MIDDLE EAST- AFRICA- SOUTH ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A002300360002-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 22, 2001
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 16, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
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CIA-RDP79T00865A002300360002-7.pdf | 239.65 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2001/11/07 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO02300360002-7
Secret
NOFORNINOCONTRACT/ORCON
Middle East -Africa -South Asia
Secret
1 27
Not 0887/75
December 16,. 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652. exemption category:
?5B(1)(2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
Nigeria: Demobilization of Armed Forces
Under Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
India: Indira's Son Moves Up . . . . . . . . . 3
Dec 16, 1975
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Nigeria
Demobilization of Armed Forces
Under Consideration
Recent public statements by army chief of staff
Brigadier Danjuma suggest that the military govern-
ment is giving serious consideration to a major
reduction in the size of Nigeria's armed forces.
There apparently are no plans, however, for proceed-
ing immediately with a general reduction in force.
Instead, by raising the politically delicate issue
of demobilization, the regime appears to be trying
to build its case for making a substantial cutback
and to win acceptance for such a move later on.
Danjuma stated in a television interview last
week that the government was "thinking" of reducing
the 250,000-man armed forces--the largest in black
Africa--by "about" 100,000 men. He took pains to
assure that affected personnel would be provided
with jobs or job training and that a "maximum effort
would be made to ensure that those discharged would
not constitute a "social danger." Danjuma sought to
justify the proposed demobilization on the grounds
that the money paid in salaries--over 90 percent of
the defense budget is for military pay--could be
better used to finance the military's reequipment
program and the country's economic development
projects.
The former regime headed by General Gowon, under
which the army was expanded from a pre-civil war total
of about 10,000 men, was unwilling to face up after
the war to the problem of reducing the army to a
more manageable size. A demobilization of the magni-
tude suggested by Danjuma would undoubtedly be popular
with Nigeria's civilian population but would, of
course, also run the risk of generating potentially
serious opposition in the military itself.
The present regime, well aware of the risk in-
volved, will certainly proceed cautiously, if at
all. Only last month, the government halted a purge
(Continued)
Dec 16, 1975 1
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of the officer corps soon after it began because
of growing discontent among junior and middle grade
officers and some members of the regime.
Nigeria's leaders may hope to minimize opposi-
tion and uncertainty by approaching the demobiliza-
tion exercise in a carefully hased, well-publicized
process. the government
plans to begin next May with t e mustering out of
all ex-servicemen who were recalled to duty during
the civil war.
If a demobilization is eventually carried out
on the scale Danjuma envisioned, it almost certainly
would result in creating a large reservoir of un-
employed, and disgruntled ex-servicemen. Other jobs
probably could not be found for more than a small
portion of those discharged. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
Dec 16, 1975
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India
Indir,a's Son Moves Up
Sanjay Gandhi, the right-of-center younger son
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, was named last week
to a top position in her Congress Party's youth wing.
he youth group's designation of the 30--year-old
anjay as a member of its executive council marks
is first assumption of a formal political post,
although he has been functioning for more than six
months as one of the Prime Minister's closest
advisers.
L~-
Many observers in India believe that Sanjay will
soon move up to a higher post and that his mother is
grooming him eventually to succeed her.
Sanjay emerged as a member of his mother's
political inner circle last June at the time of her
conviction--subsequently overturned by the Supreme
Court--for election law violations in 1971. Since
June he has influenced a number of important personnel
and policy decisions, including a cabinet shuffle
November 30 in which two of his political allies
became ministers. Another supporter was installed
last month as president of the party's youth wing.
These changes were accompanied by the ouster of
officials belonging to the party's leftist faction;
Sanjay has been a strong critic of leftist influence
in the government. He has also advocated less govern-
ment control of the economy, and his influence
may have been a factor in the regime's shift to
a somewhat more favorable attitude toward private
enterprise in recent months.
Dec 16, 1975
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The pro-Soviet Communist Party, which has been
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he Congress Party since the late 1960s, has been
There are limits, nonetheless, on Sanjay's
influence and on his potential for advancement. He
does not control his mother; she continues to make
all the important decisions. Her continuing coopera-
tion with the Communists and friendliness toward
their Soviet mentors are examples of policies that
appear to be at variance with Sanjay's anti-leftist
orientation.
If Sanjay ever does make it to the top, he would
represent the third generation in the family to lead
India. The Prime Minister's father, Jawaharlal Nehru,
was the country's first prime minister. Before
independence, Nehru and his father, Motilal Nehru,
were major leaders in the long struggle for indepen-
dence from Britain. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
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Secret
Secret