SOVIET UNION- EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300380002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 16, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Top Secret
U,2f --cL
Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
Top Secret
December 16, 1975
SC No. 00558/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E..O. 11652, exemption category:
?56(1) (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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ORCON
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
December 16, 1975
Moscow Waffles on Portuguese Timor. . . . . . . . 2
Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Japan in January . . . . . . . . . . 3
Prague's Press Blasted by Belgrade. . . . . . . . 4
Hungary-Romania: Public Warmth . . . . . . . . . 5
Bulgaria: Lilov Re-emerges . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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Moscow Waffles on Portuguese Timor
International attention to the Indonesian inva-
sion of Portuguese Timor and Soviet ideological pre-
tensions have led Moscow to edge closer to public
criticism of Jakarta. The Soviets are still pulling
their punches, however, for fear of upsetting their
gradually improving relations with Indonesia.
The most authoritative statement thus far of
Moscow's views on the invasion appeared in a Pravda
commentary by A. Yuryev on December 12. Yuryev im-
plies that the Soviet Union's sympathies rest with
the leftist-oriented Fretilin faction, but he stops
short of directly condemning the Indonesian govern-
ment's action. The commentator simply attributes
the military invasion to a "pro-Indonesian" group.
Yuryev speaks of Moscow's support of Timor's right
to self determination, but refrains from making any
judgment as to whether the former colony should re-
main independent or be absorbed by Indonesia.
The invasion came at an unfortunate juncture
for Moscow because Soviet-Indonesian relations have
been warming somewhat. Jakarta only recently agreed
"in principle" to accept a Soviet offer of over $100
million in credit to finance and build two hydro-
electric projects in Java. This is the first Soviet
aid to Indonesia since the abortive coup by the In-
donesian Communist Party in 1965.
Broader issues are also involved. In Moscow's
eyes, instability in Southeast Asia--even in Portu-
guese Timor--evokes the specter of increased Chinese
and American influence. The Soviets believe, however
ideologically distasteful it may be, that the In-
donesian government is the best hope of restoring
order to the troubled island of Timor. (CONFIDEN-
TIAL)
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Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
to Japan in January
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will go to
Japan early next month. No precise date has yet
been set, according to Japanese Foreign Ministry
officials.
Gromyko's trip to Japan has been in the works
for many months. It ran afoul of Tokyo's efforts
to negotiate a peace treaty with China in which the
latter pressed for the infamous hegemony clause.
With that treaty still unsigned, Gromyko may have
felt a visit was necessary.
His talks with the Japanese will be difficult.
The northern territories issue is certain to be
brought up, and Gromyko will not have anything new
to offer. Moscow has hinted that it might consider
giving back two of the islands, but no more. Gromyko
will also be bearded by the Japanese on the meaning
of a reference in his article in the October issue
of Kommunist implying that the territorial issue was
settled. The Japanese say that this violates the
Brezhnev-Tanaka understanding that the northern
territories were an appropriate subject of negotia-
tions between the two countries. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Prague's Press Blasted by Belgrade
With the ink hardly dry on the joint communique
summing up Premier Strougal's visit to Belgrade, the
Czechoslovak press last week once again incurred the
wrath of the Yugoslavs because of its subservience
to Moscow.
On Wednesday, the Czechoslovak party daily. Rude
Pravo commemorated the 1960 and 1969 Moscow conferences
of communist parties by calling for a new world party
conclave. The commentary gave a passing nod to the
independence of the parties, but its emphasis was on
"proletarian internationalism" and on Moscow's "in-
ternational recognition as the vanguard of the move-
ment." On the deadlocked preparations for the Euro-
pean party conference, Rude Pravo came down hard in
favor of a "truly militant and Communist" final docu-
ment. It also pushed the struggle against Maoism,
which it said has now become "an urgent combat task
for the entire Communist movement."
Belgrade's predictably angry response came
quickly. The Yugoslavs rejected Prague's attempt to
require all parties to join in the anti-Chinese polem-
ics and took particular exception to its claim that
the documents signed at the 1960 and 1969 conferences
--which Yugoslavia did not attend--are still valid.
The party organ Borba pointed out with some asperity
that Belgrade considers Prague's statements on these
documents as direct interference in Yugoslav internal
affairs.
During the Strougal visit, the Yugoslavs prob-
ably presented the Czechs a list of their grievances
over the content of Prague's propaganda. Such barbs
may continue to delay the visit of President Tito,
which the Czechoslovak regime desires. Yugoslav
handling of their complaint--broadcasting it to the
Soviet Union in Russian--indicates that they also
intended the message to get to Prague's mentors.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
December 16, 1975
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Hungary-Romania: Public Warmth
The Hungarian regime tried hard to create a warm
atmosphere for Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's
visit to Budapest from December 8-11. The differing
viewpoints of the two sides were nonetheless evident.
In addition to his formal talks with his Hun-
garian counterpart, Frigyes Puja, Macovescu made of-
ficial calls on President Losonczi, Premier Lazar,
. and Politburo member Biszku, who apparently was stand-
ing in for the traveling Kadar. The embassy says
that Hungarian media provided unusually :Friendly pub-
licity, with several editorials calling for closer
economic and political ties with Bucharest.
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suit of a decision by both sides that differences over
the Hungarian minority in Romania should not interfere
with improving economic ties or with efforts to under-
stand the other's position on certain European politi-
cal issues.
The communique, however, stated that the two
foreign ministers had a "frank and open exchange of
views" on bilateral relations, thus suggesting that
differences over the minority issue were freely aired.
. - The two sides also "exchanged views" on international
issues,.the communique stated, but the Hungarians did
get the maverick Romanians to accept favorable mention
of the Warsaw Pact, CEMA, and "socialist interna-
tionalism." (CONFIDENTIAL)
December 16, 1975
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Bulgaria: Lilov Re-emerges
Aleksandur Lilov, Politburo member and party
secretary for ideology, has returned to public view
after an absence of nearly five months.
According to a Bulgarian newspaper, Lilov was
present on December 11 when party/state leader Zhiv-
kov addressed a Sofia meeting of the Bulgarian
Writers Union. Lilov had been absent from the usual
gatherings of the Bulgarian leadership since July 23
and has also missed numerous ideological sessions at
which he would normally officiate.
Lilov is apparently not in political trouble.
Young and highly regarded, he has been a primary
architect of the "ideological offensive" that is Bul-
garia's response to detente with the West. This
hard-line policy continues, and the press on several
occasions over the last few months has mentioned
Lilov favorably. He is a close friend of Zhivkov's
daughter, Lyudmila, and some rumors claim that he
may be her third husband.
Lilov is very seriously ill an
We have no information about the nature of is in
firmity or how it will affect his future within the
leadership. (SECRET)
was in a ovie union receiving medical treatment.
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