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November 24, 1975
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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 Confidential Soviet Union Eastern Europe State Dept. review completed Confidential November 24, 1975 No. 0777/75 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE 25X1 CONTENTS November 24, 1975 Soviet Academy of Sciences Meeting To Elect Leadership and Weigh Sakharov's Case . . . . . 1 Poland: Szlachcic Sacked . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Czechoslovakia: Economic Plenum. . . . . . . . . 4 East Germany: iionecker Plus Cunhal Equals Anti-Peking Slap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Soviet Rail Machinery Derailed . . . . . . . . . 6 Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe: September 14 - November 15, 1975 . . . . . . . 8 Approved For Release 200gF'cf Q865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL, Soviet Academy of Sciences Meeting To Elect Leadership and Weigh a arovv's Case The Soviet Academy of Sciences will meet on either November 25 or 26 to elect a new presidium and officers, The e ec ions were origins y expected last May, when prestigious but aging acad- emy president Mstislav Keldysh resigned because of ill-health. They were delayed, however, allegedly to enable the incumbent leadership to see through the academy's 250th anniversary celebrations last month. Since Keldysh's resignation, academy Vice Pres- ident Vladimir Kotelnikov has been acting president. There are rumors, that Keldysh's permane =su wi a 72-year-old Anatoly Aleksandrov, the head of the Kurchatov (atomic energy) institute, and a member of the cur- rent academy presidium. Aleksandrov has not been among those thought to be in the running; if he is elected, he may well be considered only an interim president. I an effort may be made at the academy meeting to strip Nobel Peace prize winner Andrey Sakharov of his membership. Sakharov himself is aware of "soundings" within the academy on the chances of gaining enough votes for an expulsion. He says he is confident, however, that such a move would fail; academy elections and expulsions are by secret ballot of the full member- ship, and only 28 percent of the members signed the anti-Sakharov statement published last month. Alek- sandrov, incidentally, was among the 34 members of the academy's presidium--out of a total of 44--who signed the anti-Sakharov statement. November 24, 1975 25X6 25X6 25X6 Approved For Release 2007? i I F17PACLD,865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL If the regime presses the academy to expel Sak- harov and succeeds, this would be a strong indication that the scientific community no longer has the de- gree of immunity from political pressure in which it has prided itself. The US consulate in Leningrad re- ports a rumor that last week's street mugging of 69- year-old academician Dmitry Likhachev may have re- sulted from Likhachev's refusal to sign the academy's anti-Sakharov declaration. The regime, meanwhile, has increased its public campaign against Sakharov by publicizing what it calls spontaneous condemnations of the dissident physicist by the Soviet public. In his weekly television show on Sunday, Pravda political commentator Yuri Zhukov held up stacks of letters described as condemning Sakharov's Nobel award and expressing "indignation and scorn toward the organizers of this more-than- suspicious hullaballoo." In Florence, Italy, Mrs. Sakharov has reportedly told friends that she intends to go to Oslo to col- lect her husband's prize on December 10, unless he is allowed to leave, at the last moment. She repeated her own, and her husband's, anxiety, however, that if she does so she may not be permitted to return to Moscow. Her Soviet re-entry visa, already once ex- tended, expires on December 20. 1nlith the addition of the letter-writing campaign and the possibility of Sakharov's expulsion from the academy, the regime's tactics in this case become even more reminiscent of those used against Solzhenitsyn prior to his forced exile. This parallel will un- doubtedly add fuel to speculation that Sakharov may in the end be forced out of the country; he may accept this fate more willingly if the regime in fact refuses to allow his wife to return home. 25X1 November 24, 1975 Approved For Rel . OpfWN :IgAFJDP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL, Poland: Szlachcic Sacked According to the US embassy, Franciszek Szlachcic, former number two man in the Polish party, has not been elected as a delegate to the approaching party congress. At least for the near term, his political career thus seems to have come to an end. An embassy source says that in September Szlachcic tried to organize a "coup" against Gierek by disaffected party and security elements in Kra- kow. The Central Committee was allegedly tipped off by Szlachcic's brother-in-law, who is said to be vice commandant of the Krakow militia. Since then Gierek has apparently moved to iso- late Szlachcic. He did not occupy his normal po- sition with the Politburo during last Thursday's Central Committee plenum, and he and ailing party secretary Krasko were the only leaders who did not attend provincial party conferences. Szlachcic's political career has been declining since mid-1974, when he was removed from the secre- tariat for being too ambitious and openly nation- alistic. He has subsequently appeared to carry out only minor governmental assignments, and he will probably soon lose his position as vice pre- mier. The reference to a "coup," although undoubtedly exaggerated, may be related to other stories circul- ating in Warsaw about opposition within the leader- ship to Gierek's economic policies. November 24, 1975 25X1 25X1 CONFIDENTIAL, Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA- DP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL Czechoslovakia: Economic Plenum The Central Committee session that convened last Thursday contained no surprises. Party secre- tary Bilak delivered a report on the status of the European Communist party conference preparatory talks in East Berlin, but the bulk of the discussion centered around the economic tasks for next year. The Presidium report predicted that the un- spectacular goals of the state plan for 1975 will be fulfilled in the majority of sectors and overfulfilled "in places." No specifics were given on shortcomings, but one "soft spot" may be the transportation sector; its federal minister, Stefen Sutka, was replaced the day after the plenum. Transportation delays have been blamed for both production shortcomings and localized consumer goods shortages. The plenum resolution called for increased efforts to become more competitive in foreign markets and to step up production of investment and consumer goods for the domestic market. The resolution threw cold water on hopes for a reform. The regime re- vealed its formula for "increasing the participation of the working people in management the ensurance that. every worker is familar with the tasks of the economic plan. The Central Committee also sharply criticized the failure to increase the country's electric power capacity. Finally the resolution contained the standard illi l ng f call for deepening the cooperation and fu the program of economic integration with the CEMA countries, and the USSR in particular. November 24, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release" # Q fM. 'fl !79T00865AO02200180001-9 Approved For Release 200/7-,:fiyEW17j9AJ0865A002200180001-9 East Germany: Honecker Plus Cunhal Equals Anti-Peking Slap The East German party leadership used last week's visit by Portuguese Communist leader Cunhal to take another slap at the "anti-Soviet" and "anti- peace" policy of the Peking leadership. Honecker and Cunhal also underscored the importance for unity and cohesion in the Communist movement--another o- blique dig at Peking and at those independent-minded European parties which have been resisting Soviet pretensions to hegemony at the preparatory meetings for a European Party Conference. The Honecker-Cunhal meeting was marked by "i- dentical views" on all questions discussed and by a pledge to contribute to successful convocation of the European conference. Other highlights included the predictable calls for struggle against imperialism and colonialism, solidarity with the pro-Soviet Angolan MPLA, and support for the "principles of peaceful coexistence." Both sides, however, made it clear that peaceful coexistence means peace between socialist and capitalist states, but not "peace between antagonistic classes." According to the US embassy in Berlin, the communique was careful to avoid giving support solely for Cunhal and his party in Portugal. The communique, for example, spoke of the need for the Portuguese Communist Party and all "anti-fascist and genuine democratic forces" to fight for national independence. This line is in keeping with the recent East German tendency not to limit support either to Cunhal personally or to the Communists in general. November 24, 1975 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 20031~~#f't7' FdrIA -m 79`"65A002200180001-9 Approved For Reba,MIIW&rfliXgDP79T00865A002200180001-9 Soviet Rail Machinery Derailed The Soviet press has launched a campaign ex- coriating segments of the economy for causing short- ages of railroad freight capacity. The bottleneck is blamed on the insufficient production and inef- ficient utilization of freight cars and locomotives. Freight car and diesel locomotive production over the first three quarters of 1975 is below a comparable period last year and has fallen short of the plan. Railway machinery historically has been a slow-growth branch, averaging less than a third of the growth rate of total civilian machinery during 1951-73. The deficiency is particularly glaring this year, when industry as a whole is performing well. Deputy Minister Sotnikov of the Heavy and Trans- port Machine Building Branch has defended his minis- try, pointing to construction industry delays in com- pleting assembly shops for railway machinery and the failure of other branches to deliver promised parts--notably, electric lamps, metal wheels, elec- tric engines, and control panels. Contributing to these problems is the failure of the ferrous metals branch to achieve its plan for rolled metals, steel pipe, and other products. Also subjected to criticism in the press is the practice of loading freight cars to weights below the state norms. The ministries of ferrous metals, timber and wood processing, and construction mate- rials have been specifically rebuked. A dual system of records--a true waybill for customers and a false one adjusted to conform to state standards for rail- way officials--is often used to get around regula- tions. The industrial ministries under-load because the state norms often are unrealistic and result November 24, 1975 Approved For Rele(;-Q 2 03/0'4 P 1 A-1 DP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 200 Wpf7C,Iq-l7iX-P865A002200180001-9 in unnecessary losses and damage to products in ship- ment. For example, when open hopper cars are loaded with cement according to state norms, a substantial portion blows out and is lost in transit, whereas a lighter load results in less wastage. The problems with railway equipment remain largely unsolved. Attention has been focused instead on the more glamorous railroad construction projects, e.g., the Baykal-Amur Magistrale. Unless a substantial in- crease in effective rolling stock capacity occurs, the rail bottleneck will worsen as new lines are in- troduced. A policy designed to force freight loads to conform to state norms would be a cosmetic im- provement, but would increase losses during transporta- 25X1A November 24, 1975 Approved For Release 206 3'/ /'1YAWEr RD WM4865A002200180001-9 Approved For ReI f3,, ,q,QJ/ 1&: fj DP79T00865A002200180001-9 Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe September 14 - November 15, 1975 "The strengthening of the unity and cohe- sion of the states of the socialist com- munity has been and remains the central avenue of the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state." --A. A. Gromyko, "The Peace Program in Action," Kommunist No. 14, signed to press Sep- tember 24, 1975 Consolidation under Moscow's leadership was the hallmark of Soviet efforts in the period as they promoted, planned, or held a series of multilateral meetings. In October, some progress apparently was made in preparations for the European Communist con- ference, but the meeting of 28 parties in East Berlin on November 17-19 showed that important differences have not been resolved. The conference now is un- likely to be held until after the Soviet party con- gress in February. Work on the CEMA summit of bloc party and government leaders also moved in fits and starts following meetings of senior officials in Moscow in mid-September, and in early and mid-October. A tentative date seemed to have been set for mid- November, but the summit was postponed at the last minute, reportedly so that it could be coupled with a Warsaw Pact summit. The Warsaw Pact countries themselves participated in an unusual flurry of meet- ings; a series of bilateral meetings was followed by the convening of the Pact military council in late October and the Pact defense ministers in mid-November. European Communist Conference The issues causing the breakdowns have varied from one forum to the next, but the basic problem lies in Moscow's search for recognition of its lead- ership within the international communist movement and the socialist bloc. To achieve this recognition November 24, 1975 Approved For ReleaGfkbb /bbh P79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL Moscow, through its East German ally, has submitted at least four separate draft declarations to the com- mittees preparing the European Communist conference. Each version has been blander than the one preceding, but the response from independent-minded parties in Eastern and Western Europe has been generally nega- tive. Moscow persists because it believes that even with a toothless concluding document--or none at all --the holding of a conference is in itself sufficient to give symbolic recognition to Moscow's ideological leadership. The CEP1A summit has been rumored since early sum- mer and could well be a major event. There have been only two such summits, and the last gathering in 1969 apparently took decisions leading to the writing of CEMA's long-term comprehensive program. This year's summit would reportedly concern itself with "raw materials, machine building, agriculture, and trans- port," which could cover such sensitive topics as the sharply higher prices Moscow suddenly imposed on its raw materials early this year and the impact of the Soviet grain shortfall. The summit is also expected to discuss guidelines for formalizing relations be- tween CEMA and the EC. Even with the static created by the Romanians, who oppose the imposition of CEMA control over bilateral dealings with the Common Mar- ket, these questions are not the sort that are us- ually handled at the highest level. A hint of a major concern of the summit was given by a Soviet CEP 'LA specialist, who said that "some administrative changes in CEMA organization may be made, especially concern- ing the role and responsibilities of the CEMA secre- tariat." This may mean that the Soviets are attempt- ing to create new institutional forms that will ex- pedite economic integration within the bloc. Warsaw Pact Another indication that the Soviets are pushing for more integration is the activity of the Warsaw November 24, 1975 -9- Approved For Release 2003/M :lqTT9Qp?5A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL Pact. The military council reportedly contended with the "confidence-building measures" called for by the European Security Conference and Romania's continuing refusal to allow large numbers of its troops to par- ticipate in Pact exercises. It also wrestled with the Pact's 1976 exercise schedule. The defense min- isters apparently continued discussions on this topic and went on to discuss "the headquarters of the joint armed forces" in Moscow and "the current activities of the guiding bodies of the joint armed forces." These formulations are fairly standard but could im- ply that the Soviets are trying to expand the network of coordinating bodies within the Warsaw Pact. If so, a large part of the agenda of the rumored Pact summit could be devoted to ways to enhance Pact in- tegration. There may be a linkage between the drive for nearly simultaneous Pact and CEMA summits. Al- though precedents are sometimes false friends, the last expansion of the Warsaw Pact Web of organizations took place in 1969, when the military council and de- fense ministers' committee were created. This was the same year that CEMA decided on its "complex pro- gram" of integration. East Germany East Germany is without question this season's model student in the lessons of integration. To the accompaniment of high-decibel publicity, virtually the entire East German party and state leadership trekked to Moscow in early October and signed a new, 25-year friendship treaty with the Soviets. The new treaty incorporated the Brezhnev doctrine, assuring the East Germans of Soviet fraternal assistance if their regime is in internal, as well as external, danger; extended the principle of mutual military aid beyond the confines of Europe; and obliterated all references to German reunification. The treaty was based on the principles of across-the-board coordina- tion and cooperation, and expanded, though imprecisely, the military and economic commitments Moscow and East November 24, 1975 Approved For ReleaC"pQfIQAACLP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 20 "fkfVjj)?NF ,kIT00865A002200180001-9 Germany have undertaken in the Warsaw Pact and CEIIA to include political and ideological coordination. The treaty rattled the Yugoslavs and Poles. Al- most immediately they interpreted the treaty as a model for the other East European states, and their response showed that they were highly displeased with the possibility. The Yugoslavs, in particular, were distressed by the sharp reminder that the Brezhnev doctrine was alive and well, whatever the impression left by the European security accords signed in Hel- sinki. The Poles were more restrained, telling Western diplomats that they could see no reason for the agreement and certainly did not find it "con- sistent" with the Helsinki agreement. The Romanians, as might be expected, asserted that they would never sign such a treaty, and added that even the normally subservient Bulgarians would not fall into line. Yet the rumors persisted, and the announcement of Czech- oslovak leader Husak's trip to Moscow in late No- vember sparked speculation that he was going to fol- low Honecker's example. While it is possible that a new Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship treaty will be concluded, the present treaty, signed in 1970, al- ready has the key passages included in the new East German accord. Even without a new treaty, Moscow is doubtless preparing another feast celebrating bloc solidarity as the centerpiece of the Husak visit. Poland A striking new development during the period was the spate of rumors alleging Soviet unhappiness with the quality of Polish party chief Gierek's leadership, the direction of Polish economic policy, and the flourishing ties between Poland and the West. On the surface, Soviet-Polish relations seem normal, and it is generally believed that Soviet party chief Brezhnev will attend the Polish party congress which opens on December 8. Behind the scenes, however, there are mutterings from Poland about Soviet pre- tensions in CEMA; Soviet complaints about the re- liability of Poland's military; speculation in Warsaw November 24, 1975 ~~TT~~-11- Approved For Release 200c 11' A 9Tbb865A002200180001-9 Approved For ReIemRH?IVT* fIAAgDP79T00865A002200180001-9 that Moscow may have had a hand in the spate of fires in October in an attempt to discredit Gierek; rumors of a hasty trip by Soviet President Podgorny to in- terfere in the pre-congress jockeying between Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz; and unsubstantiated, low- level reports of Soviet troop movements in Czecho- slovakia and the USSR directed toward putting down disorders in Poland should a repetition of the 1970 riots occur. The Soviets may indeed be uneasy about the flare- up of unrest caused by the shortages of consumer goods and rumors of price increases, but rather than ex- acerbating the situation to undermine Gierek, Moscow has extended several loans to ease Poland through its difficulties. As the party congress approaches, Moscow may be hedging its bets by making sympathetic noises to Jaroszewicz, but past experience has shown the Soviets that control of Poland can be better ex- ercised through a leader with some claim to national popularity than through a man many Poles consider to be sitting in Moscow's pocket. Nevertheless, the charge alleged to have been made by the Soviets that Poland is adopting a "neo-Romanian" course may have some substance. Like the Romanians, the Poles have energy and other natural resources of their own, and so they have not been hit as hard by Moscow's hike in prices. Having less need to beg for economic favors from Moscow, the Poles are pursuing a some- what more nationalist course in their foreign eco- nomic relations. The confidence gained from this exercise may have contributed to Warsaw's failure to follow the East German example in updating its friendship treaty with Moscow. Romania-Yugoslavia As usual, the bad boys of the Balkans--Bucharest and Belgrade--caused some heartburn in Moscow. The Romanians and Yugoslavs have carried on an ostenta- tious flirtation with the Chinese during the period, but the Soviet reaction was, with one exception, November 24, 1975 Approved For R QIhh1 ) 4 ''iO RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL restrained. The limit was reached during the visit of Yugoslav Premier Bijedic to Peking. Following a spate of unexceptionally insulting after-dinner re- marks from the Chinese, the Soviet ambassador stalked out, followed by the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, East German, Mongolian, Hungarian, and Polish repre- sentatives. The Romanians stayed put, alongside the Albanians, Cubans, North Koreans, and Vietnamese. By walking out, the Soviets reportedly were seeking to show the Balkan duo the limits of their tolerance for rapprochement with Peking. Soviet displeasure over Romanian sniping at Soviet positions--both indirectly through the stream of visitors to Peking and the numerous Romanian speeches and articles phrased in aesopian language and directly in multilateral party, CEMA, and Warsaw Pact forums--was undoubtedly expressed during So- viet party secretary Katushev's visit to Bucharest in early October. Ceausescu and Tito may have de- cided to postpone the get-together they had planned for mid-October while the bear was aroused. The Ro- manians sent party secretary Andrei to Moscow to ex- plain Bucharest's course in greater detail, but he met a cold reception. After a suitable interval, the Romanians resumed their war of words, though at a somewhat reduced level, and Moscow has lapsed into stony silence. Belgrade's relations with Moscow have been com- plicated by its intensifying campaign against the "cominformists," among whose sins is a. greater love for Moscow than the current Yugoslav party line al- lows. The Soviets have not chosen to get caught in this morass and have studiously avoided public com- ment, though privately they admit relations are strained. The chill in Soviet-Yugoslav relations is revealed by a comparison of Podgorny's remarks in mid-October to the outgoing Yugoslav ambassador with those made a month later to his successor. Podgorny had earlier said that Moscow "firmly in- tends" to make progress in developing relations in November 24, 1975 -13- Approved For Release 2003?4' i'qIjt -B ` %T (L665A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200180001-9 CONFIDENTIAL all fields "in all possible ways" in the future. In November, however, he warned that improvement must. be based on "mutual respect and confidence, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and so- cialist internationalism." The Yugoslavs were ob- viously being put on notice to keep the anti-Soviet aspects of their anti-"cominformist" campaign within reasonable limits. 25X1 November 24, 1975 ~ / -14- Approved Approved For Relets,~ IV t' MJ7 i I iP79T00865A002200180001-9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9 Confidential Confidential Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02200180001-9