THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM (AS OF 1600 EDST) NO. 23

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002500510001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 April 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
(As of 1600 EDST)
No. 23
Military Action
1. Most Communist combat initiatives remain concen-
trated on the western and southwestern approaches to
Saigon. Communist units on April 24 captured several
government outposts blocking their way in Hau Nghia
Province. To the south, in Long An Province, the North
Vietnamese 8th Division continued driving north to the
east of Route 4, overrunning a number of government posi-
tions. If these forces continue at their current rate,
they could reach Saigon's outskirts within a few days.
2. The level of fighting remains low in the delta,
as Communist units complete preparations to renew combat.
The Communists are apparently having the same coordination
problems which led to the fairly severe mauling they re-
ceived in early April. Although the local balance of
forces is now more in favor of the government in the delta,
some military officials now admit that the fate of the
delta will be decided closer to Saigon. The defeatist
attitude prevalent in.the military hierarchy at Saigon
and Bien Hoa is now spreading to Can Tho, where the main
topic of conversation among the military staff members
is the question of what to do when the Communists win.
Newly Arrived Divisions Press Attacks
3. Two newly arrived divisions -- the 316th and the
325th are now pressing South Vietnamese forces west
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and southeast of Saigon. The 325th, which helped capture
Ham Tan two days ago, has moved west and is fast approach-
ing the port city of,Vung.Tau. Another division --- the
6th -- may be converging on the city from the north.
4. Vung Tau is an important port at the mouth of
the Saigon River and has been considered for use as an
evacuation site. The government has shifted the Airborne
brigade extracted from Xuan Loc into Phuoc Tuy Province
in an attempt to block North Vietnamese forces moving
against the city, but that unit and the forces closer to
Vung Tau are no match for the Communists. Vung Tau could
fall within the next one or two days.
5. The'North Vietnamese 316th Division, which has
moved into western Military Region 3 from the highlands,
also has gone on the attack. The 316th participated in
the fighting along Route 22 southeast of Tay Ninh City,
and late reports indicate it is assaulting government
positions in Hau Nghia Province.
The Ree Situation at Vung Tau
6. In addition. to the military threat developing
around Vung Tau, there are a number of internal diffi-
culties that Saigon is trying to counter. As many as
65,000 refugees have been pouring into the coastal town
each day this week, forcing the government to prohibit
any more from entering the city. Refugees currently on
the way to Vung Tau are being diverted to several delta
provinces, including Go Cong and Kien Hoa. Government
officials are also transferring many refugees by ship
to the delta to relieve the crowded conditions and to
prevent another panic situation such as developed at
Da Nang.
7. Despite these actions, large numbers of people
are likely to continue to head for Vung Tau in the belief
that it is their hope of escape. At last report, the road
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from Saigon was still open and both civilian and military
traffic were heavy. With the likelihood of the port at
Saigon being closed due to interdiction of the river, Vung
Tau and Rach Gia, far to the west, are the only ports
capable of handling large evacuation vessels. For those
hoping to escape the country, it remains the last hope and
these desperate people could soon bring complete chaos to
the city.
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9. The South Vietnamese abandoned a large number of
aircraft including A-1s, F-5s, and A-37s when they withdrew
from Military Regions 1 and 2, and many of the aircraft
were in flyable condition.
10. A recent
report indicated that the Com-
munists would use MIGs and
assault on Saigon. I
captured aircraft in the final
e North Vietnamese also captured
large quantities o munitions for the various South Viet-
namese aircraft.
South Vietnamese Airforce
11. The South Vietnamese are now able to fly about two-
thirds of their 1,500 aircraft. Most of these aircraft are
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still-flown from Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Can Tho'. South
Vietnamese figures show that nearly 400 aircraft were des-
troyed or abandoned to the Communists. Official estimates
conclude that at the current rate of usage, there is enough
ordnance remaining for 15-20 days, if stockpiles are not
replenished.
The Political Situation
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12. Negotiations between General "Big" Minh and Presi-
dent Huang to organize a new government appear to have hit
at least a temporary snag.
Huong is unwilling to relinquish the presidency to Minh but
instead wants him to serve as prime minister with "full civil
and military powers." Minh, in turning down the offer, argues
that the Communists will continue to refuse to negotiate
while Huong remains as president.
13. Minh apparently has picked up some powerful support
from among former members of the Thieu government. In a
conversation with an American official today, Minh said
that Joint General Staff chief Vien agreed that Huong should
resign from the presidency. Former prime minister Khiem
will also support Minh's bid and try to persuade Huong to
step down. Khiem feels that with his and Vien's support,
the military can be persuaded to accept Minh as president.
14. A Viet Cong commentary broadcast over Liberation
Radio today hardened earlier Communist demands for a new gov-
ernment and appeared to support Minh's argument that he is
the only South Vietnamese nationalist of prominence with whom
the Communists might agree to negotiate. The commentary
stated that any new government in Saigon must "not consist
of those who have closely associated with Thieu." It must
demand that the Americans immediately withdraw its personnel
and support and must require that the US immediately remove
"all US warships and Marines."
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15. The commentary also reiterated earlier communist
concern about the US evacuations of South Vietnamese, and
implied that some action might be taken to stop them. it
warned that the US would "be held fully responsible for
all consequences"-if it insisted on continuing its "present
policy."
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