LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
Secret
Latin American Trends
NOTES
SOURCED
Secret
27
December 10, 1975
No. 0539/75
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
S E C R E T
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 10, 1975
Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil . . . . . . 1
Argentina: Mounting Violence . . . . . . . 3
Mexico: Under Echeverria's Shadow . . . . . 4
NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start . . . . . . . . 7
Venezuela: COPEI - A Divided
Political Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bolivia/Chile: The Long, Hard
Road to the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
-i-
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/1 ?E l 79T00865A002300240002-9
Paraguay: Moving Toward Brazil
Paraguay, in its buffer position between the
large countries of Argentina and Brazil, has in the
past generally dispensed separate but more or less
equal treatment. It has not necessarily been trying
to play one big power off against the other but has
been trying to garner the advantages from each re-
lationship without allowing either larger country to
dominate Paraguayan affairs. Traditionally, the
Paraguayans have identified culturally with the
Argentines. The government, however, views the govern-
ment of Isabel Peron as unstable, is concerned about
a possible turn toward the left by Argentina, and is
now indicating a marked tilt in the direction of Brazil,
which Paraguay views as a future world power whose
economic interests in Latin America could assist
Paraguayan development.
This tilt was particularly evident during the visit
to Paraguay by Brazilian President Geisel in early
December. Pomp and ceremony attended the first visit
of a Brazilian Chief of State in 35 years, and the
government declared a three-day holiday for public em-
ployees. Preparations included a crackdown on Com-
munist Party members and subversives, with the number
of arrests rumored as high as 400 although official
records acknowledged only about one-tenth as many.
President Geisel received the highest decoration
Paraguay bestows on a foreign official, and he returned
a priceless gold book captured by the Brazilians in the
War of the Triple Alliance some 100 years ago. More
concrete accomplishments included the settlement of a
boundary dispute, the granting to Paraguay of $3.5 billion
in credits for construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric
project, and the signing of a new treaty of friendship
and cooperation calling for extensive Brazilian involve-
ment in Paraguayan development.
December 10, 1975
-1-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 200 N2L1SEC'W-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
Paraguay admits privately to a deliberate policy
of closer rapprochement with Brazil but at the same time is
worried about retaliation from Argentina, perhaps in
the form of harassment of river shipping. Argentina
has previously tried to torpedo the Itaipu project.
Brazil wants to draw Paraguay closer into its sphere
of influence but is also concerned about reaction from
Argentina and from Bolivia as well. Although both
countries hope to avoid needless offense with their
new treaty, they are not at all sure this is possible-
December 10, 1975
-2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/1
CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
hCET
Argentina: Mounting Violence
The "rules" of political violence may be under-
)1 going some changes in the current exchange of killings
by both left and right.
Last week's guerrilla murder of a retired general
outraged the military, but was not unprecedented. What
was unusual about that incident was the deliberate
killing of the officer's wife, who was abducted, then
strangled and shot. This particularly vicious, inten-
tional killing of a bystander may have been the spark
that ignited subsequent retaliatory killings.
Late in the week rightwing groups seeking to avenge
the death of the general killed 12 university students
in two different cities. The students, some from Peru
and Boliva, were not known to be linked to the general's
murder, and were apparently chosen at random. The
s carried
killin
th
l
d
d
i
g
er
o
nc
u
e
latest violence also
out in extremely brutal fashion.
For some time political violence has generally
been selective, attempting to avoid innocent bystanders.
The left, in resorting now to the murder of the general's
wife, seems driven by frustration over continuing failure
to foment social upheaval and provoke the military. Even
so, the act was limited. The right, however, judging from
its massive retaliation, feels far more enthusiastic than
the left about the prospect of widening the scope of
political killings.
December 10, 1975
-3-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
SECRET
Mexico: Under Echeverria's Shadow
The Lopez Portillo campaign, into its third
month, has yet to take hold. The PRI's presidential
candidate has yet to emerge from the shadow of Presi-
dent Echeverria, who shows every intention of domi-
nating the scene right up to the end of his term.
There is, of course, no concern that Echeverria's
chosen successor will not be elected president next
July 4; surely, his supporters believe, the former
finance secretary will have established his base of
power by then. The vague unease that has settled over
the Lopez Portillo camp and among politically aware
Mexicans centers more on the intentions of Echeverria
after Lopez Portillo is inaugurated next December I.
Echeverria's clearly unilateral decision in
choosing his close friend instead of the man who had
the most support in the PRI, Secretary of Government
Moya Palencia, has aroused fears that Echeverria seeks
S to retain political power as long as he possibly can,
perhaps, somq observers ar, even after his term of
office ends.
December 10, 1975
-4-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/165 I,~HT9T00865AO02300240002-9
Echeverria, in good physical health and still
ambitious, does in fact appear to have a tempera-
mental difficulty with the idea of relinquishing
power. His method of governing has become highly
personalistic and virtually autocratic. While he
doubtless is determined to remain President in fact
as well as name until his last day in office, the
workings of the Mexican political system since the
era of former president Plutarco Elias Calles, the
power behind the scene after his term ended in 1928,
have been such that the successor's authority grad-
ually and naturally increases as the time for the
formal transfer of power approaches, and the incum-
bent's diminishes. If Echeverria chooses to tamper
with this clearly understood rule of the game, polit-
ical harmony, now experiencing some of the usual pre-
election strains, could rapidly disintegrate.
Lopez Portillo, realizing that he is dealing with
a strong-minded President, is proceeding with caution
and delicacy. His public statements have been moderate
and nondemagogic. He refuses to answer many questions,
referring them to appropriate government officials in-
stead. He has evaded several real issues. His first
policy departure from the President, a proposal for an
alliance for production with private business, was
quickly linked by Echeverria men to the President's own
"popular alliance."
Senior government officials concede that Lopez
Portillo's campaign is not moving along smoothly. They
attribute this to his lack of a power base, his rag-tag,
inexperienced campaign staff, and his lack of contact
with the party's provincial leadership. Lopez Portillo
did not "win" the nomination. He was given it by
Echeverria, without having solid political backing, and
he is hampered by his inexperience in the rough and
tumble political arena.
December 10, 1975
-5-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2~ ~211E-IA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
At this stage, Lopez Portillo can do little more
than play it cautiously and work gradually to consoli-
date power. Still in command, his mentor Echeverria
nonetheless is a constitutional lame duck and his
ability to control events, whether he likes it or not,
will p weaken over the course of the next
year.
25XI
December 10, 1975
-6-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
SECRET
NAMUCAR: A Faltering Start
The constituting articles for NAMUCAR (Naviera
Multinacional Del Caribe) were signed by Mexico,
Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Jamaica, and Costa Rica
last week. Each country contributed $500,000 to cover
operating expenses for the first six months.
Colombia and Panama, two of the original states
setting up the organization, did not sign the official
agreement; Panama is expected to do so early next year.
Colombia's interest in NAMUCAR has waned perceptibly
and government officials are openly pessimistic about
the organization's chances of success. The Lopez gov-
ernment is still committed publicly to membership in
NAMUCAR--for political reasons--but its participation
at best will be reluctant and minimal.
Although NAMUCAR's finances are temporarily as-
sured, it will be many years before trained personnel
are available and the fleet will be large enough to
pose a serious challenge to foreign ship operators in
January 1976 are overly optimistic; the first two ships
will not be ready until March, at the earliest. Heavy
financial looses are expected during the first months
of operation and NAMUCAR is not expected. to break even
until near the end of its second year.
The big question, of course, is who will be shoul-
dering the losses in the meantime. In the past Caracas
has been irritated by the attitude of some of the
NAMUCAR members who believe that Venezuela's massive
oil wealth obliges it to fund a substantial part of the
shipping company's operations. Any attempt to pressure
Venezuela to do more than its share could cause the Perez
administration to reassess its support for the fleet, an
action which could have a crip ling effect on the organi-
zation's long-term prospects. 25X1
December 10, 1975
-7-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
SECRET
25X1
The opposition Social Christian (COPEI) party's
national convention has been postponed again, this
time until early next year. The delay reflects the
intense battle within COPEI to elect a new secretar
y
general and national executive committee.
Radical Senator Luis Herrera Campins and former
president Rafael Caldera are presently involved in a
bitter struggle for control of the party. Another
factor is Herrera's maneuvering for the presidential
nomination two years hence. Herrera has strong sup-
port from the party's radical youth organization and
from a number of influential leftist party leaders.
Herrera is dissatisfied with Caldera's leadership and
has accused him of imposing party candidates for na-
tional elections. Many Copeyanos, including Herrera,
believe that had it not been for Caldera's personal
intervention in 1973, Herrera would have been the
party's choice and made a better showing in the cam-
paign than Caldera's hand-picked candidate.
In the current battle for the secretary general
post, Herrera is supporting the candidacy of a former
ambassador to the US, Pedro Pablo Aguilar. Caldera
and party moderates, in the meantime, are campaigning
for Jose Curiel, former cabinet minister and Caldera's
campaign manager in the 1968 elections. The intensity
of the struggle for what some perceive as the soul of
the party is reflected in clashes that have occurred
at several regional party meetings where delegates to
the national convention are being selected. Preliminary
results of these conventions indicate that Aguilar will
control over three-fourths of the delegates and will
win election as secretary general.
December 10, 1975
-8-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
SECRET
No matter who wins, divisions within the party
will persist and perhaps become even deeper as time
draws near for the nominating convention. Supporters
of Herrera are already warning of a split if he is
again denied the party's nomination. Moderate elements
within COPEI are also saying that Herrera's nomination
as standard bearer would be disastrous for the party
and would ensure the governing-Democratic Action Party
another five years in office.
December 10, 1975
-9-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865A002300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
SECRET
Bolivia/Chile: The Long, Hard Road to the Sea
The recent announcement by the Chilean Foreign
Ministry that there is little likelihood of a quick
solution to Bolivia's aspiration for a sovereign out-
let to the sea suggests that Santiago has not yet
decided on how far to go in satisfying La Paz and
is deliberately stalling to protract the negotiations.
Chile's statement reflects its intent to squelch
continual Bolivian agitation for some concrete indi-
cation that progress is being made. Persistent claims
by Bolivian ambassadors and officials that Santiago is
-expected to answer La Paz's demands on such and such
a date are indicative of the kind of pressures Presi-
dent Banzer's government is using to keep the issue
alive and to urge faster movement in reaching a settle-
ment.
Banzer reportedly is upset with the pace of the
talks and with what he considers the delayina tactics
on Chile's Part.
December 10, 1975
SE &ET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
SECRET
Meanwhile, Peru is standing fast and making no
proposals of its own, apparently content to let Chile
and Bolivia haggle over the problem alone. The new
leadership in Lima would be unlikely to get actively
involved unless an agreement was at hand that affected
the erstwhile Peruvian provinces won by Chile in the
War of the Pacific. Under the terms of a 1929 protocol,
Peru would then have a voice in any arrangement to be
concluded. Bolivia may be underestimating the diplomatic
difficulties in squaring any settlement with Peru while
it focuses primarily on urging Chile to table an offer
satisfactory from La Paz's point of view.
It is difficult to predict how long Chile can
string Banzer along without making at least a token
gesture. If Banzer is under pressure from his own armed
forces to resolve the issue soon, then he might be forced
at some point to break relations with Chile and accuse
i Santiago of bad faith. The most likely course of events,
however, is that Bolivia will continue to spar gently in
hopes that Chile will eventually find it more profitable
to retain an ally--especially in light of its distrust
of Peruvian intentions--then to risk adding yet another
black mark to its international image.
December 10, 1975
-11-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300240002-9