MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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NOFORN
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Top Secret
SC No. 083'11e75
November 1 i , 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652 exemption category:
056(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Saudi Arabia: Port Congestion . . . . . . . . . 3
Malagasy Republic: Ratsiraka Seeks a Mandate . 5
French Territory of Afars and Issas:
Political Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
India: Latest Chapter in the Naga Saga . . . . 11
Nov 13, 1975
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Saudi Arabia
Port Congestion
Port congestion has become serious in Saudi
Arabia. At both Jidda and Damman, Saudi Arabia's
two largest dry cargo ports, ships are waiting three
months to berth, compared with two weeks last spring.
Shipowners have found it difficult to maintain: shipping
schedules. Demurrage fees and surcharges for delays
have increased freight charges as much as 50 percent.
Surging imports, up 33 percent this year, along
with poor port management and a shortage of labor
account for the delays. At Jidda, for example, all
decisions for handling ships must be made by the
Ministry of Communications in Riyadh. Good workers
can earn more money at other jobs.
.Port clearance problems and customs inefficiency
add to the delays. At Jidda, there is not dockside
rail service and only one road leads directly into
the city.
In an effort to overcome manpower and adminis-
trative problems, Saudi officials recently eased
regulations on hiring foreign workers and have sought
technical advice from aboard. Shippers are making
greater use of more advanced ships in order to reduce
congestion and some shipments have been diverted
to overland and air routes. Goods are now frequently
trucked directly from Europe. Goods are also being
shipped into Turkish ports and then trucked into
Saudi Arabia.
Despite these steps, congestion at Saudi ports
will get substantially worse in the near future.
During the nex-L. two months, 200 ships carrying a half
million pilgrims for Mecca will call at Jidda. Port
officials have reserved 4 of the 12 berths to handle
these passenger ships.
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Some officials believe that there will be a
backlog of 250 dry cargo ships at Jidda by mid-
January, resulting in berthing delays of five
months or more. As Jidda becomes more congested,
overland traffic will increase and ships will be
diverted to other Saudi Arabian or Middle Eastern
ports, causing additional delays. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Nov 13, 1975
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Malagasy Republic
Ratsiraka Seeks a Mandate
President Didier Ratsiraka on November 7 announced
plans to hold a referendum before the end of the year
on a new constitution and on his own charter for
transforming Madagascar into a more rigorously socialist
state. A committee will be established to draft the
text of the new constitution; Ratsiraka outlined his
socialist blueprint in an address in eight install-
ments over Malagasy radio in late August. The program
has since been distributed in a "little red book".
Ratsiraka believes a new constitution is needed
to restore legitimacy to Madagascar's institutions.
The present basic laws were adopted in 1972 to pro-
vide legality for the military regime that had assumed
power following widespread civil unrest. The govern-
ment has since changed hands three times, in the course
of which many provisions of the basic laws were set
aside.
Ratsiraka's charter envisions a highly-centralized
administration in which the state controls all principal
means of production. All lands either not utilized or
not owned by those who work them will be confiscated
and redistributed to the peasants. Mixed enterprises,
presumably including private capital, may be allowed
in non-vital sectors of the economy, but dependence
on foreign economic interests is explicitly rejected.
Dedicated socialists are to be placed in positions of
responsibility at all echelons.
Foreign policy is to be guided by total hostility
to colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism, together
with support for "progressive" forces everywhere.
Ratsiraka, while serving as foreign minister under a
previous government, had already oriented foreign policy
along these lines. Since becoming president, he has
further expanded relations with communist countries.
(Continued)
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Ratsiraka has developed particularly close
ties with China, which in the past year has noticeably
stepped up the pace of its activity in Madagascar.
Last July the two countries concluded a new economic
and technical cooperation agreement under which China
will extend an interest-free loan of $57.5 million.
The major portion of the loan will be used to cover
local costs of a Chinese project to upgrade an important
road between Tananarive, the capital, and a major port.
The loan is by far th?. largest Madagascar has received
from any single source in recent years. Peking in July
also provided almost $2.5 million worth of agricultural
equipment on a ten-year, no-interest credit.
The Soviets have also shown increased interest
in the island country, but their efforts have not
matched those of the Chinese. In October, a high level
Soviet trade mission visited Tananarive and signed a
trade and economic cooperation agreement that permits
the Soviets to open a trade office in the capital.
Moscow agreed to undertake five aid projects, mainly
involving technical assistance and feasibility studies.
Ratsiraka is taking a political risk in submitting
his socialist charter to a popular referendum. Dis-
enchantment with his rule is increasing among civilians
and within the military. Some dissidents consider
his socialist revolution too radical and many are unhappy
with his autocratic decision-making. Ratsiraka is
also accused of devoting too much attention to developing
his program for imposing a Marxist-oriented regime while
neglecting the more immediate problems of unemployment,
food shortages, and economic stagnation.
Ratsiraka's close ties to the Chinese have con-
tributed to the decline in his popularity. The Malagasy
are suspicious of Chinese intentions, and there is
widespread criticism of the increased Chinese activity
in the country. The arrival of a large number of
additional Chinese to work on the road project will
undoubtedly further increase Malagasy fears. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Nov 13, 1975
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French Territory of Afars and Issas
Paris has decided to grant independence to the
French Territory of Afars and Issas--the last French
foothold in Africa--but apparently has not yet come
to grips with how or when to relinquish control.
Devising a method for an orderly transfer is likely
to be difficult.
The main problem is the absence of a single
nationalist leader--or organization--who can legiti-
mately claim to represent all or even a majority of
the tribally divided population. In addition to
the fundamental conflict between the two major ethnic
groups, the Afar and the Issa, each is beset by deep
divisions within its own ranks. Beneath a thin veneer
of political party competition, politics in the ter-
ritory consists of a struggle for dominance between
the two major tribes and among their leaders. The
demands of exile groups, the conflicting interests
of the territory's two neighbors--Ethiopia and Somalia--
and the special interests of nearby Arab states, add
other dimensions to the complex political picture.
Ali Aref Bourhan, an Afar who is president of
the local governing council, represents those who
have worked closely with the French and who now
dominate the local power structure. Their nominal
party is the Afar Democratic Rally. Paris installed
Aref in the 1960s because he was willing to support
continued French rule and was able to keep the Afars
in line.
After years of defending French control, Aref
early this year came out for independence. He
apparently had become convinced his opponents were
gaining ground by identifying with the growing popular
sentiment for independence.
(Continued)
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Aref's position as leader of the local govern-
ment has allowed him to take the lead in the pre-
liminary stages of arranging the transfer of power.
His political support in the territory is not great,
however, and his abilities are limited. Most African
leaders have little respect for Aref, although he
apparently has made a good impression on some OAU
officials.
Aref's popularity among the Afars was declining
even before independence became much of an issue.
Opponents within his tribe accuse him of relying too
heavily on conservative, tradition-bound Afar advisers
and of neglecting economic development. They demand
he bring more young, better-educated Afars into his
administration and make a more forceful commitment to
development.
Influential Afars are also unhappy with Aref's
dealings with Ethiopia. They sympathize with the
struggle being waged by Afars in Ethiopia against
the military regime in Addis Ababa. Many of them
view Aref's cooperation with Addis Ababa as a sell-
out of Ethiopian Afars.
Aref's main opponent is the African People's
Independence League (APIL), led by Hassan Gouled,
an Issa, and Ahmed Dini, and Afar. Gouled and Dini
assert their organization transcends tribal lines,
but its membership appears to be mostly Issa and it
does not command a broad popular following. The
group demands immediate, unconditional independence.
Gouled and Dini have tried to improve their
images by making frequent trips to France and
occasional visits to Arab states. French officials
have met with the two but have not encouraged their
aspirations to leadership. Gouled and Dini frequently
threaten to initiate armed struggle if the French continue
to refuse to meet their demands.
(Continued)
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Gouled and Dini have established close
ties with Somalia and say they are cooperating with
the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast
(FLSC), a small Somali-backed Issa group that has
its headquarters in Mogadiscio. Gouled and Dini have
judiciously avoided discussion of the apparent
contradition between their demand for independence
and their cooperation with the Somalis who would still
like to annex the territory.
The Ethiopians back another small organization,
the Djibouti Liberation Movement (DLM), based in
eastern Ethiopia. Neither the Ethiopian nor the Somali
backed group is much more than a paper organization
formed to represent its sponsor's interests in the
territory. Both, however, are recognized and finan-
cially supported by the OAU.
Ethiopia's abandonment of its historical claim
to the territory has put Somalia on the defensive.
African leaders believe Addis Ababa is genuinely
committed to independence--the policy favored by
the OAU--but are not convinced by Somalia's ambiguous
verbal support for that goal. The OAU council of
ministers meeting in June rejected a Somali bid to
open a regional office of the OAU Liberation Committee
in Mogadiscio, which would have made the Somalis
appear to be more actively involved in the effort to
gain independence for the territory.
The developing relations between Ethiopia
and All Aref also constitute a setback for Somalia.
Mogadiiscio has been put in the position of appearing
to be the main obstacle to further progress toward
independence, even as Addis Ababa, Paris, and Ali
Aref seem to be making progress toward mutual accom-
modation. Aref's recent activities--his visit to
Ethiopia and proposal of an independence referendum--
have allowed him to seize the initiative from the
leaders of the Somali-backed APIL and FLSC.
(Continued)
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Mogadiscio also seems to have lost much of,
the support it once had from the Issas--who are
ethnic Somalis--for its territorial claims. Many,
perhaps most, Issas have little use for the leftist,
authoritarian regime of Somali President Siad.
Many Somalis who now live in the territory left
Somalia to seek economic opportunities they could
not find under Siad's socialism. Issa support for
independence over union with Somalia would grow
further if the Issas were given a larger voice in
the territory's politics and government. The
present territorial council, composed of five Afars
and four Issas, clearly is not representative of a
majority of the Issas.
The interest of nearby Arab states in the
territory's future is related to the potential
destabilizing influence independence could have in
the lower Red Sea area. The Arab states do not
support Somalia's territorial ambitions; Siad is
far too closely associated with the USSR for most
of the Arab powers along the Red Sea basin.
French officials have tentatively considered
seeking guarantees for the territory's future as an
independent state from some of the Red Sea riparian
states, but Paris has not made direct approaches to
any of them. Early this spring, Ali Aref, with
French approval, sent a delegation to several Arab
and African capitals to discuss the question of
guarantees. The delegation received little encourage-
ment. Most of the black African states, for example,
are reluctant to endorse any action that might lead
to an expansion of Arab influence over the continent.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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India
Latest Chapter in the Naga Saga
An agreement between the government of India
and a delegation of leaders from the Naga insurgent
movement, long active in northeast India, was an-
nounced on November 12. Details of the agreement
were not made public but the government agreed to
suspend action under the Unlawful Activities Act--
counter-insurgency legislation.
The Naga insurgency, originally aimed at
gaining independence for the estimated 300,000 to
400,000 Naga tribesmen living near the Burmese
border, has flared sporadically since 1952. New
Delhi has consistently refused to consider independence
for the Nagas but in 1964 did create a state, Nagaland,
that has a limited degree of autonomy.
The Naga rebellion reached its zenith in the
1950s when the insurgents numbered over 10,000. By
mid--1974 only about. 600 Nagas remained active in the
movement. More surrendered in recent months; in July
of this year an Indian official estimated that only
about 350 guerrillas were still in the jungle.
Reports received thus far do not reveal the
identities of the insurgents who met with the govern-
ment's representatives. It seems unlikely, however,
that leaders of the far left faction within the
Naga underground were present. If not, the new agree-
ment is merely another step along the way toward
eventual, but not immediate, pacification of the area.
The hard core of Naga extremists, aided by Chinese
equipment and training, will probably continue the
struggle.
The Indian government, which maintains approxi-
mately one division of troops in Nagaland, is believed
increasingly anxious to end the unsettled conditions
in the strategically-important far northeastern part
of the nation. Another simmering insurgency has been
(Continued)
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under way among the nearby Mizo tribesmen. New
Delhi's interest in re-establishing peace in the area
has probably been heightened as a result of recent
events in Bangladesh and a brief clash with China
along the Indo-Tibetan border last month. (-CONFIDENTIAL)
Nov 13, 1975 12
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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