SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Confidential
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
State Dept. review completed
Confidential
November 24, 1975
No. 0777/75
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CONFIDENTIAL
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
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CONTENTS
November 24, 1975
Soviet Academy of Sciences Meeting To Elect
Leadership and Weigh Sakharov's Case . . . . . 1
Poland: Szlachcic Sacked . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Czechoslovakia: Economic Plenum. . . . . . . . . 4
East Germany: iionecker Plus Cunhal Equals
Anti-Peking Slap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Soviet Rail Machinery Derailed . . . . . . . . . 6
Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe:
September 14 - November 15, 1975 . . . . . . . 8
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Soviet Academy of Sciences Meeting To
Elect Leadership and Weigh a arovv's Case
The Soviet Academy of Sciences will meet on
either November 25 or 26 to elect a new presidium
and officers,
The e ec ions were origins y
expected last May, when prestigious but aging acad-
emy president Mstislav Keldysh resigned because of
ill-health. They were delayed, however, allegedly
to enable the incumbent leadership to see through
the academy's 250th anniversary celebrations last
month.
Since Keldysh's resignation, academy Vice Pres-
ident Vladimir Kotelnikov has been acting president.
There are rumors, that
Keldysh's permane =su wi a 72-year-old
Anatoly Aleksandrov, the head of the Kurchatov
(atomic energy) institute, and a member of the cur-
rent academy presidium. Aleksandrov has not been
among those thought to be in the running; if he is
elected, he may well be considered only an interim
president.
I an effort may be
made at the academy meeting to strip Nobel Peace
prize winner Andrey Sakharov of his membership.
Sakharov himself is aware of "soundings" within the
academy on the chances of gaining enough votes for
an expulsion. He says he is confident, however,
that such a move would fail; academy elections and
expulsions are by secret ballot of the full member-
ship, and only 28 percent of the members signed the
anti-Sakharov statement published last month. Alek-
sandrov, incidentally, was among the 34 members of
the academy's presidium--out of a total of 44--who
signed the anti-Sakharov statement.
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If the regime presses the academy to expel Sak-
harov and succeeds, this would be a strong indication
that the scientific community no longer has the de-
gree of immunity from political pressure in which it
has prided itself. The US consulate in Leningrad re-
ports a rumor that last week's street mugging of 69-
year-old academician Dmitry Likhachev may have re-
sulted from Likhachev's refusal to sign the academy's
anti-Sakharov declaration.
The regime, meanwhile, has increased its public
campaign against Sakharov by publicizing what it calls
spontaneous condemnations of the dissident physicist
by the Soviet public. In his weekly television show
on Sunday, Pravda political commentator Yuri Zhukov
held up stacks of letters described as condemning
Sakharov's Nobel award and expressing "indignation
and scorn toward the organizers of this more-than-
suspicious hullaballoo."
In Florence, Italy, Mrs. Sakharov has reportedly
told friends that she intends to go to Oslo to col-
lect her husband's prize on December 10, unless he is
allowed to leave, at the last moment. She repeated her
own, and her husband's, anxiety, however, that if
she does so she may not be permitted to return to
Moscow. Her Soviet re-entry visa, already once ex-
tended, expires on December 20.
1nlith the addition of the letter-writing campaign
and the possibility of Sakharov's expulsion from the
academy, the regime's tactics in this case become
even more reminiscent of those used against Solzhenitsyn
prior to his forced exile. This parallel will un-
doubtedly add fuel to speculation that Sakharov may in
the end be forced out of the country; he may accept
this fate more willingly if the regime in fact refuses
to allow his wife to return home.
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Poland: Szlachcic Sacked
According to the US embassy, Franciszek
Szlachcic, former number two man in the Polish party,
has not been elected as a delegate to the approaching
party congress. At least for the near term, his
political career thus seems to have come to an end.
An embassy source says that in September
Szlachcic tried to organize a "coup" against Gierek
by disaffected party and security elements in Kra-
kow. The Central Committee was allegedly tipped
off by Szlachcic's brother-in-law, who is said to
be vice commandant of the Krakow militia.
Since then Gierek has apparently moved to iso-
late Szlachcic. He did not occupy his normal po-
sition with the Politburo during last Thursday's
Central Committee plenum, and he and ailing party
secretary Krasko were the only leaders who did not
attend provincial party conferences.
Szlachcic's political career has been declining
since mid-1974, when he was removed from the secre-
tariat for being too ambitious and openly nation-
alistic. He has subsequently appeared to carry
out only minor governmental assignments, and he
will probably soon lose his position as vice pre-
mier.
The reference to a "coup," although undoubtedly
exaggerated, may be related to other stories circul-
ating in Warsaw about opposition within the leader-
ship to Gierek's economic policies.
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Czechoslovakia: Economic Plenum
The Central Committee session that convened
last Thursday contained no surprises. Party secre-
tary Bilak delivered a report on the status of the
European Communist party conference preparatory talks
in East Berlin, but the bulk of the discussion
centered around the economic tasks for next year.
The Presidium report predicted that the un-
spectacular goals of the state plan for 1975 will be
fulfilled in the majority of sectors and overfulfilled
"in places."
No specifics were given on shortcomings, but
one "soft spot" may be the transportation sector; its
federal minister, Stefen Sutka, was replaced the
day after the plenum. Transportation delays have
been blamed for both production shortcomings and
localized consumer goods shortages.
The plenum resolution called for increased
efforts to become more competitive in foreign markets
and to step up production of investment and consumer
goods for the domestic market. The resolution threw
cold water on hopes for a reform. The regime re-
vealed its formula for "increasing the participation
of the working people in management the ensurance
that. every worker is familar with the tasks of the
economic plan. The Central Committee also sharply
criticized the failure to increase the country's
electric power capacity.
Finally the resolution contained the standard
illi
l
ng
f
call for deepening the cooperation and fu
the program of economic integration with the CEMA
countries, and the USSR in particular.
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East Germany: Honecker Plus Cunhal
Equals Anti-Peking Slap
The East German party leadership used last
week's visit by Portuguese Communist leader Cunhal
to take another slap at the "anti-Soviet" and "anti-
peace" policy of the Peking leadership. Honecker
and Cunhal also underscored the importance for unity
and cohesion in the Communist movement--another o-
blique dig at Peking and at those independent-minded
European parties which have been resisting Soviet
pretensions to hegemony at the preparatory meetings
for a European Party Conference.
The Honecker-Cunhal meeting was marked by "i-
dentical views" on all questions discussed and by a
pledge to contribute to successful convocation of
the European conference. Other highlights included
the predictable calls for struggle against imperialism
and colonialism, solidarity with the pro-Soviet
Angolan MPLA, and support for the "principles of
peaceful coexistence." Both sides, however, made it
clear that peaceful coexistence means peace between
socialist and capitalist states, but not "peace
between antagonistic classes."
According to the US embassy in Berlin, the
communique was careful to avoid giving support solely
for Cunhal and his party in Portugal. The communique,
for example, spoke of the need for the Portuguese
Communist Party and all "anti-fascist and genuine
democratic forces" to fight for national independence.
This line is in keeping with the recent East German
tendency not to limit support either to Cunhal
personally or to the Communists in general.
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Soviet Rail Machinery Derailed
The Soviet press has launched a campaign ex-
coriating segments of the economy for causing short-
ages of railroad freight capacity. The bottleneck
is blamed on the insufficient production and inef-
ficient utilization of freight cars and locomotives.
Freight car and diesel locomotive production
over the first three quarters of 1975 is below a
comparable period last year and has fallen short of
the plan. Railway machinery historically has been
a slow-growth branch, averaging less than a third
of the growth rate of total civilian machinery during
1951-73. The deficiency is particularly glaring this
year, when industry as a whole is performing well.
Deputy Minister Sotnikov of the Heavy and Trans-
port Machine Building Branch has defended his minis-
try, pointing to construction industry delays in com-
pleting assembly shops for railway machinery and the
failure of other branches to deliver promised
parts--notably, electric lamps, metal wheels, elec-
tric engines, and control panels. Contributing to
these problems is the failure of the ferrous metals
branch to achieve its plan for rolled metals, steel
pipe, and other products.
Also subjected to criticism in the press is the
practice of loading freight cars to weights below
the state norms. The ministries of ferrous metals,
timber and wood processing, and construction mate-
rials have been specifically rebuked. A dual system
of records--a true waybill for customers and a false
one adjusted to conform to state standards for rail-
way officials--is often used to get around regula-
tions.
The industrial ministries under-load because
the state norms often are unrealistic and result
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in unnecessary losses and damage to products in ship-
ment. For example, when open hopper cars are loaded
with cement according to state norms, a substantial
portion blows out and is lost in transit, whereas a
lighter load results in less wastage.
The problems with railway equipment remain largely
unsolved. Attention has been focused instead on the
more glamorous railroad construction projects, e.g.,
the Baykal-Amur Magistrale. Unless a substantial in-
crease in effective rolling stock capacity occurs,
the rail bottleneck will worsen as new lines are in-
troduced. A policy designed to force freight loads
to conform to state norms would be a cosmetic im-
provement, but would increase losses during transporta-
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Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe
September 14 - November 15, 1975
"The strengthening of the unity and cohe-
sion of the states of the socialist com-
munity has been and remains the central
avenue of the foreign policy activity of
the CPSU and the Soviet state." --A. A.
Gromyko, "The Peace Program in Action,"
Kommunist No. 14, signed to press Sep-
tember 24, 1975
Consolidation under Moscow's leadership was the
hallmark of Soviet efforts in the period as they
promoted, planned, or held a series of multilateral
meetings. In October, some progress apparently was
made in preparations for the European Communist con-
ference, but the meeting of 28 parties in East Berlin
on November 17-19 showed that important differences
have not been resolved. The conference now is un-
likely to be held until after the Soviet party con-
gress in February. Work on the CEMA summit of bloc
party and government leaders also moved in fits and
starts following meetings of senior officials in
Moscow in mid-September, and in early and mid-October.
A tentative date seemed to have been set for mid-
November, but the summit was postponed at the last
minute, reportedly so that it could be coupled with
a Warsaw Pact summit. The Warsaw Pact countries
themselves participated in an unusual flurry of meet-
ings; a series of bilateral meetings was followed by
the convening of the Pact military council in late
October and the Pact defense ministers in mid-November.
European Communist Conference
The issues causing the breakdowns have varied
from one forum to the next, but the basic problem
lies in Moscow's search for recognition of its lead-
ership within the international communist movement
and the socialist bloc. To achieve this recognition
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Moscow, through its East German ally, has submitted
at least four separate draft declarations to the com-
mittees preparing the European Communist conference.
Each version has been blander than the one preceding,
but the response from independent-minded parties in
Eastern and Western Europe has been generally nega-
tive. Moscow persists because it believes that even
with a toothless concluding document--or none at all
--the holding of a conference is in itself sufficient
to give symbolic recognition to Moscow's ideological
leadership.
The CEP1A summit has been rumored since early sum-
mer and could well be a major event. There have been
only two such summits, and the last gathering in 1969
apparently took decisions leading to the writing of
CEMA's long-term comprehensive program. This year's
summit would reportedly concern itself with "raw
materials, machine building, agriculture, and trans-
port," which could cover such sensitive topics as the
sharply higher prices Moscow suddenly imposed on its
raw materials early this year and the impact of the
Soviet grain shortfall. The summit is also expected
to discuss guidelines for formalizing relations be-
tween CEMA and the EC. Even with the static created
by the Romanians, who oppose the imposition of CEMA
control over bilateral dealings with the Common Mar-
ket, these questions are not the sort that are us-
ually handled at the highest level. A hint of a major
concern of the summit was given by a Soviet CEP 'LA
specialist, who said that "some administrative changes
in CEMA organization may be made, especially concern-
ing the role and responsibilities of the CEMA secre-
tariat." This may mean that the Soviets are attempt-
ing to create new institutional forms that will ex-
pedite economic integration within the bloc.
Warsaw Pact
Another indication that the Soviets are pushing
for more integration is the activity of the Warsaw
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Pact. The military council reportedly contended with
the "confidence-building measures" called for by the
European Security Conference and Romania's continuing
refusal to allow large numbers of its troops to par-
ticipate in Pact exercises. It also wrestled with
the Pact's 1976 exercise schedule. The defense min-
isters apparently continued discussions on this topic
and went on to discuss "the headquarters of the joint
armed forces" in Moscow and "the current activities
of the guiding bodies of the joint armed forces."
These formulations are fairly standard but could im-
ply that the Soviets are trying to expand the network
of coordinating bodies within the Warsaw Pact. If
so, a large part of the agenda of the rumored Pact
summit could be devoted to ways to enhance Pact in-
tegration. There may be a linkage between the drive
for nearly simultaneous Pact and CEMA summits. Al-
though precedents are sometimes false friends, the
last expansion of the Warsaw Pact Web of organizations
took place in 1969, when the military council and de-
fense ministers' committee were created. This was
the same year that CEMA decided on its "complex pro-
gram" of integration.
East Germany
East Germany is without question this season's
model student in the lessons of integration. To the
accompaniment of high-decibel publicity, virtually
the entire East German party and state leadership
trekked to Moscow in early October and signed a new,
25-year friendship treaty with the Soviets. The new
treaty incorporated the Brezhnev doctrine, assuring
the East Germans of Soviet fraternal assistance if
their regime is in internal, as well as external,
danger; extended the principle of mutual military aid
beyond the confines of Europe; and obliterated all
references to German reunification. The treaty was
based on the principles of across-the-board coordina-
tion and cooperation, and expanded, though imprecisely,
the military and economic commitments Moscow and East
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Germany have undertaken in the Warsaw Pact and CEIIA
to include political and ideological coordination.
The treaty rattled the Yugoslavs and Poles. Al-
most immediately they interpreted the treaty as a
model for the other East European states, and their
response showed that they were highly displeased with
the possibility. The Yugoslavs, in particular, were
distressed by the sharp reminder that the Brezhnev
doctrine was alive and well, whatever the impression
left by the European security accords signed in Hel-
sinki. The Poles were more restrained, telling
Western diplomats that they could see no reason for
the agreement and certainly did not find it "con-
sistent" with the Helsinki agreement. The Romanians,
as might be expected, asserted that they would never
sign such a treaty, and added that even the normally
subservient Bulgarians would not fall into line. Yet
the rumors persisted, and the announcement of Czech-
oslovak leader Husak's trip to Moscow in late No-
vember sparked speculation that he was going to fol-
low Honecker's example. While it is possible that a
new Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship treaty will be
concluded, the present treaty, signed in 1970, al-
ready has the key passages included in the new East
German accord. Even without a new treaty, Moscow
is doubtless preparing another feast celebrating bloc
solidarity as the centerpiece of the Husak visit.
Poland
A striking new development during the period
was the spate of rumors alleging Soviet unhappiness
with the quality of Polish party chief Gierek's
leadership, the direction of Polish economic policy,
and the flourishing ties between Poland and the West.
On the surface, Soviet-Polish relations seem normal,
and it is generally believed that Soviet party chief
Brezhnev will attend the Polish party congress which
opens on December 8. Behind the scenes, however,
there are mutterings from Poland about Soviet pre-
tensions in CEMA; Soviet complaints about the re-
liability of Poland's military; speculation in Warsaw
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that Moscow may have had a hand in the spate of fires
in October in an attempt to discredit Gierek; rumors
of a hasty trip by Soviet President Podgorny to in-
terfere in the pre-congress jockeying between Gierek
and Premier Jaroszewicz; and unsubstantiated, low-
level reports of Soviet troop movements in Czecho-
slovakia and the USSR directed toward putting down
disorders in Poland should a repetition of the 1970
riots occur.
The Soviets may indeed be uneasy about the flare-
up of unrest caused by the shortages of consumer goods
and rumors of price increases, but rather than ex-
acerbating the situation to undermine Gierek, Moscow
has extended several loans to ease Poland through
its difficulties. As the party congress approaches,
Moscow may be hedging its bets by making sympathetic
noises to Jaroszewicz, but past experience has shown
the Soviets that control of Poland can be better ex-
ercised through a leader with some claim to national
popularity than through a man many Poles consider to
be sitting in Moscow's pocket. Nevertheless, the
charge alleged to have been made by the Soviets that
Poland is adopting a "neo-Romanian" course may have
some substance. Like the Romanians, the Poles have
energy and other natural resources of their own, and
so they have not been hit as hard by Moscow's hike
in prices. Having less need to beg for economic
favors from Moscow, the Poles are pursuing a some-
what more nationalist course in their foreign eco-
nomic relations. The confidence gained from this
exercise may have contributed to Warsaw's failure
to follow the East German example in updating its
friendship treaty with Moscow.
Romania-Yugoslavia
As usual, the bad boys of the Balkans--Bucharest
and Belgrade--caused some heartburn in Moscow. The
Romanians and Yugoslavs have carried on an ostenta-
tious flirtation with the Chinese during the period,
but the Soviet reaction was, with one exception,
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restrained. The limit was reached during the visit
of Yugoslav Premier Bijedic to Peking. Following a
spate of unexceptionally insulting after-dinner re-
marks from the Chinese, the Soviet ambassador
stalked out, followed by the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak,
East German, Mongolian, Hungarian, and Polish repre-
sentatives. The Romanians stayed put, alongside the
Albanians, Cubans, North Koreans, and Vietnamese.
By walking out, the Soviets reportedly were seeking
to show the Balkan duo the limits of their tolerance
for rapprochement with Peking.
Soviet displeasure over Romanian sniping at
Soviet positions--both indirectly through the stream
of visitors to Peking and the numerous Romanian
speeches and articles phrased in aesopian language
and directly in multilateral party, CEMA, and Warsaw
Pact forums--was undoubtedly expressed during So-
viet party secretary Katushev's visit to Bucharest
in early October. Ceausescu and Tito may have de-
cided to postpone the get-together they had planned
for mid-October while the bear was aroused. The Ro-
manians sent party secretary Andrei to Moscow to ex-
plain Bucharest's course in greater detail, but he
met a cold reception. After a suitable interval,
the Romanians resumed their war of words, though at
a somewhat reduced level, and Moscow has lapsed into
stony silence.
Belgrade's relations with Moscow have been com-
plicated by its intensifying campaign against the
"cominformists," among whose sins is a. greater love
for Moscow than the current Yugoslav party line al-
lows. The Soviets have not chosen to get caught in
this morass and have studiously avoided public com-
ment, though privately they admit relations are
strained. The chill in Soviet-Yugoslav relations is
revealed by a comparison of Podgorny's remarks in
mid-October to the outgoing Yugoslav ambassador
with those made a month later to his successor.
Podgorny had earlier said that Moscow "firmly in-
tends" to make progress in developing relations in
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all fields "in all possible ways" in the future.
In November, however, he warned that improvement
must. be based on "mutual respect and confidence,
guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and so-
cialist internationalism." The Yugoslavs were ob-
viously being put on notice to keep the anti-Soviet
aspects of their anti-"cominformist" campaign within
reasonable limits.
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