SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000230002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 28, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
October 28, 1975
SC No. 00533/75
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Warning Notice
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(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
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Release to ...
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 28, 1975
Yugoslavia: Stalinists in the Dock. . . . . . . 1
Hungary: Central Committee Meets. . . . . . . . 7
New Iraq-USSR Oil
Development Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Japan-USSR: Fishery Accord. . . . . . . . . . . 9
Soviets Seek Help for
Diesel Truck Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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Yugoslavia: Stalinists in the Dock
Belgrade's strongest campaign against pro-Soviet
subversives in at least four years continues to gain
momentum. The US embassy reports that 123 Comin-
formists are now in Yugoslav jails awaiting trial.
Denunciations of the Cominformists are pouring
in from every corner of the country. The party
weekly Kommunist set off the anti-Stalinist campaign
two weeks ago with a stinging attack on "counter-
revolutionaries and traitors" who covertly undermine
the country's independence and social system. Top
level party and government spokesmen have followed
up with specific references to the desires of the
subversives to attach Yugoslavia to the Soviet "camp."
Many of these hints of suspicion about Moscow's at-
titude toward the Tito regime have been broadcast to
the USSR.
The anti-Stalinist hue and cry derives from Bel-
grade's awareness that the faltering economic per-
formance this year could create an opportunity for a
small but highly organized group--like the Comin-
formists--to undermine the Tito system. Wary that
the group might be gathering strength for a strong
post-Tito drive for power, the regime appears deter-
mined to imprison all the potential Stalinists it
can find before it is too late.
Behind this passionate reaction lies a deep-
seated fear that Moscow's benevolence toward Belgrade
over the past few years only masked an ultimate So-
viet plan to restore Yugoslavia, by whatever means,
to the Soviet orbit. The current easing of the re-
gime's usual strictures against anti-Soviet propa-
ganda is apparently meeting an overly enthusiastic
response from the masses. Last Friday, Kommunist
sternly warned those who "slander" honest Communists
as "Cominformists" that only the subversives stand
to gain from the spread of doubts about the leader-
ship.
October 28, 1975
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Until recently, the details of the conspiracy,
its size, and plans for trials were kept under wraps,
but the party and front groups are now filtering out
information which implies that some sentences may be
doled out soon. Although there are occasional rumors
of a public show trial, insiders are now suggesting
that the trials will be held in camera;. and that the
results will be carefully used to feed the current
"vigilance" campaign.
According to the US embassy, the Belgrade diplo-
matic circuit is abuzz with speculation about a new
downturn in relations with Moscow, but a full breach
is not expected. So long as Belgrade does not in-
dulge in overtly anti-Soviet allegations and Moscow
holds its anger in check, the two countries are likely
to maintain their uneasy relationship. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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TOP SECRET UMBRA
Hungary: Central Committee Meets
At a one-day session on October 23, the Hun-
garian party Central Committee decided to carry out
a party card exchange in 1976. The announcement of
the program at the congress last March implied it
would be implemented this year. The delay may be
the result of nothing more than routine bureau-
cratic problems.
The session also issued a communique on foreign
I policy issues that broke little new ground. The
document said that detente is gaining ground, ap-
j_ plauded the Helsinki accord, and warmly endorsed
Soviet proposals for general and total disarmament.
It called the SALT negotiations of "very great
importance" and plumped for adoption of the War-
saw Pact's proposals at the MBFR talks.
The communique pointed to the Middle East as
a continuing source of "considerable danger," re-
affirmed full Hungarian support for the Arabs, and
disparaged "the optimism" of those "who con-
cluded the Sinai II agreement." The statement sup-
-j--ported the Portuguese Communist Party in its efforts
to "transform" the country "democratically."
The communique was optimistic about the chances
1 for increased cooperation within the Communist
Z movement, but said only that Hungary "is particip-
ating" in preparations for the European Communist
Conference. (CONFIDENTIAL)
October 28, 1975
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TOP SECRET UMBRA
New Iraq-USSR Oil Development Contract
The USSR and Iraq have signed a contract for
exploitation of the Luhais oil field in southern
Iraq. The oil field is expected to produce at least
50,000 barrels a day.
Soviet equipment will be used to construct a
gas separation unit, a pumping station, storage
tanks, and a power plant. Moscow provided technical
assistance and long-term credits in 1969 for ex-
ploration of this major oil field. Moscow also
will help construct a 50- to 60-mile pipeline con-
necting the new field with Iraq's pipelines in the
south. There is no indication that the Soviets will
be involved in financing the $50-million project.
A number of developing nations that received
Soviet oil development assistance in'the past are
now turning to more advanced Western petroleum
technology. Iraq, however, appears sufficiently
satisfied with Soviet performance to conclude a
new contract. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Japan-USSR: Fishery Accord
The three-year fishing agreement between the
Soviet Union and Japan, which took effect Thursday,
is aimed at preventing disputes over accidents in-
volving Soviet fishing vessels operating near
Japan's eastern Pacific coast.
Soviet trawlers have frequently damaged Japa-
nese fishing gear. Refusal of the Soviet Ministry
of Fisheries to pay for these accidents has been a
long-standing irritant to Tokyo. Under the agree-
ment, the Japanese can now demand compensation for
damage inflicted on their fishing boats and equip-
ment; compensation would be retroactive for two
years. The Soviets also agreed to take preventive
measures in the future, but refused a Japanese
request to exercise restraint in their trawling
operations near Japan's coastal waters.
The agreement will be extended automatically
unless either of the two parties gives six months'
notice of intention to terminate it (UNCLASSIFIED)
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Soviets Seek US Help for
Diesel Truck Program
The USSR is planning to make another large in-
vestment in truck manufacturing. The Soviets want
to obtain US technical assistance and engine design
for the production of 200,000 diesel engines a
year. The engines are to be built for Likhachev, a
leading Soviet truck manufacturer in Moscow, at an
affiliate plant to be constructed in Smolensk.
Company officials have been discussing the project
with International Harvester of Chicago for several
months, and prospects are good for conclusion of a
contract next year. Party Chief Brezhnev was person-
ally involved in starting the negotiations.
Likhachev's decision to build diesel engines
in the 150-- to 160-horsepower range probably means
that Likhachev's medium sized 3- to 5-ton trucks,
now powered with gasoline engines, will be shifted
to diesel power. Greater use of diesel power in
truck transportation could mean better performance
at reduced operating cost. The only current pro-
ducer of truck diesels in the USSR, the Yaroslavl
Engine Plant, builds up to 100,000 engines a year
for use in heavy and off-highway trucks. These
engines fall below Western standards in quality
and performance.
The USSR has sought unsuccessfully for years
to obtain Western production technology and design
for diesel engines. Successful conclusion of ne-
gotiations with International Harvester will be a
significant technological gain for the USSR. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
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