WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000100002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Turks Consider Options on Cyprus and US
Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pace of Greek Political Activity Picks Up . . 3
Italian Socialists Set Strategy Looking to
]?ebruary Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Ottawa's Economic Control Program Designed to
Check Wage Spiral and Enhance Trudeau's
Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
DOS review(s) completed.
October 20, 1975
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Turks Consider options on `'.his and ITS
Bases
Turkey's policy options regarding Cyprus an'
the US bases issue will be under high level review
at. today's meeting of the National Security Council
and later this week when the cabinet convenes. The
results will provide important clues as to the
practical effect of last week's mid--term senatorial
elections on Prime Minister Demirel's ability to
move his fractious coalition government to act de-
cisively on the critical. issues facing the country.
It remains to be seen whether Demirel's most
troublesome coalition partner, ?Tecmettin Erbakan,
has been chastened enough by his National Salvation
party's substantial electoral losses to follow
Demirel's lead. The attitude of opposition leader
Bulent Ecevit is another unknown, His party's
strong election showing may make him more aggressive
and reluctant to give Demirel the latitude required
to deal with these problems.
The military's input into these foreign policy
deliberations will be channeled through the National
Security Council. The communique issued after the
Council's meeting today did not offer any hint as
to what their recommendation would be. Military
leaders are thought, however, to desire rapid move-
ment to consolidate the gains made on Cyprus last
o
a
restore re
summer,
Turkey's international isolation.
(,ctol-er 20, 1975
ns with the US and mitigate
ti
l
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Pace of Greek Political Activity Picks Up
The pace of Greek political activity has in-
creased following the convening of parliament on
October 6 and major speeches by the various political
party leaders on October 16. Prime Minister Cara-
manlis' New Democracy Party continued to act in un-
ison as its candidates swept the elections for parlia-
mentary offices.
Caramanlis put on an excellent performance be-
fore the parliament and seemed to emerge as the winner
of the debate with the opposition. His speech con-
tained no surprises, and was devoted primarily to
foreign policy.
Caramanlis defended his Balkan Conference initia-
tives by citing the desire to eliminate the traditional
distrust among Balkan countries and to substitute for
it cooperation in accord with the "spirit of Helsinki
He noted that while Albania had refused to participate,
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania had accepted. He
expressed hope that Turkey would, too, so that the con-
ference might be convened by the end of the year.
He linked Greece's withdrawal from the military
side of NATO to the situation engendered by the Turk-
ish invasion of Cyprus and consideration of eventual
reintegration to the solving of the Cyprus problem.
Meanwhile, Greece would seek a "special relationship"
with NATO similar to that of France or Norway. He
also noted that Greek entrance into the EC would con-
solidate Greek democracy, reinforce the nation's
security, and accelerate its cultural and economic
development.
Caramanlis explained that the revision of defense
relations with the US does not arise out of any
hostility toward the US but rather, out of the need to
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harmonize the status of the US bases with current
reality and Greek national interests. Consequently,
some bases would be dismantled while others would be
reduced in size and come under national control.
The Prime Minister expressed the hope that Turkey
will move to settle the Cyprus dispute now that'the
US embargo has been eased and the senatorial elections
have been held but he was not optimistic. He promised
to continue the struggle for a just solution in the
event the Turks are not forthcoming. He declared
that Greece wants a peaceful settlement of the Aegean
controversy by means of international arbitration, but
cautioned that Turkey would make a great mistake
were it to interpret this as a sign of weakness.
On domestic issues, Caramanlis asserted that the
government had carried out all appropriate measures
against junta elements and that further prosecutions
would be selective and not by group. In this regard,
he announced another postponement of the trial of those
responsible for the Cyprus coup against President
Makarios because such a trial would harm national inter-
ests. He blamed the country's economic woes on junta
mismanagement, large defense expenditures, and unfavor-
able international economic conditions. He cautioned
labor against disruptive strikes and excessive demands;
promising that sacrifices now would assure economic
and social progress in the near future.
Caramanlis' comments were followed by those of
Center Union/New Forces leader George Mavros who
agreed essentially with most of the government's
positions, pointing out the continued difficulty the
party is having in establishing its own identity.
Mavros did call for a more thorough purge of junta
elements and for the reform of the bureauacy. Pan-
hellenic Social Movement leader Andreas Papandreou
took exception to nearly all the government's posi-
tions, and his presentation was marked by numerous
interjections by Caramanlis and a lengthy heated
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exchange with Mavros over an incident in last year's
election campaign. Communist Party of the Interior
spokesman Leonidas Kirkos stressed the need for a
more intensive purge of junta elements from the
state machine. The Moscow-backed Communist Party of
the Exterior boycotted the session because of a
parliamentary ruling that prevented its leader,
Harilaos Florakis from speaking.
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Italian Socialists Set Strategy Looking to
February Congress
The Italian Socialist Party last week approved
a platform designed to distinguish the party from
both the Christian Democrats and Communists and to
reinforce its pivotal position between them. The
platform was put together in strategy sessions held
by the Socialist central committee to r.nrepare for
the party congress in February.
Socialist chief De Martino practically ruled
out his party's return to full participation in the
national, government before the next parliamentary
election, which must be held by the spring of
1977. In the meantime, the Socialists seem willing
to continue their crucial parliamentary support
for some kind of interim government, such as Prime
Minister Tioro's Christian Democratic--Republican
coalition. Socialist support for Tloro will be
reviewed, however, after the passage of emergency
anti-recession measures and the conclusion of talks
between government and labor on major contract
renewals.
In any event, the Socialists categorically
exclude a return to the formula that has been the
basis for most Italian governments since 1963--
a center-left coalition dominated by the Christian
Democrats. De r1artino left the door open to renewed
collaboration with the Christian Democrats after
the next election, provided they accept Socialist
programs and agree to a mechanism that would obligate
the Communists to support the government's decisions.
The Communists' lack of enthusiasm for the
latter idea--which is intended to minimize the
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advantages of their opposition status--has
strained relations with the Socialists. While
De Plartino noted that the Communists had adopted
a number of democratic policies in recent years,
he put more emphasis on the contradiction between
that trend and the Communists' continuing ties
to Moscow. That was one of the reasons cited
by De Tlartino in ruling out for the near term
either a Communist-Socialist alliance at the
national level or the "historic compromise"--
Communist leader Berlinguer's proposal for a rap-
prochement with the Christian Democrats which the
Socialists fear would relegate them to a marginal
role in Italian political life.
The Socialists, by adopting these policies,
are attempting to apply the lessons they drew
from the outcome and aftermath of the regional
and local elections last June. The Socialists
advanced only moderately in those contests while
the Communists scored unprecedented gains--a develop-
ment the Socialists attribute to their long associa-
tion with the Christian Democrats in the government.
At the same time, the Socialists' experience
in the many local coalitions they formed with
the Communists after the elections has revived
Socialist fears of_ ultimately being absorbed by
the stronger and better-organized Communists.
By taking their distance from the Christian
Democrats, the Socialists hope to compete on an
equal footing with the Communists for the votes of
dissatisfied Italians in the next election. The
Socialists also hope to derive political advantage
by highlighting the differences between themselves
and the Communists, particularly on international
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Ottawa's Economic Control Program Designed to
deau's Image
T
ru
Check Wage Spiral and Enhance
The main goals of the tough anti-inflation
program announced by the Canadian government
last week are to check excessive wage increases
and to refurbish Prime Minister Trudeau's image
as a "take-charge" leader.
Trudeau, according to an aide, had been
forced to act now because wages, particularly
for provincial and municipal workers, were
out of control. The government recognized
the problems involved in regulating prices,
but concluded that wages could not be restrained
without also trying to control prices. For
cosmetic purposes, Ottawa hopes the new federal
Anti-Inflation Review Board's first case will
focus on prices, because a move to roll back
a price increase would help convince labor
of the government's good faith.
Although the Canadian Labor Confederation
initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude,
labor leaders now appear to view the government's
program as designed to control wages. Opposition
by the Confederation and its affiliated unions
is growing. Several unions have threatened
to ignore wage controls and to challenge the
constitutionality of the program in the courts.
Trudeau's aide indicated that the decision
to adopt controls was also based upon the need
to improve his image as a strong leader. Political
observers note that after the Prime Minister
appeared on television to announce bold new
programs to deal with the 1970 Quebec crisis
and the 1972 oil crisis, his Gallup poll ratings
soared.
October 20, 1975
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Trudeau's prestige has been slipping in
the facie of Ottawa's failure to deal effectively
with Canada's economic problems. Dissidents
in his Liberal Party threatened to call for
a special leadership convention at next month's
party conference, a move some observers felt
might have the support of 20 to 25 percent
of the delegates. This potentially serious
blow to Trudeau's prestige is believed by the
government to have been overcome by the bold
new economic program.
Eight of the ten provinces have agreed
to go along with the program and Ottawa is
hopeful they will set up provincial anti-inflation
boards. This would make it easier for Ottawa
to administer the program, as well as shift
some of the tough decisions on wages and prices
to provincial governments most of which are
controlled by opposition parties.
Trudeau,however, faces opposition from
two provincial premiers David Barrett of British
Columbia and Peter Loughheed of Alberta. Barrett
needs labor support in the election next year
and Loughheed, according to Trudeau's aid,
wants to enhance his chances to assume the
national leadership of the Progressive Conservative
Party. Loughheed publicly opposes the program
because he believes it will hinder Alberta's
industrial development and exploitation of
its resources. Loughheed's opposition, while
popular in Alberta, is at odds with the national
party's long standing advocacy of wage and
price controls.
The US embassy in Ottawa believes that
the Trudeau government may be over optimistic
about the program's chances of success. The
constitutionality of the program is likely
to be tested in the courts and there is no
assurance that Trudeau's political position
will be strengthened. The government also
may have over emphasized the political advantages
without giving sufficient thought to the long-
range economic consequences of the program.
pctober 20, 1975
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