THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 13

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002500390001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CAMBODIA
1. The Khmer Communists a ear~on the verge of takin
Phnom Penh.
~ A late report
also indicates that insurgent forces have captured Takhmau,
the. cat~ital's southern suburb.
~ government units have abandoned all
positions on t e east bank of the Mekong River opposite down-
town Phnom Penh. The Cambodian officer estimated that the
city would fall within a day and said that the navy was plan-
ning to run the Mekong River -- presumably to South Vietnam --
with its remaining craft.
CENTRAL IN'.I'ELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence-
15 April 1975
The Situation in Indochina
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 13 -
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2. On the opposite side of the city, battlelines around
Pochentong aixport are running roughly along the railway
embankment about a mile north of the airfield. A small insur-
gent force yesterday penetrated into the market just north-
east of the airstrip but was quickly forced to withdraw. The
main highway between Phnom Penh and Pochentong was cut late
today, however, and the airport was reportedly being hit by
machine gun and mortar fire.
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5. South Vietnamese forces have expanded their hold-
ings bath east and west of Xuan.Loc. The government units
attempting to open the road to Saigon-are still meeting
determined Communist resistance, however, and their progress
has been slaw. Although there is a shortage of focid in the
city, some of the civilians who fled from the city to the
surrounding countryside are beginning to trickle back.
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The artillery bombard-
ments together with suspecte .sapper attacks with~_n the
airbase resulted in the temporary closing of the jet fighter
airstrip and destroyed large quantities of :Fuel and munitions.
If these. attacks, continue, air operations in support of
.South Vietnamese farces around Xuan Loc, will be sharply cur-
tailed.
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Fighting Increases Outside of Phan Rank.
'7. Yesterday's shelling of Phan Rang City has been
followed by a number of ground attacks on government defen -
sive positions to the north and west of the city. Although
mast government forces are holding firm, one Ranger battal-
ion, however, has been forced to pull back. The regional
commander, General Toan, has decided to postpone the with-
drawal of the remainder of the Airborne brigade which has.
been the backbone of the government's defense line.
8. The commander of the forward regional headquar-
ters, at Phan Rang now has the Airborne and Ranger units
deployed north and. northeast of the airbase and the two
.2nd Division regiments to the west and northwest of the
airbase. Territorial forces have the responsibility of
defending Phan Rang City -- located some five miles south-
east of the airbase -- and the immediate .surrounding area.
The Situation in the Delta
9. Fighting is still 'underway in Vinh Long Province
across the river from Can Tho as the Communists continue to
threaten Route 4. Early on April 15, Communist gunners
fired an ineffective mortar barrage at the Binh Thuy Air-
:-.,base .-outside Can Tho, and lator fired some 50 rounds o~
mortar into Cai Lay District town at a critical road junction.
10. To the north in Duang Tuong Province, the North
Vietnamese 8th Division has been redeploying in preparation
for its long-expected campaign to cut Route 4. If the 8th
Division coordinates its attacks on Route 4 with the North
Vietnamese Sth Division farther north in Long An Province,
the South Vietnamese 7th Divisian will. be hard pressed to
keep this vital link to Saigon open.
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The Political Situation
'll. A recent sampling of South Vietnamese opinion since
early April reflects a rnaod of pessimism within official
.circles. The sampling was made before President Ford's.
address to Congress on April 10 and the recent creditable
showing by the South Vietnamese military at Xuan Loc and in
the .delta. It seems unlikely, however, that these develop-
ments, in themselves, have been enough to alter what appears
to be a general conviction that adequate U5 support will not:.
be forthcoming and that the Communists now are simply too
strong for the South Vietnamese military to hold indefinitely.
~, .
12. The-most immediate concern of mast South Vietnamese,
especially those who have worked closely-with the Americans,
is "what happens if." Reassurances that they will be evac-
uated are much sought after. Some middle-level government
officials are adopting an attitude that the Americans are
their "only .card" left -- and that their evacuation should
not be permitted unless guarantees for their .safety are made.
A farmer cabinet. official, believes that large-scale evacua-
tion would be nearly impossible and that. once it begins, govern-
ment troops would fire on anyone trying to leave. Another
government politician feels that as soon as the Communists
begin hitting the government's defenses around Saigon, there
,:will : be wholesale panic similar to th~at~ at Da Nang and that ~~
evacuation from .Tan Son Nhut Airport would not be feasible
because of the chaos.
13. A sense of impending disaster also permeates the
military. Some senior military officials reportedly are
readying various evacuation schemes of their own. "Several
generals" reportedly 'have commandeered a-boat which will be
used to evacuate themselves and their families. Air Farce
personnel reportedly have made preparations to move themselves
and their families out of Saigon an Vietnamese Air Farce planes
and Navy personnel are making similar preparations using-navy
boats and aircraft. -
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