THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1976
JCS review completed.
State Dept. review DIA review(s)
completed completed.
by
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The Military Affairs Committee (MAC) ... ......... 1
of the Central Military Components
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL MILITARY LEADERSHIP
Political Development
Politics and Development............................... ..... 1
6
The General Staff Department (GSD) ............................... 30
Politics and Development .................................... 30
The General Political Department (GPD) ........................... 65
Politics and Development .................................... 65
69
The General Logistics Department (GLD) ........................... 84
Politics and Development.................................... 84
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) ........................... 99
The Foreign Affairs Bureau .................................. 1U3
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Navy Headquarters ................................................ 119
Air Force Headquarters ........................................... 129
Artillery-Headquarters ............................................ 144
Armor Headquarters .............................................. 162
Engineer Corps Headquarters, ... ................................. 171
Railway Corps Headquarters ...................................... 179
Th.e.Academy of Military Science (AMS) ... 188
........................
The Military and Political Academy (MPA) ........................
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THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (MAC)
Politics and Development
The Military Affairs Committee (MAC) of the Central Committee
(sometimes translated as the Central Military Commission), has been the
key organ of Party control over the military ever since the early days
of the Chinese revolution. Although its name, composition and duties
have varied over time, it is now clearly the supreme organ responsible
for the control, deployment and development of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA).
Organizationally, the MAC is subordinate only to the Standing
Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It
was in no way responsible to the Party Secretariat during the time when
that body exercised supervisory control within the CCP. During the
Cultural Revolution, there were times when it appeared that the MAC was
to some degree responsible to the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) of the
Central Committee, but that degree is open to some question. Since the
dismantling of the CRG, no overall supervisory Party organ has been for-
mally established, but even if, as some have speculated, the Secretariat
has been revived in some form, it is likely that the MAC will retain its
independence, and will remain responsible only to the highest levels of
Party authority.
Although the past three Ministers of National Defense have wielded
considerable influence within the MAC, there are no structural lines
subordinating it to the MND, which is an organ of the State Council. If
anything, the reverse is more likely the case, that is, that the MND is
a "paper" organization, a best a low-level administrative body, subor-
dinate in all military or substantive matters to the MAC rather than to
the State Council. (See below for a further discussion of the Ministry of
National Defense.)
Under Politburo direction, the MAC has authority over the entire
Chinese military establishment, and may send orders directly to any com-
ponent, though it ordinarily transmits these through the General Staff.
The MAC apparently serves in an advisory capacity for Politburo dis-
cussions of military-related matters. It interprets, sometimes reformu-
lates, and transmits doctrines, policies and programs for the PLA; it
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supervises implementation of these policies and programs, as well as the
overall work of subordinate organs. At least once a year, and more often
if necessary, it convenes conferences on military or politico-military
problems. (The MAC has apparently met more frequently during the recent
political crisis.)
The MAC has the ability to penetrate to any level of the PLA hier-
archy, and has frequently involved itself in what might be considered.
inconsequential problems, as well as major policy issues. It has the
authority to establish or abolish military and politico-military organs
and offices, and to reorganize military region commands and service
arms. The MAC investigates, evaluates, appoints or removes, promotes
or demotes high-ranking officers, probably from army-level on up; it
also investigates and confers "model" unit or soldier titles for emula-
tion by the rest of the PLA. The MAC, through the General Political
Department (GPD) and the political security apparatus of the PLA, keeps
watch on the political indoctrination process and on the political
behavior of Chinese soldiers. At the direction of the Politburo, the MAC
is probably the overall coordinating body for PLA participation in the
organizing, equipping atd training of local militia units.
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the MAC is a decision-making authority,
dependent largely upon subordinate organs both for the information
required to render effective decisions, and for the apparatus to imple-
ment those decisions.
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THE-GENERAL-STAFF DEPARTMENT (GSD)
Politics- and-Development
There is no component of the PLA that was hit earlier or harder
by the Lin Piao Affair purges than the General Staff Department (GSD).
The primary reason for this appears to be the fact that-Lin had
packed the GSD with his proteges and was attempting to use it as
a means for his own personal domination of the PLA.
The general staff concept was
probably introduced to China in the early 1920s through the succes-
sive influence of the Japanese (through returned students), the
Russians (in the Whampoa Military Academy) and the Germans (National-
ist advisers, somewhat later). Owing to the Whampoa influence,
Chinese Communist armies seem to have adopted the staff concept
without question ever since they became more than guerrilla bands
in the late 1920s. It was not until the late 1930s, however,
when the Chinese Communists had established a firm base area and
had recruited a large army, that the staff concept moved beyond
the army-level of organization and became a centralized function
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THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (GPD)
Politics and Development
It would appear that, after a long period of being in a sort
of bureaucratic limbo, the General Political Department (GPD) of
the PLA has been restored to fulfill its traditional functions.
There are now increasing numbers of personnel publicly associated
with the GPD, and the department has again begun to issue public
directives, sponsor conferences, etc.
The GPD, which has rightly been called the most important
peacetime organ of the PLA, has traditionally been responsible
for maintaining the political awareness, ideological orthodoxy
and loyalty to the regime that Mao has often stated to be an
absolute requisite for the success of socialism in China.* In
this regard, the GPD has been the most important organ dealing.
with what is ordinarily referred to as "political security" in
the military, which includes such matters as surveillance, enforc-
ing political discipline, and controlling promotions and demotions.
Organizationally, the GPD has been subordinate only to the
MAC or its equivalent ever since its inception in 1931. It is
generally considered to be co-equal in authority with the GSD,
co-ordinating with it when necessary, but in no way subordinate.
Up until the Cultural Revolution, its leadership remained compara-
tively stable, though strains must have begun to appear in the
early 1960s, when Mao and Lin began their effort to make the
PLA a political show ase by heightening the intensity logical education in the PLA.
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purges in the military got underway in 1967, the GPD was hit early
and hard, with virtually the entire leadership, including the Direc-
tor and his deputies as well as many sub-department directors and
deputies, eventually removed and heavily criticized. By August of
1967, the GPD had virtually ceased to exist, its functions having
been taken over by the CRG of the PLA and a military "Support-the-
Left" group, both essentially under the supervision of the Secretary-
General of the MAC. In late 1967, this structure underwent a further
change with the dissolution of the PLA/CRG, and responsibility for
political indoctrination and security work was divided among several
MAC organs (See under MAC), particularly the Political Work Group,
and later the Administrative Office.
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THE-GENERAL-LOGISTICS-DEPARTMENT-tCLD)
Politics-and-Development
The General Logistics-Department ',(also known as the General
Rear Services Department LGRSD7) is responsible for overall
logistical planning and support for all components of the PLA.
Aside from the expected responsibility for quartermaster, ordnance
and transportation, GLD functions include administration of
all PLA hospitals, control of finances for the PLA, some adminis-
trative control over military barracks, academies and factories,
and responsibility for veterinary work in the army.'Not surprisingly,
such a wide range of activities entails a rather large staff
organization, and the GLD leadership group is the largest of
the headquarters departments with ten known Deputy Directors
o appear regularly in public.
and several political officers
Organizationally, the GLD is, on paper at least, co-equal
with the GSD and GPD, subordinate only to the Military Commission.
In practice, however, it is more likely that the GLD is subordinate
in some fashion or another to the General Staff, since Logistics
is such a key factor in operational planning. The exact nature
of this relationship, however, is unknown.
The GLD coordinates its work through the logistics sections
of the various service headquarters, military region and district
commands and field armies in the PRC. It is also organized into
several functional departments and bureaus, which handle the
various aspects of logistics work. Unlike the GSD and GPD, it
would appear that the various Deputy Directors of the GLD have
specific responsibility over these functional departments.
Though the exact names of these departments may have changed
over time, and reorganizations have no doubt taken place, it is
believed that the following sub-departments exist within the GLD:
Political Department -- Responsible for political security and
indoctrination within the GLD.
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Ordnance Department (also known as Weapons and Equipment Depart-
ment or Armaments Department) -- Probably responsible for
production, storage, and supply of ordnance for units in the
PLA, as well as foreign countries.
Enterprise Department -- (possibly the same as the Quartermaster
Department) -- Probably responsible for production and
supply of non-ordnance supplies such as clothing, tools,
etc.
Transportation Department -- Probably responsible for distri-
bution of military equipment to various PLA components.
Motor Vehicle Control Department -- Probably responsible for
allocating military vehicles, inspecting motor pools, etc.
Fuel Department -- Probably responsible for procurement and dis-
tribution of POL supplies.
Military Facility Custody Department -- Probably responsible for
planning, construction and maintenance of military bases,
barracks, offices, etc.
Factory Control Department -- Probably responsible for administration
and production control in military-related industrial plants.
Medical Department -- Responsible for administration, supply,
training and upkeep of PLA hospitals and medical departments.
Finance Department -- Responsible for the PLA's accounting and pay
systems.*
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The GRSD was organized as a central component of the People's
Revolutionary Military Committee in 1949, and has developed
in a comparatively orderly manner. Its leadership has been
purged and shaken up from time to time, but never to an extent
that it would impede the GLD from carrying out its crucial supply
responsibilities. Dismissed leaders have generally been quickly
replaced. Cultural Revolution purges of the military only brushed
lightly on the GLD, with one Political Officer and one Deputy
Director being removed.
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THE-MINISTRY-6F-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-(MND)
According to the various editions of the Constitution of the PRC,
the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is the central organ respon-
sible for command and control of the Tilitary establishment. Most
organizational charts of the PLA place the MND at the top of the hier-
archy, at the same level as the MAC, or between the MAC and the
General Staff. This is somewhat misleading, for in fact, the role of
the MND in the past few years has been quite uncertain. The consensus .
of opinion is that it is now largely a 'paper' organization, devoid
of any substantive power in the decision-making or command structure
of the PLA, which are dominated, respectively, by the MAC and the
General Staff.
Prior to 1959, when Peng Te-huai was Minister of Defense, it
is possible that the MND had a good deal more authority, but with the
rise of Lin Piao and heavier Party penetration of the military estab-
lishment, it went into a kind of eclipse. Although the Minister himself
has had considerable prestige, he has exercised his power through the
MAC, rather than the MND. Deputy Ministers of Defense were not included
in military policy-making, and were not even replaced when their numbers
were depleted by death, demotion or transfer. (No new Vice-Ministers
have been appointed since 1959.)
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overseas embassies and for performing protocol functions for visiting
military delegationsand Peking-based foreign attaches. It has been
speculated that the MND may perform certain administrative functions
for the MAC, such as recruitment and civil defense programs, and may
help the State Council coordinate the requirements of the military
establishment with the capabilities and priorities of the other minis-
tries. The NDSTC and NDIO are nominally under the control of the State
Council, and the MND may act as something of an intermediary between
the MAC, which sets the requirements for these bodies, and the State
Council,?which may help administer them. The MND may also participate
in the technical aspects of drawing up the budget requirements for the
PLA..
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The-Foreign-Affairs-Bnreaa-of-the-Ministry-of-National-Defense
The Foreign Affairs Bureau of the MND is responsible for the
appointment and activities of Chinese military attaches in overseas
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embassies. Presumably, the Bureau coordinates intelligence require-
ments and reports with the Intelligence Department of the GSD.
In that regard, it is interesting that t e current j
Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau 'is also believed to be part
of the General Staff. Other functions of the bureau include proto-
col and escort duties for foreign military delegations visiting
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NAVY HEADQUARTERS
Established in 1950,
The Navy ma be in for some ex ansion an improvemen
in the near future.
The Navy is organized both geographically and functionally. Its
ships and patrol craft are divided among three fleets, the North Sea
Fleet headquartered at Tsingtao (Shantung Province), the East Sea
Fleet located in Shanghai, and the South Sea Fleet based outside
of Canton. At the headquarters level, there are believed to be sections
in charge of sea forces, marine forces, naval air forces and coastal
artillery, as well as Departments of logistics, political work, ship-
building and repair, naval schools, surveying, navigation, etc.*
Command of these various components is centered in Navy Head-
quarters, Peking, which is directly subordinate to the MAC through
the General Staff.
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AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS
The Air Force (commonly abbreviated CCAF) Headquarters in Peking
is responsible for command and control of the world's third-largest
air force.
Ithe A
ir Force possesses i s own
command structure, consisting of MR Air Force commanders and
staffs, which is subordinate directly to Peking. The primary
mission of the CCAF is air defense, but it can also support tactical
operations.
Like all other functional components of the PLA, the CCAF is
closely controlled by the central military hierarchy, taking its
orders from the MAC (General Office) and the General Staff. Its
headquarters consists of a Commander and Political Officer, each
with several deputies, and staff officers. There are also believed
to be several functional departments concerned with training,
communications, meteorology, operations, logistics and aviation
engineering. Below these are the 10 MR Air Force Commanders
and their staffs.
The CCAF was organized in 1949 with considerable assistance
from the Soviet Union, both in terms of materiel and of training.
During the 1950s, the Soviets also helped the Chinese develop a
large aircraft industry, as well as training procedures. The loss
of Soviet assistance has been more damaging to the Air Force than
to most other components, since the Chinese lack the technological
capability to keep pace with the USSR or the US in aeronautical
engineering and armaments. Most of their equipment is now con-
sidered obsolescent by Western and Soviet standards.
Given the mobility and destructive firepower that even an
obsolescent air force can bring to bear, control of the CCAF at
the command-level has been an important consideration in PLA politics.
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ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS
The Headquarters of the Artillery Corps of the PLA, which could
probably be most accurately described as a sub-component of the General
Staff, has overall responsibility for providing conventional artillery
t for round force units.
Given the scattered deployment of artillery forces, and their sub-
ordination to field army and MR command structures, the responsibilities
of Artillery Headquarters are primarily administrative. It is probably
most occupied with training, planning artillery contributions to army
army maneuvers and deployment and personnel matters.
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ARMOR HEADQUARTERS
From its rather humble beginning in Yenan during World War II,
when a few Russian-trained officers drilled Red Army troops on three 25X1
captured Japanese tanks, the PLA Armored Corps has developed into a
formidable force suDnlementine Chinese ground forces.
Like Artillery Forces, Armored units are as-
signed to tield army and MR commands, and are subordinate to their
planning staffs. At the MR level, at least, a qualified Armor officer
is usually part of the commander's staff. Armor Headquarters in
Peking, then, is responsible for training, personnel assignment,
administration, and coordinated planning for all Armored units. It
can be considered a staff, rather than a command operation.
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ENGINEER CORPS HEADQUARTERS
The PLA Engineer Corps Headquarters was established in or about
1954 to maintain unitary control over the various engineer units
attached to field armies and MR. Since that time, its scope of
responsibility has expanded considerably. Like artillery and armored
units, some engineer troops are permanently assigned to the various
main force units scattered throughout China. They perform standard
combat engineer support tasks, such as bridging and road maintenance.
Since the early 1950s however, when the PRC set about improving its
communications and transportation systems, PLA Engineer Corps units
have been specifically assigned to road construction projects F
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RAILWAY CORPS HEADQUARTERS
The PLA Railway Corps (or Railway Engineer Corps) got its
start in Northeast China during the Chinese civil war, when Lin
Piao's forces were able, for the first time, to make extensive
use of the existing rail system to transport troops and materiel.
After the establishment of the People's Republic, the Railway
regiments were placed under the jurisdiction of the PRMC, but
remained a rather small corps with a limited mission. They were
instrumental in keeping up the flow of supplies to Chinese troops
serving in Korea, despite heavy American bombing. In 1954, when
Peking began a program to improve the communications network,
the Railway Corps was established under the Ministry of National
Defense, and its mission and strength were both considerably
expanded. It was then made responsible for the construction,
maintenance and security of China's strategic railroads, in
addition to its more conventional military duties. The Railway
Corps has thus played a key role in the development of China's
economy, pushing rail lines through some of the world's most
difficult terrain. Its current strength is placed at 13 to 15
divisions,-or about 67,000 men
All Railway Corps units are under the control of the Rail-
way Corps Headquarters in Peking.
there are three, and perhaps five regional support headquarters,
located in the main areas of rail construction. The nature of
their mission requires units to work closely with both mili-
tary and civilian authorities at the local level (local
civilians often are 'volunteered' to augment the labor force
on key rail projects).
it may have five departments: Personnel and administration;
track-laying and construction, tunnelling, reconnaissance,
planning and geology, and political affairs.
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THE ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE (AMS)
The Academy of Military Science (AMS) was established in
March, 1958, for the purpose of studying and using the latest
techniques (mostly received from the Soviet Union) of military
science for the development of the PLA. Its first Commandant,
and concurrently Political Officer, was Yeh Chien-ying.
there is evidence
that it has concentrated most of its attention on military theory
and strategy. Its first known work-was a thorough report of stan-
dard and regularized military doctrine and regulations, which
came out in about 1961. As late as 1972, its was known to have a
War History Department, which published a study of anti-tank tac-
tics used by the PLA, and it recently drew up regulations for the
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THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACADEMY (MPA)
The PLA's Military and Political Academy (more correctly,
Military and Political College) is believed to have been established
sometime during the Cultural Revolution, and represented something
of a reorganization of the GPD's Military and Political Academy
and possibly some other high-level military schools in Peking.
It was supposedly patterned after the "Anti-Japanese Military
and Political College" of the Yenan period, and its curriculum
was devoted to the study of Mao, Marx and Lenin. It did not emerge
in the public media as a recognizable separate entity until just
after the Lin Piao affair, when one of its officers was identified
for the first time. Since that time, several other officers have
been mentioned publicly, and its leadership core has grown and
changed.
The student s. are drawn from all military components,
and apparently are already mid-career officers. Though it is not
necessarily a school for political officers only, it would appear
that the primary emphasis of its curriculum is toward subjects
that would be of most interest and concern to career political
officers.
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