CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000250001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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i
NOFORN
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
Handle via Talent- Keybde Channels
October 28, 1975
TCS No. 784/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11662, exemption category:
4 5B(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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ORCON/NOCONTRACT
CHINESE AFFAIRS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
October 28, 1975
The Militia: Changing Roles Again. . . . . . . 1
A Cautious Look at Portuguese Timor . . . . . . 4
Commemorating the Long March. . . . . . . . . . 6
Sino--Japanese Oil Pact Negotiations . . . . . . 8
Shanghai Leads in Rapid Expansion of
China's Petrochemical Industry. . . . . . . . 11
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ANNEX: Angola and Rhodesia:
An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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The Militia: Changing Roles Again
Since the early 1970s the militia has spent
little time sharpening its military skills and in-
stead has been deeply involved with production,
political activities and police functions. During
the past couple of months, however, there seems to
have been a reordering of these priorities. As
early as June, Fukien began to emphasize military
training for the militia, but in most places this
policy did not emerge in full view until September
and October.
Central Directive 18 has inspired a broad ef-
ort MMMMTO upgrade the military proficiency of both
_
the urban and rural militia. Provincial militia
conferences have been held in a few places. The
conference in Kwangtung, for instance, was addressed
by fairly senior provincial party and military dis-
trict leaders who stressed the need to prepare for
war and implement the "latest important instructions"
of Mao and the Central Committee. Underscoring these
themes, participants at the conference were taken to
observe a demonstration of antiaircraft gunnery given
by the militia of a number of Canton factories. The
meeting's final document and the accompanying South-
ern DaiZy editorial were replete with references to
the need for raising military proficiency.
On the anniversary of Mao's 1958 call for militia
building, other provinces likewise have emphasized in
their media treatment the military role of the militia.
For instance, in Hopei the militia was given training
in anti-tank warfare, while in Liaoning the emphasis
was on repelling enemy landings and house-to-house
combat.
This renewed emphasis on military affairs does
not mean that the militia's police and production
October 28, 1975
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functions have been dropped completely. They are
now, however, played less prominently in the press.
Whereas since the organization of the urban militia
in fall, 1973, Shanghai has been held up as a na-
tional model for enforcing the dictatorship of the
proletariat, in recent broadcasts there is scant men-
tion of Shanqhai in discussing militia affairs.
This change in the militia's functions may
not stem solely from Peking's revised view of mili-
tary priorities as enshrined in Directive 18, but
could also reflect disenchantment with the perfor-
mance of the urban militia during the past months.
In attempting to control worker unrest this summer,
in some places the militia itself became embroiled
in the factionalism and had to be disbanded. Indeed,
this is one of the reasons Peking was forced to send
the PLA into Chekiang. Deeply suspicious of any en-
largement of the PLA's role in civil affairs, Peking
at this point may have no choice but to strengthen
the Public Security Bureau. While the bureau has been
rebuilt down to the local levels, it does not appear
currently to have regained its pre - Cultural Revolu-
tion authority.
If the past is any guide to the present, it is
likely that the decision to give the militia a
more important place in China's defense was not
taken without controversy. During the past decade
or so the militia has been a contentious issue
within China's leadership, raising questions about
allocation of military resources, control and defense
strategy. Throughout this period there have always
been important elements within the military estab-
lishment that have opposed assigning the militia a
larger role. In the mid-1960s then chief of staff
Lo Jui-ching argued for a conventional force defense
of China in the event of attack and objected strongly
to the notion of a people's war which assigned a
vital role to the militia. This was probably a factor
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in Lo's purge. In the late 1960s Lin Piao, apparently
under strong pressures from within the military, al-
lowed militia training to languish. Finally, in mid-
1973 when the organization of the urban militia was
under consideration, the PLA made its position clear
in the pages of the Liberation Army DaiZy by arguing
against such an expanded role.
It is not difficult to see why a decision to
emphasize military training would generate misgivings
in the military establishment, particularly among
strong advocates of a modernized army. Not only does
it tend to reduce the importance of the PLA regular
forces in China's defense, but it has been made quite
clear in the media that the militia will remain under
strict party, rather than military, control. In ad-
dition it seems likely that such a training program
will tend to draw down the PLA's own resources. Al-
though there have been indications in the press that
Peking wants militia units to rely on their own re-
sources, this may be too much to ask. In Szechuan,
for example, regular army units have already been
used to assist the militia in training.
If opposition exists within the military, it
probably carries little weight. While it is still
too early to reach any firm judgments, the national
and provincial press have given little hint of op-
position to this larger military role for the militia.
It may be that such a role was one of the concessions
which the military modernizers, Lo Jui-ching included,
had to make in order to push through the other reforms
contained in Central Directive 18. (SECRET NOFORN)
October 28, 1975
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A Cautious Look at Portuguese Timor
With one eye focused carefully on Jakarta, the
Chinese press and Foreign Ministry have cautiously
taken note of the situation in Portuguese Timor, com-
menting publicly on the colony for the first time
since Lisbon began its decolonization program last
year.
Although Peking's sympathies clearly lie with
the leftist Fretilin, which advocates immediate in-
dependence, the Chinese have not directly criticized
other groups in the colony, one of which is closely
identified with Jakarta's desire to incorporate Por-
tuguese Timor into Indonesia. A brief NCNA broadcast
on October 14 depicted Fretilin as having the support
of "most of the people" in the colony and pointed up
the rebels' recent military gains.
The same broadcast also referred--without ex-
plicit criticism--to Indonesian Foreign Minister
Malik's publicly expressed "hope" that East Timor
would join Indonesia and to foreign press accounts
of Indonesian "attacks" on the colony earlier in
the month.
that Fretilin representatives had sought
Chinese military and economic assistance during re-
cent meetings with Chinese officials in Australia
and Mozambique. Implying a rejection of the Fretilin
request, it noted that the situation in Timor was
very unstable and China should not commit itself too
rapidly in order not to tarnish its image of non-
interference in Timor's internal affairs. Evidence
of Soviet meddling in Timor, on the other hand, should
be exposed if it is uncovered,
October 28, 1975
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Chinese leaders recognize that overt support
of Fretilin would seriously jeopardize their long-
standing efforts to improve official relations with
Indonesia. The Chinese almost certainly realize
that any direct involvement in Timor would play di-
rectly into the hands of elements in Indonesia--
especially in the military--who oppose improved re-
lations with Peking out of fear of Chinese "expan-
sionism."
The status of Lisbon's other enclave in East
Asia, Macao, probably has contributed to Chinese
caution on the Timor question. Peking considers
Macao to be Chinese territory "temporarily" occu-
pied by the Portuguese and wants no immediate change
in the colony's status. The Chinese are especially
opposed to any notion of an independent Macao and
supported the colonial government's removal from
the colony of a handful of Portuguese leftists who
advocated independence earlier in the year.
For these reasons, the Chinese can be expected
to continue to play down future developments in Timor,
avoiding positions that could undermine Peking's ef-
forts to improve ties with Jakarta or its preference
for a continuation of the status quo in Macao. (SE-
CRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
October 28, 1975
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Commemorating the Long March
The unprecedented media attention which Peking
has given to the 40th anniversary of the Long March
harbors a curious mixture of accolade for the PLA
as a whole and admonition for certain elements within
the military establishment. With the winding down
of the anti-Confucius campaign in mid-1974, public
criticism of the PLA has been substantially reduced,
but now the Central seems to have gone a step further
by endeavoring to polish the army's image. The joint
People's Daily Liberation Army Daily editorial spared
few superlatives in glorifying the Red Army, precur-
sor of the PLA. High-ranking military men from the
region and district levels were accorded prominent
roles in the provincial celebrations, and veteran
cadres were called upon to recount their experiences
of the Long March. Many of these military figures
had a hard time of it during the Cultural Revolution,
and the festivities seemed to be Peking's way of wel-
coming them back to the fold.
If the Central simply sought to use the Long
March to renovate reputations and images, it could
have accomplished this without discussing in some
detail the issue of dissident lines within the army
during the 1934-35 trek. In fact, the joint edi-
torial, the reprint of Liu Po-cheng's 1959 article,
and all but a couple of provincial accounts of the
celebrations focused on the victory of Mao's line
over those of Wang Ming and Chang Kuo-tao. The
editorial, which presents the most authoritative
exposition, labels the factions headed by Wang and
Chang during the Long March as "revisionist/capi-
tulationist." It goes on to lecture that the march
was successful only because these dissidents were
defeated by Mao's revolutionary line and urges per-
sistent opposition to capitulationists today.
October 28, 1975
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The term "capitulationism" appeared from time
to time during the anti-Confucius campaign in con-
nection with Lin Piao's alleged sympathy for recon-
ciliation with the Soviet Union. Capitulation to
the Soviets has also been a major theme in the cur-
rent movement to study the novel "Water Margin."
By raising the issue again in the context of dis-
cussing factionalism within the military, albeit
historical, Peking seems to be admonishing certain
elements within the PLA high command who are sus-
pected of favoring some measure of accommodation
with the Soviet Union. Indeed,
in talking confidentially abou mi i ary
lea ers with strong political impulses, recently
commented that "there are still plenty of them (Lin
Piao elements) about." He went on to say, however,
that the bulk of the army was solidly behind the
administration.
This view fits well with the press treatment
of the Long March which seems to reassure the PLA
as a whole while pointing the finger at certain sus-
pect elements. While Peking provides few hints as
to whom these individuals might be, it does appear to
suggest that nothing dramatic will be done about them,
at least for the present. The Long March editorial
as well as the provincial press, in speaking of cur-
rent priorities, encapsulates them in "Chairman Mao's
three directives. These make it clear that sta-
bility and unity in the interest of economic growth
are equally important as "combating revisionism."
(SECRET NOFORN/NO CONTRACT/ORCON)
October 28, 1975
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Sino-Japanese Oil Pact Negotiations
The first stage of Sino-Japanese negotiations
for a long-term oil pact ended in late September
with the Japanese offering to buy quantities of
crude oil well below the production capability an-
ticipated by the Chinese. According to the tenta-
tive agreement, Japan's purchases would increase
nominally next year to 172,000 barrels per day from
the 156,000 barrels per day contracted for this year.
The quantity would then increase by 86,000 barrels
per day each year, with the possibility of a "bal-
loon" increase in 1980 that could bring the total to
576,000 barrels per day. Peking had earlier discussed
exports of 1,000,000 barrels per day.
Japan was scheduled to send a high-level delega-
tion to Peking on October 21 for further talks. A
final pact will not be signed until differences over
price and Japanese proposals for reciprocal Chinese
purchases of oil equipment are settled. Peking,
initially at least, is rejecting Japanese demands
for lowering the $12.10 a barrel price charged in
1975 contracts to "a price competitive with Dlid-East
oil." The two sides have agreed that equipment pur-
chases will be straight commercial deals without Japa-
nese participation in the Chinese oil industry.
Peking wanted to sell nearly all of its export-
able crude to Japan through 1980. This tentative
agreement reflects China's acceptance of market re-
alities. With world oil in ample supply, guaranteed
markets for annually increasing quantities of Chinese
crude are hard to find because of its high price,
paraffin content and high transport costs.
Peking undoubtedly is intensifying efforts to
find alternative markets for its crude oil. Other
Asian markets such as the Philippines and Thailand
October 28, 1975
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are small, and possible sales to Western Europe or
the US are unlikely as long as Peking's prices and
transport costs remain noncompetitive.
Peking may now look more kindly on proposals
to channel crude to refineries to be built in loca-
tions along China's periphery. For example, explora-
tory talks have taken place for a 200,000 barrel per
day refinery and petrochemical plant to be built in
Macao by Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha of Japan. Chinese
communists in Hong Kong have asked Singapore oil
companies. to process Chinese crude, with the re-
sulting products to be returned to the Chinese. (SE-
CRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL)
October 28, 1975
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Shanghai Leads in Rapid Expansion of China's
Petrochemical Industry
Petrochemical production in Shanghai will soon
take on major importance as the large integrated
petrochemical complex nears completion. Chinese
news media have trumpeted the rapid completion of
this project in a number of recent press releases.
The core of the project is a dozen foreign-built
p:Lants in a production chain which focuses on the
output of fibers and plastics. The complex was
completed in only twenty-one months.
The Chinese recently revealed still another
large petrochemical complex under construction in
South China near Canton. Recently developed oil
:fields in that area reportedly will provide feed-
stocks, and foreign firms probably will provide
the bulk of the plant and equipment. Very few de-
tails on the status of this project have yet become
available to us.
Expansion of the oil industry in recent years
has made possible the rapid growth of the petro-
chemical industry. China has ample oil and gas
for feedstock, and growing oil exports have eased
the problem of buying foreign petrochemical plants
and technology.
(TOP
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October 10 Congolese military delegation arrives
in Peking. (U)
October 12 Singapore trade delegation departs for
China to promote trade ties between the
two countries. (U)
October 13 Chinese charge Hsiao Te arrives in
Manila to set up Chinese embassy in the
Philippines. (U)
Spokesman for Chinese Foreign Ministry
issues "statement" rebuking US for al-
lowing Tibet independence activities in
the United States. (U)
October 14 Secretary general of the UN Conference
on Trade and Development arrives in Pe-
king for an eight-day visit. (U)
Official delegation from Bahrain ar-
rives in Peking for a four-day visit. (U)
October 15 Brazilian parliamentary delegation be-
gins official visit to China. (U)
October 15 - National Conference on Learning from
20 Tachai holds concluding session; Hua
Kuo-feng delivers summing-up speech.
(U)
October 16 New scientific and technical protocol
signed with Albania. (U)
Madame Mariam Traore, wife of Malian
head of state, arrives in Peking for a
five-day visit; meets with Mao on Oc-
tober 19. (U)
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October 16 Japanese economic delegation arrives
in Peking; meets with Foreign Trade
Minister Li Chiang on October 17 and
with Liao Cheng-chih, president of the
China-Japan Friendship Association, on
October 21.
October 17 Party delegation headed by central com-
mittee member Chang Ping-hua departs for
Romania. (U)
October 18 New scientific and technical protocol
signed with Czechoslovakia. (U)
Trade protocol signed with Guinea. (U)
October 19 China observes 40th anniversary of
completion of Long March; People's
Daily and Liberation Army Daily pub-
lish joint editorial. (U)
October 19 - Secretary Kissinger visits China; meets
23 with Chairman Mao on October 21. (U)
October 20 Chinese Charge Lu Tzu-po arrives in
Bangkok to establish Chinese embassy
in Thailand. (U)
October 21 Shipping agreement signed with Algeria.
(U)
Trade delegation from Guyana arrives
in Peking. (U)
New scientific and technical protocol
signed with Yugoslavia. (U)
October 23 Royalty from Nepal arrive in China for
official visit. (U)
October 28, 1975
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October 24 Chinese "friendship delegation" ar-
rives in Pyongyang to attend cere-
monies marking 25th anniversary of
the entry of Chinese "volunteers"
into the Korean War. (U)
Military delegation headed by deputy
chief of general staff Ho Cheng-wen
departs for Sweden. (U)
October 27 China conducts underground nuclear
test at Lop Nor center. (U)
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Angola and Rhodesia: An Overview
Peking's adoption in the early 1970s of a
flexible, pragmatic foreign policy emphasizing
good state-to-state relations brought to a vir-
tual halt Chinese support for subversive activi-
ties against incumbent black African governments
---an activity that was in general decline in any
case. Peking, however, was able to retain a rev-
olutionary aura for its African policy by contin-
uing to support black nationalist efforts to depose
white minority governments in southern Africa. The
Chinese were also seeking to expand their African
contacts with an eye to limiting Soviet influence
throughout the region and saw their involvement with
the liberation movements as a means of gaining stock
with black African leaders--who were and still are
united in their opposition to white rule in the
south.
Of the three most important areas of confronta-
tion in 1970--Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia--a
settlement has been achieved only in Mozambique.
In Rhodesia the basic white-black conflict remains
unchanged, but major differences have emerged among
interested black governments and the liberation
leaders themselves over the best tactics for ending
white rule in Salisbury. In Angola the contrast be-
tween the start of the decade and the present is
even more dramatic: the movement to replace Portu-
guese colonialism has evolved into a civil war among
black Angolans.
Early Misggivings in Angola
Although its involvement with the Angolan lib-
eration movements goes back to the early 1960s, Pe-
king probably long had misgivings about its role. In
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varying degrees, all the liberation movements in
southern Africa were rent by internal rivalries
that undermined the effort to overthrow white or
colonial rule. These problems, however, were par-
ticularly acute in Angola, where even in the mid-
60s the three major liberation groups spent as much
of their energies skirmishing with each other as
they did fighting the Portuguese. In these circum-
stances, Peking avoided continuing obligations to
any of the three, shifting its support to first one
and then the other group, sometimes aiding all three
simultaneously, and reviewing the results of each
individual infusion on the political and military
activities of the recipient. Although by the early
1970s Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement (MPLA) had
emerged as the most effective and widely recognized
organization, Peking grew increasingly disenchanted
with the MPLA's close ties with Moscow and in 1973
cut off its contacts. Holden Roberto's National
Front (FNLA) began receiving the bulk of Chinese
assistance while Jonas Savimbi's National Union
(UNITA) continued to receive occasional financial
support from Peking. This policy also related well
to Chinese efforts to curry favor with Zaire's Mo-
butu and Zambia's Kaunda--backers of FNLA and UNITA
respectively.
The Chinese reacted cautiously to the Alvor
agreement of January 1975, whereby the three contend-
ing Angolan groups agreed to participate in a transi-
tion government, and Lisbon set November 11 as the
date for Angolan independence. Publicly Peking lauded
the agreement--Chou En-lai even sent his personal
congratulations to the three leaders--and the Chinese
no doubt hoped the truce would stick, since it enjoyed
a measure of influence with two of the three groups
which theoretically at least stood an equal chance of
solidifying their position in an elected post-libera-'
tion government. Moreover, with Lisbon's unilateral
decision to decolonize, Peking's "revolutionary" ap-
proach to the Angolan situation ceased to have much
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relevance. A peaceful transition to independence
would allow Peking to ease out of its special re-
lationship with UNITA and particularly with FNLA
and develop a new Angolan policy more in line with
the realities of the situation.
Ten years of dealings with the mutually antag-
onist Angolan groups, however, undoubtedly suggested
to Peking that the odds favored its early collapse.
As a result, Peking felt compelled to continue to
provide training and equipment for FNLA units so as
to assure their military capabilities should full-
scale hostilities begin with MPLA. Reports of FNLA
dissatisfaction with the level of assistance and of
Chinese reluctance to provide more support suggest
that Peking was trying not to increase FNLA capa-
bilities to the point where Holden Roberto of his
own accord would be tempted to opt for a military
feud with MPLA.
Sliding Downhill
Developments in Angola since mid-year have
probably exceeded Peking's darkest fears. When
it became obvious early in the summer that increased
Soviet arms deliveries had tipped the military ba-
lance in favor of P 'lPLA, Peking apparently tried to
forestall a total collapse in Luanda by inviting an
MPLA delegation to Peking and offering to "reassess"
Chinese support for all three groups if the tripar-
tite status quo were maintained. When this effort
failed and MPLA unleashed its freshly equipped units
against both FNLA and UNITA, Peking responded by
stepping up its shipments to FNLA via Zaire and by
attempting to work through Zambia and Tanzania to
provide increased support to UNITA.
While renewed arms deliveries and direct Zairian
military intervention have averted a total military
victory for MPLA, Peking's clients are still in pre-
carious positions. Despite its recent battlefield
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successes, for example, FNLA has little prospect
of regaining all the military and political ground
it has lost since mid-year. Even if it does, the
rivalry between the two major groups has grown so
unyielding that a new rapprochement appears vir-
tually unattainable. UNITA has always been a rel-
atively impotent military force, staying in the
game by virtue of the tribal support it receives
in the area it controls. UNITA's prospects appear
linked to Savimbi's willingness to formally ally
himself with either of the other two groups--a
move which could still be decisive--but so far he
appears determined to maintain his independence.
Under these circumstances, MPLA will almost cer-
tainly continue to hold all the advantages when the
Portuguese pull out next month, and Peking's chances
for future influence in Angola will remain shaky.
On the regional level, moreover, Peking's An-
golan connections have shown signs of becoming sig-
nificant irritants in state-to-state relations. Tan-
zanian President Nyerere, for example, has embargoed
a recent shipment of Chinese arms to UNITA and has
privately blasted Peking for letting the Sino-Soviet
rivalry in Angola take precedence over the interests
of the Angolan people (see Chinese Affairs, Septem-
ber 29, 1975). Nyerere is a long-time supporter of
MPLA but, if recent African speeches at the UN are
any indication, even those African leaders who are
not closely connected with any of the contending An-
golan groups are taking a similarly dim view of ex-
ternal involvement of any sort in Angola. Support
for FNLA and UNITA still gains Peking points with
Zaire and Zambia to be sure, but such returns would
be largely vitiated if a wider African backlash de-
velops. Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in his own
UN speech last month appeared to reflect concern for
the potential damage to Peking's image when he blamed
the Soviets and the US for using Angola as an ideo-
logical battlefield and tried somewhat lamely to por-
tray China's treatment of the Angolans as "even-
handed."
October 28, 1975
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:Running put of Options
As things now stand there appears to be little
the Chinese can do to shore up their position in
Angola. Peking could, of course, cut its losses
by ending its involvement altogether or by switching
its support to MMMPLA in hopes of eventually weaning
it away from Moscow. From its talks with the MPLA
delegation in Peking this summer, however, the Chi-
nese know that the latter would be a poor gamble.
Abandoning FNLA and UNITA would cede dominant in-
fluence in Angola to Moscow, and such a Chinese de-
fault in the Sino-Soviet rivalry while there still
exists a chance of retrieving the situation is
clearly unthinkable in Peking. The Chinese have
also apparently discarded the option of stepping up
their military assistance, probably recognizing that,
as other outside powers such as South Africa have
begun to provide military assistance, the military
shortcomings of FNLA and UNITA are now more the re-
sult of training and severe logistic problems than
arms shortages per se.
For the short term at least, Peking thus ap-
pears to have little choice but to play out its string
in Angola. The Chinese can be expected to continue to
help keep FNLA and UNITA afloat and to lend their sup-
port to efforts at political compromise. Peking will
probably use its leverage with regional governments
and with its Angolan clients to promote African re-
conciliation attempts such as the current undertaking
by the organization for African Unity. Although they
have almost no leverage in Lisbon, the Chinese may
also take what steps they can to encourage the Por-
tuguese not to leave the MPLA in de facto control of
Angola on November 11. Peking might even see some
merit in a Portuguese move to involve the UN in a
peace-keeping role, although it would almost certainly
not take the lead in seeking such international in-
tervention.
October 28, 1975
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Nevertheless, Peking by now probably reckons
that the chances are dim for anything but continued
fighting in the post-liberation period and that
China will be facing hard decisions regarding An-
gola in the near future. Indeed, the possibility
that FNLA and UNITA may establish a rival regime
or regimes and that Peking might be drawn into a
prolonged insurgency in Angola may already be
creating heartburn in Peking. For the moment, how-
ever, the Chinese appear to be hoping that some
eleventh-hour solution will present itself and that
they will be able to salvage something from a situ-
ation that has gone sour on all fronts.
For the Chinese the situation in Rhodesia
continues to embody opportunities that have ceased
to exist in Angola. The cause of majority rule in
Rhodesia still enjoys the support of all black
Africa, and Peking's revolutionary approach--though
controversial--remains relevant. Moreover, the
Chinese recognize that so far as the Sino-Soviet
rivalry for long-term influence in southern Africa
is concerned, the stakes in Rhodesia are much higher
than in Angola. Peking clearly believes that the
days of white rule in Salisbury are numbered and
that whoever has the ear of the future rulers there
will have an instrumental role in shaping the even-
tual outcome throughout the region.
Peking dabbled with the Rhodesian liberation
movement in the early 1960s, but its active involve-
ment began in 1964 when it became the major supporter
for the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), com-
posed of urban intellectuals who had broken away
from the Soviet-backed Zimbabwe African People's
Union (ZAPU). While never numerically as strong as
their Angolan counterparts, the Rhodesian groups
were just as given to debilitating factional squab-
bling, and Peking probably discounted ZANU's ability
October 28, 1975
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to mount effective military or political actions
against Salisbury in the near term. But immediate
progress in Rhodesia itself was far less important
to Peking in the mid-60s than the opportunity to
compete with the Soviets for influence both in the
liberation movement and with presidents Nyerere
and Kaunda--who at the time played host to all
African liberation groups no matter what the ideo-
logical complexions.
With exclusive and consistent political and
financial support from Peking, ZANU by the early
1970s had emerged as the most militarily active
of the two major liberation groups operating out-
side Rhodesia. Peking made no secret of its satis-
faction with ZANU raids in rural areas of northeast-
ern Rhodesia in 1972 and 1973, publicly stressing
the importance of the "armed struggle" and rewarding
now deceased ZANU leader Chitepo with a visit to
China. Following the Portuguese coup in April 1974,
Peking stepped up its arms deliveries to ZANU and
urged its clients to expand their guerrilla opera-
tions, arguing that coupled with the dwindling Por-
tuguese role in Mozambique, this would greatly in-
crease the pressure on Salisbury to reach an accom-
modation with the black nationalists.
Temporal Setbacks
Chinese satisfaction with Rhodesian developments
turned to dismay early this year as Zambia, Tanzania,
Botswana, and soon-to-be independent Mozambique--all
working in concert with Pretoria--succeeded in forcing
ZANU and ZAPU to unite under the aegis of the African
National Council (ANC), to halt guerrilla operations,
and to agree to talks with Salisbury. The prospect
of negotiations alone was probably not overly dis-
turbing to Peking. Black nationalists within Rhodesia
had occasionally talked with Ian Smith's government
over the years, and the Chinese had remained relatively
silent on the subject. The decision by the black Afri-
can leader to force a merger of the liberation groups,
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to pursue exclusively political tactics, and to
cooperate with tie South Africans, did, however,
cut entirely the wrong way from Peking's view.
The strength of ZANU lay in its military capa-
bilities,.:and ZANU leaders would inevitably take
the back seat to more politically adroit ANC
figures in any negotiations. Moreover, Peking's
influence with ZANU itself stood to suffer as the
enforced military inactivity diminished the de-
pendence on Chinese assistance. On a broader plane,
the move by the black African leaders represented
a rejection of Peking's revolutionary approach in
Rhodesia and---so far as the black leaders' willing-
ness to cooperate with Pretoria was concerned--
throughout the region.
The Chinese did little to hide their feelings
over the new initiative. Chinese media kept up steady
criticism through last spring and summer stressing
that "talks must be based on fighting" and that "while
negotiations (were) a form of struggle, armed struggle
must not be given up." Peking also made strong diplo-
matic presentations to Lusaka--which had closed down
all the Chinese operated training bases in Zambia to
assure compliance with the ceasefire--creating strains
on Sino-Zambian relations (see Chinese Affairs, May
27, 1975), and it apparently applied similar heat to
the Tanzanians. At the same time, however, Peking
was careful to limit the damage to such carefully and
expensively constructed relations, acceding rather
quickly, for example, to a demand that it stop by-
passing the ANC structure by continuing to provide
direct assistance to former ZANU leaders.
Getting Back on Track
Since the breakdown of talks between Salisbury
and the black nationalists in late August, events
in Rhodesia have begun to play into Peking's hand
again. Nyerere and Mozambique's Samora Machel
may have come around to the view that Salisbury's
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resistance to change can only be worn down by re-
sumed guerrilla operations--or at least the threat
of renewed military pressure. With the serious
factional splits in the ANC in recent weeks, these
two leaders reportedly are backing the militant ex-
ternal group--composed mostly of former ZANU members.
The militants have been given approval to establish
several new bases along Mozambique's border with
Rhodesia. Peking has long enjoyed dominant influence
in both Dar es Salaam and Lourenco Marques and, hav-
ing formally agreed this summer to meet all ANC re-
quirements for training and equipment, may well be
in a position to close out any Soviet role with the
guerrillas whatsoever.
While China's approach to the Rhodesian question
is once again convergent with its interest in main-
taining good relations with Tanzania and Mozambique,
Zambia's position still remains troublesome to Pe-
king. With the closure earlier this year of the
Benguela railroad through Angola, Zambia copper ex-
ports have dropped dramatically and Lusaka is hoping
that successful negotiations between Salisbury and
black Rhodesian nationalists will enable Zambia to
begin using rail lines through Rhodesia again. As
a result, Kaunda has continued to hold a hard line
against, guerrilla use of Zambian soil and is appar-
ently promoting the efforts of the less radical
ANC faction--headed by former ZAPU leader Joshua
Nkomo--to maintain a dialogue with Ian Smith. While
there is little likelihood that the Chinese will ever
condone Kaunda's conservative policy, Peking does
appear willing to make allowances for the difficult
circumstances the Zambians face. The Chinese media,
for example, have conspicuously avoided any refer-
ences to the failure of the Victoria Falls talks in
August in obvious deference to the sensitivities of
Kaunda, who had staked considerable personal prestige
on a successful outcome. Similarly, Chinese officials
made a show of public harmony with Alexander Grey Zulu,
the secretary general of Zambia's ruling party, when
October 28, 1975
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he visited Peking last month although differences
were reportedly aired behind the scenes.
The Chinese can be expected to keep a weather
eye on developments regarding Rhodesia and, with
their recent experiences--including those in Angola
--firmly in mind, take care to anticipate shifts in
regional political currents and any potential open-
ings for Moscow. Peking can be expected. to continue
pushing the "armed struggle," believing that China's
influence over the black nationalists is directly
related to their dependence on Chinese assistance.
Faced again with concerted African attitudes, how-
ever, the Chinese could come to support a negotiated
settlement provided that the military option is kept
fresh and Peking's clients are assured a strong voice
in the bargaining. In his UN speech, Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua appeared to hold out this possibility
by saying that while "armed struggle is fundamental
...we have always advocated the use of revolutionary
dual tactics (talk/fight)" in Rhodesia. (SECRET NO-
FORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT)
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