LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A0021(Sj7
NOFORN
Latin American Trends
Secret
Novembr- x-
No. 05_-:4;
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
056(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7
 Approved For Release a''0g1/@8/I8 2 c A-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 5, 1975
Argentina: Caving in to Terrorist Pressure . 1
Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on
Sea Outlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chile: Promotion Problems . . . . . . . . . 4
Venezuela: Union Election Postscript . . . . 5
A New Defense Force for the Bahamas? . . . . . 6
Surinam: Deadlock Broken . . . . . . 8
Cuban Chronology for October 1975 . . . . . . 10
November 5, 1975
- i-
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7
 Approved For Release 20Qgl1rF-a4-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Argentina: Caving in to Terrori-s'Pr_essure
The Argentine government has again acceded t-
union pressure, which now includes the very real
threat of industrial terrorism, in granting a major
wage hike. This action highlights the Peron admin-
istration's continued failure to come to terms with
labor, its major supporter, and it destroys the
agreement that Economy Minister Cafiero made last
week with Peronist business and labor leaders to tie
salaries to increases in productivity.
The very name "social truce' given to the agree-
ment implies that there were no illusions about the
intense conflict of interests generated by rapidly
escalating inflation and other major economic prob-
lems. It would now seem that labor leaders responded
to Cafiero's appeal without consulting their rank
and file supporters,who would have been barred by the
agreementfrom striking for six months and forced to
forego cost-of-living wage increases which in many
cases had, been negotiated months ago.
Another complicating factor is the upsurge in
industrial terrorism. The recent kidnaping of the
production manager of the Mercedes Benz assembly plant
is illustrative and may be only a hint of violence to
come. Since October 8, some 4,000 workers at the
plant have been striking on demands that go far beyond
cost-of-lying wage adjustments. They want laid-off
workers to be reinstated and their union to be allowed
to reorganize itself democratically. The company could
probably have settled with the workers long ago if they
had not also been challenging the authority of the
externally imposed union leaders---a factor that is
fundamental to Peronist doctrine and over which the
company has no control. So far the guerrilla ki.dnap,.F,s
have refused to discuss the term-:, of release until the
-1-
Approved For Release 2001/ _ DP79T00865A002100100002-7
QC;
 Approved For Release 200'9:klLA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
strike is settled, dismissed workers are reinstated
and all employees are paid for their weeks on strike.
This is not an isolated incident. It appears
that the Peronist leftist Montoneros are now active
in all industrial centers of Argentina. Recently
Ricardo Balbin, the major political opposition
leader, took note of the situation by saying the
guerrillas are in the factories."
The abrogation of the social truce thus con-
stitutes a defeat for union leaders as well as the
government. The labor movement is being radicalized
under them, and it may be only a matter of time be-
fore the middle class labor hierarchy is completely
ignored or deposed by the mass of workers. Under
Maria Estela Peron the government has shifted too far
to the right for too long for Peronism to retain the
ideological appeal it acquired under her late husband.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1975
-2-
Approved For Release 20Q fiK-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release V//}8TCIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Bolivia: Banzer Moderates Stand on Sea Outlet
President Hugo Banzer seems to be backpedaling
on his commitment to obtain a seacoast for Bolivia.
In a speech before approximately 100 labor coordina-
tors at the Quemada Palace on October 31, Banzer
denied that he had taken an intransigent stand on
the sea route issue. Instead, he said that his commit-
ment was to seek such a route "persistently."
Early in October, while in New York to plead
Bolivia's case before the United Nations, Banzer in a
press interview expressed his 'complete optimism'
concerning Bolivia's early success in obtaining a sov-
ereign outlet to the sea. Despite Banzer's public
utterances, the Chilean Foreign Minister still holds
the position that formal negotiations have not begun.
Banzer's new approach to Bolivia's long-standing
foreign policy goal will not sit well with ultranation-
alists in the armed forces, but there is no evidence
of plotting within the military and Banzer now seems
more secure than at any time during his four-year
presidency. Some military officers have indicated
to US embassy officials that the word 'sovereignty'
could be interpreted to mean exclusive control of an
outlet to the sea for an extended period of time. If
this view can be sold to most of the officer corps,
Banzer's chances of negotiating a solution to the
problem will be greatly enhanced. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1.975
-3-
Approved For Release 20"W
R6 iq[A-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 2001 /0 SC 4 bP79T00865A002100100002-7
Chile: Promotion Problems
Command changes and retirements in the Chilean
army, announced last Wednesday, may provide clues to
President Pinochet's relations with restive officers.
Although armed forces unity has not been a serious
problem, Pinochet appears to be using the normal re-
assignment process to strengthen his own support and
weaken potential challengers. He must move carefully,
however, lest he step on too many toes and create new
animosities in the process.
The primary target of the present army shuffle
appears to be defense staff chief General Arellano,
a widely popular officer and the most likely potential
political challenger to the President. Already, sev-
eral generals close to Arellano have been removed and,
Pinochet has
requested Are ano s resignation. The request followed
Arellano's refusal to accept an ambassadorial post--an
obvious demotion. The status of Pinochet's reported
request remains unclear but, because of Arellano's
popularity, his forced ouster probably would cause
division within his service.
Possibly in preparation for a move to force Arellano
out, Pinochet has shifted his former military attache
in Washington to head the key Santiago second division;
the ex-attache is a long-time presidential confidant.
Occasional friction has surfaced within the junta
over Pinochet's policies and his tendency to exercise
power exclusively. Suspicions about these latest army
moves may renew tensions and possibly erode some of his
support in the military. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
November 5, 1975
g/p-4-
Approved gFor Release 2001/Qi~,I:RCffDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 20(gl"_MjE'7A-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Venezuela: Union Election Postscript
The governing Democratic Action Party (AD) won a
narrow victory over four leftist party slates in elec-
tions for the leadership of SUTRAHIERRO, the single
union that now represents the country's iron workers.
AD won the two principal positions on the nine-
member executive committee--secretary general and
organization secretary--but failed to gain a majority
on the committee or in any of the district union coun-
cils; or the important disciplinary committee. The
leftist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and
the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) placed second and
third respectively. Both parties can be considerably
encouraged by the election results. They succeeded
in their year-long massive effort to gain a foothold
among the workers of the Guayana Iron Mining Region
and to capitalize on the hard feelings generated by
the government's tough handling of wildcat strikes
in January and May.
AD leaders, although publicly pleased with the
election results, still lack the firm control over
the union that they need to prevent a repetition of
the labor disputes that have disrupted production
this year.. Both MIR and MAS are in a strong position
now to encourage labor unrest in the industry if they
choose. A first test of the government's control
over the workers will occur in 1976 when the new union
leaders renegotiate working contracts. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 200
{A-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
ET,
 Approved For Release 2001/gRCr
_aRDP79T00865A002100100002-7
In his speech to the opening session of the con-
vention of the ruling Progressive Labor Party in
Nassau last week, Prime Minister Lynden 0. Pindling
put on public record his party's aspirations for the
Commonwealth over the next decade. The prime minister
covered the Bahamian waterfront, touching on foreign
policy goals, economic matters, and problems related
to the defense of the island nation.
One of the major topics he discussed was the
establishment of a "People's Defense Force" to pre-
serve national security while at the same time pro-
moting national development. He made clear that he
is not worried about a military attack, but does fear
an economic one: "Bahamians have seen, in most recent
times, how our economic security could be very easily
threatened and we have come to appreciate more fully
how little we would be able to do if there was an
actual confrontation.'- This is obviously a reference
to the recent--and still unresolved--lobster dispute
with US-based fishermen.
The proposed defense force would be responsible
for patrolling sea lanes through or bordering on
Bahamian waters, and for combatting such illegal ac-
tivitiesas smuggling and violations of Bahamian fish-
ing regulations. The force, however, would also be
designed to provide emergency relief services in the
event of a natural disaster.
25X6.
November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 Y CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
SECRET
 Approved For Release 201 1 ? 1 E IA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Pindling's concept would require a considerable
expansion of present law enforcement facilities. The
Royal Bahamas Police Force consists of only 930 members
with a reserve of 125. The police have only five small
boats to patrol 100,000 square miles of ocean. The
prime minister gave no hint as to the size of the pro-
posed force or how it would be financed. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7_
Approved For Release 2Ql~0 /p :.IDIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 2001gR/M=RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Surinam: Deadlock Broken
The political deadlock that handcuffed Surinam's
Staten (parliament) for a month and a half has been
broken and it now appears that the November 25th date
for independence will be met.
The latest threat to the independence timetable
began in late August when three legislators from
Minister-President Arron's predominantly black Na-
tional Party Coalition (NPK) bolted to the opposition
(see Latin American Trends, September 10, 1975).
Neither the government nor the opposition Hindustani
Reformed Party (VHP) could then muster a majority, and
VHP leader Jagernath Lachmon ordered his party to boy-
cott the Staten to slow the pace of independence.
A major breakthrough came in mid-October when
George Hindori, a prominent VHP member, revolted
against Lachmon's obstructionist tactics. He an-
nounced that he would cooperate with the government
at least long enough to form a quorum that would per-
mit the Staten to convene to enact necessary pre-
independence legislation, the most important of which
is a new constitution. Hindori's action ended the pos-
sibility that Arron's government would be voted down,
which would have necessitated an election before inde-
pendence with the attendant likelihood of heightened
racial tension and perhaps civil disturbances.
Meanwhile, in the Netherlands last week the Dutch
parliament decisively approved without amendments or
conditions a bill to grant independence to Surinam.
'i'his was done despite stronc; critici. sri of the policies
of the Arron q ?vernment by a VF:IP delegation that at-
tended the procedural debate in The Hague.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 ~ClA P79T00865A002100100002-7
, R.~,'1
 Approved For Release '0/-0~/V$1 CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
Political manuevering and hard bargaining still
lie ahead as the united Hindustani Reformed Party
attempts to obtain legal guarantees to safeguard the
rights of the East Indian community. The resignation
of Lie Kong Fong, one of the three defectors from
Arron's coalition in August, will help the government
by providing it with a slim parliamentary majority.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
"November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 3 'J'CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08P79T00865A002100100002-7
Cuban Chronology for October 1975
October 1 - EFE carries item stating that Honduras
and Cuba will shortly begin discussions
aimed at resuming commercial and diplo-
matic relations.
October 2 - The Cuban-Spanish Friendship Association
in Havana releases a statement of protest
regarding the execution of five alleged
terrorists.
October 6 - Christine Walevska, a cellist from Los
Angeles, arrives in Cuba at the invitation
of Fidel Castro. She is the first US
musician to give concerts in Cuba since
the revolution.
October 7 - President Dorticos receives new Mexican
ambassador to Cuba, Celso Delgado Ramirez.
October 8 - A Cuban labor delegation arrives in Panama
to attend a workers' congress.
Ambassador Alarcon tells the UNGA: Cuban
solidarity with Puerto Rico is not a nego-
tiable issue; it is Cuba's duty to give
"effective" support to the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola.
October 9 - CEMA party secretaries and deputy premiers
meet in Moscow. Antonio Perez Herrero and
Belarmino Castilla Mas attend for Cuba.
October 11 - Cuba and USSR sign sugar industry coopera-
tion agreement.
November 5, 1975
-10-
Approved For Release 2001/08/ ,Sikf79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 200 10 d T dA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
October 12 - Kim Il-song receives Cuban. Communist
Party delegation headed by Guillermo
Garcia Fri-as to the 30th anniversary of
the founding of the Korean Workers Party.
Cuba and Canada sign a civil air agree-
ment.
October 14 - Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez
Font arrives in Panama as head of the
Cuban delegation to the SELA meeting.
October 15 - Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission
for Economic and Scientific-Technical
Cooperation meets in Moscow. Cuban-Soviet
trade to increase more than 30 percent this
year.
Party delegation headed by Guillermo Garcia
Fri-as arrives in Mongolia. A cooperation
agreement is signed on October 17.
October 16 - The Cuban government rejects the request of
30 Chilean leftists for asylum in Cuba.
Panamanian National Guard delegation headed
by Lt. Col. Armando Contreras arrives in
Cuba.
October 18 - Celia Sanchez heads the departing Cuban
delegation to the women's World Congress
held in East Berlin October 20-27; Velma
Espin, already in East. Berlin, will act
as chief of the Cuban representatives.
Cuban trade delegation arrives in Cali,
Colombia.
Novembe 5, '975
-13-
Approved For Release 209// r1CIA-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
 Approved For Release 2001;4 f-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
October 20 - A Cuban friendship delegation arrives
in the Dominican Republic; one of its
members is Osvaldo Cardenas, chief of
the Caribbean Section of the PCC Central
Committee's America Department.
October 22 - Cuba and Belgium sign bilateral air serv-
ice agreement.
October 23 - Manuel Piniero, PCC central committee
member and chief of the America Depart-
ment,arrives in Jamaica as head of the
Cuban delegation attending the annual
People's National Party congress.
Draft Cuban Communist Party Platform
published in Granma. Main points:
strengthen relations with the USSR, pro-
mote detente, improve living conditions,
and encourage economic integration with
Latin America and Caribbean countries.
October 24 - Bulgarian-Cuban Commission for Economic
and Scientific-Technical Cooperation
meets in Sofia. Flavio Bravo Pardo
heads Cuban delegation.
October 26 - US Congressman John Breaux(Dem., Louisiana)
arrives for a three-day visit with Cuban
economic, trade, and agriculture officials.
October 28 - Castro addresses Cuban atheletes returning
from Pan American games in Mexico.
October 29 - Argentine and Cuban officials hold trade
talks in Havana.
Cuba's first resident ambassador to Guyana,
Ivan Cesar Martinez Montalvo, presents
his credentials. Cuban embassy opens in
Georgetown.
November 5, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/08/08,A-RDP79T00865A002100100002-7
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02100100002-7