WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000220001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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NOFORN
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Secret
No. 0294-75
October 24, 19775
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NO CONTRACT
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(i), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Political Maneuvering in Turkey on Eve of
Bases Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NATO and Arms Standardization . . . . . . . . . 3
Icelandic Women Strike! . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EC Seeks OECD Help for Europe's Ailing 7
Steel Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
October 24, 1975
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Political Maneuvering in Turkey on Eve of US
Bases Negotiations
With negotiations on the status of the US bases
scheduled to begin next week, Turkish Prime Minister
Demirel is still trying to reach a consensus within
his fractious coalition that would allow him to act
decisively on both the bases issue and the Cyprus
problem.
The National Security Council met on October
20--with the most troublesome coalition partner
Necmettin Erbakan present--to review policy options
on pressing foreign policy matters. The Council
agreed to recommend opening talks with the US on
the bases and to try again for a solution to the
Cyprus problem.
The cabinet has not yet considered the Council's
recommendations. It is possible, however, that
when a cabinet meeting is finally held, Erbakan--
feeling on stronger ground than in the Security
Council--may still raise objections to the Council's
recommendations.
Erbakan appears determined to maintain his ob-
structionist position within the government despite
his party's substantial losses in the recent mid-term
senatorial elections. According to
relations between Demirel and Erbakan have deteriorate
since the election. Erbakan's party has openly
threatened to boycott cabinet meetings until Demirel
accepts the party's conservative policies reiterated
by the leadership on October 20.
'T'hat threat, which was accompanied by Erbakan's
reiteration of his uncompromising position on Cyprus,
sparked a wave of speculation about the possible
break-up of the coalition. The government will
probably survive, but there is likely to be continued
bickering between Demirel and Erbakan in the coming
weeks, with the Prime Minister's ability to act
decisively hanging in the balance.
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Demirel is trying to reduce Erbakan's influence
in the coalition by wooing dissident parliamentary
deputies from minor parties on the ri ht--including
Erbakan's. According to Demirel 25X1C
is also considering ways to foster a split between
Erbakan and Minister of Agriculture Ozal, who re-
portedly opposes Erbakan's hard line and controls
nearly half of Erbakan's parliamentary contingent.
Demirel is, unlikely, however, to win enough support
through these maneuvers to offset the possible de-
fection of Erbakan from the coalition. As a result,
the Prime Minister reportedly is also considering
offering more ministries to Salvationist deputies
in exchange for a softening of Erbakan's position
on the Cyprus question.
In approaching sensitive foreign policy issues,
Demirel will also be keeping an eye on both opposition
leader Ecevit and the military. Ecevit's strong
showing in the election may make him more aggressive
and reluctant to give Demirel the latitude he needs
to deal decisively with these problems. Their views
on Cyprus are not far apart, but Ecevit continues to
take a hard line on the US bases.
The military wants to consolidate gains made
last summer on Cyprus, restore relations with the
US and ease Turkey's sense of international isolation.
Military leaders generally agree that the government's
continuing inaction is exacerbating these already
sensitive problems. They may already have put pres-
sure on the politicians--Demirel in particular--to
reach some solution on the Cyprus issue and move to
normalize relations with the US. (SECRET NOFORN/
NOCONTRACT)
October 24, 1975
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NATO and Arms Standardization
At a meeting on Wednesday which had been expected
to approve implementation of the Alliance's new arms
standardization initiative, the NATO ambassadors de-
cided to defer action pending clarification of a col-
lective European position. The formal cause for the
delay was the uncertainty surrounding French condi-
tions for participation in the effort. What really
underlies the European hesitation, however, is a con-
tinuing fear--shared by all the allies--that unless
modified, the arms standardization program could ulti-
mately enhance US domination of Europe.
The effort to standardize conventional armaments
among the allies is as old as the Alliance itself.
The endeavor has recently drawn new life from a uni-
que conjunction of political, strategic and economic
conditions., The onset of strategic parity and the
modernization and reinforcement of Warsaw Pact con-
ventional capabilities in Europe have highlighted the
need to strengthen the Alliance's ability to resist a
conventional attack. The economic difficulties en-
countered by the West, coupled with the rising cost
of military hardware, have made the idea economically
more attractive. Finally, precarious conditions on
NATO's southern flank have lent real urgency to the
need to shore up the Alliance.
The Europeans have generally welcomed indications
during the past year that the US, in proposing to buy
more of its weapons in Europe, would be willing to
end its predominance in trans-Atlantic arms trade and
encourage the development of a technologically and
economically competitive European arms industry.
Apart from the economic benefits expected to flow
from such an arrangement, this prospect was especially
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appealing to Europeans who fear that detente would event-
ually lead to their permanent subordination to the US.
At this week's meeting, however, French ambassador
de Rose expressed concern that the present American
terms for US purchases in Europe would not in fact in-
ject balance into the trans-Atlantic arms trade. The
key issue is the apparent US requirement that European
hardware, to qualify for purchase by the US, meet strict
standards. of quality and economy. The French complain
that Europe still lacks the organization to enable it
to compete on equal terms with the US and that the US
condition thus implies a degree of European political
and economic unity that does not yet exist. The French
would clearly like the strict US economic requirements
relaxed and some form of subsidy for European industry
introduced to encourage the cooperative steps that will
make equal competition possible. As the French see it,
participation in the trans-Atlantic arms trade would
otherwise threaten the eventual reduction of European
industry to a state of substantial technological depend-
ence.
Although the French were in the forefront of the
Wednesday discussion, others clearly share their views.
The official NATO proposal presented to the ambassadors
sought to characterize the effort merely as an initiative
on reciprocal arms sales rather than one embracing co-
production arrangements which would require a collective
European industrial base. This position reflects a
general European desire to await evidence that the US
plans to deliver on its promises to increase its pur-
chases of European equipment. Without such evidence,
other Europeans have indicated that the "two-way street"
might only tempt the Europeans to exploit the US init-
iative for short-term economic advantage.
The fact that France has raised these arguments
puts the question in its most acute form--a fact surely
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not lost on France's European allies. For without the
participation of France's sizable arms industry, the
effort to organize a competitive European arms program
is likely to suffer. Pressure on France by its Euro-
pean allies to step up its cooperation in this area with
the Alliance is also likely to subside until there are
signs that a collective effort would benefit all of
them.
The allies will meet again on November 12, after
the European members have met in the Eurogroup forum
to complete their response to the official NATO proposal.
The allies also hope to receive more information regard-
ing the terms of French participation. Further discus-
sion focusing on how the US intends to interpret the
"two-way street" can be expected at that meeting.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
October 24, 1975
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Icelandic Women Strike!
Over 90 percent of all employed women in Iceland
stayed at home today to demonstrate their importance to
the national economy. Many housewives also reportedly
are taking the day off.
The work stoppage has had a major impact. Most stores
simply decided not to open their doors this morning, and
radio and TV are expected to go off the air. The most
critical impact has been the shutting down of the tele-
phone system--the exchanges are manually (womenly) oper-
ated. This has brought all bureaucracies, especially the
government, to a standstill.
When plans for the one-day stoppage in observance of
the UN Womens' Year were first announced, Iceland's men
treated it as a joke. Today, however, one man was quoted
to the effect that the only way to cope is for the men
immediately to stage a sympathy strike. (UNCLASSIFIED)
October 24, 1975
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