SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900200001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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gul r,--7, T K Ou E
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Department review completed
Top Secret
October 8, 1975
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October 8, 1975
USSR and East Germany Sign Friendship Treaty . . . 1
Soviet Propaganda on Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
EC Delegation Holds Talks in Bucharest . . . . . . 5
Personnel Changes in the Czechoslovak
Party Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iranian Prime Minister Visits Bulgaria . . . . . . 7
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USSR and East Germany Sign Friendship Treaty
The 25-year friendship treaty signed by the So-
viet Union and East Germany on Tuesday is another at-
tempt by Moscow to legitimize the division of Germany
and to justify Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It
may serve as a model for the future revision of cor-
responding treaties with other East European states.
The new agreement replaces a 20-year accord
signed in 1964 that was to remain in effect unless
a German peace treaty was signed or Germany was re-
united. The Soviets clearly believe that the Helsinki
agreement is a surrogate for a German peace treaty.
Moreover, both the new friendship treaty and Brezhnev's
remarks preceding its signature make plain that the
European status quo is now considered frozen and that
any possibility for German reunification, peaceful
or otherwise, is out of the question. References in
the treaty to East Germany as a "sovereign, independent
state" reflect both sides' desire that East Germany's
enhanced status be internationally recognized.
The treaty also includes language that asserts
the responsibility of all socialist countries to sup-
port, strengthen, and defend "socialist gains." This
language was used to justify the Soviet-led invasion
of Czechoslovakia and has come to be known as the
"Brezhnev doctrine." By their selection of these
words, the Soviets are telling the East Europeans
that there will be no fundamental change in their
relationship with the USSR as a consequence of
Helsinki.
The Soviets may also have been trying to reassure
the East Germans that they need not fear the con-
sequences of progress at the Vienna force reduction
talks. The Vienna talks were discussed when Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Prague and East
Berlin in late September, and East Berlin's coolness
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to force reductions was evident from its failure to
follow Prague in specifically endorsing Soviet ef-
forts. Differences also cropped up during Soviet
Defense Minister Grechko's talks with his East German
counterpart in Moscow immediately after the Gromyko
trip. The East German insisted that until "military
detente" is reached, the socialist community's mili-
tary strength must be increased. Recognition of East
German security needs was also stressed by Honecker
and his fellow travelers in Moscow, although Honecker
did let slip a qualified endorsement of the limitation,
but not reduction, of military forces in Central
Europe.
At the same time, the citation of the Brezhnev
doctrine and the great stress on across-the-board
cooperation in the treaty may be intended by Brezhnev
to quiet fears within the Soviet leadership that the
Helsinki final act and the Vienna force reduction
talks will undermine Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe.
In an article in Kommunist released on the eve of the
Honecker visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
clearly stated that Moscow will raise the degree of
its cohesion with Eastern Europe to still higher
levels. If the new treaty with East Germany is
intended as a vehicle for reaching this goal, invita-
tions to the Czechoslovaks, Poles, and other East
Europeans to sign similar accords may be in the
offing.
October 8, 1975
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Soviet Propaganda on Spain
The Soviets have taken advantage of the strong
Western reaction to the executions in Spain to
mount a vehement propaganda campaign of their own
against the Franco regime.
The Soviets have also begun to accuse the US
of guilt by association, although they have cloaked
their criticism by citing foreign commentary. Iz-
vestia on October 6 asserted that "many press organs
consider the agreement reached between Washington
and Madrid as moral support by the US Department of
State for the Spanish Government."
As in most Soviet propaganda campaigns, there
is a pro-forma quality to the diatribes. The
Spanish trade mission in Moscow has gone on func-
tioning normally, and its Soviet employees showed
up for work on what Moscow had proclaimed as a day
of European labor solidarity against the Franco
government.
The predominant theme of Soviet commentary is
that the executions strip the facade of liberalism
from the Spanish government and show that its true,
fascist, nature is unchanged. The Soviets have as-
serted that the Franco regime is incapable of
evolving in a "liberal" or "democratic" way, but
stop short of saying that such evolution would be
impossible for Spain after Franco departs. If the
Soviets are indeed arguing against the likelihood
of evolutionary change, they could come into con-
flict with the Spanish Communist Party which, like
the Italian party, believes in seeking power by
legal means. In the last two years, as the end of
the Franco era seemed to be approaching, the So-
viets have sought to patch up relations with the
independent-minded Spanish party.
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The signals from Moscow on this issue are mixed.
In an article in the latest edition of the Soviet
foreign affairs weekly New Times, a Spanish Civil
War exile, now a Soviet citizen, refers optimisti-
cally to the prospects for slow and bloodless change
in Spain. Publication of the article may have been
intended as a gesture to the Spanish party.
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EC Delegation Holds Talks in Bucharest
An EC commission delegation is in Bucharest to
discuss a bilateral textile agreement.
These are the first negotiations between the EC
commission and an individual CEMA member since the
Soviets began pressing for an overall EC-CEMA rela-
tionship almost two years ago. Romania and Hungary
indicated to the EC last spring that they were will-
ing to negotiate a textile agreement in the context
of the International Multilateral Fiber Agreement
that each has signed.
I the Romanians
also want to use the current talks to discuss a
broad range of trade issues, outside the CEMA context
and without any Soviet participation. Thirty percent
of Romania's trade is already with the EC, and
Bucharest is eager to increase this figure. The
Romanians may press for loans and credits at favorable
rates as well as increased industrial coo ation
including joint ventures in Romania
The timing of the EC-Romanian textile negotiations--
just before the planned CEMA summit next month--under-
scores Bucharest's determination to pursue and expand
bilateral ties with the EC. Deputy Premier Patan re-
cently asserted, in fact, that such contacts could
proceed without waiting for the conclusion of a CEMA-
EC general accord. The Soviets, however, prefer to
have the general accord precede bilateral contacts.
Moscow apparently also wants a more comprehensive
agreement than does Bucharest
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Personnel Changes in the
Czechoslovak Party Secretariat
A plenum of the party Central Committee early
this week released Oldrich Svetska from his post on
the secretariat and appointed him editor-in-chief of
the party daily, Rude Pravo, a post he held from
1958 to 1968. Josef Havlin, currently the Czech
minister of education, was elected to replace Svetska
as party secretary.
These shifts presage a tougher ideological line
in Czechoslovakia. Both men are veteran hard liners.
Havlin, who staunchly supported ousted party boss
Novotny and adopted a particularly tough line toward
restive students in 1967, was dropped from all of-
fices during the Dubcek era. Like Svetska, he has
had previous press experience, and will not hesitate
to crack the ideological whip in the regime's drive
to have the media more closely reflect the view from
the Kremlin. The Husak leadership has--since mid-
summer--criticized "numerous problems and short-
comings" in the country's printed media
I I and Prague recently relievea
moderate Miroslav Moc from his post of editor-in-
chief of the party daily.
The Central Committee approved a letter to party
organizations on preparations for the 15th party con-
gress next April. Party chief Husak described the
note as "an important ideological-political docu-
ment." The plenum also approved a report to the
Presidium on the further development of agriculture
and the food industry.
October 8, 1975
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Iranian Prime Minister Visits Bulgaria
Agreements on economic and scientific cooperation
highlighted the visit by Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda
to Bulgaria last week. The talks continued the peri-
odic exchange of high-level visits between the two
countries--the last being by party chief Zhivkov to
Iran in 1974.
The visit received low-key coverage in the Bul-
garian press. The joint communique published on Octo-
ber 6 contained little of interest, and few details on
the agreements were released. The talks did, however,
carry forward Bulgaria's effort to expand its surface
transportation network and industry. Iran agreed to
purchase railroad passenger and freight cars, and
Bulgaria's director of freight car manufacturing plants
will visit Iran in the near future for further talks.
The Bulgarians will also increase their exports of
meat, cheese, butter, and other foodstuffs.
I one of
the main subjects of discussion was the improvement
of surface transportation through Bulgaria to facil-
itate shipments to Iran. Both countries still con-
front the Turkish bottleneck separating them. Turkey's
limited rail capacity has contributed to endemic rail
congestion at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Sofia
has been trying--with little success--to persuade the
Turks to take some cooperative action on their side
of the border.
The communique did not mention the question of
oil. As the US embassy points out, however, the sub-
ject certainly is of more than passing interest to the
Bulgarians, especially if there is any prospect that
they could obtain it on concessional terms.
October 8, 1975
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