SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200130002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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November 20, 1975
Communist Parties Remain at Impasse. .
. .
. . .
7
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Speculation
on Husak's Visit . . . . . . . . . .
. .
. . .
9
Yugoslavia: Vojvodina Party
Leader in Trouble . . . . . . . . . .
. .
. . .
11
The Shape of Rumors and Speculation
About Soviet Leadership Changes. . .
. .
. . .
13
Sakharov's Prize: The Dissidents' View.
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Communist Parties Remain. at Impasse
The European Communist parties have postponed
until January setting a date for the already much-
delayed European Communist party conference.
The senior delegates, who met again in East
Berlin this week, had been expected to complete work
on the controversial document to be issued at the
conclusion of the conference. Continuing differ-
ences between Moscow and the independent-minded
Yugoslav, Italian, Romanian, and Spanish parties
apparently prevented this and led, in turn, to the
failure to set a date.
In the wake of the postponement, conference
preparations in East Berlin will revert to lower-
level editorial efforts to harmonize the various
parties' positions.
Yesterday's postponement virtually excludes the
possibility of holding a European Communist party
conference before the Soviet party congress in
February. The Soviets had made a number of conces-
sions in an apparent effort to hold the conference
before their congress.
The setback will be even more embarrassing to
Moscow because the Soviets also failed at the last
minute to have a CENA summit meeting held this week.
The two events are not directly related, but the
consecutive postponements convey an impression of
disarray in the Communist camp.
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USSR-Czechoslovakia: Speculation on Husak's Visit
No reason has been given for the visit to Mos-
cow by Czechoslovak President and-party chief Husak
later this month, but the signing in October of a
new East German - Soviet Friendship Treaty during
party leader Honecker's visit has led to speculation
that Husak might sign a new Czechoslovak--Soviet
treaty.
Unlike the case of East Germany, where the
previous friendship treaty had clearly become out-
dated, there appears to be no compelling reason for
a revision of the 1970 treaty between Prague and
Moscow. The latest East German document incorpo-
rates the "Brezhnev Doctrine," expands the provision
of mutual assistance beyond Europe, and abandons
support for the reunification of Germany. The
Czechoslovak treaty already contains the first two
elements and the last does not apply.
Indeed, the two documents are very similar;
the Czechoslovak treaty may even have been used
as a model for the East German - Soviet accord.
New elements in the East German treaty include
specific references to closer cooperation and co-
ordination in the political, military, economic,
and ideological fields, but these themes, already
familiar in the speeches of Czechoslovak leaders
are not sufficient in themselves to warrant re-
writing the 1970 treaty to include them.
Statements on further cooperation and pledges
to defend detente and the results of the CSCE
could easily be contained in a joint protocol,
should Brezhnev feel the need for an easy foreign
policy success before the coming Soviet party
congress. This would accomplish Moscow's aim
without the embarrassment to Husak that a revision
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of the friendship treaty would entail. The Czecho-
slovak leader would probably not want to focus
attention on the 1970 document, which is the first
embodiment of the Brezhnev doctrine in international
law.
On the surface, there are no pressing bilateral
problems that require resolution at the summit, but
Husak may seek to work out unresolved details of
trade arrangements between the two countries before
their respective five year plans are announced at
the end of the year. He may also report on the
status of his party as preparations begin for its
April party congress and try to get a reading from
Brezhnev on how things stand in the Soviet party.
Whatever the agenda, there is no doubt that
the Husak visit will provide an occasion to celebrate
the unity and cohesion of the socialist camp, a
quality much in need of advertising in the wake of
the abrupt postponements and delays in moving to-
ward a CEMA summit and convening the European Commu-
nist conference. The example so ostentatiously
set by the East Germans and Czechoslovaks may also
be used by Moscow to persuade others in the camp
to fall into line.
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Yugoslavia: Vojvodina Pare
Leader in Trouble
Dusan Alimpic, party boss of the Serbian prov-
ince of Vojvodina, is evidently in hot water, and
the first personnel shake-up for the Tito regime in
years could result.
Alimpic, a former secret police official and
a hard-line orthodox Communist, came to power during
a purge of liberals in December 1972. He now ap-
pears to be in trouble for the very traits that
first brought him to party prominence. Alimpic's
reputation as a dogmatic disciplinarian and his
record of suppressive tactics strongly suggest that
he sympathizes with the "firm hand" program advocated
by the Yugoslav neo-Stalinists. There are, in fact,
rumors that he is a Cominformist.
Although the rumors are probably unfounded,
Alimpic's stewardship in Vojvodina is definitely
being criticized. For at least the past year, Stane
Dolanc--Tito's number two in the party--has made
an unusual number of visits to the outlying towns
of the province in an apparent effort to survey
the people's mood. Tito himself grilled provincial
leaders--minus Alimpic--on the local state of af-
fairs in early November. He was clearly not
satisfied.
For the past six weeks Alimpic has been out
of the limelight, and it is his subordinates who
have been making the mandatory noises against Com-
informists. During a brief Tito visit: to Vojvodina
last week, Alimpic's name was prominently absent
from the list of local officials who welcomed him.
On Tuesday, one of Alimpic's subordinates--the
chief of the Novi Sad party organization--made the
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public announcement that nine Cominformists are under
arrest. The nine, who allegedly "were inspired and
encouraged from abroad," could, when tried, provide
an opportunity for Alimpic's political enemies to
criticize him openly for his laxity in checking
hard-liners.
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The Shape of Rumors and Speculation
About Soviet Leadership Changes
Reports and rumors of future changes in the
Kremlin affecting leaders other than General Secre-
tary Brezhnev have been received sporadically over
the past year. They can be expected to increase in
frequency if not in accuracy as the CPSU Congress
scheduled for next February draws closer.
To a very large extent these reports appear to
spring from recognition that a generational change-
over is impending in the Politburo. The general
secretary and his deputy are 69, the premier is 71,
the president and the minister of defense are 72,
and the ideological "high priest" is 73. Only Premier
Kosygin has a clear "heir"--First Deputy Premier
Mazurov--in place. The lack of visible preparations
for the next generation to move up has generated
speculation among both Soviet and foreign observers.
It should be noted that, with few exceptions, the
reports received this year concerning changes in
the Kremlin have come from sources outside Moscow
who are themselves exposed to--and presumably
influenced by--Western speculation.
Most of these reports contain no suggestion
of a coup and are cast in terms of "plans" to deal
with the contingencies of failing health and
advancing age. The scenarios are extremely
fragmentary, as if the speakers lacked a complete
list of Kremlin VIPs and had forgotten or never
heard of the less visible but still key leaders
and portfolios. Those variously rumored to be on
the way out have been the most visible seniors--
Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, Suslov and--since he
gave the October Revolution address this fall--Peishe.
Polyansky, although by no means a senior, has also
been rumored on his way out, obviously because of
the bad harvest this year.
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There has been no speculation concerning
Grechko despite his age. Equally curious is the
tendency to separate Kirilenko (69) from his age
group of "outgoing" seniors and to view him as a
member of the replacement generation. Presumably
this is because there is a lack of confidence on
the part of the speculators in trying to single out
a successor to Brezhnev who is really from the next
generation.
The cast of players from the take-over genera-
tion in the circulating scenarios is limited essen-
tially to those leaders whose duties keep them in the
public eye in Moscow. A very mixed bag of Kirilenko,
Mazurov, Gromyko, Romanov, Ponomarev and Demichev
are posited individually, never as a group, as the
"next" generation. We have received no speculation
thus far concerning KGB Chairman Andropov, Moscow
party boss Grishin, party secretary for agriculture
Kulakov, or RSFSR Premier Solomentsev. Less sur-
prisingly, regional leaders such as Kunayev of
Kazakhstan and Rashidov of Uzbekistan have also been
ignored as have party secretaries Ustinov (defense
industry), Kapitonov (cadres), Dolgikh (heavy in-
dustry) and Katushev (relations with ruling CPs).
With the exception of the obvious promotions
of deputies--Kirilenko to replace Brezhnev and
Mazurov to replace Kosygin--there is little con-
sistency in the pattern of the reports. In
contrast to last year when his removal was frequently
rumored, Gromyko this year is regarded as a stayer,
with East Berlin sources positing that he will be
part of a "troika" to succeed Brezhnev. (Gromyko's
son is assigned to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin).
mnotes
wis u y that while they expect Kirilenko or Mazurov
to succeed Brezhnev, they would prefer "someone like
Gromyko." This East European reasoning is based on
their view of Kirilenko and Mazurov as wanting to
keep Eastern Europe on a tighter leash than would
Gromyko who is associated with the greater flexibility
of detente policies.
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Kosygin's departure is predicted fairly often,
although one report has him moving to the less
onerous slot now occupied by Podgorny. Suslov's
age is implicitly recognized with his "understudies"
--Ponomarev and Demichev--variously suggested to suc-
ceed him. Either one is logical if one looks at the
two portfolios he carries--international communism
and Soviet intellectuals--but Ponomarev who will be
71 in January is scarcely representative of the next
generation, and Demichev has been clinging by his
fingernails to his candidate Politburo membership
since he lost his secretary slot last fall.
In sum, this crop of rumors and reports
--appears to spring primarily from wide-
spread recognition of the visible gen-
eration gap in the Kremlin;
--is too inconsistent to represent a con-
certed effort to push a given Soviet
line;
--ignores several key figures and in many
cases shows a distorted understanding
of power positions in the Kremlin;
--represents an interesting but not un-
expected political phenomenon in the
increased willingness of Soviets abroad
to voice speculation on the top leaders.
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Dissidents' View*
The award of a Nobel Peace Prize to Andrey Sak-
harov appears to be generating a degree of cohesive
activism among members of the Soviet dissident commu-
nity that may give the regime pause, at least over
the short term. In the longer term, however, the
dissidents' prospects remain grim.
Support for Sakharov among the dissidents gained
momentum with the release to the Western press on
November 19 of a statement reportedly signed by 77
Jewish activists praising Sakharov's contribution to
peace. The document is the third public declaration
of support for Sakharov and his principles that has
appeared in as many weeks. The first, signed only
by a handful of the most prominent names, was made
public on October 30, evidently in response to the
publication by Izvestia of a statement by 72 members
of the Academy of Sciences condemning Sakharov and
the Nobel Committee.
Last week, 37 dissidents of differing philo-
sophical stripes joined in issuing a statement con-
demning the regime's refusal to permit Sakharov to
travel to Oslo next month for the award ceremony. The
dissidents pledged support for Sakharov and charged
that the regime's action is proof of its "fear in the
face of the unwavering movement of civil thought and
morality" in the USSR.
The first two declarations, both of which may
have been drafted and organized by writer Andrey
Amalrik, brought together such figures as reformist,
Marxist historian Roy Medvedev, sculptor Ernst
Neizvestny, former general Petr Grigorenko, poet
Aleksandr Ginzburg, members of the official writers
union Vladimir Kornilov and Osip Cherny, and Larisa
Bogoraz, wife of writer Anatoly Marchenko. Also among
the signatories were Jewish activist V:Ltaly Rubin and
mathematician Vladimir Albrecht. The :Latter is the
secretary of the Moscow branch of the London-based
*Some copies of the Staff Notes of November 19 did
not contain page 2 of this article. It is therefore
reprinted in full today.
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human rights organization Amnesty International--a
post formerly held by Sakharov's associate Andrey
Tverdokhlebov, who was arrested in April and re-
portedly is scheduled to face trial soon.
Although the dissidents' claim to a cohesive
"movement" is an overstatement, Sakharov's award has
become a focal point for some persons in and out of
the establishment who until now have not been pre-
pared to play an active role in the human rights
field. For both the big names and the lesser lights,
the regime's handling of the dilemma presented by
Sakharov is less important than the fact of the No-
bel award itself. They see in the prize proof that
Sakharov's efforts, and by extension those of the
dissident community as a whole, have been recognized
by the West in the most dramatic way possible. They
clearly hope by their actions to sustain and broaden
the West's attention to their cause.
The dissidents' actions are a product of Sak-
harov's confrontation with the regime over basic
principles--freedom of thought and movement--which
all can support. Their new-found courage and seem-
ing unity, however, do not stem from a common assess-
ment of the situation and are, therefore, probably
fragile and temporary.
Some of the dissidents hope that a united front
on the issue of Sakharov will increase official con-
cern over the Soviet image abroad, especially now in
the post-Helsinki and pre-CPSU congress period, and
result in an improved domestic climate. Others, more
numerous, believe their long-term prospects and those
for democratic change in the USSR are so dismal that
nothing will be lost by grasping the opportunity pro-
vided by Sakharov's prize to rake the regime over
the coals. Jewish activists--while pleased with Sak-
harov's award and willing to stand up for him--appear
convinced that neither support nor lack of it for
Sakharov's cause will have any measurable effect on
their specific interests, mainly eased emigration.
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The more pessimistic majority see the Kremlin
as willing to use Sakharov's case to make even clearer
than before that the CSCE agreements cannot be cited
by the West to press for change in Soviet domestic
policy. They also point to the Soviet leadership's
recent retrenchment on doctrinal issues as an indi-
cation not only of pre-congress closing of ranks,
but also a reaction to perceived exploitation of hu-
man rights by some in the West to sabotage detente.
In this atmosphere, the dissidents see their future
as dark.
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