AFTER MAO: FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES IN THE SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

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D
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
August 1976
AFTER MAO: FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES IN THE SUCCESSION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
NOTE: During preparation of this study other CIA offices were consulted,
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SECRET PR 76 10060
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Mao Tse-tung, 82, appears to be deteriorating rapidly, and China
is probably already under some degree of "collective" leadership.
It seems somewhat more likely than not that Mao's domination will be
succeeded by a group which includes Leftist and Rightist figures but
which on balance is Centrist. If such a group in fact accedes to
power, it is unlikely to make radical changes in either domestic or
foreign policies in the immediate post-Mao period. It may slightly
reduce tension with the USSR, but it -- or almost any other possible
constellation of successors -- will probably wish to maintain the
opening to the US.
A legacy of the Cultural Revolution has seemed to be a "factional"
leadership below Mao's level, in which many leaders can be credibly
regarded as Leftist, Centrist, or Rightist, calculated primarily in
terms of their apparent allegiance to and fervor for Mao's fundamental
revolutionary objectives. Mao's latest and current favorite appears
to be the Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, whom Mao personally named in April
both as First Vice-Chairman of the Party and as Premier (passing over
two Leftists who were in line for those posts). Why did not Mao
elevate one of the Leftists whose policy predilections are closer to
Mao's heart? The apparent answer is that Mao lacked confidence in
the Leftists' ability to manage Chinese affairs, and that Hua was
chosen as the most able administrator for the difficult period which
Mao knew to lie ahead, the nearest thing to another Chou En-lai, who
was the only one of Mao's principal lieutenants of the past 15 years
to have remained in Mao's high favor until his death. Hua was a
"compromise" -- not one forced on Mao by other leaders, but in the
sense of Hua's being, like Chou, a man who (as Mao saw it) could be
relied upon to avoid the excesses repeatedly committed by the Leftists
while not abandoning Mao's long-term goals as a Rightist would.
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At this time, those with the greatest access to Mao, and in
the best position to influence whatever decisions he is able to
make in his last months, appear to be the Centrist Hua Kuo-feng
and the police figure Wang Tung-hsing, the head of Mao's personal
bodyguard and of the overall political security apparatus. Some
Leftist figures (those passed over when Hua was named) and some
Rightist figures probably also have some access to Mao, and they
may be trying to manipulate the old man, maneuvering for position
in the post-Mao leadership. It is conceivable that Mao will once
again, for the fourth time in a decade, change his mind about the
succession, and, if so, in favor of the Leftists; but it seems
more likely that Hua will bear the mark of Mao's favor -- for what-
ever that is worth -- into the post-Mao struggle.
UNLIKELY, BUT DRAMATIC, POSSIBILITIES
There are some dramatic and highly disruptive contingencies
that could occur on Mao's death. The most important of these are
a coup employing military and security forces of the Peking Military
Region (MR), military intervention by some of the leaders of the ten
MRs outside Peking, and a Soviet attack on China. An attempted
coup is a serious possibility; the other two seem most unlikely
except in the event of a coup.
The possibility of a coup has to be taken seriously, because
of the sharp differences among various leaders and because there
are forces in Peking which could probably bring off a coup, at
least initially. The passed-over and unpopular Leftists, fearful
about their futures, or Rightist military leaders, fearful of the
Leftists, might conspire with the most important figures of the
physical security apparatus -- the leaders of the Peking MR and of
the smaller inner-core forces -- to seize their opponents and even
the Centrist figures like Hua Kuo-feng who have kept the balance.
The three key physical security figures, acting just by themselves,
could probably carry out a successful coup.
But there are strong countervailing factors. Neither the
Leftists nor the Rightists would seem likely to be successful in
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enlisting the cooperation of the key security figures in any coup
aimed at Hua. Beyond this, any hypothetical group of conspirators
would have to have the cooperation or assent of military forces in
the Peking area, especially the main-force armies of the Peking MR;
otherwise, the coup could quickly be reversed. While two of the
three key physical security figures do in fact command these forces,
they too would have to face the problem of the morning after -- that
is, to justify their actions not only to the forces they had employed
in the coup but to military forces throughout China. They might be
sufficiently persuasive -- which is the reason for regarding a coup
as more than a marginal possibility. But a coup would carry a high
risk of splitting the military forces of the Peking MR, leading to
armed clashes among elements of them, in turn risking the spread of
armed conflict throughout China to a state of anarchy or civil war.
This situation would in turn entail the highest risk of Soviet inter-
vention, a development which almost all of the post-Mao leaders --
including the physical security figures, who are on record as hard-
line anti-Soviet -- would wish to avoid.
Intervention in the succession process by leaders of the MRs
outside Peking seems most unlikely unless Peking itself is in a
state of chaos and the conflict has spread further. As things now
stand, no single MR could possibly conduct a successful offensive
against the capital with its own resources, and it would be very
difficult -- owing to the strict controls all along the line -- for
the leaders of a group of MRs either to conspire successfully or to
bring their forces into action.
The Russians might offer -- especially in a state of civil war --
to provide substantial material support to a group of MR leaders whom
they believed to be pro-Soviet, but no such leaders can now be
identified, nor are the central leaders likely to allow the situation
to deteriorate to the point that either the MR leaders or the Russians
would attempt to intervene. The Regional leaders will probably prove
to be passive, accepting whatever arrangements are made in Peking
and anticipating -- with reason -- an increase in their own influence
with the successor leadership.
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A Soviet attack on China at the time of Mao's death, whether
or not coordinated with action by MR leaders, seems the least likely
of the dramatic possibilities. There is no doubt of the Soviet
ability to drive deep into the Northeast (without using nuclear
weapons), but there are many sound military and political reasons
to refrain from such an attack. Although a Chinese civil war might
present a serious temptation to Moscow, even in those circumstances
there would be many obstacles to a meaningful military or political
victory for the Russians.
Beyond this, after Mao's death there will be the fact of a quali-
tatively new political situation for Moscow to try to exploit. The
sensible course for the Russians, with their most implacable enemy
departed and with a new group in power which is bound to feel insecure,
will be to talk, not fight.
AN UNSTABLE "COLLECTIVE"
Assuming, then, no such dramatic development as a coup, a multi-
regional revolt, or a Soviet attack, the successors -- even if they
have been working together reasonably well as a "collective" during
Mao's deterioration -- will still face a serious problem in distri-
buting power among themselves in the immediate post-Mao period (meaning,
a few months).
There is no one of Mao's stature to turn to as the "natural"
leader. Although Hua Kuo-feng might immediately be named Chairman in
the interest of an appearance of unity, a decision might be made (out
of respect to Mao's memory) to retire the post of Chairman. This
would put Hua on a collision course with the Leftist Chang Chun-chiao,
the apparent de facto Secretary-General of the Party now and the other
principal contender for the topmost place, for the post of de jure
Secretary-General, which would then be the Party's most important
position. It would bring the already contending forces in the leader-
ship into a crucial conflict at once.
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Assuming that the successors realize the dangers of such a
conflict and retain the Chairmanship, recognizing Hua as the de facto
leader and Chang as the (continuing) Secretary-General -- thus dividing
the power and avoiding a direct confrontation -- Hua might later be
installed as Chairman. However, neither Hua nor anyone else as Chairman
would be able to dominate the Party as Mao had. Nor, probably, could
any single faction -- whether Centrist, Leftist, Rightist, or other --
as power and influence will be widely dispersed. The group that
dominates, both in the immediate post-Mao period and for some time
beyond, will probably prove to be some combination of the strongest
figures from all points of the. political spectrum.
Little is known of the personal character of the key figures --
for example, the Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, the Leftist Chang Chun-chiao,
and the two "wild cards," Chen Hsi-lien (the Commander of the Peking
MR) and Wang Tung-hsing (the policeman), who look to be potentially
the most powerful individuals.* Thus it cannot be judged with
confidence whether they will be able to agree even temporarily on
what would seem to outsiders an equitable distribution of power.
Chen and Wang, acting together, might be 'king-makers' for any group
of contenders of their choice; opposing one another, they might cause
great disorder. On balance, it seems likely that most of the key
figures, acting from a sense of national interest, will be able to
agree upon some form of "collective" leadership which conceals the
extent of their differences.
There is a credible distribution of power among the most important
figures which, while probably unstable, might hold for the immediate
post-Mao period. The center-line in such a "collective" would run
through the Center of the Chinese political spectrum as now perceived --
"moderate" in Chinese terms, although still more "revolutionary" than,
say, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The
constellation would be:
*The term wild card" is used for a leader whose record does not
permit his classification as Left, Center, or Right, but whose power
is such that his support would be of great value to any classifiable
contender.
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-- The Centrist Hua Kuo-feng, 56, as de jure or de facto Party
Chairman or (if that post is abolished) as Secretary-General;
-- The Leftist Chang Chun-chiao, 64, as Secretary-General or
(if Hua gets that post) as Premier;
-- The Rightist old Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, 78, and the "wild
card" Chen Hsi-lien, 63, remaining respectively Minister of Defense
and Commander of the Peking MR, and the principal figures of the
Military Affairs Committee which controls and directs the armed forces;
-- The Centrist Chi Teng-kuei, 45, remaining the Party's super-
visor of organizational work and becoming the back-up for Hua or Chang
in the Party or governmental structure;
-- The "wild card" Wang Tung-hsing, 60, continuing in the role of
the leadership's principal security specialist;
-- Most of these, plus one of the lesser Leftists -- the now
second-ranking Vice-Chairman of the Party, young Wang Hung-wen, about 40,
or Madame Mao, 61, or the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, about 45 -- as
composing the bulk of the Politburo Standing Committee, the core of the
Party power; and
-- The Rightist Chiao Kuan-hua, 64, the very able protege of
Chou En-lai, continuing as Foreign Minister.
A Centrist leadership of this kind would be expected to take
Centrist positions on three inescapable policy-questions: the group's
relationship to Mao's "thought," the concept of "rehabilitation," and
the Sino-Soviet-American triangle.
Mao's successors will almost certainly affirm their fidelity to
his "thought," in the interest of continuity and because they have been
so intimately associated with his policies. Whatever degrading of Mao
in his Stalinist role may eventually occur, it will probably not come
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in the immediate post-Mao period. Some of the disruptive manifestations
of Mao's "thought" can and very probably will be modified, but quietly,
employing other aspects of the "thought" to justify this.
Mao's policy of "rehabilitation" -- of thousands of Party cadres,
government functionaries, and military leaders brought down in the
Cultural Revolution, many of whom are again in important posts -- will
probably be reaffirmed, although many will remain purged. Some of the
Leftist leaders would probably like to reverse the "rehabilitation"
policy -- in effect, to call for another Cultural Revolution, another
mass campaign to give them domination; but any such initiative would
probably unite their opponents and result in the downfall of the Leftists.
Because the military will probably have a strong voice in the
Centrist leadership, Mao's successors may move to reduce the tension
in the Sino-Soviet relationship, even in the immediate post-Mao period.
There is some room for a very limited easing of this tension without
appearing to repudiate Mao himself. For example, there seems a good
chance that the Chinese will quietly modify their demands in the border
dispute.
It is not expected, however, that the Chinese will adopt a policy
of equidistance from the USSR and the US. The probability seems strong
that the USSR will remain the "main enemy," and that Mao's successors
will persist in the policy of attempting to use the US as a strategic
counterweight to the USSR. Hua Kuo-feng, who seems to have the best
chance to be the leading figure of the post-Mao "collective," appears
to be genuinely committed to this course, and so does the likely Foreign
Minister. If for no other reason than that Peking's exploration of the
potential of the US connection has not yet been completed, almost
any constellation of post-Mao leaders could be expected to continue the
process of exploration, even while complaining that the pace of "normali-
zation" of Sino-American relations is too slow.
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