CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100180001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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cret
NOFORN
VT~TT MOUE51,
Chinese Affairs
Handle via 1TALENT-KEYHOLE-
COMINT Channels
Top Secret
November 10, 1975
TCS No. 786/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
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NOCONTRACT/ORCON
GAMMA ITEM
CHINESE AFFAIRS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 10, 1975
The Army in Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Learning from Tachai . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Promoting Pyongyang . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Two Strikes on Wang . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Education: Dissatisfaction with Inaction . . . .
16
West Germany: No Wrinkles in the Red
Carpet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
i
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PLA Less Involved in Politics
but Problems Linger
After an extended period of political jockeying,
Chinese civilian and military leaders in the past
year or so seem to have managed to forge a tentative
modus vivendi. Residual mistrust exacerbated by con-
tentious policy questions, however, leaves the dura-
bility of this arrangement open to some doubt.
strict confidence b
comments are prob-
ably colored by his strong sympathies for the rela-
tively pragmatic domestic and foreign policies asso-
ciated with Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping, and his views--as well as his harsh com-
ments about some aspects of past Chinese policies--
probably reflect those of the personalities now domi-
nant in Peking.
expressed confidence that the party
was in firm control of the army and was careful to
point out that the army is solidly behind the poli-
cies of Teng Hsiao-ping. Indeed, he acknowledged
that Teng had been personally responsible for the
rehabilitation of a number of PLA officers who had
come on hard times during the Cultural Revolution,
including former chief of staff Lo Jui-ching.
Teng's own appointment in January as chief of
staff and the rebuilding of the high command with
veterans who owe their return to the pragmatic coa-
lition in char e in Pekin is quite obviously the
reason for optimism. Moreover, there
are no signs that the trend of the past two years of
bringing back veteran cadres has abated. Just re-
cently, three rehabilitated officials were appointed
as deputy directors of the influential General Politi-
cal Department (GPD). This shifts the balance among
November 10, 1975
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leading members of the GPD in favor of those who op-
posed leftist elements during the Cultural Revolution.
In the view of how-
ever, the power game is not necessarily over. he main-
tained that the party has been able to control the army
only because of the "loyalty and forbearance of a num-
ber of responsible peo le"--obviousl in the military
establishment itself. went on to
express his apprehension about officers wit in the
military who want the army to retain a prominent po-
litical role.
Ever since Lin Piao's alleged coup attempt in
mid-1971, party leaders have sought, with considerable
success, to divest the PLA of the formidable political
clout it accumulated as a result of the Cultural Rev-
olution. Despite the removal of many professional
military men from leading civilian posts in the prov-
inces and the unprecedented rotation in December 1973,
of military region commanders out of their established
power bases, there are signs that Peking is still
uneasy about the military's political influence.
said as much in discussing
the dispatc t is summer of PLA troops into Hangchow
factories to quell worker unrest. He indicated that
the decision was taken in Peking with much foreboding
that it might be a first step toward an expanded mili-
tary voice in civilian affairs. According to his
account, it was largely pressure from the army itself,
coupled with the absence of effective alternatives,
that forced Peking to authorize PLA intervention.
This allusion to high level concern jibes well
with other signs that civilian Chinese leaders want
the PLA to keep its distance from civilian affairs.
Senior Hong Kong cadres, for example, were informed
in late October that Teng had said that the army
should return to its primary role as a fighting force
and all non-military tasks should be taken away from
November 10, 1975
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Leadership turnouts during the past couple of
months have shown that Peking finds it necessary to
keep up its efforts to whittle down the political
power of the military in the provinces. Of late the
focus seems to be at the military district levels
where at least four commanders have been transferred.
At a recent briefing in Canton, cadres were told
that commanders and troops would be henceforth shifted
periodically to prevent the re-emergence of "war-
lor:dism."
Peking's commemoration of the 40th anniversary
of the Long March this month seems to encapsulate
Peking's ambivalent attitude toward the military.
On the one hand the unprecedented glorification of
the Red Army went some distance toward polishing up
the image of the PLA as a whole. At the same time
the media treatment clearly contained admonitions
aimed at certain elements within the military estab-
lishment who may favor some measure of accommodation
with the Soviet Union. In discussing foreign policy
and without mentioning the army specifically, -
implied that there are those in China
who would like to see an improvement in relations with
Moscow. said that although China is cur-
rently fighting the Soviet Union "tooth and nail,"
this is "not necessarily" a permanent situation.
Turning to the question of military preparedness,
expressed concern that China was
ill-equipped to meet the Soviet threat and took to
task those within the leadership who oppose the modern-
ization of the PLA. In an obvious swipe at the con-
cept of a "people's war," affirmed that
the threat from the Soviets require a conventional
response and there was no room for "guerrilla ro-
manticism."
A debate over whether to modernize China's con-
ventional forces or to invest more heavily in stra-
tegic arms has surfaced from time to time in the Chi-
nese press over the past few years. The controversy
seemed to become particularly strong during last
year's anti-Confucius campaign.
November 10, 1975
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The debate appears to have come to a head at an
enlarged meeting of the party's Military Affairs Com-
mission last summer. Following the session, the Cen-
tral Committee issued Central Document No. 18 which--
-deals almost exclusively
wit stream ining t e PLA's conventional capability.
seem to reflect this
outcome in that he stressed China's need for more
conventional arms and commented that advanced weapons
had been too costly.
An article appearing in the People's Daily in
early August made essentially the same argument, at-
tacking unnamed figures who were said to advocate a
significant increase in advanced weapons programs.
The polemical tone of this lengthy article raises
the possibility that Central Document No. 18 may not
rest on as firm a consensus as its supporters would
like. The stumbling blocks at this stage may not only
involve the residual influence of the advanced weapons
lobby, but also budgetary constraints and political
sensitivities.
appeared to be keenly aware
of these obstacles. He claimed that the problem now
was how to improve the PLA's military capabilities
without appearing to go back on past doctrine and
without too much expenditure. According to him there
are always difficulties in "going back too quickly
and too publicly" on decisions made by Chairman Mao.
This was apparently an allusion to Mao's concept of
a "people's war" strategy for defending China.
In discussing the expense involved in a modern-
ization program, he remarked that this raised "seri-
ous economic questions" and implied that the Chinese
leadership was still puzzling over the question of
financing. One possibility which was discussed in
Peking, was the purchase
of weapons technology a roa , possibly from the US.
November 10, 1975
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To the extent that is accurately re-
flecting real concerns, such pro ems of implementation
could provide openings for elements who would like to
modify or reverse Directive 18.
seemed even less sanguine in
reflecting on succession and the impact it might have
on remaining frictions in civilian-military relations.
As the old guard passes from the scene, he clearly
implied, this relationship will undergo its severest
test. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
November 10, 1975
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Learning from Tachai: Agricultural
Mechanization and Political Stability
The month long national conference on learning
from Tachai, China's agricultural model, ended in
mid October and has received prompt provincial
response. Provincial propaganda, including
speeches by some provincial party chiefs, has
followed closely the line set out in a speech on
October 15 by Vice Premier Hua Kuo-feng, the party
leader in charge of agriculture.
The main points in Hua's speech were:
--mechanization of agriculture is essential
for the longer term goal of modernizing
industry, defense, science, and technology;
--private plots larger than those permitted
by party policy should be cut back, with
the excess land turned back to the commune
for collective farming;
--at least 100 Tachai-type counties should
be established annually for the next five
years, one feature of a Tachai-type county
being a steady improvement in the living
standards of commune members;
--another national agricultural conference will
be held in five years to discuss the sixth
five-year economic plan (China is scheduled
to begin its fifth five-year plan next
year).
On the political front, Hua said responsibility
for building Tachai-type counties rests with
county party officials and warned that political
factionalism should not be allowed to impede
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agricultural development. Hua suggested that local
officials who persist in factionalism be trans-
ferred out of the area "as soon as possible" but
that local officials who have merely made mistakes
should be re-educated not transferred. He called
for annual "rectification" campaigns by local
party organs to prevent political errors and
ordered that those who engage in speculation,
bribery, and theft be punished by law.
Provincial response to the conference, while
following closely the economic guidelines, has used
the occasion to call for unity and stability and
to condemn persistent factionalism. The new leader
of Yunnan Province urged all people to work
together to modernize agriculture regardless of
which faction they belong to. Politburo member Wei
Kuo-china, newly transferred to Kwangtung as party
boss, used his maiden address to warn the
traditionally independent-minded people of that
province against arbitrarily changing policies
established by the Central Committee or by the
provincial leadership.
Most provinces have called for studying the
speeches at the conference made by vice premiers
Teng Hsiao-ping, Hua Kuo-feng and Chen Yung-kuei,
who himself hails from Tachai. Kwangsi Province
even mentioned a speech, otherwise not reported,
by female Vice Premier Wu Kuei-hsien. Interest-
ingly, not a single province has so much as
mentioned the "important speech" by Chiang Ching
made at the opening of the conference but not
published. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 10, 1975
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Promoting Pyongyang
Peking has pulled out virtually all of the
stops in its support of the pro-Pyongyang resolution
during UN debate on the Korea question this year.
China's objective is clearly to highlight the
solidarity of Sino - North Korean interests, especially
in contrast with what Peking describes as Moscow's
duplicity and deceptive designs on Pyongyang. Never-
theless, the Chinese have not closed the door to
eventual adjustments on the Korea question.
It has been clear for some time that Peking's
essential concern in Korea has been to build the
kind of relationship with Pyongyang that would help
block any improvement in Soviet influence there.
In order to satisfy the objective, the Chinese
have had to soft-pedal differences with the North
Koreans.
But there are differences. Peking has long
viewed disarray on the Korean Peninsula as inimical
to its interests because of the possibility it
could lead to Soviet "meddling" there. As a
result, the Chinese have urged a cautious course
on Pyongyang, most importantly by discouraging Kim
Il-song from taking a more aggressive posture on
the issue of Korean reunification. Moreover, the
Chinese are persuaded that North Korean military
action against the South would lead to complica-
tions for Peking in its dealings with Tokyo,
especially if the Japanese saw a need for rearmament
in the wake of North Korean actions. Nevertheless,
the Chinese have increased their diplomatic support
to the North Koreans over the past year or so in
order to gain Pyongyang's confidence and, perhaps,
in exchange for North Korean assurances that force
will not be used against the South.
The presence of US troops in the South could
be the crux of any differences. The North Koreans
November 10, 1975
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demand the elimination of the US presence. The
US and Seoul have insisted that the UN Command
cannot be dissolved until other means of enforcing
the armistice have been created.
Peking has expressed opposition, "in
principle," to the presence of foreign troops in
other countries. The Chinese have made it clear,
however, that they will not object to a continued
US military role in countries where "special
circumstances" exist--for example, Japan, Thailand,
the Philippines. Behind this view is the Chinese
belief that hasty US withdrawals could result in
Soviet attempts to "fill the vacuum," and the
Chinese have implied privately that the same
considerations influence their attitude toward the
US military presence in South Korea.
Despite such implicit Chinese support for a
continuing US military role in Asia, Peking has
felt compelled to provide firm public support of
Pyongyang's case in the UN. At the UN, both Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and UN Chief Delegate
Huang Hua have characterized the US presence in
South Korea as the key issue in any solution of
the problem,. and both have expressed strong support
for the resolution that calls for the removal of
these troops. Huang used unusually tough language
in his denunciations of the US, describing as
"downright deception" attempts to keep troops in
the South and, for the first time in three years
at such a high level, accusing the US of "armed
provocations" against the North. Both Huang
and Chiao dismissed as "impractical" Secretary
Kissinger's recent'proposal to call a conference
to discuss ways of preserving the armistice.
The Chinese in the UN were at least as tough
on the Soviets with regard to the Korea question.
Huang accused Moscow of hypocrisy in its attitude
toward Korean reunification and charged that the
November 10, 1975
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Soviets were, in fact, attempting to "create two
Koreas." Huang's comments marked the first time
that the Chinese had used the UN forum to criticize
Moscow's position on the Korea issue. Outside
the UN, the Chinese press has also drawn attention
to Moscow's "flirtation" with Seoul, which Peking
described as part of Soviet attempts to sabotage
Korean reunification and to increase its influence
in North Asia.
In order to draw greater contrast between
their own and Moscow's intentions in Pyongyang, the
Chinese this year buttressed their UN statements
with forceful commentary on the 25th anniversary
of the entry of Chinese "volunteers" into the
Korean war. The focus of these comments was on
the historical importance of Korea to China's
security. In a joint editorial marking the
anniversary, Peking asserted that the US had intended
to invade China when it "launched" the war in
Korea and that the Korean people's successful
struggle "safeguarded the security of China."
Speaking at an anniversary banquet in Peking,
Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien made similar comments.
These remarks are clearly designed to demonstrate
the importance the Chinese attach to close relations
with Pyongyang.
Despite all the rhetoric, the Chinese have not
painted themselves into a corner on the Korea
question. As in the past, Peking has not attached
any special urgency to its call for the withdrawal
of US forces in the South but has focused in a
generalized way on the "unreasonableness" of the
US position. NCNA's account of the General
Assembly First Committee voting on the Korea
question--both the pro-Pyongyang and the pro-Seoul
resolutions were approved--was remarkably low-key
and suggests the possibility of eventual Chinese
adjustments on the issue. Criticism of the US role
in the voting was limited and the harshest comments
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were saved for the Soviets. The article concluded
with a prediction that neither "superpower" will
be able to obstruct "a reasonable solution" to the
Korea question, a hint that future negotiations
may be required in order to reach a solution.
Another consideration that the Chinese almost
certainly must be taking into account is President
Ford's scheduled visit to Peking. The full General
Assembly will probably take up the Korea matter
next week and heated debate could develop if both
resolutions are voted on by that body. Chinese
leaders probably are persuaded that it would be
prudent to avoid another bitter exchange on Korea
just days before President Ford's trip to China.
In, fact, Huang Hua last week said that Peking would
accept a proposal that the General Assembly simply
approve the First Committee report without either
debating or voting on the two separate resolutions.
This procedure would enshrine the pro-Pyongyang
resolution in the UN record, but would not result
in. any clear cut solution of the question, a
development that almost certainly would satisfy
Peking. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
November 10, 1975
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Two Strikes on Wang
For the second time this year, stories are
making the rounds in China that young party vice
chairman Wang Hung-wen has failed to come up with
an adequate answer to important questions put to
him by Mao. In both instances, the man who sup-
plied the right answer was Teng Hsiao-ping, although
one version of the story credits Chang Chun-chiao
with providing the satisfactory response.
The most recent account, reportedly transmitted
in a Central Committee document, is of a conversa-
tion in which Mao asked Wang and Teng for their
opinions about what China would be like in the next
decade. Wang's response was upbeat, saying that
people would continue to give prominence to Mao's
thought. Teng, on the other hand, took a darker
view, warning that changes must be made now to im-
prove the people's living conditions in order to
avert future problems. Mao reportedly agreed with
Teng's assessment and told Wang to learn from that
response. Another version has Chang Chun-chiao
responding in much the same vein as Teng, with Mao
expressing his dissatisfaction with Wang's reply
and ordering him to undergo re-education in Shanghai.
Wang has not appeared in Peking since May but
has appeared in Shanghai on two occasions. Reports
that he has been in nearby Chekiang Province since
July supervising the restoration of order in that
troubled area are beginning to wear a bit thin in
light of his prolonged absence from the capital and
the stories now circulating about him--obviously
at Peking's initiative, given the apparent inclusion
of one version in a central document.
The current story is almost an exact replica
of an alleged earlier discussion in which Mao re-
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portedly asked Teng and Wang how to handle the
Chekiang situation. On that occasion, too, Teng's
answer showed a greater understanding of the com-
plexities of the situation and Wang was admonished
by Mao to study Teng's response.
Wang's alleged answers seem almost overly sim-
plistic, perhaps a contrivance by Peking to show
that, despite his rapid rise in the party hierarchy,
Wang has much to learn before he is competent to
handle the diverse and complex problems facing China.
In. this, he is a perfect foil for the vastly more
experienced Teng, whose answers leave little doubt
that he is capable of running the country after Mao's
death and that he has Mao's support. That one ver-
sion of the story substitutes Chang Chun-chiao for
Teng may not be an accident. Chang stands a good
chance to succeed Teng over the longer term.
The fact that these stories are circulating
widely in rumor form suggests they are a gauge of the
Chinese people's assessment of the three men. Based
on these stories, it would appear that the populace
would be far more comfortable with Teng and later
Chang as leaders in the post-Mao era, largely because
they appear to be more sensitive and responsive to
the needs of the people.
More importantly, Peking's apparently deliberate
role in portraying these men in such a manner says
much about their relative political standing. Teng
and Chang, obviously, are doing very well, but Wang
Hung-wen's status within the hierarchy seems to have
slipped. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
November 10, 1975
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Concern that the current education system is
inadequate for China's needs, first voiced by Pre-
mier Chou En-lai at the National People's Congress
in January, reportedly was reiterated in more spe-
cific terms in a recent speech by Minister of Edu-
cation Chou Jung-hsin. The minister's criticism
focused mainly on the educational reforms of the
Cultural Revolution, reforms initiated at Mao's
behest that emphasized politics at the expense of
academic training.
University educators have long complained about
the poor quality of entering students, the lack of
attention to studying basic scientific theory, and
the inordinate amount of time spent discussing po-
litical issues. Chou Jung-hsin echoed these com-
plaints and summed up the shortcomings of current
educational policy by saying that university stu-
dents, who ideally should be both "red" (thoroughly
familiar with communist doctrine) and "expert" in
their chosen fields, are neither.
Although problems with the education system
have long been recognized, very little has been
done about them over the years. Lack of progress
on this issue is due in part to the highly politi-
cal nature of educational policy--any changes in
the Cultural Revolution reforms have been staunchly
opposed by the party's left wing--and perhaps by
some uncertainty over where Mao stands.
Mao's current position is becoming more clear.
It appears that he is now prepared to endorse changes
in the reform program that he himself introduced
during the Cultural Revolution. According to stor-
ies circulating in Shanghai, Mao believes that uni-
versity education must be improved and that students
November 10, 1975
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need not study political theory in college but can
learn it at work. Chou Jung-hsin, in his speech,
claimed that Mao had ordered a symposium to be held
in 1974 on the need to increase the study of basic
scientific theory in the universities and, in that
same year, instructed that some high school graduates
be admitted directly into the universities without
first spending a few years working in the rural
areas.
Not surprisingly, the physicist who chaired
the symposium was subsequently attacked, undoubtedly
by party left wingers, and none of the local offi-
cials responsible for university enrollment responded
to Mao's offer to accept high school graduates di-
rectly into some universities.
Chou Jung-hsin's speech linking Mao to pro-
posed improvements in the education system has
apparently been disseminated throughout China.
This firmer fix on Mao's views toward higher edu-
cation may bolster efforts to improve the situation
in the universities, which remain the weakest link
in China's stated goal of modernizing agriculture,
industry, defense, and science and technology. The
key to modernizing science and technology is to
improve academic training in the universities.
Steps have been taken toward modernization in the
other areas, but thus far very little has been done
to improve the sorry state of China's universities.
In addition to Mao's backing for changes in
the education system, which would provide short
term justification for making improvements in that
area, there are signs that Peking is trying to en-
sure that education be kept out of the hands of
party left wingers over the longer term. Politburo
member Chang Chun-chiao, who probably favors improve-
ment in the academic field, recently met with the
Venezuelan minister of education, suggesting that
the powerful Chang may have added education to his
November 10, 1975
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growing list of responsibilities.
The high level attention devoted to problems
in that area, Mao's own approval for changes, and
Chang Chun-chiao's possible involvement are all
signs that the logjam on educational policy may
soon be broken. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
November 10, 1975
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West Germany: No Wrinkles in the Red Carpet
West German Chancellor Schmidt's recently con-
cluded state visit to China, which he has declared
a "success," was carefully stage-managed by the Chi-
nese. Schmidt postponed his scheduled visit early
this year after the Chinese gave a high level re-
ception to Schmidt's arch conservative political
rival Franz-Josef Strauss. The postponement clearly
dismayed the Chinese who began working immediately
to improve Sino-German relations and to smooth the
way for the rescheduled state visit. During the
spring, summer, and early fall, the Chinese:
--ordered their embassy in Bonn to expand
contacts with Schmidt's Social Democratic
Party;
--expedited preparations in Peking for a
German technical exhibition, the largest
and best attended foreign exhibition ever
held in China;
--completed negotiations for a Sino-German
aviation and maritime agreement and for
the establishment of a joint economic
commission so that formal signing cere-
monies could take place during Schmidt's
visit;
--gave Franz-Josef Strauss more routine
treatment during his second visit to
Peking in September;
---showed keen interest in expanding
German imports while talking of modi-
fying China's raw material export
policy to allow sales of some coal
and oil to West Germany.
November 10, 1975
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During his five-day stay in China, Schmidt
had ceremonial meetings with Mao and with National
People's Congress Chairman Chu Teh and was accorded
the honor of being the first Western government head
to visit Sinkiang Province on the Sino-Soviet border.
The chancellor had indicated apprehension that pub-
lic differences over East-West detente might mar his
visit and give political ammunition to his critics
at home--a concern that was undoubtedly heightened in
the wake of Secretary Kissinger's visit. But he came
away openly pleased with Chinese awareness of his
sensitivities in this regard.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping gave heavy play
to anti-Soviet, anti-detente themes in his welcom-
ing speech but made no direct attacks on German
Ostpolitik. Teng apparently took the same tack in
private discussions with the West Germans and his
farewell speech was most noteworthy for its ring-
ing endorsement of European unity rather than any
anti-superpower vitriol. The absence of a com-
munique on Schmidt's departure was somewhat puzzl-
ing: a formal joint statement might have been
expected on the initial visit by the head of such
an important government and there were some indica-
tions that initial plans called for one. Some fric-
tion over wording may have arisen during preliminary
discussions between the two sides, and mutual agree-
ment may have been reached to dispense with a com-
munique rather than risk a second postponement of
the visit--a development both Peking and Bonn un-
doubtedly wanted to avoid. In any event, both
sides pointed to the signing of the maritime and
aviation agreements and the establishment of the
joint commission as evidence of the visit's suc-
cess and of warming bilateral relations.
The Chinese may soon realize some welcome re-
turns for their hospitality. On the same day that
Schmidt arrived in China, Bonn announced that it
favored Peking in its dispute with Taipei over
ownership of some real estate in West Berlin.
November 10, 1975
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The move adds substance to rumors that Bonn would
not block a Chinese request to establish a con-
sulate in West Berlin. Recent reports have indi-
cated that Bonn may also be actively considering
Peking's request for permission to post Chinese
military attaches in West Germany. Peking has been
pushing for action on both questions for nearly two
years, recognizing that either step would irritate
Moscow and provide further proof of China's expand-
ing ties with Western Europe. (SECRET NOFORN/N000N-
TRACT/ORCON)
November 10, 1975
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September 1 Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan meets in
Peking with visiting Thai journalists.
(U)
October 23 Import-export agreement signed with
visiting Guyana trade mission. (U)
Italian Communist Party delegation
headed by Central Committee member
Manlio Dinucci begins "friendly visit."
(U)
October 24 Malaysian delegation, led by Agricul-
ture Minister Abdul Ghafa, concludes
"friendly visit" to China and departs
Peking for Kuala Lumpur. (U)
October 24- Chinese trade delegation led by Vice
30 Minister of Foreign Trade Chen Chieh
visits Pakistan. (U)
October 25 1976 trade protocol signed. (U)
China and North Vietnam sign agreement
in Peking on "mutual supply of goods
and payments" in 1970. (U)
October 26 Burmese industrial delegation arrives
in Peking; meets with Vice Premier Li
Hsien-nien on October 31. (U)
October 28 Ministerial level postal and telecom-
munications delegation departs for
Algeria. (U)
Delegation headed by Vice Minister of
Communications Tseng Sheng departs for
inter-governmental maritime conference
in London. (U)
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October 28
Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching identi-
fied as new first secretary of Kwang-
tung Province. (U)
October 29-
West
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
November 2
pays
Mao
state visit to China; meets with
on October 30; departs via Sinkiang
Province. (U)
October 30 Equatorial Guinea trade delegation headed
by Foreign Minister Bonifacio Nguema
Esono arrives in Peking. (U)
October 31 Public health delegation headed by Pub-
lic Health Minister Liu Hsiang-ping de-
parts for visits to Albania, Algeria,
and Yugoslavia. (U)
November 3 Mexican scientific delegation begins
official visit. (U)
A delegation of the Chinese People's
Association for Friendship with For-
eign Countries departs for visit to
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.
(U)
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman is-
sues statement concerning October 20
incident along the Sino-Indian border.
(U)
Pakistani agricultural delegation led
by Minister of Food and Agriculture
arrives in China. (U)
November 4 Sino-Bulgarian scientific and techni-
cal commission meets in Sofia, signs
protocol. (U)
November 5 Sino-Hungarian scientific and techni-
cal commission meets in Belgrade, signs
protocol. (U)
November 10, 1975
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November 5 Trade agreement signed with Gambia.
(U)
China and Fiji agree to establish
diplomatic relations. (U)
November 10, 1975
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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