SOVIET UNION-EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002400180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
FF NOTES
Secret
172
December 30, 1975
No. 0785/75
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December 30, 1975
Pay Raise for Romanian Military. . . . . . . . . 1
Zagladin Takes on the Hard Liners on
Communist Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Soviets May Be Building Case That CSCE
Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty. . . . . . . . . 6
USSR: Electric Power in the New Five
Year Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CHRONOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ANNEX: Yugoslavia: Cominformism as a Domestic
Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Pay Raise for Romanian Military
The recently announced liberalization of pay
and annual leave for the Romanian military suggests
that Ceausescu is worried about possible dissatis-
faction in the armed services. On December 29, the
Executive Political Committee issued a decree calling
for pay hikes of 100 percent for privates, 65 and 70
percent for corporals and sergeants, and 29 percent
for military cadets, commissioned and noncommissioned
officers, and reservists. The decree also grants
increased pay allowances for food and longer vacations.
In a rare public admission, the Ceausescu regime
last fall confirmed that food shortages existed in
Romania. The situation had apparently deteriorated
rapidly following the devastating floods which hit
Romania in July. The military played a leading role
in fighting the floods and in maintaining basic serv-
ices throughout the country. Indeed, consumer problems
may have played a part in Ceausescu's decision to
cancel his visit to Yugoslavia in mid-October. The
regime has now made foodstuffs more readily available
throughout the country, and modest pay hikes have
been announced for the civilian sector of the economy.
Although the pay scales for the Romanian mili-
tary, particularly the enlisted men, are low, the
military pay raises are the first hint that public
discontent may have spread into the ranks of the
armed forces. The military is a mainstay of the Ceau-
sescu regime, and the size of the wage increases re-
flects the leadership's sensitivity to any signs of
discontent.
Meantime, Ceausescu has still not offered any
significant broad policy changes to ease popular dis-
content over the long run. The regime, for example,
seems determined to proceed with rapid industriali-
zation regardless of its effect on the average Ro-
manian. I
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Zagladin Takes on the
Hard Linerson Communist Tactics
A two-part article in Questions of Philosophy
this fall by V. V. Zagladin differs sharply from the
hard-line views on communist party tactics expressed
in August by Konstantin Zarodov. The differences are
so pronounced that Zagladin may well have intended
his article as a rebuttal of the hard liners. As is
characteristic of this type of Soviet writing, Zag-
ladin sets up symbolic villains. When he upholds
Lenin against "left revisionists" such as Bukharin,
Zagladin is attacking those unnamed individuals whom
he deems to be the modern advocates of Bukharin's
heresy.
Zagladin's position as First Deputy Chief of the
International Department of the CPSU Central Committee
carries far more prestige than Zarodov's post as edi-
tor of the WorZd Marxist Review. On the other hand,
Zarodov's article, which appeared in Pravda, re-
ceived far wider dissemination than is customary for
such arcane doctrinal treatises.
In any case, Zagladin's effort is no more the
last word in this ancient dispute than was Zarodov's.
The most significant aspect of Zagladin's article
may be that, despite Brezhnev's highly publicized
reception of Zarodov in September, it is still possi-
ble to present a divergent opinion in a major
publication.
The theoretical debate over the preconditions
for the transformation to socialism, which Zagladin
addresses, reaches practical application in the ques-
tion of communist party tactics for obtaining power.
Where Zarodov is militant and uncompromising in op-
position to the idea of cooperation between social-
ists and communists, Zagladin seems to feel that it
is more important to secure tangible improvements in
the position of the workers than to adhere to some
abstract ideal of party purity.
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Zagladin explicitly states that it is necessary
to win over a majority of the working class before
attempting the socialist transformation of society.
As is customary in these theological debates, Zagladin
draws freely on the Leninist gospel, citing those
maxims that favor mass movements and majorities. He
quotes Lenin to the effect that it is essential to
win over "not merely a simple majority of workers,
but the majority of those exploited."
All this is in striking contrast to Zarodov, who
seemed to endorse Portuguese party leader Cunhal's
argument that mere numerical majorities were inconse-
quential and that a determined cadre could seize power
regardless of the latest poll results. Zagladin's
position is diametrically opposed. Again citing
Lenin, he argues that "It is criminal to lead only
the vanguard alone--the working class---into the battle
for the revolution."
Insofar as Zagladin acknowledges the importance
of "subjective" factors--the intangibles such as the
willingness of communists to seize the moment and
convert a revolutionary situation into revolution--
he is in agreement with the militants. But his final
weighing of the factors is much different and, al-
though he does not dismiss the importance of the sub-
jective element, he says explicitly that if the neces-
sary preconditions are absent, no subjective activity
can lead to a victorious revolution. "The party
cannot by its will summon up the enormous surge of
the overwhelming majority of the people's mass which
is extremely important for the revolution."
In what may be a necessary effort to rationalize
retroactively the Russian experience, Zagladin asserts
that under certain historic conditions it is some-
times possible for states at the middle level of de-
velopment to leap directly into socialism. But the
inescapable conclusion of Zagladin's reasoning is
that such a leap is nearly impossible in countries of
developed capitalism. Indeed, it appears that he is
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firmer in this position in his second section, which
was signed to press in November, than in the first,
which was dated a month previously. Both were prob-
ably prepared considerably earlier. In the interval
between the two parts, Zagladin may have felt the
need to rebut contrary statements more forcefully.
While the shadow of the leftist setback in Chile
hangs over these debates, their current application
is clearly in Western Europe. Zagladin has frequent
dealings with western communist parties and may have
felt the need to present a thesis with which they
would be sympathetic and which would justify their
independence while avoiding a doctrinal break with
Moscow.
The hard-line position to which Zarodov seems to
subscribe, and which the Italian Communists have been
compelled to rebut, maintains that the defeat in
Chile occurred in large measure because the left
forces were not sufficiently resolute. The Italians
will be much more comfortable with Zagladin's
thesis, which supports their analysis that the left-
ists failed in Chile because they lacked the mass
electoral support necessary to push thru the funda-
mental social changes they undertook.
The differences between Zagladin and Zarodov
are also of intense concern to the French party. As
the prospect of obtaining at least a share of power
has grown closer, the French seem to be moving
steadily away from Zarodovite orthodoxy, which con-
signed them to an opposition they now increasingly
believe was both permanent and sterile.
While Zagladin offers a doctrinal rationaliza-
tion for participation in government by the major
Western communist parties, his thesis tends to post-
pone the actual transformation to socialism. In-
deed, he lists a variety of "negative phenomena" in
modern advanced societies that collectively act to
render such a transformation difficult. While he
also cites, almost in an obligatory fashion, develop-
ments that tend to enhance the preconditions for a
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socialist transformation, his overall conclusion
leans toward pessimism about. the immediate likelihood
of socialist revolutions in advanced countries. In
the continuing debate within the Soviet Union over
whether the current economic distress of the West
makes it susceptible to social transformation, and
hence, perhaps, to Soviet meddling, Zagladin is
clearly a voice of caution.
Zagladin seems aware that his evolutionary pre-
scription for achieving socialism suffers somewhat
in comparison with the shortcuts offered by the
militants who emphasize "subjective" factors, i.e.,
the willingness of a well-disciplined faction to
seize power regardless of shortcomings in the "ob-
jective" preconditions. As if in compensation, Zag-
ladin presents the concept, seldom heard nowadays,
that state-monopoly capitalism is a significant step
toward the socialization of production. Presumably
this is because it then becomes impossible for pri-
vate capital to recover its former position. This
resembles the line taken by some Soviets with re-
gard to Portugal, in which the temporary fluctuations
in the fortunes of the communist party were seen as
less significant than the fact that irreversible
socio-economic changes were taking place that would
prevent a return to the prerevolutionary situation.
Thus, while Zagladin cannot offer shortcuts, the
transformation achieved by his formula is likely to
be more solidly grounded and more permanent. F
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Soviets May Be Building Case That CSCE
Act Is Equivalent to a Treaty
In their continuing campaign to inflate the
importance of CSCE, the Soviets now seem to be moving
toward the position that the CSCE Final Act is binding
under international law. Writing in New Times, Va-
lentin Yaroslavtsev asserts that, although the act
is not formally a treaty, there is an obligation to
observe its provisions. The crux of his argument
is that "The Final Act contains so many stipulations
calling for its observance that taken together they
carry no less force in relation to this document than
the paeta aunt servanda (pacts should be observed)
principle does in relation to international treaties."
While Yaroslavtsev's legal reasoning is tortured,
his article indicates the extent of Soviet sensitivity
to Western claims that the act is not binding in
international law. Although Yaroslavtsev's article
appears to be the farthest the Soviets have gone in
controverting the Western interpretation, they have
argued from the start that they felt obliged to
observe all the provisions of the Final Act.
The Soviets are, of course, interested in mag-
nifying the importance of favorable aspects of the
CSCE act, particularly the statement on the invio-
lability of frontiers. To be consistent, however,
they would have to acknowledge that all parts of the
document, including the "freer movement" provisions
they find distasteful, have equal legal force. Some
of the "freer movement" clauses are more loosely
worded than the principles such as the inviolability
of frontiers, but the Soviets cannot altogether
escape the dilemma. Asserting that the Final Act
approximates a treaty in its legal force merely seems
to transfer the current debate over the relative
merits of various sections of the document to a dif-
ferent plane.
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If the Soviets continue to insist that the Final
Act is legally binding, there may be some potential
for mischief over the longer term. It could, at the
extreme, even serve as a rationale for taking action
against a nation that they deem to be in violation
of it. This prospect is still remote, but it is a
logical culmination to the growing Soviet tendency
to regard the CSCE act as a substitute for the World
War II peace treaty that they recognize will never
come to pass.
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USSR: Electric Power in
The New Five Year Plan
Soviet plans for production of electric power
during the tenth five-year plan period may not be
fully realized, but lags in power-consuming sectors
of the economy probably will be sufficient to off-
set the shortfall and maintain an overall balance
between electric power supply and requirements.
The new plan provides for production of 1,340
to 1,380 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in
1980, an increase of 29 to 33 percent over 1975.
This is considerably less than the 40 percent in-
crease achieved in 1971-7-5, and is the lowest rate
of growth projected for power output since World
War II.
Total industrial output is to increase at a
faster rate than electric power--35 to 39 percent--
with an even greater increase in consumption of
power by industry as a result of plans for increased
automation and mechanization. This suggests that
the share of total power output consumed by industry
may be greater than in the past.
The rural economy will also increase its use
of electric power, from 7 percent of the total power
supply in 1975 to 10 percent in 1980. Even if power
production goals are achieved, some competition for
electricity is likely to develop between the indus-
trial, rural, and urban sectors of the economy.
Regional shortages of power almost certainly
will become more prevalent, especially in the Eu-
ropean USSR, which is -deficient in energy resources,
but which consumes 80 percent of the electricity.
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Achievement of the goal for electric power
production depends on fulfillment of plans to in-
stall 67,000 to 70,000 megawatts of new generating
capacity and to construct high-voltage, long-dis-
tance transmission lines. Approximately 20 percent
of the planned additions to capacity are to be in
nuclear electric powerplants--compared with about
7 percent in the last five year plan. Another 20
percent will go to hydroelectric plants, and the
remainder to conventional thermal powerplants, some
to be built in the eastern regions of the country
to utilize cheap coal. All the nuclear capacity
and more than a third of the hydro capacity will be
located in the European USSR.
Past performance suggests that fulfillment of
the plan for installation of new capacity will be
difficult. The goal for the previous five-year pe-
riod was 67,200 megawatts, but installation probably
has fallen short by 10,000 to 12,000 megawatts.
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December 23 Politburo member Suslov and the other
ranking East European delegates to
the Cuban party congress, which ended
yesterday, fly home.
US provides the USSR with a note
verbaZe of protest concerning the
international venting of debris
from three Soviet underground nuclear
tests this year.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja
completes a two-day official visit
to the USSR.
Foreign Minister Gromyko and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov have
separate talks with the visiting
Jordanian delegation headed by
former prime minister Rifai.
December 24 UK chief rabbi Jakobovits completes
a ten-day official visit to the
USSR, the first by the chief rabbi
of a Western state.
Politburo member Suslov arrives in
Moscow from Havana and is met at
the airport by Brezhnev and others.
Romanian Foreign Trade Minister
Patan arrives in Belgrade for trade
talks.
First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov ends talks with Jordanian
delegation in Moscow.
December 30, 1975
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December 24-25 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Minic
holds talks in Bucharest with his
Romanian counterpart Gheor he
Macovescu. E__ I
December 25 Israeli Foreign Minister Allon
confers with Romanian De put Foreign
Minister Pacoste.
Yugoslavia and Romania sign in
Belgrade a trade agreement for 1976-80
and a commodity trade protocol for
the coming year.
December 26 Yugoslavia makes first public
admission of the arrest of Vladimir
Dapcevic,, a leadin anti-Titoist
emigre.
Soviets' TU-144 SST begins regular
service on its first route, Moscow
Premier Kosygin begins a four-day
official visit to Turkey.
December 27 Semen Skachkov, head of Iran-Soviet
Committee for Economic and Technical
Cooperation, concludes official
talks in Baghdad.
Peoples Republic of China releases
Soviet helicopter crew captured in
March 1974.
December 28 Premier Kosygin attends ceremonies
opening the Soviet-assisted Iskenderun
steel complex in Turkey.
Azerbaydzhan Supreme Court sentences
five men to death by firing squad
for defrauding the state of some
12 million dollars.
December 30, 1975
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December 29 Secretary of Commerce Morton signs
US-USSR Maritime Agreement in
Washington.
FUTURE EVENTS
January 1
GDR-FRG health agreement to enter
Romania to begin a two-year term
as a non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council, taking the seat
now occupied by the Belorussian SSR.
USSR to impose a 56 MPH speed
limit, the first control of highway
speed in Soviet history.
Czechoslovakia lifts its ban on
permanent representation there for
foreign firms; the ban had been
instituted just after the republic
was taken over by the Communists.
A new Soviet internal passport
system to be implemented.
into effect.
USSR's new "financial aid tax" on
remittances from abroad to enter
January 9 Foreign Minister Gromyko to begin
an official visit to Japan expected
to last four or five days.
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January 12 SALT negotiators to resume their
discussions at Geneva.
UN Security Council to begin a new
debate on Middle East issues with
fedayeen representatives on hand
in New York.
January 14 US congressional delegation, headed
by Chairman of the House Foreign
Relations Committee Thomas Morgan,
to begin -a three-day visit to Yugo-
mid-January A PLO delegation led by "Foreign
Minister" Qaddumi to 9o to Moscow
on official business.
January 20 Armenian Communist Party congress to
convene.
Lithuanian Communist Party Congress
January 22 Georgian Communist Part congress to
convene.
January 23 Turkmen Communist Party congress to
convene.
January 27 Tadzhik Communist Party congress to
convene. F_ I
January 28 Azerbaydzhan Communist Part congress
to convene.
Estonian Communist Party congress to
convene.
January 29 Moldavian Communist Party Congress
to convene.
December 30, 1975
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late January MBFR negotiations to resume in
Vienna.
whether and how to treat peaceful
nuclear explosions in a threshold
test ban treaty.
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Yugoslavia: Cominformism as a Domestic Issue
The public revelations associated with the dis-
covery of pro-Soviet subversion within Yugoslavia
have had a "ripple effect" in domestic politics that
will almost certainly influence the country's leader-
ship into the initial stages of the post-Tito era.
The issues are basic. As a result, debates over
whether to have centralized or decentralized rule,
how to cope with politico-military blocs, and the
wisdom of one-man rule are once again sparking dis-
cord, and even factionalism.
A Major Catalyst
The discovery of an illegal Cominformist group
in the spring of 1974 caught Yugoslavia in the wake
of one of Tito's most turbulent periods of rule.
From December 1971 through late 1973, Tito cracked
down on nationalists and reformers, demanded total
agreement with his views, and broke with many long
time personal friends over his decision to court
Moscow and recentralize the Yugoslav party. In the
process, he purged the press, brought the courts to
heel, and swept aside all talk of political reforms.
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Moreover, the October war in the Middle East in 1973
drove Tito into an extremist anti-Western phase of
nonaligned activism that damaged Yugoslavia's ef-
forts to maintain a balanced world posture between
East and West.
By early 1974, the principal players in the
Yugoslav regime, either from a reluctance to break
with the team or from careerist considerations, had
meekly followed this implicitly more Moscow-oriented
party line. Against this background, the discovery
of a faction of pro-Soviets in Yugoslavia created
considerable disarray in the Tito regime. Soviet
support for the Cominformists raised serious ques-
tions about Moscow's intentions as well as doubts
about the country's ideological and internal security
defenses.
Tito, in his efforts to shore up domestic de-
fenses against Soviet influence, has thus far
stressed that his authoritarian program since 1971
does not need alterations, only fuller implementa-
tion. Tito's stance has, however, caused the argu-
ment over centralism versus decentralism to re-emerge
--a debate that has driven Yugoslav politics from
the country's beginnings as a unified state. The
debate is still far from settled, but advocates of
decentralization, after being muzzled for years, are
finding vindication in the regime's criticisms of
the Soviet "model."
Factionalism Anyone?
Tito has tried to limit Soviet influence and
to isolate the country's Cominformists by stressing
the basic historical differences between Soviet and
Yugoslav communism. His campaign for a dominant,
centralized party had, to some extent, blurred such
distinctions.
He has so far relied most heavily on revivals
of his break with Stalin in 1948. Such themes may
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be good gruel for the masses, but some of the Yugoslav
elite are asking tough questions about how much the
Soviet and Yugoslav systems actually differ in
practice.
Other Yugoslavs, notably republic-level offi-
cials, are trying to use the debate over federal
authority to block federal programs that clearly ex-
ceed the federation's constitutional authority. Re-
gime leaders in Belgrade are tolerating this backtalk.
it is premature to expect a resurgence of
liberalism and reformism, but certain groups--mainly
non-Serb intellectuals--are intently watching for op-
portunities. Meantime, their opponents--armed with
Tito's personal instructions--are determined to main-
tain "order and discipline" in domestic affairs.
Although Tito himself this fall warned against
using smear tactics against "honest Communists," the
tensions between the factions have already caused
some vicious rumor-mongering. For example, the
party leader in Vojvodina recently was the target of
a whispering campaign that erroneously alleged he
was under arrest as a Cominformist.
The Economy: An Achilles Heel
This revived political and ideological feuding
also feeds on an economic situation that Tito him-
self admits is "not good." Regime spokesmen have
been warning for months that the appeal of the Comin-
formists will grow if inflation continues to rise
and the standard of living continues to fall.
Tito's solution to such problems has been to
cut federal spending and to have Belgrade impose un-
constitutional investment limits on the republics.
He also believes that the blame for irresponsible
economic activity rests squarely on the republics.
The federal government, however, continues to
be the butt of domestic complaints about the country's
economic ills. Premier Bijedic's cabinet--the im-
plementor of party programs--is under attack.
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Although Tito recently expressed his confidence in
Bijedic, the Premier might become a scapegoat.
Any politically sensitive problems in the
economy--such as an upswing in strikes--could thus
spark even sharper debates within the leadership.
Strikes could force the leadership to consider
whether to get tough with the workers, while worrying
about possible disruptive tactics by the pro-Soviet
dissidents at hand.
Outlook - More Collectivity at the Top
The domestic impact of pro-Soviet subversion
and Moscow's failure to make amends for its sponsor-
ship of the Cominformists make Tito's rapprochement
with Brezhnev in the early 1970s look like a mistake
of major proportions. So far, the drive against
Stalinists and dogmatists has not hurt Tito's per-
sonal position. The mistake has, however, set many
people thinking that the post-Tito era must be led
by a collective of leaders who will presumably make
better policy judgements.
Tito's likely successors appear to be the most
vehement in the anti-Cominformist drive. The hottest
denunciations of Stalinism have come from Tito's
vice president, Vladimir Bakaric, a Croat elder
statesman and head of the commission for protection
of the constitution. Stane Dolanc, the number-two
man in the party, shares the outlook of Bakaric, and
Edvard Kardelj, the regime's senior thinker and
Tito's closest associate, is also working quietly to
strengthen the ideological core of the Yugoslav system.
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the omin ormis a air, the ugoslav military--the
strongest force for unity in the country--is playing
its most public political role in years.
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Military officers have admitted that they have
'?war-gamed" every likely scenario--presumably in-
cluding senility--for the succession to Tito. In
the end, the army could well cast a crucial card in
what kind of state Yugoslavia will be after Tito is
dead and the Cominformist scare is over, F
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