SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100260001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 12, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
November 12, 1975
SC No. 00540/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL. .. - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
058(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
November 12,
1975
Moscow Says "No" to Sakharov .
. . . . . . . . .
1
Soviet-Yugoslav Relations. . .
. . . . . . . . .
3
Price Rises in Czechoslovakia:
The Regime Claims No ! . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
5
Hungarian Party Card Exchange.
. . . . . . . . .
8
More on Albania . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
10
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Moscow Says "No" to Sakharov
Nobel Peace prize winner Andrey Sakharov told
Western correspondents in Moscow yesterday that his
application to go to Oslo to collect the award on
December 10 had been denied on the grounds that he
possessed state secrets. Sakharov, who was cut off
from the Soviet nuclear program in 1968, said he
did not intend to resubmit the travel request since
he considers the rejection "invalid." He said he
hopes the decision might still be reversed, but
believes that is possible only if "international
opinion" lobbies on his behalf.
Moscow's denial of Sakharov's request appears
to be in line with other discernible steps toward
doctrinal retrenchment and tightened ideological
control that has become evident in Kremlin politics
in the post-Helsinki and pre-CPSU congress period.
The move serves notice to domestic and foreign
audiences that the case of the dissident physicist
has internal political and policy implications that
outweigh any damage the action may do to the Soviet
image abroad.
Even so, Moscow's continuing anti-Sakharov
propaganda campaign is being generally cast in
terms of a defense of detente against those at
home and abroad who, like Sakharov and the Nobel
Committee, undermine that policy. Domestically,
the denial of the visa is designed to dash the
hopes for change that many other human rights
activists saw in the combination of the Helsinki
accords and Sakharov's Nobel prize.
In this atmosphere, the chance of a favorable
reconsideration by the regime of Sakharov's re-
quest for a round trip to Oslo is remote. At the
same time, there is some new fuel for speculation
that at the last moment he may be offered a one-
way ticket out of the country.
November 12, 1975
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The same day that Sakharov's travel application
was denied, Moscow belatedly announced that last
January it had lifted the citizenship of dissident
Vladimir Maksimov, once a close associate of Sak-
harov, who left the USSR in February 1974 on a one-
year visa. Maksimov, whose departure came at almost
the same time that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was ex-
pelled, was not expected to return home. The regime
may have waited until now to publicize Maksimov's
formal expulsion to signal that some form of ex-
pulsion is an alternative for Sakharov if he continues
to press his case.
Both Sakharov and his wife are evidently strug-
gling to do just that by keeping the spotlight of
Western publicity on their cause. Mrs. Sakharov, who
recently received Soviet permission to extend her
stay in the West through December 20 and who may
try to collect her husband's award in his name
(Staff Note, November 6), said on Monday that for
the first time Sakharov feels physically threatened.
She offered no details, but added that the question
of her husband's trip to Oslo was a test case of the
Helsinki agreements and appealed for Western support.
In Moscow, meanwhile, senior officials of the
Academy of Sciences are reportedly sounding out the
chances of expelling Sakharov from the academy. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
November 12, 1975
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Soviet-Yugoslav Relations
With trials of Stalinist subversives in the
offing, Belgrade is having trouble keeping anti-So-
vietism within Yugoslavia under control.
On Tuesday, Todo Kurtovic, the Yugoslav party's
secretary for ideology, raised doubts about Soviet
intentions toward Yugoslavia at an assembly of top
propagandists. He particularly questioned the
reliability of Moscow's past assurances that it would
not interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs or try to
dominate the Yugoslav party. The Kurtovic speech is
the most direct public criticism of Moscow since the
anti-Stalinist campaign began a month ago. His state-
ments, however, fall short of Tito's unfulfilled threat
a year ago to expose every aspect of the subversive
activity.
Despite Belgrade's desire to avoid an open polemic
with Moscow, there are growing indications of excessive
zeal in condemning the Soviets. For example, a Croat
government official has told the US consul
general that anti-Titoi in the West are in
league with the Soviet-inspired "Cominformists."
Several newspapers--including the army weekly--have
also tried to evoke the emotional patriotism of 1968
by reviving stories of the Yugoslav reaction to the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Belgrade appears adamant in demanding that the
pro.-Soviet influence be eliminated. Kurtovic said
that the Stalinists have flourished partially because
of the laxity of the regime, and ordered the prop-
agandists to describe more plainly to their audiences
the differences between the Soviet and Yugoslav systems.
He attacked "alien recipes" that would undo Yugoslav
independence and weaken the popular will to fight in
defense of the country. Kurtovic appeared especially
concerned that admitted flaws in the political system
and the economy would allow the pro-Soviets to promote
their simplistic panacea of rigid centralism and
coercion as the only solution for Yugoslavia.
November 12, 1975
SECRET SPOKE
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Moscow last year handled Yugoslav sensitivities
regarding Soviet ties to the subversives by issuing
flat public denials and privately mollifying Tito
with shipments of modern arms and energetic reassur-
ances of good will. This year the stakes for both
sides may be higher.
Moscow has so far not responded publicly to this
round of allegations; instead it has depicted bilateral
relations as normal. The Soviet restraint may reflect
their desire to avoid giving recognition to the charges.
Moscow also wants to preserve as positive an atmosphere
as is possible as it prepares for the European Commu-
nist conference and the Soviet party congress. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
November 12, 1975
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Price Rises in Czechoslovakia:
The Regime Claims No!
In the past week, top Czechoslovak leaders have
sought to scotch apparently widespread rumors of im-
pending price increases. The beginning of a new five
year plan in January plus expected price increases
in Poland and Hungary have evidently sparked specula-
tion among Czechoslovaks that the prices they pay
will also go up.
Premier Lubomir Strougal, speaking to the Prague
rally on the occasion of the Soviet October Revolu-
tion anniversary last Thursday, assured his audience
that the only thing to rise after New Year's day would
be pensions. On Monday, party chief and President
Gustav Husak reiterated the point, lashing out at
foreign propaganda and malicious rumormongers for
influencing "the naive to let their imaginations run
riot." He angrily denied rumors of price hikes for
food, meat, rents, and gasoline, stating flatly that
such increases were neither planned nor needed.
Having sought to win popular acceptance through
raising the standard of living and satisfying con-
sumer desires, Husak is understandably sensitive to
rumors of price rises. Shortly after he replaced
Dubcek in 1969, the regime rolled back prices for
a number of basic consumer goods and has since
generally maintained stabilized price levels.
The rapid rise in international prices, however,
is straining Prague's ability to shield the consumer
from price increases. From 1973 to 1974, for in-
stance, state subsidies allowing retail prices to
remain stable tripled from 6 billion Kcs. (Czecho-
slovak crowns) to 18 billion Kcs. The regime's plan
for dealing with increased raw material prices
through harder work and improved management has
November 12, 1975
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SECRET SPOKE
obvious limits. In addition, subsidizing consumer
interests also restricts the availability of funds
for other projects like the long-overdue moderniza-
tion of industry.
For political reasons, however, the regime will
probably attempt to maintain the current price level
at least until after the 15th party congress next
April. In the meantime, there are several methods,
such as "new" products and repackaging, to introduce
hidden price increases. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 12, 1975
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Hungarian Party Card Exchange
The Hungarian party will conduct its first party
card exchange since 1967--and its sixth since 1945--
in leisurely fashion over the next 12 months. The
program was kicked off by party'secretary Arpad Pullai,
who apparently has prime responsibility for administer-
ing the program, at the Central Committee session on
October 23. The exchange is expected to be completed
next November when new cards are printed.
In his speech, which has only recently been
published, Pullai sought to portray the card exchange
as an almost routine affair. He asserted that ex-
change will not be a purge or "inquisition," and
emphasized that the party does not suffer from polit-
ical laxity or factionalism. Instead, he said, the
program is intended to stimulate increased activism
and ideological commitment.
Party directives on the card exchange echo this
low-key approach. Certain categories of members--in-
cluding manual workers not given specific party tasks,
recently admitted young people, and older and retired
persons--will be evaluated leniently. Also to be
judged lightly will be party members who abstain from
religious practices but have been unable to persuade
members of their family to do likewise.
Each of the approximately 750,000 party members
will be interviewed about his participation in party
work, willingness to accept new assignments, ideological
and political consciousness, and his life style. The
authorities will also assess whether an individual
has "improper materialistic tendencies."
Plans for a card exchange were announced at the
party congress last March, and there has been some
puzzlement as to why the regime waited so long to
move forward. The regime may have felt a necessity
November 12, 1975
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to postpone the exchange to avoid a direct link with
top-level changes made at the congress and shortly
thereafter. The embassy reports there is speculation
in Budapest that the ever-cautious Hungarian leader-
ship is awaiting the results of the European Communist
party conference and the Soviet party congress before
it concludes the exchange. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 12, 1975
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The political scene in Albania remains murky,
but the evidence of fairly widespread personnel
purges is increasing. The purges are reportedly
related to a struggle between those who wish to
maintain an orthodox, hard-line policy and others
who see no chance of improving the political situ-
ation until Albania's isolation is ended (Staff
Notes, November 3).
recently returned from
Tirana impressed with the entirely new cast of
characters in the Albanian officialdom he met dur-
ing his visit. He mentioned no names or functions,
however, nor did he indicate on what level the
purges had taken place. He tended to dismiss
"pro-Sovietism" as a major cause for the ousters,
but was certain that many elements in Albania wish
for a restoration of better relations with Moscow
and that their attitude probably lay at the heart
of the struggle.
Tirana has maintained its silence on the
ousters, and there is no indication that the top
leadership has been affected. Party boss Enver
Hoxha has made no public appearances recently, but
none has really been required, and his heir ap-
parent Premier Mehmut Shehu was host at a reception
last week for a visiting Chinese health delegation.
seemed to feel that
tensions of the kind he described are fairly prev-
alent throughout Albanian society, but he did not
look for change any time soon. He pointed out that
the regime now rounded up "revisionists" and tech-
nocrats of questionable loyalty and then simply
exiled them to the countryside. He thought that
"some day" the modernizers, fed up with Albanian
backwardness, would have some success in getting
policies changed. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
November 12, 1975
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Secret
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