THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 22

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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5
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 17, 2004
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1
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Publication Date: 
April 23, 1975
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IM
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'? ~ Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 . 25X1 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE~AGENCY' DirectaratE of Intelligence 23 April 1975 INTELLIGENCE MEMaRANDUM The Situation in Vietnam (As of 160p EDST) No. 22 Militar~Action 1. The lull is continuing. Some Communist units are reported to still be having difficulty moving enough sup- plies forward and there could be some additional delay before same units are ready to resume the attack, but most evidence points to direct assaults on Saigon's outer defenses this week or by the end of the month at the latest. Communist units in the past month have sometimes been slow moving into weakly defended or. abandoned areas -- in many cases the combat units merely got ahead of their supply columns.- Such difficulties around Saigon are expected to be rectified shortly. 2. Strong North Vietnamese counterattacks against ga?vernment troops and positions in Tay Ninh Province again closed the road to the provincial capital, probably for the last .time, The South Vietnamese were also forced from the Rach Kien District town in Long An Province just ten miles southwest of Saigon. This position is east of Route ~ and the Communists now threaten the road from both sides. It also gives them a new approach to Saigon's southern suburbs. 25X1 Approve - - Approved For-Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 Hanoi Using Southern Parts 3. The North .Vietnamese are moving supplies by sea into the former "avernment arts as far south as Nha Trang. a number of small coastal vessels and barges unloading at Nha Trang. Similar activity has been previously noted at Qu Nhan and Da Nang and it is expected the North Viet-~ namese will soon begin using their newly=acquired port facilities as far south as Ham Tan, including Cam Ranh Bey and Phan Thiet. Saigon Generals Captured 6. Hanoi Radio announced on April 23 that Lt. General Nguyen Vinci Nghi anal Brig. General Pham Ngoc Sang were captured. General Nghi was the commander of the Military Region 3 Forward Command at Phan Rang and General Sang was the commander df the South Vietnamese Air Farce 6th Division. These men and their staffs were unable to fly from Phan Rang when it fell to-the Communists last week, because rebellious ranger troops seized and tack off in the only available rescue aircraft. -Nghi and Sang were last thought to be retreating through the forest south toward Phan Thiet. 25X1 25X1. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001 }0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 - 25X1 Trying for a Dialoc~e 7. In the face of Communist intransigence, South Vietnam's new president, Trap Van Huong, still .appears to be trying to open some sort of political dialogue. He met twice today with the French ambassador to Saigon and recalled his chief negotiator in Paris, Ambassador Phong, for "urgent" di.scussians. 8. What Huong has in mind is not clear, but he appears hopeful that the Viet Cong will accept some offer of political dialogue with. the government short of surrender discussions. The French government, which has been in contact-with Communist representatives in Paris, apparently still believes that such talks can be arranged. Ambassador Phang, whose opinion probably has been influenced heavily by the optirnistic line of the French, also shares that view. 9. Mast political apposition leaders, such as for- mer vice--president IJguyen Cao Ky and General "Big" Minh, also retain-hope that some farm of so7.uti.on short of surrender might be arranged. But they recognize that the Communists will not negotiate with the remnants of the 'I'hieu regime and that the first order of business is to replace it with one that hopefully meets Communist specifications. 1.0. In typical South Vietnamese fashion, however, there is considerable disunity among various opposition elements. Four. of the principal oppasitionists -- Catholic leader Father Thanh, "Big" Minh, former senate chairman Iluyen, and Buddhist activist Vu Van Mau -- met today to prepare a joint statement demanding that Presi- dent Huong step aside and allow a new cabinet to take charge. The statement was to have carried a threat of public demonstrations should Iiuong refuse to step down, but `the four-were unable to agree on the procedures under which a new cabinet would operate. 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 11. There now is some doubt that Vu Van Mau and the An Quang Buddhist elements he represents will en- dorse the statement.- Their refusal to do'so would only further delay the formation of a government with some chance of dealing with the Communists. Moreover, there are no indications that the military would sup- port any arrangement which the political apposition .can agree on. Despite the precarious situation in South Vietnam, this element's support -_- or'at least its agreement not to interfere -- is still needed before a new government can be formed. 12. President Huong reportedly accepted the resig- nation of-the Can cabinet "in principle" today but requested that it remain in office "several more days" until he can select a replacement. Huong gave na indi- cations with whom he has been discussing various posi- tions, but stated that he hoped to have 'a new govern- ment formed by Friday. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00865A002500500001-0