TURKISH CYPRUS IN 1976: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: STUDY

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August 1976
TURKISH CYPRUS IN 1976: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
NOTE: The author propared this study while serving as a summer intern
in the Office of Political Research. Other offices were consulted
and their comments were appreciated and used. Comments on the paper
will be welcomed
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Within the sphere of Greco-Turkish rivalry and tension, the
problem of Cyprus remains a major issue that defies easy solution.
In the wake of the ill-fated Greek coup against Archbishop Makarios
III in July 1974, Turkish military forces intervened in order to
impose their own answer: the de facto partition of the small island
into two separate communities. The purpose of this study is to
present an assessment of northern Cyprus under the Turks, its
economic, demographic and political conditions.
Research for this paper was considerably hampered by frequent
unavailability of even basic information. This paucity is principally
a reflection of limited US access to that portion of Cyprus and the
reluctance of mainland and Cypriot Turks to divulge information to the
world. We may even conjecture that the authorities themselves do not
possess many accurate statistics because of the still considerable
disarray in the north of Cyprus.
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I.
THE BACKGROUND ....................................
1
II.
POPULATION CHANGES IN THE NORTH ...................
4
A. The Exodus of Greek Cypriots .................
4
B. The Influx of Non-Cypriot Turks ..............
6
III.
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NORTHERN CYPRUS., ............
8
A. TFSC Administration .................
8
.........
B. Turkish Cypriot Relations with Turkey........
9
IV.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
11
V.
GENERAL PROSPECTS .................................
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Southern Limit
of Turkish Control
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When the Turkish invasion force landed in Cyprus on 20 July
1974, it served as an effective catalyst in bringing about a de
facto partition of two major ethnic communities that had grown
increasingly intolerant and distrustful of each other. Out of
the social and economic chaos that accompanied the military
intervention, two separate political entities emerged. The Greek
Cypriot government under Archbishop Makarios III is still recognized
internationally as the sole representative of a united and independent
Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots, determined to build and regulate their
own society and economy, on 13 February 1975, unilaterally proclaimed
the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC-Kibris Turk Federe Devleti).
While the history of Turkish-Greek rivalry on Cyprus is
not central to the theme of this paper, it does provide a useful
setting for appreciating the major premise of the paper: that
the TFSC will not surrender its social or economic integrity
to any island-wide administration nor accept any central
political controls that compromise Turkish Cypriot communal
independence.
Greek and Turkish Cypriot relations go back to 1571 when
Ottoman forces captured the island and colonized it with around
20,000 soldiers. When the central administration of the sprawling
Ottoman Empire was strong, the Greek Cypriots were reasonably
assured of a secure position and their "Greekness" was preserved
by virtue of an autocephalous Greek Orthodox archbishop. The
disintegration and deterioration of authority in Istanbul, however,
allowed control of the island to fall into the hands of rapacious
governors and officials whose misconduct exacerbated tension
between the two predominant ethnic communities on the island.
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In the wake of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Sublime
Porte was persuaded to relinquish control of the troublesome
island to the British in exchange for promises of support against
Russia. While British rule in Cyprus was characteristically
fair and provided some significant improvements on the island,
the colonial officers were incapable of quelling demands for
Enosis (Union with Greece) by the Greek Cypriots and the growing
antagonism between the ethnic communities. In the early 1950s,
militant proponents of Enosis formed the guerrilla group EOKA
under the leadership of George Grivas, and engaged in an active
campaign of harassing British authorities.
By 1959, the British resolve to control Cyprus as a crown
colony was gone and in that year agreements among Britain, Greece
and Turkey were signed in London and Zurich leading to an inde-
pendent republic of Cyprus in 1960. Enosis was renounced but
the island was free and the Turkish minority received an extra-
ordinary share of political authority.* The absence of the strong
moderating hand of the British, however, allowed fears and ambitions
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be aggravated, each side
now supported by its respective "homeland." Brooding collectively
over their enforced proximity, both communities in Cyprus displayed
an almost total inability to comprehend the fears on the "other
side."
* According to the 1960 constitution, for example, the president
of the republic had to be Greek and the vice-presidency was
reserved for a Turk. In most areas of government administration,
a "70-30 per centum" principle was applied; i.e.,
70
percent
of a national body or service had to be Greek and
30
percent
Turkish. The actual nationality ratio was closer
to
80 percent-
20 percent. For discussion of the Cypriot constitution, see
Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis
Government (Philadelphia, 1968). Since December 1963, Turkish
Cypriot political leaders have not actively participated in the
Cypriot national government.
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The intercommunal battles of 1963-64 and 1967 were clear
signs that the citizens of the Cypriot republic did not accept
the status quo. Assigning administrative positions upon the
basis of ethnic origin only served to intensify communal rivalry.
Both communities had become firmly entrenched in positions
that were essentially irreconcilable and reinforced by separate
arguments that were painfully logical and persuasive. For the
Greeks, the issue was quite simple; they represented the vast
majority of Cyprus' population and the principles of democracy
necessitated that the Turkish Cypriots accept their role as
a minority. Their refusal to do so, accompanied by demands for a
disproportionate voice in civil and military affairs, was the
factor that denied Cyprus its traditional serenity. The Turks,
on the other hand, vigorously contended that the Greeks were
bent upon obliterating their culture and keeping them impoverished
second class citizens. Furthermore, in their estimation, the
Greeks were cunning and faithless, willing to mouth any lie if it
advanced them along the byzantine path to Enosis. That the sit-
uation was heading towards a complete breakdown was clear. The
only question was of when it would occur. The Cypriot republic
was buried in July 1974 when the Greek Colonels "masterminded"
a coup against Archbishop Makarios III. The ineptness of the
plotters and the resulting confusion gave the Turkish government
of Bulent Ecevit a justification for invading and occupying al-
most 40 percent of Cyprus.
Since the conclusion of that operation (code-named "Attila"),*
northern Cyprus has become very nearly a closed society, at least
* The choice of the code-name "Attila" for the Turkish interven-
tion operation provides an interesting insight into one aspect of
contemporary Turkish psychology. First, there is a growing trend
among modern Turks to delve into and identify with their pre-
Islamic heritage; i.e., the 'pure' Turkic traditions. Second,
although Attila enjoys a rather unsavory reputation in the West
("The Scourge of God," etc.) his martial prowess and strength
are qualities admired by a very large sector of Turks.
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in terms of efforts to assess social and economic conditions.
We are, to be blunt, reduced to offering a statement of problems
with regard to the Turkish-controlled sector of Cyprus.
A. The Exodus of Greek Cypriots
Prior to the July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, approxi-
mately 160,000 Greek Cypriots inhabited the sector now under
Turkish control. Today, the Greek population has dwindled to
around 6,000 and is continuing to decrease at an average rate
of nearly 400 per month. The vast majority of the Greek Cypriot
refugees fled during the Turkish invasion, and since the cessation
of hostilities the Turkish Cypriots have displayed virtually no
interest in permitting these individuals to return to their former
homes. Concomitantly, those few Greek Cypriots who at first refused
to flee their home-s have been subjected to steady harassment and
were urged to move to the south of Cyprus. Not unnaturally, a
goodly number of these Cypriots, finding themselves a small minority
within a hostile environment, do not require much encouragement to
migrate. Greek churches and cemeteries have become occasional tar-
gets of extensive and malicious desecration, in part popular retri-
bution for real or imagined Greek excesses of 1963-64, 1967 and 1974.*
There have also been isolated reports of Greek Cypriots simply being
thrown out of their homes and even shot if they resisted, although
it would seem that Turkish authorities prefer the Greeks to leave
of their own volition. It is reasonable to assume that if
* In 1963-64, both sides exchanged accusations of atrocities
and massacres, many of which were ill-founded or designed for
propaganda purposes. It does appear, however that both at this
time and in 1967, the Turkish Cypriot civilians suffered far more
severely than did the Greeks. Rauf Denktash, leader of the TFSC,
recently asserted that since 1963, over 100 were destroyed or
damaged by the Greeks. This appears to be an exaggeration, although
even today there are ruins of Turkish villages destroyed in 1963
and 1967.
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the current conditions and attitudes continue, within the next two
years the Turkish-held portion of Cyprus will be almost completely
free of Greek Cypriots.
As the Greek enclave within northern Cyprus erodes steadily,
the Turkish population there grows, albeit in a haphazard fashion.
The size of the Turkish element within Cyprus is naturally a crucial
factor with regard to future negotiations determining the size of
any possible Turkish Cypriot zone. Each side in the dispute has
played fast and loose with this particular statistic, with the
official Turkish position claiming that in L975 there were around
160,000 Turkish Cypriots on the island. The Makarios government
contends that there were only 106,000. According to the 1960
census, there were around 105,000 Turkish Cypriots, an increase
of 30 percent since the previous census of 1946,* This would
suggest that in the next 14 years after 1960, the natural increase
There have been a variety of intriguing features in the res-
pective growth patterns of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with
the former usually demonstrating a greater natural increase than
the latter. For example, from 1891 to 1901, the Turkish Cypriot
community increased by 7.05 percent whereas the Greeks expanded by
15.09 percent. In the decade between 1921 and 1931, the Greeks
grew by 13.77 percent and the Turks only by 4.73 percent, although
part of this surprisingly low rate of growth can be explained by
the significant emigration of Turks to Anatolia between 1924 and
1926, presumably to become citizens of the nascent Turkish republic.
All in all, between 1881 and 1946, the Greek Cypriot community in-
creased by 163 percent and the Turks by around 77 percent. The cause
of this disparity was not one of fertility or (we assume) congress,
but because of the great infant mortality rate among the Turks and
their shorter life expectancy. Since 1946, however, the Turkish
Cypriot community has displayed more vitality than the Greeks,
increasing 30.9 percent versus 22.3 percent up through 1960, prob-
ably owing to improved medical care.
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within the Turkish community would amount to around 32,000
individuals, thereby implying the 1974 Turkish population to
be 137,000. This figure cannot be considered precise, however,
because of the flight of Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 and 1967
and the refusal of Turkish Cypriot authorities since 1964 to
provide complete vital statistics to the government in Nicosia.
An additional problem is that both Greek and Turkish officials
kept very inaccurate records on the emigration of Cypriots.
Hence, the most reasonable estimate for the present Turkish Cypriot
population in 1976 is 90,000 to 100,000 but this cannot be verified.*
B. The Influx of Non-Cypriot Turks
The indigenous population of the Turks has been con-
siderably augmented both by the presence of Turkish military
personnel and immigrants from Anatolia. There are around
25,000 regular Turkish troops remaining in Cyprus. Veterans
of the 1974 campaign and their dependents have been granted
by the TFSC the right to become naturalized Cypriot citizens,
but there is no clear information about how many troops have
taken advantage of this opportunity.
*'_This approximation is based upon an extrapolation using the number
of voters in the June 1976 Turkish Cypriot elections and the demographic
features of Cyprus in preceding years. In the TFSC general elections,
slightly under 54,000 ballots were cast, the voting pool consisting of
all individuals 18 years of age or older. Approximately 60 percent of
the Cypriot population fits into this age bracket, a figure which in-
dicates that the entire Turkish Cypriot population amounts to at least
90,000. Obviously, a crucial factor in this equation is the percentage
of Turkish Cypriot voters who visited the polls as compared to the
number of those eligible, a figure which is not available. Given the
general excitement of the first general election in the TFSC, it seems
certain that at least 90 per cent of the electorate participated which
means that there would be around 60,000 qualified voters. Turning again
to the process used above, this number allows us to calculate the popu-
lation of the TFSC as numbering 100,000 at most.
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The most dramatic and controversial aspect of the demographic
change in Cyprus has been the influx of Turks from Anatolia. Greek
Cypriot sources have asserted that so far, 50,000 Turks from Asia
Minor have migrated and settled within northern Cyprus, occupying
Greek Cypriot dwellings in the process. More realistic estimates,
however, suggest that the figure is closer to 20,000. There is a
serious problem in categorizing these newly-arrived Turks; i.e.,
what percentage are returning Turkish Cypriot refugees and how many
are latter-day colonizers from the Turkish mainland or just tem-
porary workers, especially from the coastal provinces?*
Those Turks who are in fact Cypriot in origin will probably
not encounter too much difficulty in blending into the social
and economic environment of Cyprus. Peasants from Anatolia,
on the other hand, cannot expect to find an equally satisfactory
situation. Turkish Cypriots tend to be considerably more sophisti-
cated than their Anatolian counterparts whose habits and customs
are basically the same as those of a millenium ago
There are other significant facets to the ongoing relation-
ship between island and mainland Turks. Administrators and
technicians sent by Ankara to put northern Cyprus back on its
feet have experienced considerable difficulty. Although the
Turkish Cypriots are usually more skilled than the average
peasant imported from Turkey, they nevertheless suffer from
a severe lack of managerial and entrepreneurial training, the
* The use of immigrants from the Anatolian coastal areas is
very logical, insofar as such individuals and families would,
presumably, be more adaptable to the economic and geographic
conditions within Cyprus. There have been occasional references
to the Laz Turks of the Black Sea area who have been, historically,
more familiar with citrus crops and maritime activities.
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result of long years of Greek domination and suppression. The
Ankara technocrat faces an exasperating and frustrating challenge
that invites irritation on the part of his intended beneficiary.
While genuinely grateful for the support of Turkey, some Turkish
Cypriots resent the condescending manner of their brethren and their
"you should be grateful to us" attitude. As suggested above, such
friction presents no serious immediate problem but as the Turkish
sector grows more secure, this tension is likely to surface.
III. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NORTHERN CYPRUS
The current political administration of northern Cyprus appears
to follow the form stipulated in the 1960 Cypriot constitution. The
civilian administration consists of a president, prime minister,
council of ministers and a forty-man constituent assembly elected by
direct popular vote. Although the Turkish Cypriot constitution as
proclaimed in May 1976 is somewhat vague as to the duties of the
president, it is nevertheless clear that he is the center of civilian
authority within the state, with the prime minister functioning in a
secondary role, although this situation also depends upon personali-
ties. The 20 June 1976 elections made it abundantly clear that Rauf
Denktash enjoys massive popular support, winning almost 80 percent of
the votes. His party, the National Unity Party, did not fare quite
so well but still succeeded in securing 30 seats within the constitu-
ent assembly, thereby giving Denktash substantial authority.
As the principal political figure within the Turkish Cypriot
community, Denktash enjoys a long record of serving the needs of his
compatriots. Aggressive yet also a good tactician, he has been
characterized as a "bull on figure skates" in his continual battle for
the independence of the Turkish Cypriots. His extremely personal and
hard-working approach has won him a large and devoted following. His
only serious opposition is Dr. Fazil Kucuk, a former leader of the
Turkish community and founder of the newspaper Halkin Sesi (Voice of
the People).
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The Council of Ministers named by Denktash can be characterized
as young'*, inexperienced and loyal to the President. They have re-
ceived a warm but not particularly enthusiastic reception in the
Turkish Cypriot press, which expressed some concern over their age
and ability. On the other hand, youth and stamina are essential
ingredients for this fledgling republic if it is to survive.
B. Turkish Cypriot Relations with Turkey
Both the mainland Turkish military command and Ankara wield con-
siderable influence over Cypriot policy but the exact nature of their
power is difficult to assay. The Turkish embassy in Nicosia is the
principal conduit through which vital funds from Ankara are channeled
to the Denktash administration and is thereby in a strong position to
exert pressure upon its political actions. Their willingness to employ
this leverage, however, is tempered by a desire to maintain tranquility
within the Turkish Cypriot community. The role of the Turkish military
commanders on Cyprus has also apparently been reduced, owing to the
declining likelihood of renewed military activity.
If the growing ability of Denktash to act independently of Ankara
is in part the result of his overwhelming support within northern
Cyprus, then it is also the direct consequence of Turkish internal politics
and realities. Turkish policy with regard to Cyprus (or, more accurately,
the general lack of it) makes sense only when we put ourselves into the
shoes of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel. In order for such a
scenario to become meaningful, two points must be understood:
1. The mainland Turks have a very genuine and sincere interest
in the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots who are viewed as 'outer
Turks' (dis Turkler). Their kinship is acknowledged in frequent-
ly romantic nationalistic terms that, not surprisingly, are
oftentimes tarnished when the two parties make contact with one
another. Nevertheless, their mutual feelings of ethnic bonds
are extremely strong and the bloodshed of 1974 added yet anoth-
er tangible justification for strengthening their ties.
* The average age of the ministers is 41, the oldest being 50 and
the youngest 30.
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proverb has it, the Turks are willing to "burn the blanket
in order to kill the fleas." Convinced by both history and
world opinion, the Turks believe that they are utterly alone
in the international scene and cannot trust anyone else. The
overwhelming condemnation by the UN of Turkish actions in
Cyprus was judged by many Turks as proof of their isolation.
These factors underscore Demirel's difficulty in bringing about
progress in the Cyprus negotiations. Demirel publicly declares his
commitment to a bi-zonal federation on Cyprus with a weak central
administration. While such a proposition is far removed from the
status quo ante bellum, he nevertheless feels that this move would
create greater international respect for Turkey and thus alleviate
its relative isolation. This approach, however, is sharply criticized
by some members of his coalition, most notably Deputy Prime Minister
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the National
Salvation Party.
Demirel's ability to maintain a majority in the Grand National
Assembly has been consistent but the margins are always very narrow
with a delicate balance. The adroit political manuevering that is
essential to preserve his four-party coalition does not permit Demirel
to display the moderation and generosity required to speed up the
Cyprus discussions since any truly conciliatory gestures would provoke
the wrath of his political partners and bring about the fall of his
administration. Thus, it is clearly to his advantage to sit and do
little, about Cyprus, a policy by default that will continue as long
as Demirel is preoccupied with holding his government together.
If, then, we fault Demirel to some measure for the continuing
deadlock on Cyprus, we still cannot assume that a change in adminis-
tration, presumably in favor of Republican People's Party (RPP) chief
Bulent Ecevit, would automatically bring about any significant changes
concerning Cyprus because he too would probably be forced to form a coa-
lition government. Within the last two years, there has been a growing
trend within Turkey away from the extremist parties (both leftist and
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rightist) resulting in the strengthening of the two principal parties,
the Justice Party (JP) and the RPP. This movement does not clearly
work to the advantage of either party, however, and the role of the very
small parties remains every bit as crucial as before. The JP and RPP
are too evenly matched now in terms of popular support for either side to
claim an unqualified majority in the Grand National Assembly. This
provides the fringe groups with broker-power completely out of pro-
portion with their real strength.
There is still another possibility that induces Demirel to hold
tight on Cyprus in order to'preserve power; namely, it is by no means
certain that Ecevit could forge a viable coalition to replace that of
Demirel. Such a failure could leave Turkey without a government and
perhaps force the military to intervene for the sake of maintaining
public order, an unpleasant prospect for all the political parties.
Meaningful data on the economic status of northern Cyprus are as
scanty as indicators of social conditions. A recent US senatorial staff
report bluntly stated, "There are no real economic indicators for the
North (sic). Statistics are few and where available are usually
unreliable."* Indeed, we are compelled to rely upon the meagre data
that either the Turkish Cypriots or mainlanders are willing to
disclose for their own purposes.
* Crisis on Cyprus. 1976: Crucial Year for Peace. A Staff Report
prepared for the use of the subcommittee to investigate problems con-
nected with refugees and escapees for the committee on the judiciary.
United States Senate, 94th Congress, second session. January 19, 1976,
p.64.
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Although the amount of land actually controlled by Turkish forces
is around 38 percent of Cyprus, in economic terms this area represents
well over one-half of the island's pre-1974 wealth. The vast prepon-
derance of the economic activity had been, of course, in the hands of
the Greek Cypriots, and with their departure since mid-1974, tech-
nical and managerial skill also vanished, thus leaving northern Cyprus
debilitated and still suffering from the destruction caused by the
invasion.
Any attempt to gauge the relative economic success or failure of
northern Cyprus is hampered by the general lack of pre-1974 indicators
for the productive capabilities of the portion currently controlled by
the Turkish Cypriot "government." The Turkish forces occupy only one
administrative district in toto, the rest of their holdings being
comprised of portions of other districts. Since most agricultural and
industrial statistics are broken down only in terms of district pro-
duction, it is all but impossible to ascertain, for example, the actual
value of a given percentage of a district. In other words, it is a
tedious task to compare or contrast precisely how well the Turkish
Cypriots are making use of the land vis-a-vis the Greek Cypriot
experience in the area.
In the second half of 1974, the Cypriot Turks and military
forces: were far too preoccupied with maintaining a semblance of order
and settling Turkish Cypriot refugees to pay adequate attention to the
economy of the newly-conquered area. Economic enterprises including
small-scale industries, agriculture and the highly-lucrative tourist
industry virtually came to a halt. In 1975, however, significant if
haphazard progress was made in reconstructing the economic life of
northern Cyprus, especially in the field of tourism where the physical
effects of war were minimal. Of the 58,000 overnight tourists who
visited Turkish-held Cyprus, approximately 90 percent were from the
Turkish mainland, the rest being presumably Europeans or those carrying
British Commonwealth passports. These visitors spent around $22 million
of which 20 percent was in foreign currency. Both mainland and Cypriot
Turks see potential profit in developing the tourist business. Turkish
Cypriot authorities are hoping to lure some 90,000 tourists to the
island in 1976, a figure that is probably too optimistic. Nevertheless,
barring an outbreak of hostilities, and assuming a resumption of normal
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patterns of life in the North, more tourists will seek the natural
pleasures of the island, leaving behind their liras, pounds,
dollars and marks.
In the area of foreign trade, Turkish Cyprus has not exhibited the
same vigor as shown with regard to tourism. During all of 1975, exports
totaled approximately $10 million with 40 percent of the goods, mostly
citrus produce, received by Turkey.* Imports, 65 percent of which came
from Turkey, were valued at over $30 million thus leaving the Turkish
Cypriots with a trade deficit of $20 million. :Thus far, we should also
note, the Turkish Cypriots have not encountered any overwhelming dif-
ficulty in locating markets for their goods. The Turkish Cypriots
project exports for 1976 will amount to about $26 million, anticipating
a large increase in agricultural output. Imports are expected to amount
to $48 million consisting mostly of finished industrial items and
certain foods, notably cereals.
The Turkish Cypriots have experienced their greatest difficulty
in attempting to revive the industrial sector. In 1974 there were 230
industrial facilities in northern Cyprus of which less than 50 are
currently operating. Part of the explanation for this slow recovery
is certainly due to war-related damage in 1974, both deliberate and
accidental. The greatest challenge, however, is in locating and
training personnel to man these factories. Mainland and Cypriot Turks
have cooperated in this venture but have had little success in any but
the smallest plants. It will probably require three to five years for
* By way of comparison, under the Greek Cypriots.southern Cyprus
recorded export sales for 1975 valued at $135 million, a staggering
achievement that bears testimony to the resilience and ability of the
Greek Cypriots. Part of this recovery is also due to the fact that
the government of Makarios is still recognized internationally as the
sole legitimate government in Cyprus and is thus better able to
attract vital international loans. Also, the Greek Cypriots have
better access to foreign markets than their Turkish rivals.
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northern Cyprus to achieve its pre-1974 industrial output, given the
present: trends.
For the average Turkish Cypriot there have been some serious
problems such as double-digit inflation, vegetable shortages, and an
overall lack of numerous small-industry items (e.g., shoes, clothing).
The frustration generated by these conditions is, however, countered by
a greater sense of security and a pragmatic understanding of the dif-
ficulty of rebuilding an economy and locating markets. Unemployment
is also a looming problem, prompted by the influx of refugees and the
release of military personnel from active duty. The situation is not
caused by a lack of job opportunities but, rather, the unsuitability
of the current workforce for the openings available, particularly in
the industrial and professional spheres.
There have been a few other internal developments that clearly
underscore the intention of the Turkish Cypriots and their patrons to
settle permanently in their northern enclave. Electrical facilities,
fuel depots, new roads and airfields are being constructed on a modest
scale yet they signal the aim of the Turkish Cypriots towards total
independence from southern Cyprus.
One last sign of how Turkish Cypriot officials view the current
year in economic terms is the projected budget for northern Cyprus.
This budget, as approved by the Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly,
breaks down as follows:*
Income (TL16 = US$1)
Local revenues and domestic loans: TL676 million (US$42 million)
Aid from Republic of Turkey TL450 million (US$28 million)
Total TL1,126 million (US$70 million)
FBIS, Western Europe, Vol. VII (May 19, 1976), R6.
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Expenditures
Investment expenditures: TL262 million (US$16 million)
Current expenditures TL864 million (US$54 million)
Total TL1,126 million (US$70 million)
The probability that the Turkish Cypriots will be able to achieve a
balanced budget is quite low. While they are assured of receiving
almost 50 percent of their revenue from Turkey, they are likely to
encounter problems in tax collecting. Import duties, for example,
formerly represented the largest single source of government income
on the island. In an effort to alleviate shortages and inflation of
some foodstuffs duties have been removed on food items imported from
Turkey, thereby reducing cost and increasing availability to the con-
sumer. On the other hand, this practice robs the government of a
considerable source of income. The Turkish government will probably
be willing to absorb part of any major deficit but is constrained
by its own unfavorable economic situation.
Since there is little reason to expect that the status quo between
the two communities in Cyprus will change significantly within the
near future, we may argue as follows. With regard to social inte-
gration and development in northern Cyprus, four relatively distinct
groups are involved: resident Turkish Cypriots, returning Turkish
Cypriot refugees, military and administrative personnel from Turkey
and the mainland peasants migrating to Cyprus. Among the first
three groups, there will be few long-term problems in social inter-
action and cooperation. There will probably be traces of rural
versus urban rivalry as well as mainland/island interethnic tensions
but these factors are not likely to pose any insurmountable block to
an integrated society in northern Cyprus. All three of these groups,
however, will be suspicious, if not overtly hostile, toward any major
influx of Anatolian peasants, individuals socially and culturally
alien both to Turkish Cypriots and urban mainland Turks. The growth
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of mutual antagonism may, in fact, reach the point where restrictions
may be placed upon their migration to Cyprus. On the whole,
however, Turkish Cypriot society will continue to display remarkable
unity spawned both by a perception of Greek animosity and a generally
stoic outlook towards the world around them.
In the economic sphere, there is every indication that despite
an uneven economy and a generally depressed standard of living, the
Turkish Cypriots are absolutely determined to create a viable state.
Given their resources, support from Turkey and sheer endurance, there
is also no doubt that they will succeed in doing so despite severe
hardships. Tourism and agriculture are making good progress
and if the industrial sector is lagging far behind, it will never-
theless be close to adequate for local consumption. While northern
Cyprus may never be truly prosperous, the economic output will be
sufficient to meet the modest expectations of the Cypriot Turks.
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