SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. review completed
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
November 17, 1975
Poland: The Negative Aspects
of Administrative Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Hungarian Premier's Italian Trip. . . . . . . . . 4
Romania: Carrying Its Case in the Media.
Yugoslavs Fire New Blast at Bulgaria. . . . . . . 10
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Poland: The Negative Aspects
of Administrative Reform
The US consulate in Krakow reports that worsen-
ing economic problems in southern Poland have caused
growing unease and, in some cases, disaffection among
local party officials. The consulate sees few signs
that the highly touted administrative reform enacted
last May has led to a more rational approach to the
nation's economic problems or that it has strengthened
Gierek's control of the party at the grass-roots
level. On the contrary, consular officers believe
that the reform has aggravated Gierek's problems and
that he may face severe testing in the near future.
Over the last four months grumbling among Po-
lish workers in the south has perceptibly increased
as a result of chronic focd shortages and stepped-up
exhortations to work harder. While the consulate
does not feel that there is a real danger of open
protests or strikes, it believes that spreading dis-
satisfaction is putting pressure on local authorities
to devote more resources to improving living condi-
tions.
Local leaders have responded to the complaints
by flooding the market with frozen geese and canned
beef with German and English export markings, but
they have not instituted substantial agricultural
reforms. Given the Poles' insatiable demand for
meat, there is a limit to what can be done to ease
thy problem. Some local party officials are begin-
ning to talk openly and pessimistically about the
developing squeeze, and consular officers have heard
them criticize present national policies in an un-
precedented way.
Gierek's efforts to meet the problems through
administrative juggling have had only limited suc-
cess. In the Katowice and Opole provinces, the re-
forms were implemented smoothly and the role of the
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ruling technocrats was enhanced. It is not entirely
clear, however, that the hard-charging leaders are
in full agreement with policies made in Warsaw.
In the rest of the consular district, implemen-
tation of the reforms has been slow and painful.
Personnel shifts were extensive, and there have been
indications of footdragging on the part of some of-
ficials.
The situation as outlined by the consulate is
not restricted to southern Poland. In order to win
time and support for its policies the national
leadership, including Gierek, has run what appears
to the consulate as an American-style campaign.
Gierek has visited many potential trouble spots this
fall as he prepares for the party congress early
next month. At each stop he has been faced with
tough questioning. In response, he has emphasized
past successes and pointed out that there are limits
to what can be done. Gierek obviously hopes that
he will be able to win enough time for his reforms
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Hungarian Premier's Italian Trip
During a four-day visit to Italy last week,
Premier Gyorgy Lazar had official talks with top
Italian leaders and became the first Hungarian
government head to meet the Pope since 1945. This
was Lazar's first venture into bilateral diplomacy
in the West since he became premier last spring.
European security and bilateral economic
relations apparently dominated the official talks.
Afterwards, Lazar proclaimed Hungarian readiness
"to take practical steps" to implement the Helsinki
accord and "to promote" its ten basic principles.
His predictable support for Soviet disarmament
initiatives included a profession of hope that
European force reductions and SALT would "bring
fruit before long."
On economic issues, the Hungarians were clearly
looking for ways to resume disrupted shipments of
meat to Italy--an important source of hard-currency
earnings for Budapest--and to expand industrial co-
operation under the 10-year economic cooperation
agreement signed last year. Rome's foreign trade
minister will visit Budapest in early December for
follow-up talks.
In an apparent reference to CEMA-EC relations,
Lazar said that relations within a multilateral
framework cannot reduce or replace bilateral co-
operation. This appears to be in line with Soviet
statements, which in effect argue that the EC's
common commercial policy towards CEMA countries
should not disrupt bilateral relations between
member countries of CEMA and the EC.
Lazar's call on Pope Paul VI continued the
moderate upturn in Hungarian-Vatican relations.
Nothing substantive appears to have come from the
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meeting, although Lazar later held out the
prospect of eventual diplomatic relations-
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The Hungarians are eager for the Pope to desig-
nate a primate of the Hungarian church to replace
the late Cardinal Mindszenty. Budapest may calculate
that appointment of a successor would help erode the
Mindszenty legend in the minds of Huncrari an f,Ai i osfors
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Romania: Carrying Its Case in the Media
The Romanian press has recently begun to re-
port details of the current anti-Cominformist cam-
paign inside Yugoslavia, thus publicly signaling
Bucharest's approval of how Tito is dealing with
the pro-Soviet subversives.
On November 9 the Romanian party daily
Seinteia ran a summary of Tito's speech to party
activists in Novi Sad, in which the Yugoslav leader
scathingly condemned pro-Soviets within Yugoslavia.
Four days later, Lumea, the weekly foreign affairs
journal, devoted an entire page to extracts from
the same speech. The article contained pointed
references to "permanent pressure against an inde-
pendent and nonaligned Yugoslavia" and to those
acting "not on their own initiative" (or, at the
direction of Moscow). Continuing the anti-Soviet
theme, the latest issue of the party's historical
journal reportedly contains one of the most stingingly
anti-Comintern historical pieces in years.
The coverage may mark the opening stages of a
media campaign designed to complement Ceausescu's
current anti-Soviet offensive (Staff Notes, November
11). Bucharest is challenging Moscow on numerous
issues, including greater economic integration
within CEMA, Moscow's pretensions to the leading
role in the world communist movement, and
increased Soviet pressure for conformity with
Warsaw Pact military policies. In the past, when
faced with Soviet demands, the Romanian leader has
taken his case to the domestic and foreign audience
in an effort to enlist support for his independent
stance.
The articles tend to support Yugoslav diplomats
in Bucharest who continue to deny, following the
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postponement of the Yugoslav-Romanian summit, that
there has been a falling-out between Bucharest and
Belgrade. The diplomats acknowledge, however,
that there are minor differences on tactics. The
Yugoslavs are presumably uneasy about Ceausescu's
goading of Moscow.
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Yugoslavs Fire New Blast at Bulgaria
The main daily in Yugoslav Macedonia has leveled
serious new charges at Sofia for alleged repression
of Macedonians in Bulgaria. The article was broad-
cast last Thursday over the national news service
Tanjug--an action suggesting approval by high officials.
The timing of the broadcast is curious. It came
just five hours after Radio Belgrade had broadcast the
communique signed that day by the Yugoslav foreign min-
ister and his visiting Bulgarian counterpart. The com-
munique, among other things, committed both sides to
limit polemics over the disputed Macedonian issue
(Staff Notes, November 15).
The new Yugoslav attack is sharper than any for
many months. It predictably centers on a Bulgarian
census next month which, Belgrade fears, will be used
to deny the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bul-
garia. The article accuses Sofia of using police
methods to suppress Macedonian national consciousness,
propagandizing the "dissolution of Yugoslavia," and
reopening concentration camps for Macedonian national-
ists.
Why Yugoslavia violated the spirit of the com-
munique even before the ink was dry is unclear. Bel-
grade may have wanted to get on record once more with
a strong statement of support for Macedonian interests
lest it be accused of "selling out" the Macedonians
in return for questionable concessions from Bulgaria.
Somewhat less likely, the press guidelines in Belgrade
may have been outdated, and thus still were empha-
sizing aggressive polemics. In either case, the arti-
cle would be no more than an isolated parting shot.
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