LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A00ISW 1-8
NOFORN
Latin American Trends
SOURCED
Secret
Novembr.r.
No. 05 4 =}
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL.,. - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
ClassIfled by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11662, exemption category:
$ 58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2O jJOe/0? :?lA-RDP79TOO865AO02100100001-8
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 5, 1975
Argentina: Caving in to Terrorist Pressure . 1
Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on
Sea Outlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chile: Promotion Problems . . . . . . . . . 4
Venezuela: Union Election Postscript . . . . 5
A New Defense Force for the Bahamas? . . . . . 6
Surinam: Deadlock Broken . . . . . . 8
Cuban Chronology for October 1975 . . . . . . 10
November 5, 1975
- i-
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8
 Approved For Release Ab*( [d TCIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Argentina: Caving in to Terrorist Pressure
The Argentine government has a,jain acceded to
? union pressure, which now includes the very real
threat of industrial terrorism, in granting a major
wage hike. This action highlights the Peron admin-
Lstra.tion's continued failure to come to terms with
labor, its major supporter, and it destroys the
agreement that Economy Minister Cafiero made last
week with Peronist business and labor leaders to tie
salaries to increases in productivity.
The very name "social truce given to the agree-
ment implies that there were no illusions about the
intense conflict of interests generated by rapidly
escalating inflation and other major economic prob-
lems. It would now seem that labor leaders responded
to Cafiero's appeal without consulting their rank
and file supporters,who would have been barred by the
agreement from striking for six months and forced to
forego cost.-of-living wage increases which in many
cases had been negotiated months ago.
Another complicating factor is the upsurge in
industrial terrorism. The recent kidnaping of the
production manager of the Mercedes Benz assembly plant
is illustrative and may be only a hint of violence to
come. Since October 8, some 4,000 workers at the
plant have been striking on demands that go far beyond
cost-of-lying wage adjustments. They want laid-.off
workers to be reinstated and their union to be allowed
to reorganize itself democratically. The company could
probably have settled with the workers long ago if they
had not also been challenging the authority of the
externally imposed union leaders----a factor that is
fundamental to Peronist doctrine and over which the
company has no control. So far the guerrilla kidnap?:rs
have refused to discuss the terms of release until the
-1-
Approved For Release 20Q #9 q F EIIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001 /O&WyJZI '1J DP79T00865A002100100001-8
strike is settled, dismissed workers are reinstated
and all employees are paid for their weeks on strike.
This is not an isolated incident. I:t appears
that the Peronist leftist Montoneros are now active
3 in all industrial centers of Argentina. Recently
Ricardo Balbin, the major political opposition
leader, took note of the situation by saying the
guerrillas are in the factories."
The abrogation of the social truce thus con-
stitutes a defeat for union leaders as well as the
government. The labor movement is being radicalized
under them, and it may be only a matter of time be-
fore the middle class labor hierarchy is completely
ignored or deposed by the mass of workers. Under
/ Maria Estela Peron the government has shifted too far
to the right for too long for Peronism to retain the
ideological appeal it acquired under her late husband.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1975
-2-
Approved For Release 2001/Q. 8kCslp- DP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 200?4-b-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on Sea Outlet
President Hugo Banzer seems to be backpedaling
? on his commitment to obtain a seacoast for Bolivia.
In a speech before approximately 100 labor coordina-
.~ tors at the Quemada Palace on October 31, Banzer
denied that he had taken an intransigent stand on
the sea route issue. Instead, he said that his commit-
ment was t:o seek such a route "persistently.`
Early in October, while in New York to plead
Bolivia's case before the United Nations, Banzer in a
press interview expressed his "complete optimism"
concerning Bolivia's early success in obtaining a sov-
ereign outlet to the sea. Despite Banzer's public
utterances, the Chilean Foreign Minister_ still holds
the position that formal negotiations have not begun.
Banzer's new approach to Bolivia's long-standing
foreign policy goal will not sit well with ultranation
alists in the armed forces, but there is no evidence
of plotting within the military and Banzer now seems
I more secure than at any time during his four-year
presidency. Some military officers have indicated
to U'S embassy officials that the word 'sovereignty'
could be interpreted to mean exclusive control of an
outlet to the sea for an extended period of time. If
this view can be sold to most of the officer corps,
Banzer's chances of negotiating a solution to the
problem will be greatly enhanced. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1.975
-- 3-
Approved For Release 20g/ 8V 'IA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 200'~/~A~~1~4-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Chile: Promotion Problems
Command changes and retirements in the Chilean
army, announced last Wednesday, may provide clues to
President Pinochet's relations with restive officers.
Although armed forces unity has not been a serious
,~ problem, Pinochet appears to be using the normal re-
.~ assignment process to strengthen his own support and
weaken potential challengers. He must move carefully,
however, lest he step on too many toes and create new
animosities in the process.
The primary target of the present army shuffle
appears to be defense staff chief General Arellano,
a widely popular officer and the most likely potential
political challenger to the President. Already, sev-
eral generals close to Arellano have been removed and,
.... _ __1_ _ i L . .
requested Arel ano s resignation. e request followed
j Arellano's refusal to accept an ambassadorial post--an
obvious demotian. The status of Pinochet's reported
request remains unclear but, because of Arellano's
popularity, his forced ouster probably would cause
division within his service.
Possibly in preparation for a move to force Arellano
out, Pinochet has shifted his former military attache
in Washington to head the key Santiago second division;
the ex-attache is a long-time presidential confidant.
Occasional friction has surfaced within the junta
over Pinochet's policies and his tendency to exercise
power exclusively. Suspicions about these latest army
moves may reneU~ tensions and possibly erode some of his
support in the military. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
November 5, 1975
-4-
Approved For Release 2001/~~DP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 20~7~$f~'~lA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Venezuela: Union Election Postscript
The governing Democratic Action Party (AD) won a
narx-ow victory over four leftist party slates in elec-
tions for the leadership of SUTRP,HIERRO, the single
union that: now represents the country's iron workers.
AD won the two principal positions on the nine-
member executive committee--secretary general and
organization secretary--but failed to gain a majority
on ~tYie committee or in any of the district union coun-
cils or the important disciplinary committee. The
leftist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and
the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) placed second and
third respectively. Both parties can be considerably
encouraged by the election results. They succeeded
in their year-long massive effort to gain a foothold
among the workers of the Guayana Iron P2ining Region
and 'to capitalize on the hard feelings generated by
the governnment's tough handling of wildcat strikes
in January and May.
AD leaders, although publicly pleased with the
election results, still lack the firm control over
the union that they need to prevent a repetition of
the labor. disputes that have disrupted production
this year. Both MIR and MAS are in a strong position
now to encourage labor unrest in the industry if they
choase. A first test of the government's control
ovE:r the workers will occur in 1976 when the new union
leaders renegotiate working contracts. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/ g(gg~r RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/g>~~RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
A New Defense Force for the .Bahamas?
In his speech to the opening session of the con-
vention of the ruling Progressive Labor Party in
Nassau last week, Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling
put on public record his party's aspirations for the
Commonwealth o~-er the next decade. The prime minister
covered the Bahamian waterfront, touching on foreign
policy goals, economic matters, and problems related
to the defense of the island nation.
One of the major topics he discussed was the
establishment Gf a "People's Defense Force?' to pre-
serve national security while at the same time pro-
moting nationaJ_ development. He made clear that he
is not worried about a military attack, but does fear
an economic one; ''Bahamians have seen, in most recent
times, how our economic security could be very easily
threatened and we have come to appreciate more fully
how little we would be able to do if there was an
actual confrontation.'' This is obviously a reference
to the recent--and still unresolved--lobster dispute
with US-based fishermen.
The propo~~ed defense force would be responsible
for patrolling sea lanes through or bordering on
Bahamian waters, and for combatting such illegal ac-
tivitiesas smuggling and violations of Bahamian fish-
ing regulations. The force, however, would also be
designed to provide emergency relief services in the
event of a natural disaster.
November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/08/0>~ CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
SECRET
 Approved For Release 20~~T~~B~'CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Pindl.ing's concept would require a considerable
expansion of present law enforcement facilities. The
Royal. Bahamas Police Force consists of only 930 members
3 with a reserve of 125. The police have only five small.
boats to patrol 100,000 square miles of ocean. The
prime minister gave no hint as to the size of the pro-
posed force or how it would be financed. (CONFIDENTIAL)
i~,~ vc~r~,ber 5,
'7 -
Approved For Release 20010?1~8~i~1~-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/~~~~C~l~RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
J
J
Surinam: Deadlock Broken
The political deadlock that handcuffed Surinam's
Staten (parliament) for a month and a half has been
broken and it now appears that the November 25th date
for independence will be met.
The latest threat to the independence timetable
began in late August when three legislators from
Minister-President Arron's predominantly black Na-
tional Party Coalition (NPI:) bolted to the opposition
(see Latin American Trends, September 10, 1975).
Neither the government nor the opposition Hindustani
Reformed Party (VHP) could then muster a majority, and
VHP leader Jagernath I,achmon ordered his party to boy-
cott the Staten to slow the pace of independence.
A major breakthrough came in mid-October when
George Hindori, a prominent VHP member, revolted
against Lachmon's obstructionist tactics. He an-
nounced that he would cooperate with the government
at least long enough to form a quorum that would per-
mit the Staten to convene to enact necessary pre-
independence legislation, the most important of which
is a new constitution. Hindori`s action ended the pos-
sibility that Arron's government would be voted down,
which would have necessitated an election before inde-
pendence with the attendant likelihood of heightened
racial tension and perhaps civi]_ disturbances.
Meanwhile, in the Netherlands last week the Dutch
parliament decisively ap~-~roved without amendments or
conditions a bill to grant independence to Surinam.
~i'ha.s was done despite stroner 11 - Cuba and USSR sign sugar industry coopera-
tion agreement.
-10-
Approved For Release Z~~1~8'j'CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/O~I~~I~~DP79T00865A002100100001-8
Political. manuevering and hard bargaining still
lie ahead as the united Hindustani Reformed Party
attempts to obtain legal guarantees to safeguard the
rights of the East Indian community. The resignation
of Lie Kong Fong, one of the three defectors from
Arron's coalition in August, will help the government
by providing it with a slim parliamentary majority.
(CONFIDENTIAL?
November 5, 1975
_9-
Approved For Release 2001/08/(~~G~P79T00865A002100100001-8
 Approved For Release 2001$-~I~-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
October 12 - Kim Il-song 'receives Cuban Communist
Party delegation headed by Guillermo
Garcia Friers to the 30th. anniversary of
the founding of the Korean Workers Party.
Cuba and Canada sicrn a civil air agree-
ment.
October 14 - Foreign Trade Minister Mar_ceio Fernandez
Font arrives i_n Panama as head of the
Cuban delegation to the SELA meeting.
October 15 - Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission
f_or Economic ar~d Scientific--Technical
Cooperation meets in Moscow. Cuban-Soviet
trade to increase more than 30 percent this
year.
Party delegation headed by Gui7lerrlo Garcia
Friers arrives in P9ongolia. A cooperation
agreement is signed on October 17.
October 16 - The C~xban government rejects the request: of
30 Ctzilean leftists for asu1um i~x Cuba.
Panamanian National ~=ward delegation headed
by Lt. Col. Armando. Contreras arrives ire
Cuba.
October 18 - Celia Sanchez heads the departin~?CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
SECREI~
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8
Seeret
Seeret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8