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November 5, 1975
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A00ISW 1-8 NOFORN Latin American Trends SOURCED Secret Novembr.r. No. 05 4 =} Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8 Warning Notice Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL.,. - This Information has been Authorized for Release to ... ClassIfled by 010725 Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11662, exemption category: $ 58(1), (2), and (3) Automatically declassified on: Date Impossible to Determine Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8 Approved For Release 2O jJOe/0? :?lA-RDP79TOO865AO02100100001-8 This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. CONTENTS November 5, 1975 Argentina: Caving in to Terrorist Pressure . 1 Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on Sea Outlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Chile: Promotion Problems . . . . . . . . . 4 Venezuela: Union Election Postscript . . . . 5 A New Defense Force for the Bahamas? . . . . . 6 Surinam: Deadlock Broken . . . . . . 8 Cuban Chronology for October 1975 . . . . . . 10 November 5, 1975 - i- S E C R E T Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100001-8 Approved For Release Ab*( [d TCIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Argentina: Caving in to Terrorist Pressure The Argentine government has a,jain acceded to ? union pressure, which now includes the very real threat of industrial terrorism, in granting a major wage hike. This action highlights the Peron admin- Lstra.tion's continued failure to come to terms with labor, its major supporter, and it destroys the agreement that Economy Minister Cafiero made last week with Peronist business and labor leaders to tie salaries to increases in productivity. The very name "social truce given to the agree- ment implies that there were no illusions about the intense conflict of interests generated by rapidly escalating inflation and other major economic prob- lems. It would now seem that labor leaders responded to Cafiero's appeal without consulting their rank and file supporters,who would have been barred by the agreement from striking for six months and forced to forego cost.-of-living wage increases which in many cases had been negotiated months ago. Another complicating factor is the upsurge in industrial terrorism. The recent kidnaping of the production manager of the Mercedes Benz assembly plant is illustrative and may be only a hint of violence to come. Since October 8, some 4,000 workers at the plant have been striking on demands that go far beyond cost-of-lying wage adjustments. They want workers to be reinstated and their union to be allowed to reorganize itself democratically. The company could probably have settled with the workers long ago if they had not also been challenging the authority of the externally imposed union leaders----a factor that is fundamental to Peronist doctrine and over which the company has no control. So far the guerrilla kidnap?:rs have refused to discuss the terms of release until the -1- Approved For Release 20Q #9 q F EIIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001 /O&WyJZI '1J DP79T00865A002100100001-8 strike is settled, dismissed workers are reinstated and all employees are paid for their weeks on strike. This is not an isolated incident. I:t appears that the Peronist leftist Montoneros are now active 3 in all industrial centers of Argentina. Recently Ricardo Balbin, the major political opposition leader, took note of the situation by saying the guerrillas are in the factories." The abrogation of the social truce thus con- stitutes a defeat for union leaders as well as the government. The labor movement is being radicalized under them, and it may be only a matter of time be- fore the middle class labor hierarchy is completely ignored or deposed by the mass of workers. Under / Maria Estela Peron the government has shifted too far to the right for too long for Peronism to retain the ideological appeal it acquired under her late husband. (CONFIDENTIAL) November 5, 1975 -2- Approved For Release 2001/Q. 8kCslp- DP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 200?4-b-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on Sea Outlet President Hugo Banzer seems to be backpedaling ? on his commitment to obtain a seacoast for Bolivia. In a speech before approximately 100 labor coordina- .~ tors at the Quemada Palace on October 31, Banzer denied that he had taken an intransigent stand on the sea route issue. Instead, he said that his commit- ment was t:o seek such a route "persistently.` Early in October, while in New York to plead Bolivia's case before the United Nations, Banzer in a press interview expressed his "complete optimism" concerning Bolivia's early success in obtaining a sov- ereign outlet to the sea. Despite Banzer's public utterances, the Chilean Foreign Minister_ still holds the position that formal negotiations have not begun. Banzer's new approach to Bolivia's long-standing foreign policy goal will not sit well with ultranation alists in the armed forces, but there is no evidence of plotting within the military and Banzer now seems I more secure than at any time during his four-year presidency. Some military officers have indicated to U'S embassy officials that the word 'sovereignty' could be interpreted to mean exclusive control of an outlet to the sea for an extended period of time. If this view can be sold to most of the officer corps, Banzer's chances of negotiating a solution to the problem will be greatly enhanced. (CONFIDENTIAL) November 5, 1.975 -- 3- Approved For Release 20g/ 8V 'IA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 200'~/~A~~1~4-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Chile: Promotion Problems Command changes and retirements in the Chilean army, announced last Wednesday, may provide clues to President Pinochet's relations with restive officers. Although armed forces unity has not been a serious ,~ problem, Pinochet appears to be using the normal re- .~ assignment process to strengthen his own support and weaken potential challengers. He must move carefully, however, lest he step on too many toes and create new animosities in the process. The primary target of the present army shuffle appears to be defense staff chief General Arellano, a widely popular officer and the most likely potential political challenger to the President. Already, sev- eral generals close to Arellano have been removed and, .... _ __1_ _ i L . . requested Arel ano s resignation. e request followed j Arellano's refusal to accept an ambassadorial post--an obvious demotian. The status of Pinochet's reported request remains unclear but, because of Arellano's popularity, his forced ouster probably would cause division within his service. Possibly in preparation for a move to force Arellano out, Pinochet has shifted his former military attache in Washington to head the key Santiago second division; the ex-attache is a long-time presidential confidant. Occasional friction has surfaced within the junta over Pinochet's policies and his tendency to exercise power exclusively. Suspicions about these latest army moves may reneU~ tensions and possibly erode some of his support in the military. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) November 5, 1975 -4- Approved For Release 2001/~~DP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 20~7~$f~'~lA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Venezuela: Union Election Postscript The governing Democratic Action Party (AD) won a narx-ow victory over four leftist party slates in elec- tions for the leadership of SUTRP,HIERRO, the single union that: now represents the country's iron workers. AD won the two principal positions on the nine- member executive committee--secretary general and organization secretary--but failed to gain a majority on ~tYie committee or in any of the district union coun- cils or the important disciplinary committee. The leftist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) placed second and third respectively. Both parties can be considerably encouraged by the election results. They succeeded in their year-long massive effort to gain a foothold among the workers of the Guayana Iron P2ining Region and 'to capitalize on the hard feelings generated by the governnment's tough handling of wildcat strikes in January and May. AD leaders, although publicly pleased with the election results, still lack the firm control over the union that they need to prevent a repetition of the labor. disputes that have disrupted production this year. Both MIR and MAS are in a strong position now to encourage labor unrest in the industry if they choase. A first test of the government's control ovE:r the workers will occur in 1976 when the new union leaders renegotiate working contracts. (CONFIDENTIAL) November 5, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/ g(gg~r RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001/g>~~RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 A New Defense Force for the .Bahamas? In his speech to the opening session of the con- vention of the ruling Progressive Labor Party in Nassau last week, Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling put on public record his party's aspirations for the Commonwealth o~-er the next decade. The prime minister covered the Bahamian waterfront, touching on foreign policy goals, economic matters, and problems related to the defense of the island nation. One of the major topics he discussed was the establishment Gf a "People's Defense Force?' to pre- serve national security while at the same time pro- moting nationaJ_ development. He made clear that he is not worried about a military attack, but does fear an economic one; ''Bahamians have seen, in most recent times, how our economic security could be very easily threatened and we have come to appreciate more fully how little we would be able to do if there was an actual confrontation.'' This is obviously a reference to the recent--and still unresolved--lobster dispute with US-based fishermen. The propo~~ed defense force would be responsible for patrolling sea lanes through or bordering on Bahamian waters, and for combatting such illegal ac- tivitiesas smuggling and violations of Bahamian fish- ing regulations. The force, however, would also be designed to provide emergency relief services in the event of a natural disaster. November 5, 1975 Approved For Release 2001/08/0>~ CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 SECRET Approved For Release 20~~T~~B~'CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8's concept would require a considerable expansion of present law enforcement facilities. The Royal. Bahamas Police Force consists of only 930 members 3 with a reserve of 125. The police have only five small. boats to patrol 100,000 square miles of ocean. The prime minister gave no hint as to the size of the pro- posed force or how it would be financed. (CONFIDENTIAL) i~,~ vc~r~,ber 5, '7 - Approved For Release 20010?1~8~i~1~-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001/~~~~C~l~RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 J J Surinam: Deadlock Broken The political deadlock that handcuffed Surinam's Staten (parliament) for a month and a half has been broken and it now appears that the November 25th date for independence will be met. The latest threat to the independence timetable began in late August when three legislators from Minister-President Arron's predominantly black Na- tional Party Coalition (NPI:) bolted to the opposition (see Latin American Trends, September 10, 1975). Neither the government nor the opposition Hindustani Reformed Party (VHP) could then muster a majority, and VHP leader Jagernath I,achmon ordered his party to boy- cott the Staten to slow the pace of independence. A major breakthrough came in mid-October when George Hindori, a prominent VHP member, revolted against Lachmon's obstructionist tactics. He an- nounced that he would cooperate with the government at least long enough to form a quorum that would per- mit the Staten to convene to enact necessary pre- independence legislation, the most important of which is a new constitution. Hindori`s action ended the pos- sibility that Arron's government would be voted down, which would have necessitated an election before inde- pendence with the attendant likelihood of heightened racial tension and perhaps civi]_ disturbances. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands last week the Dutch parliament decisively ap~-~roved without amendments or conditions a bill to grant independence to Surinam. ~i'ha.s was done despite stroner 11 - Cuba and USSR sign sugar industry coopera- tion agreement. -10- Approved For Release Z~~1~8'j'CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001/O~I~~I~~DP79T00865A002100100001-8 Political. manuevering and hard bargaining still lie ahead as the united Hindustani Reformed Party attempts to obtain legal guarantees to safeguard the rights of the East Indian community. The resignation of Lie Kong Fong, one of the three defectors from Arron's coalition in August, will help the government by providing it with a slim parliamentary majority. (CONFIDENTIAL? November 5, 1975 _9- Approved For Release 2001/08/(~~G~P79T00865A002100100001-8 Approved For Release 2001$-~I~-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 October 12 - Kim Il-song 'receives Cuban Communist Party delegation headed by Guillermo Garcia Friers to the 30th. anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party. Cuba and Canada sicrn a civil air agree- ment. October 14 - Foreign Trade Minister Mar_ceio Fernandez Font arrives i_n Panama as head of the Cuban delegation to the SELA meeting. October 15 - Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission f_or Economic ar~d Scientific--Technical Cooperation meets in Moscow. Cuban-Soviet trade to increase more than 30 percent this year. Party delegation headed by Gui7lerrlo Garcia Friers arrives in P9ongolia. A cooperation agreement is signed on October 17. October 16 - The C~xban government rejects the request: of 30 Ctzilean leftists for asu1um i~x Cuba. Panamanian National ~=ward delegation headed by Lt. Col. Armando. Contreras arrives ire Cuba. October 18 - Celia Sanchez heads the departin~?CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 SECREI~ Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8 Seeret Seeret Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100001-8