MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

--&iR
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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0866/75
October 9, 1975
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Tunisia: Soviet Naval Visit . . . . . . . . . . 1
Iran-Bulgaria: Iranian Prime Minister's
Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Bangladesh-India: Uneasy Relations. . . . . . . 3
Afghanistan: Return of the Mohammadzai . . . . 5
Oct 9, 1975
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Tunisia
The arrival at La Goulette harbor on
October 9 of three Soviet naval ships marks
the seventh port call by the Soviet fleet to
Tunisia since May 1974. One of the ships is a
standard F-class attack submarine, the first
Soviet submarine ever to visit Tunisia.
The Tunisian government reportedly had
difficulty deciding whether or not to grant
permission for this latest visit, which the
Soviets had been seeking since early September.
Tunisian officials, traditionally wary of the
Soviet Union, apparently concluded that such visits
can serve to counter third world charges that
Tunis cooperates too closely with the US. It
is more than likely, however, that the Tunisians
will continue to grant permission for Soviet
naval visits on an ad hoc basis and will not yield
to Soviet efforts to earances for
routine port calls.
Oct 9, 1975 1
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Iran-Bulgaria
Iranian Prime Minister's Visit
Agreements on economic and scientific cooperation
highlighted the visit by Iranian Prime Minister
Hoveyda to Bulgaria last week. The talks continued
the periodic exchange of high-level visits between
the two countries--the last being by party chief
Zhivkov to Iran in 1974.
The visit received low-key coverage in the Bul-
garian press. The joint communique published on
October 6 contained little of interest, and few
details on the agreements were released. The talks
did, however, carry forward Bulgaria's effort to
expand its surface transportation network and industry.
Iran agreed to purchase railroad passenger and freight
cars, and Bulgaria's director of freight car manufac-
turing plants will visit Iran in the near future for
further talks. The Bulgarians will also increase
their exports of meat, cheese, butter, and other
foodstuffs.
I I one
of the main subjects ot discussion was e improve-
ment of surface transportation through Bulgaria to
facilitate shipments to Iran. Both countries still
confront the Turkish bottleneck separating them.
Turkey's limited rail capacity has contributed to
endemic rail congestion at the Bulgarian-Turkish
border. Sofia has been trying--with little success--
to persuade the Turks to take some cooperative action
on their side of the border.
The communique did not mention the question of
oil. As the US embassy points out, however, the sub-
ject certainly is of more than passing interest to
the Bulgarians, especially if there is any prospect
that they could obtain it on concessional terms.
I
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Afghanistan
:Return of the Mohammadzai
President Daoud has lately been restoring his
extended family, the Mohammadzai, to a central role
in his regime while reducing the influence wielded by
leftists. The Aohammadzai clan's traditional dominance
of Afghan governments had been diluted somewhat
following the leftist-led military coup that brought
Daoud to power in 1973.
One clan member who wields growing power is
Lieutenant General Ghulam Haider, the commander of
army forces in the Kabul area.
Daoud also has moved toward a reconciliation
with another prominent Mohammadzai, Major General
Abdul Wali. Wali was the Kabul area commander under
the previous royalist regime and was arrested at
the time of the coup in 1973. Last week he was
released, along with a number of other royalist
officials. Wali is expected to leave the country
shortly to join the exiled former king in Rome,
but some observers in Afglianistan believe he could
become a prominent leader--possibly even a successor
to Daoud--in the future. Daoud, Wali, and the ex-king
are close relatives.
months he has removed a number of leftists from
influential government and army positions.
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Leftists have never been numerous in Afghanistan,
but Daoud has been concerned over their ties to the
USSR and their cohesiveness in a country where no
formal political parties are permitted. He may also
have concluded, following outbreaks of anti-government
violence in August, that the conservative Islamic
tribesmen who constitute the bulk of the Afghan
populace were unhappy over government policies and
that he could mollify them by returning to a more
traditional regime.
In turning away from the left and toward the
Mohammadzai, Daoud may also be trying to improve
his government?s performance on economic and social
problems. Many of the leftists in the regime have
been young and inexperienced, while the Mohammadzai
have run the country for over a century. In any
case, Daoud does not want his downgrading of the
left to damage relations with his Soviet neighbor,
on which Afghanistan ;aas long depended for military
and economic aid.
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Secret
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