SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001900230002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 9, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
%UITT HOUE
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
143
October 9, 1975
No. 0765/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
October 9, 1975
The Difficult Side of
Honecker's Moscow Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet Nonconformists
Go on Busman's Holiday . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ukrainian Party Boss
Discloses Harvest Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . 5
Bulgarians Admonished to
Maintain Orthodoxy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Yugoslavs and Bulgarians
To Examine Macedonian Issue . . . . . . . . . . 7
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The Difficult Side of Honecker's Moscow Trip
Although the new friendship treaty with the
Soviets provided the gloss on the current, visit
of top level East Germans to Moscow, the Honecker
delegation anticipated hard bargaining over bilateral
economic problems and matters of defense and se-
curit
The Soviet decision early this year to in-
crease raw materials prices had reportedly upset
East German economic planning. As a result bilateral
economic talks had concentrated on this issue for
several months. if the Soviets failed to make price
concessions, the Honecker regime
would have to a er 1 s c is policies in order
to maintain the stand ent
economic stagnation. such
a policy could mean either a an Monmen or price
stability or closer cooperation with capitalist
states.
A shift would also place party chief Honecker
in an awkward situation. During the 15th party
plenum on October 2-3, Honecker had stressed that
the regime would continue its consumer-oriented
policies, and had referred to the impending 9th
congress as a "milestone for our social development."
East Germany may have to turn to the West for
economic assistance.
the Soviets are press-
ing East Berlin for a larger contribution to the
October 9, 1975
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Warsaw Pact defense effort, including bearing more
of the cost of stationing Soviet forces in East
Germany. If East Berlin cannot do this, Moscow
wants the East Germans to increase the size of
their defense establishment, thus permitting a cor-
responding reduction in Soviet forces in the coun-
try. The East German leadership has tried to coun-
ter the Soviet position by citing the nation's eco-
nomic burdens and obligations to the USSR. The US
embassy in Moscow has also picked up reports that
there have been differences over the troop question
in recent Soviet - East German discussions.
The regime is clearly caught in a squeeze.
Given its shortage of manpower, East Germany would
be hard pressed to expand its defense commitments
significantly without depleting the labor pool and
further weakening its economy. On the other hand,
the Honecker leadership relies on the continued
presence of Soviet forces in East Germany for do-
mestic security, which it evidently believes will
be no easier to maintain after the Helsinki summit.
(SECRET NOFORN/WNINTEL)
October 9, 1975
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Soviet Nonconformists Go on Busman's Holiday
Nonconformist artists from Moscow and Lenin-
grad, happy but tired after their recent, success-
ful exhibits, are going to Soviet Georgia for two
or three weeks of vacation. While there, however,
they will try to put on a joint show in Tbilisi
with some of their Georgian colleagues. Since of-
ficials in Moscow and Leningrad made a point of
,.limiting the shows there to local artists, the pros-
pects for approval of an inter-city exhibit are
small, but the artists say it is worth a try.
A group of some 30 nonconformists from Moscow,
Leningrad, and the Baltic republics are slated to
leave for Georgia on October 10. Meanwhile, their
Georgian counterparts reportedly are trying to get
official permission for a joint, week- or ten-day
exhibit, opening about October 18. If approval is
granted, the visiting artists will send for their
paintings--about five from each artist--and give
a boost to what all hope will be the first show of
nonconformist art in Georgia.
Apart from Moscow, Leningrad, and the more
Western-oriented Baltic capitals--especially Es-
tonia's Tallin--Tbilisi in Georgia and Yerevan in
Armenia contain the only significant concentrations
of nonconformist--some say nationalist--artists in
the USSR. The artists reportedly chose Tbilisi
over Yerevan for their attempt because the unoffi-
cial art community there is reputed to have better
relations with the municipal authorities. The
timing--immediately after the two Russian shows--
was picked so as to permit the Georgian artists,
and for that matter the city officials, to appeal
to the precedent set in Moscow and Leningrad. By
not bringing their canvasses with them immediately,
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the visitors hope to keep their hosts out of trouble
should the Tbilisi city fathers turn down the ex-
hibit. In that event, the artists say, they are
set to enjoy a rest in "sunny Georgia." (CONFID-
DENTIAL)
October 9, 1975
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Ukrainian Party Boss
Discloses Harvest Shortfall
The Soviets waited four days before publishing
an expanded version of a speech by Ukrainian party
boss Shcherbitsky that gave relatively precise indi-
cations of the shortfall in this year's Ukrainian
grain harvest. The delay plus Shcherbitsky's defen-
sive treatment of the subject seem to reflect concern
that harvest difficulties risk becoming an explosive
issue in pre-party congress politicking. Shcherbitsky
may fear that not only he, but his patron Brezhnev--
the leading spokesman for Soviet agricultural policy
--will come under criticism for the harvest failure.
By broaching the matter himself, he probably hopes
to head this off.
Speaking at the conclusion of a republic party
meeting in the Ukraine--one of the major grain
producing areas--Shcherbitsky said that the 1975
grain harvest was below expectations because of
extremely unfavorable weather. Nevertheless, he
stated, "the gross grain harvest this year will
exceed the average annual harvest in the last five-
year plan period (19.66-70) and will be significantly
more than in 1972." This works out to a harvest of
about 34 million tons, or approximately 14 to 15
million tons under the planned goal set for this
year. Shcherbitsky is the first high-level Soviet
official to reveal publicly any specific details on
the extent of this year's harvest shortfall.
Shcherbitsky then went on to call for a "cor-
rect approach" in appraising the harvest results.
He sought to absolve the party leadership and its
program, saying that the "enormous work done by
our party and the achievements in implementing the
party's agricultural policy must not be belittled."
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 9, 1975
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Bulgarians Admonished to Maintain Orthodoxy
The Bulgarian party faithful have been warned
against any relaxation of ideological vigilance in
the post-Helsinki period. Writing in the official
party organ on September 29, Lydumila Zhivkova--
Minister of Art and Culture--noted that the party
will face "certain difficulties" in the period
ahead. There will be "some tendencies," she
stressed, to propagandize "bourgeois influence...
anticommunist concepts and tendencies like violence,
racisim, discrimination, pornography...."
Zhivkova's remarks are consistent with the
rigid orthodoxy of the Bulgarian regime. It is
the timing of the publication that is significant.
Lydumila, who is party chief Zhivkov's daughter and
appears to enjoy growing prominence in government
and party circles, had just returned from the
Bucharest conference of socialist ministers of cul-
ture. Moreover, US Deputy Secretary Ingersoll--the
highest ranking US official ever to visit the
country--had only recently left Sofia, where he
had been received by top Bulgarian leaders. Zhivkov,
who has been giving increasing priority to improving
relations with the US and gaining access to much
needed Western technology, is keenly aware of the
accompanying necessity to increase political dis-
cipline at home. This. effort to sharpen the party's
ideological awareness during the East-West detente
era is likely to grow as Bulgaria approaches its
11th party congress in March 1976. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Yugoslavs and Bulgarians
To Examine Macedonian Issue
the ugos av and u garian regimes na
vene a joint meeting of scholars to recommend ways to
defuse the tangled Macedonian issue.
The inspiration for this venture reportedly came
during a meeting between party leaders Tito and
Zhivkov at the Helsinki summit. Since the CSCE ses-
sion, the Yugoslav polemic against Sofia's refusal
to distinguish between a Macedonian minority and
the Bulgarian majority has slackened.
While joint efforts are a step forward, it is
doubtful that the two sides will manage to do much
more than settle the dust for a brief time. The
spirit of the Tito-Zhivkov talks in Helsinki could
founder rather quickly if the Bulgarians proceed with
a planned census that omits a category for "Macedo-
nians." Yugoslav Macedonians view the census as an
indirect Bulgarian challenge to their nationhood
and, ultimately, to their territorial integrity.
The Yugoslavs would have little or no room for com-
promise without prompting charges that Belgrade is
selling out the interests of the smaller minorities--
a serious matter in multi-national Yugoslavia.
Even if Sofia defers the census, a host of
other issues remain outstanding. Among them are
jointly claimed cultural heroes, explanations of the
"liberation" of Yugoslav Macedonia during the war,
and linguistic claims. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 9, 1975
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