MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
Rz-
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
i4
No. 0883/75
November 20, 1975
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NOFORN/NO CONTRA CT/ORCON
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extractionof Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11552, exemption category:
458(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
USSR-Lebanon: Moscow's Reaction to the
Turmoil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR-Afghanistan: Podgorny May Visit
Kabul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Nov 20, 1975
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SECRET
USSR-Lebanon
The Soviets have publicly welcomed the current
breathing spell in Lebanon and expressed hope that
it will lead to an end to the turmoil. They clearly
would prefer to see the emergence of a more leftist
government in Lebanon, but fear this cannot be
accomplished without risking another Arab-Israeli
war.
Among Moscow's worries are:
--That turmoil in Lebanon might eventually
trigger Syrian and Israeli intervention,
requiring the Soviets to increase their sup-
port of the Arabs.
--That civil war and foreign intervention in
Lebanon could force the fedayeen to abandon
their base of operations there and disperse
to other Arab countries, diluting Moscow's
already limited influence over the fedayeen
and increasing their dependence on Arab
governments.
--That the Lebanese situation is distracting
the fedayeen and Syrians from objectives more
important to the Soviets, specifically, under-
cutting US influence in the Middle East and
isolating Egypt.
Despite the conflict between Soviet interest in
supporting the left and avoiding an intensification
of the fighting, the Soviets have tried to achieve
both goals. They have consistently praised the
"restraint and maturity" of Yasir Arafat and the
Palestine Liberation Organization for staying out of
the fighting, and have labeled the fedayeen who have
been involved in the fighting as "terrorists."
(Continued)
Nov 20, 1975 1
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Moscow has privately warned the PLO of the
danger of Israeli intervention, has approved of its
decision to steer clear of the fighting, and has
urged it to support the efforts of the Lebanese govern-
ment to regain control of the country.
At the same time, the Soviets have made clear
that they will support the PLO if its people and
facilities are threatened. In October, they increased
arms shipments to the PLO and sent 30 rocket launchers
especially designed for street combat.
The Soviets apparently told Syrian President
Asad last month in Moscow that they supported its
efforts to reduce tension in Lebanon. The need for
a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Lebanon
has been the prevailing theme of Moscow's public
comment--including its broadcasts to the Arabs--
throughout the period of conflict. Last week,
Soviet Ambassador Soldatov met with Lebanese Prime
Minister Karami, publicly backed his efforts to
achieve stability, and urged him to support reforms
favorable to the left.
Moscow has consistently championed Lebanese
"progressive forces," supporting their positions on
the issues at stake and stressing their efforts for
a negotiated solution. Moscow seeks increased
influence in Lebanese political life and a stronger
position for the relatively small Lebanese Communist
Party.
The USSR appears to have acquiesced in efforts
by the Lebanese Communist Party to enhance its
standing with the Lebanese left by participating
in the fighting. From the early stages of the con-
flict, party members have been prominent behind the
barricades; in April or May, the Soviets unsuccessfully
urged the PLO to arm the party.
(Continued)
Nov 20, 1975
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Moscow apparently has not given the Lebanese
Communists all the help they want, however, and
may not be able to control party militants. In
September, party leaders complained about the lack
of more direct Soviet backing. In October, when
the shooting threatened to draw in outsiders, the
Soviet embassy in Beirut reportedly sought to get
the party militants to withdraw from the fighting.
At present, there is not evidence available
that Moscow has shipped arms to any leftist com-
batants, but neither is there any sign that it has
sought to halt the flow of Soviet-made arms from
Arab countries to them. Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive
Socialist Party has continued buying arms directly
from East European countries, while the commercial
sources of East European-made arms for the conservative
Phalangists have dried up. Moscow undoubtedly thinks
that as long as the Phalangists are heavily armed,
the Lebanese leftists must have what they need to pro-
tect themselves and preserve the influence of the
Palestinians in the country.
If intense fighting resumes, the Soviets will
probably continue to do what they can to curb fedayeen
or Syrian actions that could lead to general hostilities
in the Middle East. At the same time, Moscow will
seek to preserve its ties with the fedayeen and
Lebanese leftists, perhaps by offering more explicit
Soviet supportive actions in the event the Muslim
position is threatened and by moving directly to ensure
adequate supplies of arms. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTARCT/
ORCON)
Nov 20, 1975
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USSR-Afghanistan
Podgorny May Visit Kabul
Soviet chief of stat n will visit
Kabul in the near future,
The report seems p au
t e Soviets an the Afghans routinely exchange
visits on an annual basis and Afghan President Daoud
was in Moscow in June 1974. Podgorny's trip is
ostensibly to inspect a Soviet irrigation project,
but his main concern is probably to take a first-
hand look at the Daoud government since the President's
purges of leftist officials, including cabinet mem-
bers, in August and September.
the Soviets
have already demonstrated tneir e over
Daoud's actions-,.against Afghan leftists by dragging
their feet in supplying agreed-upon military equip-
me t. He says that Moscow has postponed delivery
of tanks until next April and that there
are at least 4,000 crates of Soviet military items
stalled at the border awaiting clearance from Moscow.
Soviet military
specialists a ac n units have been less
denied visas to Afghan students sc e uled to parti-
cipate in an exchange program in the Soviet Union
last month.
Moscow is undoubtedly displeased about Daoud's
move against the leftists, but the available evidence
does not bear out Afghan allegations that the Soviets
are using military aid and the student exchange pro-
gram to express their concern. For one thing, Moscow
has continued to provide weapons to Kabul since Daoud
took action against the leftists. In fact, deliveries
since August have been greater than in the preceding
months in 1975. It is possible that the backlog at
the border was created because the Soviets wanted to
(Continued)
Nov 20, 1975 4
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move the material quickly into Afghanistan before
winter set in and the paper work has not yet caught
up.
The Soviet-Afghan student exchange program has
been plagued with problems before. The real issue
has not been state-to-state relations, but rather
Daoud's desire to exercise more control over the
selection of scholarship recipients. (SECRET NOFORN/
NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
Nov 20, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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