that has
"generated considerable, and fully justified interest
also in our country."
Bilak's statement stops short of a firm commit-
ment to reinstate purged party members. Its evasive-
ness on a time factor suggests a compromise in which
the hard liners have given some ground but have not
capitulated. It will nevertheless raise the hopes of
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those individuals willing to recant. Their expecta-
tions will probably be fueled by the promise that
"a program which all honest people in our country
could understand and accept" will be worked out for
the 15th party congress scheduled for next April.
By holding out the carrot, the regime may be
trying to divide the ranks of the purge victims,
splitting the dissidents--the small militant minor-
ity--away from the majority, who might be swayed by
the prospects of reconciliation after seven years
of frustration and economic hardship. Since the
November plenum last year, the party has given in-
creasing attention to economic performance, and the
former party members are an untapped or, at least,
under-utilized resource, particularly in the area of
badly needed managerial talent.
October 3, 1975
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Hungary: Preparing the People
In a recent speech to parliament, Premier Lazar
told the Hungarian consumer to expect a slowdown in
improvements in the standard of living during the
next five years. His warning is the latest in a
series of statements by high-level Hungarian spokes-
men that are intended to scale back popular expecta-
tions.
In a partial preview of the five year plan,
which will be published within the next several months,
Lazar said that Budapest can not avoid further in-
creases in consumer prices, and revealed that "guar-
anteed" rises in living standards would be "several
percent" less than in past years. He implied that
increases in real income would be especially modest
during 1976 and 1977. A Hungarian economist told the
embassy that the regime would like to hold this in-
crease to 1.5 percent per year, but would probably
not do so because of the domestic political effect.
Real income has been increasing at an average annual
rate of 5 percent since 1970.
Lazar was frank about the difficulties that West-
ern inflation and recession and Soviet price increases
are causing for Hungary. He called for greater worker
productivity, cutbacks in luxury imports, more exports,
and greater modernization in industry. He said that
the overall growth of investments would be half the
rate sustained during 1971-75, despite an increase
in energy-related investment outlays.
On the sensitive subject of management policy,
Lazar suggested a commitment to Budapest's flexible
economic system when he said "there is no need to
change the basic principles." He cited the initia-
tive and imagination of enterprises as a "precondi-
tion" for national economic growth. At the same time,
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Lazar acknowledged that some modifications are in
the works that will increase the role of the cen-
tral bureaucracy. Lazar said "it is not our aim
to over-regulate," but pointed to current economic
pressures as justification for the changes. I
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Iranian Premier Visits Czechoslovakia
Discussions of bilateral economic relations
dominated the visit of Iranian Premier Hoveyda to
Prague earlier this week. The Czechs, anxious to
get further cooperation from Tehran, rolled out
the red carpet, and President Husak presented
Hoveyda with the country's highest award, the Order
of the White Lion, First Class.
The Czechoslovak media gave prominent and fa-
vorable play to Czechoslovak-Iranian relations
throughout the visit. A commentary in the party
daily, for example, underscored Czechoslovakia's
role in the realization of Iran's development plans
and Tehran's elimination of "imperialists" from key
sectors of the economy.
According to the communique on Hoveyda's talks
with Premier Strougal, the two sides agreed that
the forthcoming joint commission meeting in Tehran
would work toward a long-term agreement on economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation. The premiers
also discussed cooperation--including joint projects
in third countries--in "new industrial" and agricul-
tural fields. No details were given. The communique
indicated that financial cooperation was another
topic discussed. This suggests that at long last
Prague may be on the verge of entering the Western
money market.
Although there was no suggestion in either the
official coverage or in the communique that the sub-
ject of oil was brought up, Premier Strougal went out
of his way to support the 10-percent increase in oil
prices recently decided by the OPEC nations. Accord-
ing to Strougal, Czechoslovakia considers the increase,
"as desired by Iran, very reasonable and logical."
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Soviet Activity in Asia
(August 29 - October 1)
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The Soviets in private exchanges with Western
officials continue to maintain that Sino-Soviet
bilateral relations are neither better nor worse
than they were a year ago. The China desk officer
in the Foreign Ministry recently advised a US of-
ficial to attach no special significance to the
fact that for the first time in six months the Soviet
press had publicly mentioned the downed helicopter
crewmen that China has detained since 1974; it was
just Moscow's way of reminding everyone the issue is
not forgotten. The same Soviet official maintained
that nothing had occurred during the last round of
border talks and that the value--but not the volume--
of Sino-Soviet trade will increase this year because
the two sides had been able to agree on repricing.
The two sides exchanged more heated messages
than usual over the issue of Soviet wreath-laying
in China. As they usually do, Soviet media reported
that China had refused permission for Soviet
representatives to lay wreaths at memorials to
fallen soldiers in several places in China on the
anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II.
China, which does not usually respond to these
protests, did so this year in a verbal statement
by the Foreign Ministry explaining that China could
not receive Soviet representatives as long as Mos-
cow continued to deploy troops on the Sino-Soviet
border and continued to send spies into China.
Peking's decision to go public may have been in-
spired by Moscow's publication last April of a
Soviet statement--the first in several years--
charging China with desecrating Soviet war memorials
in China.
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Moscow's handling of Chinese National Day was
in keeping with its behavior of recent years. There
were articles in Pravda and Izvestia that were highly
critical of the Chinese but also, as usual, included
reference to the hope for better relations in the
future. Soviet leaders also sent their usual mes-
sage to Peking reiterating their desire for a restora-
tion of friendly ties, and held a reception in Moscow--
which was attended by China's ambassador to the USSR--
under the auspices of the almost moribund Sino-Soviet
Friendship Society.
This is the first time in 20 years that
the talks, which deal with routine matters about
transportation on the border rivers, have not been
held. The reason for the failure to meet apparently
is China's attempt to change the ground rules by
bringing in territorial questions.
China's tougher stance this year may hive been
prompted by signs the Soviets are improving their
military capabilities on Big Ussuri, the island op-
posite Khabarovsk which the Soviets have long occupied
but which by most international standards belongs to
Big Ussuri is one of the most sensitive points
along the Sino-Soviet border. Every year, when the
border rivers thaw, China challenges Moscow's de
facto ownership of the island by threatening to send
a ship equipped with special facilities for rapid
communication with Peking around the northern part
of the island. The ship has never actually entered
Soviet waters but the annual cat and mouse game does
succeed in making the Soviets nervous.
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The annual Soviet propaganda offensive against
China that began with an editorial article on China
in the number 12 (mid-August) issue of Kommunist
continued, as party propagandists and some of the
more subservient Communist parties picked up and
echoed Kommunist's charges against the Chinese.
Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the Foreign Ministry's
First Asian Division, said the article was drafted
last spring. The article clearly was updated, how-
ever, to take into account the charges China leveled
steadily throughout the summer against alleged Soviet
machinations in Europe and Asia. Kommunist accused
the Chinese of seeking to strengthen the Western
ability to counter the socialist camp, forming an
anti-Soviet alliance with Japan, opposing Vietnamese
reunification, frustrating India's efforts to
establish good ties with its neighbors, and foster-
ing anti-government activity in India, Burma, and
Bangladesh.
The Kommunist article suggested that Moscow is
satisfied it has met the political and ideological
challenge posed by Chinese foreign policy. The
article did urge other Communists to attack Maoism,
but it also said flatly that China had failed to
frustrate detente and aggravate Moscow's relations
with the West, particularly the US. Kommunist's
line on China's internal development was consistent
with its treatment in previous years. The Soviets
conceded that the Chinese have succeeded in re-
storing some semblance of normality--particularly
with regard to the economy--since the Cultural
Revolution, and admitted that the moderates seem
to be exercising more real influence than the leftists.
This line is at odds with what Soviet Sinologists
say privately to Westerners about the Western tend-
ency to underrate leftist influence, but it probably
more accurately represents Moscow's assessment.
Nevertheless, Kommunist is gloomier than ever before
on the prospects for any improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations after Mao and Chou die, stating specifically
that it would be unrealistic to expect any radical
changes in Chinese policy as a result of one or two
crisis phenomena.
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Kommunist was signed to the press before the
Water Margin campaign got under way in China. Initial
Soviet comment on that campaign tended to play down
its significance, but recent Soviet broadcasts have
acknowledged that the campaign might be directed at
rooting out pro-Soviet forces in China.
Signs of renewed factional infighting in Peking
probably prompted a lengthy Red Star article on
September 11, which recounted Mao's efforts to make
the army serve as executor of his antisocialist
domestic policies. Red Star conceded that on the
whole Mao has been successful in maintaining control
of the army, but was more explicit than the Soviets
usually are in noting the existence of opposition
to Mao in the army. The article maintains, for ex-
ample, that the top three jobs in the Chinese armed
forces are now in the hands of leaders of rival
political groups (a claim we do not buy) and that
the degree of reconciliation between them is "un-
questionably temporary."
in running this kind of article, Red Star might
be trying to send a message to counterparts in China,
namely that the Soviets recognize that there are
Chinese military leaders who want better relations
with the Soviet Union and that, if the time ever
comes, they can expect a sympathetic hearing from
Moscow. It is also possible that the Soviet military
is supporting Soviet efforts to maintain some flex-
ibility vis-a-vis China in order to encourage those
in China who might support a rapprochement with the
USSR.
Japan: Recent Soviet propaganda has treated
the Japanese harshly. In an article in Pravda on
the anniversary of the end of the war, Kapitsa
suggested that the Japanese were at fault for
the slow pace in improving Soviet-Japanese relations
and that Moscow regarded the territorial issue be-
tween the USSR and Japan as closed. Moscow's tough
line was probably prompted by signs that the stalled
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negotiations on a Sino-Japanese peace treaty were
about to resume.
Shortly before Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa
met with Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua at
the UN last week, the Soviets increased their pres-
sure on the Japanese. Several articles appeared in
the central press warning the Japanese of the "severe
consequences" for Soviet-Japanese relations if Japan
signed a treaty with China containing an anti-hegemony
clause. On September 17, the Soviet ambassador in
Tokyo called on Miyazawa to warn that Foreign Minister
Gromyko's visit to Japan, tentatively scheduled for
the end of the year, depended on how Japan handled
the anti-hegemony clause. Gromyko himself probably
conveyed much the same message to Miyazawa when they
met at the UN last week.
All of this activity is in part a charade be-
cause in private the Soviets have long acknowledged
that Japan eventually will sign a treaty containing
the anti-Soviet clause. The Soviets may have some
hope that their efforts could, as they apparently
did last spring, further delay the treaty, but
basically they want to convince the Japanese that
if they sign the treaty they will ultimately have
to make some compensatory gesture toward the USSR.
What Moscow would like most is Japan's agreement
to negotiate the interim friendship treaty first
proposed by Foreign Minister Gromyko last January
as a way of muting the political impact of the pend-
ing Sino-Japanese peace treaty. But because of the
two countries territorial differences, the Japanese
rejected Gromyko's proposal and probably will do so
again if the Soviets resubmit it. Japanese politicians
of every coloration, including Prime Minister Miki,
have roundly denounced an article in the latest issue
of Foreign Affairs by a confidant of Prime Minister
Miki that suggested Japan compromise on its ter-
ritorial problem with the USSR.
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On the whole, however, the Soviets seem satisfied
with the course of Soviet-Japanese economic relations.
The two countries signed an important fisheries agree-
ment early this summer and Soviet propagandists still
wax enthusiastic about Soviet-Japanese economic co-
operation.
North Korea: Despite Moscow's support for
North Korea at the UN, relations with Pyongyang are
not good. Both the Soviets and the Koreans keep
talking about a visit by Kim Il-song to Moscow be-
fore the end of the year, but this seems unlikely
in light of China's closer ties with North Korea
and recent Soviet gestures toward Seoul. Chinese
Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao visited North
Korea last week for the second high-level Sino -
North Korean exchange in less than a year, and Mos-
cow granted visas to South Korean athletes to take
part in the World Games in Moscow and to a high
level South Korean delegation going to Moscow for
a meeting of UN associations. The Soviets curtailed
contacts with Seoul when Pyongyang objected in 1973.
Their present behavior probably was provoked by re-
cent signs of further improvement in Pyongyang's
ties with Peking. Moscow has not yet reported the
new US proposal for a resolution of the Korean
problem, but the Soviets probably will eventually
support Pyongyang's rejection of it.
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SOUTH ASIA
India, Bangladesh: Soviet propaganda support-
ing Prime Minister Gandhi's domestic moves has
abated somewhat, suggesting Moscow recognizes the
decreasing chances for effective right-wing opposi-
tion to Gandhi's moves. Gandhi, though doubtless
appreciative of Soviet support, is playing down
her Soviet connection. She passed up an opportunity
to meet with alternate Politburo member Soloment-
sev who stopped off in New Delhi en route home from
North Vietnam and apparently did not consult the
Soviets at the time of the recent coup in Bangladesh.
Moscow and New Delhi are dealing with the new
Bangladesh government (Moscow, for example, re-
cently resumed arms aid negotiations), but both are
worried that the government will emerge as anti-
Soviet and anti-Indian.
Afghanistan: President Daoud recently removed
at least a half dozen highly placed left-wingers
from his government. Until now, the Soviets have
not reacted to Daoud's policy of gradually chipping
away at leftist influence in the government, but
his latest moves may galvanize them into action.
Burma: Burmese President Ne Win is reportedly
planning to visit Moscow later this year to balance
his planned trip to Peking, where he hopes to per-
suade China to curtail further its support for
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Burmese insurgents. The Soviets have made much in
their propaganda in the last year or so of China's
support for the insurgents and probably will again
offer Ne Win military aid. The Burmese have de-
clined Soviet military aid offers in recent years
for fear of antagonizing the Chinese.
Cambodia: Hanoi apparently arranged a meet-
ing between Soviet and Cambodian officials who
were in Hanoi for the 30th anniversary of North
Vietnamese independence. The meeting--Moscow's
first with any Cambodian communist leader--appar-
ently accomplished little. Just before he departed
for Phnom Penh, Sihanouk again attacked Cambodia's
"false friends" who had abandoned her in times of
"misfortune."
Thailand: Thailand's Foreign Minister made an
effort this month to correct the impression that
Thailand is leaning toward Peking by inviting For-
eign Minister Gromyko to visit Bangkok to sign a
Soviet-Thai cultural accord. The Soviets probably
are pleased, but it is unlikely that Gromyko will
accept only to sign a cultural agreement with one
Southeast Asian country. The Thais recently ac-
cepted Moscow's offer to send a team of experts
to examine the feasibility of shale oil exploita-
tion in Thailand; they also decided to repeal the
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State Trading Act adopted in November 1974 to con-
trol anticipated Thai trade with China, partly be-
cause the Soviets pointed out the act also hampered
their efforts to increase trade with the Thais.
Thailand, however, has indefinitely shelved Moscow's
request to station a military attache in Bangkok.
Vietnam: Moscow sent alternate Politburo mem-
ber So 03 mentsev and party secretary Katushev to
Hanoi for the opening of the Soviet-built Ho Chi
Minh mausoleum and the 30th anniversary of Vietna-
mese independence in early September
e war is over, the Soviets may well announce an
aid commitment that will cover the period of Hanoi's
next five year plan. Moscow probably will increase
its economic aid to Vietnam, but the overall total
will probably decline because of Hanoi's reduced
need.
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Top Secret
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