THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 22

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1975
• Content Type: IM

'? ~ Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 .
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE~AGENCY'
DirectaratE of Intelligence
23 April 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMaRANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
(As of 160p EDST)
No. 22
Militar~Action
1. The lull is continuing. Some Communist units are
reported to still be having difficulty moving enough sup-
plies forward and there could be some additional delay
before same units are ready to resume the attack, but
most evidence points to direct assaults on Saigon's outer
defenses this week or by the end of the month at the latest.
Communist units in the past month have sometimes been slow
moving into weakly defended or. abandoned areas -- in many
cases the combat units merely got ahead of their supply
columns.- Such difficulties around Saigon are expected to
be rectified shortly.
2. Strong North Vietnamese counterattacks against
ga?vernment troops and positions in Tay Ninh Province
again closed the road to the provincial capital, probably
for the last .time, The South Vietnamese were also forced
from the Rach Kien District town in Long An Province just
ten miles southwest of Saigon. This position is east of
Route ~ and the Communists now threaten the road from both
sides. It also gives them a new approach to Saigon's
southern suburbs.
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Hanoi Using Southern Parts
3. The North .Vietnamese are moving supplies by sea
into the former "avernment arts as far south as Nha
Trang. a number
of small coastal vessels and barges unloading at Nha
Trang. Similar activity has been previously noted at
Qu Nhan and Da Nang and it is expected the North Viet-~
namese will soon begin using their newly=acquired port
facilities as far south as Ham Tan, including Cam Ranh
Bey and Phan Thiet.
Saigon Generals Captured
6. Hanoi Radio announced on April 23 that Lt. General
Nguyen Vinci Nghi anal Brig. General Pham Ngoc Sang were
captured. General Nghi was the commander of the Military
Region 3 Forward Command at Phan Rang and General Sang
was the commander df the South Vietnamese Air Farce 6th
Division. These men and their staffs were unable to fly
from Phan Rang when it fell to-the Communists last week,
because rebellious ranger troops seized and tack off in the
only available rescue aircraft. -Nghi and Sang were last
thought to be retreating through the forest south toward
Phan Thiet.
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Trying for a Dialoc~e
7. In the face of Communist intransigence, South
Vietnam's new president, Trap Van Huong, still .appears
to be trying to open some sort of political dialogue.
He met twice today with the French ambassador to Saigon
and recalled his chief negotiator in Paris, Ambassador
Phong, for "urgent" di.scussians.
8. What Huong has in mind is not clear, but he
appears hopeful that the Viet Cong will accept some
offer of political dialogue with. the government short
of surrender discussions. The French government, which
has been in contact-with Communist representatives in
Paris, apparently still believes that such talks can be
arranged. Ambassador Phang, whose opinion probably has
been influenced heavily by the optirnistic line of the
French, also shares that view.
9. Mast political apposition leaders, such as for-
mer vice--president IJguyen Cao Ky and General "Big" Minh,
also retain-hope that some farm of so7.uti.on short of
surrender might be arranged. But they recognize that
the Communists will not negotiate with the remnants of
the 'I'hieu regime and that the first order of business
is to replace it with one that hopefully meets Communist
specifications.
1.0. In typical South Vietnamese fashion, however,
there is considerable disunity among various opposition
elements. Four. of the principal oppasitionists --
Catholic leader Father Thanh, "Big" Minh, former senate
chairman Iluyen, and Buddhist activist Vu Van Mau -- met
today to prepare a joint statement demanding that Presi-
dent Huong step aside and allow a new cabinet to take
charge. The statement was to have carried a threat of
public demonstrations should Iiuong refuse to step down,
but `the four-were unable to agree on the procedures under
which a new cabinet would operate.
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11. There now is some doubt that Vu Van Mau and
the An Quang Buddhist elements he represents will en-
dorse the statement.- Their refusal to do'so would
only further delay the formation of a government with
some chance of dealing with the Communists. Moreover,
there are no indications that the military would sup-
port any arrangement which the political apposition
.can agree on. Despite the precarious situation in South
Vietnam, this element's support -_- or'at least its
agreement not to interfere -- is still needed before a
new government can be formed.
12. President Huong reportedly accepted the resig-
nation of-the Can cabinet "in principle" today but
requested that it remain in office "several more days"
until he can select a replacement. Huong gave na indi-
cations with whom he has been discussing various posi-
tions, but stated that he hoped to have 'a new govern-
ment formed by Friday.
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