THE SUCCESSION IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002600250001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
Intelligence Report
The Succession in China
Secret
No. 1031/75
October 1975
Copy N?_ 164
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OCI No. 1031/75
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1975
The Succession in China
The issue of the succession to Mao Tse-tung--and
more recently to Chou En-lai as well--is one of the most
troublesome in Chinese politics. In one form or another
it has been a cause of disputes in the Chinese leader-
ship for more than a decade, and the issue today is by
no means completely resolved. Problems concerning the
succession were a major factor in the fall of both Liu
Shao-chi and Lin Piao, each of whom had been successively
designated as Mao's "chosen" successor; they also helped
precipitate not only the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69
but also the anti-Confucius campaign of 1974. The dis-
array these two movements engendered in part suggests
the high stakes for which the major contenders for
ultimate power believe they are playing, but at the same
time the contentiousness which the movements revealed and
exacerbated has made resolution of the central problem
more difficult. Teng Hsiao-ping, who now runs the
country on a day-to-day basis, recently remarked to
foreign newsmen that he expected difficulties in the
transition period following the death of Mao and Chou.
There are three essential problems impinging on
the succession question. One involves policy, one is
largely institutional, and one is primarily personal in
nature. All three issues interact with one another, and
the leading figures among the Chinese leadership probably
do not entirely separate them out at any given moment.
The policy issue basically revolves around differinq
views about how China should be run and how its institu-
tions should be organized. Should, that is, China follow
Note: This publication has been prepared jointly by the
Office of Current Intelligence and Central Research Staff.
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a course that is essentially "pragmatic," building
a modern economy, encouraging technical skills,
pursuing the goals of a. modern nation-state under
strong central direction and control, or should
"shortcuts" be attempted through stress on revolutionary
elan, ideological purity and mass effort, even at the
expense of institutional cohesion, rational planning and
the rapid development of technical expertise.
The institutional issue involves essentially a
question of how power should be distributed among the
major organs of state--the party, the government and the
military. Should, that. is, authority reside primarily
in the party, as was the case in the 1950s and early
1960s, should it lie primarily with the military, as was
the case in the late 1960s, or should it be distributed
among all three institutions, as has been the case in
the past four years. This issue is further complicated
by divisions within the major institutions themselves.
The party and to a lesser degree the government, for
example, has long been. split between a majority group
devoted to the "pragmatic" tasks of modern nation-building
under close centralized control who suffered greatly
during the Cultural Revolution but have more recently
been resurgent, and a smaller, ideologically-oriented
"radical" group advocating the efficacy of mass enthusiasm
who did well in the Cultural Revolution but have recently
been partly eclipsed, while the military is divided be-
tween a technically-oriented group stressing the impor-
tance of modern weapons and a group stressing the
importance of ideological motivation in warfare, as well
as between the friends and enemies of the late defense
minister, Lin Piao.
Personal issues, while real, are more shadowy.
In retrospect it seems likely that personal differences
long existed among the Chinese leadership; these differ-
ences were greatly sharpened and intensified by the
struggles of the Cultural Revolution and more recent
squabbles; some of these antipathies probably run too
deep for any but the most temporary amelioration or truce.
Those who were attacked in 1966-68 resent their accusers;
those who did the attacking are fearful that old scores
will eventually be paid off.
Formally at least, the Chinese envisage some form
of collective leadership to succeed Mao and Chou. This
collegial group is likely to be composed of a half
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dozen or more leaders who now occupy important positions
in Peking. Apart from the fact that all are now individ-
uals of great importance in China, however, the members
of this group are a disparate lot, varying greatly in
age, experience, ideological outlook and institutional
loyalities. Strains tending to pull them apart are
already visible. These strains are likely to intensify
once the charismatic authority of Mao and to a lesser
extent Chou is no longer a factor in leadership politics.
It is unlikely that the collegial group will immediately
split apart following these two leaders' death, however.
All, members of the collective leadership will be acutely
aware of China's weakness in the early post Mao/Chou
period, and all have been traumatized by the divisions
engendered by the Cultural Revolution and would probably
hope to avoid a new and ungovernable upheaval of similar
magnitude. The prospect then is for a period of behind-
the-scenes maneuvering as individuals and shifting
groups jockey for advantage.
The trend at present is toward a return to a
"pragmatic" and authoritarian ordering of the Chinese
state along lines similar to those prevalent in the
1950s and early 1960s. This trend accords with the known
views of Chou En-lai and appears to have the backing of
Mao; it is unlikely to be reversed prior to the death
of both these men, but the current pace of restoration
of the status quo ante is such that it is also unlikely
that the process will be complete before the succession
takes place. The return to pragmatism and order has
been accomplished largely at the expense of the "radical"
wing of the party, which has already been so weakened
that it probably will not be in a position to make a
bid for power in the immediate succession period. How-
ever, the movement toward more traditional ways of doing
business also involves a strengthening of the party
apparatus at the expense of the military. Here the
issue is in greater doubt. The military has been con-
siderably weakened politically in the past four years,
but senior commanders, of course, control troops and a
number probably have unappeased political ambitions.
Strains between the party and the military establishment
could develop early in the succession period, particularly
if military leaders believe army prerogatives are being
whittled away and military concerns are being given
short shrift.
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In the immediate succession period a key role
will undoubtedly be played by Teng Hsiao-ping. He is
slated to assume Chou's position as premier, and he also
holds important party and military posts. In the latter
capacity he now serves as army chief of staff. Teng,
however, is far from the universally-admired figure Chou
En-lai has been. He was purged and reviled in the
Cultural Revolution and still bears political scars from
that period of upheaval. As a former secretary-general
of the party he is a strong advocate of party domination
of the affairs of state, but he seems sensitive to the
crucial role of the military in current Chinese politics
and has been inserting supporters in the central military
establishment and, in particular, appealing to the
technically-oriented military group that hopes to
modernize China's armed forces. In the effort both to
control and appease the military, the role of Chen
Hsi-lien is likely to be of major importance. Chen is
probably anxious to protect military prerogatives and
as commander of the crucial Peking Military Region his
troops are in a position to overawe the capital. If
reports that he is charged with China's military procure-
ment program are correct he probably has a vested interest
in the modernization of the armed forces.
Teng will also have to look over his shoulder at
Chang Chun-chiao once the succession period has begun.
In his mid-60s, Chang is significantly younger than the
71-year-old Teng, he is an adroit politician in the mold
of Chou En-lai, and he also holds important posts in the
government, military and party apparatus--the only lead-
ing figure other than Teng to hold jobs in all three
major institutions. Chang is in an excellent position
to gather in most of the marbles in the longer run, and
developments in the succession period may well turn on
his relations with Teng. Although he holds a high
military position as chief of the military's General
Political Department, Chang's relations with the military
have generally been unfriendly--a significant disability.
He is probably acting as secretary-general of the party,
however, and in this capacity may well have inserted
supporters in the middle and lower ranks of the party
apparatus. Moreover, although he has generally adopted
moderate and "pragmatic" political positions in recent
years, he first made his mark in the Cultural Revolution
and unquestionably has closer ties to the "radical" wing
of the party than does Teng.
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Over the longer run these ties could prove important.
Historically, the authoritarian, centralized and party-
dominated approach to running the Chinese state has
proved inflexible and unresponsive to the needs and con-
cerns of the lower ranks of the political machine;
counterpressures could easily rise again as they did
in the mid-1960s. In the past several years there have
been numerous signs of dissatisfaction with Peking's
relatively "conservative" domestic politics on the part
of the "radical" wing of the party, and recently there
have been some indications that pressures also exist
for a more "revolutionary" foreign policy. As political
"outs," the left wing of the party has something in
common with the military, which has also suffered
reverses in recent years, and over the longer term an
alliance of convenience is possible. Such an alliance
helped launch the Cultural Revolution, and there were
signs in 1974 that a similar marriage of convenience
was being attempted in the course of the anti-Confucius
campaign. In this shadowy infighting Chen Hsi-lien--a
classic "swing man"--appeared to play an important role.
The major representatives of the left in the post
Mao/Chou collective leadership will be Chiang Ching
(Mao's wife) and Yao Wen-yuan. Neither is an especially
impressive politician and Chiang Ching in particular
has recently suffered political reverses that are probably
irreparable; Mao has disassociated himself from her, and
she cannot claim to be the trustee of his "thought" in
the succession period. Yao, still in his early 40s,
could, however, play the part of spokesman for the
"radicals" if pressures start building on the left. This
is also true of Wang Hung-wen, nominally the third-rank-
ing member of the party. Wang is even younger than Yao,
and like Chiang Ching is partly discredited at present.
His present political position is ambiguous, but he has
good "radical" credentials and could play a part in a
coalition of "outs" although he is unlikely to be a
mover and shaker in his own right.
Over the longer term divisions also may develop
along age lines as older leaders such as Teng Hsiao-ping
and others of his generation grow more feeble. In this
regard two younger party functionaries, Chi Teng-kuei
and Hua Kuo-feng could prove of considerable importance.
Both rose to prominence in the Cultural Revolution but
have subsequently adopted relatively "pragmatic" political
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positions. Hua in particular, as head of China's
security organs, is likely to play an important role
in the succession collective.
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