LEBANON'S DISSOLUTION: FUTURE AND CONSEQUENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1
LEBANON'S DISSOLUTION:
FUTURES AND CONSEQUENCES
STAT
August 1976
Final Report
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Page
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Scenario 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 8
Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Scenario 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Scenario 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Charts
Political Actors in the Lebanese Crisis: May 1976 . . . . 3
Alignment of Forces: February 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Alignment of Forces: May 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pro-Syrian Alignment of Forces After 1 June 1976 . . . . . 6
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the exception of the Palestinian role in Lebanon and. Lebanon's
role (to include the Palestinians) in an Arab-Israeli confrontation,
there appears to be no issue that is not subject to resolution by
compromise.. Most parties will settle for greater Muslim participation
and representation in government. Most parties seem to agree that the
Lebanese President would remain a Maronite, although some of his powers
would be shared by a Prime Minister who would remain a Sunni and become
more responsible to Parliament than to the President. Most parties also
agree that greater representation of Muslims in the decision-making
processes affecting military matters is needed (National Security type
organization). And finally, most parties agree to greater Muslim officer
representation and participation in decision-making processes of the
Lebanese army (combined Chiefs-of-Staff type organization).
Nonetheless, it appears that a solution to Lebanon's crisis will be
affected by:
1. the absence of a security force which, in the initial stages,
will be able to separate the combatants and then gradually disarm them,
thereby restoring some measure of security; and
2. the atmosphere of suspicion, communal strife, and the de facto
partition of Lebanon into Christian and Muslim areas which will render
the creation of a Lebanese security force difficult.
The next president of Lebanon will have to be acceptable to and enjoy the
support and cooperation of all factions in order to be effective. At first,
he will have to govern Lebanon with emergency powers; yet he cannot govern
as a dictator, since the Muslim community will view that as a Christian
attempt to rescind the understanding achieved through the new Covenant. The
authors feel that a foreign security force, therefore, will be needed in
the initial one-to two-year period to assist the new president in the task
of restoring order, and must remain in Lebanon until a Lebanese security
force can be created to assume the tasks performed by this foreign contingent.
As it affects Lebanon's laissez-faire policy, to include banking,
compromise is possible if some degree of control is exercised by the
government. The control sought is one that would ensure equitable
taxation of the lower economic strata. The majority of the parties do
not feel that the banks should be controlled any further.
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Compromise is evident on the issue of distribution of wealth, with
emphasis on Sunni and Shi'a sects and regions, with the understanding
that the process would be gradual and evolutionary rather than radical
and revolutionary. Although the issue of naturalization for Kurds,
nomads, and overseas Lebanese appears to pit Left versus Right, a
compromise is possible. A number of formulas can be developed which would
open up naturalization for all for a limited and agreed upon period,
after which the process would become selective on a case by case approach.
The Palestinians remain and will remain a problem until the
relationship of the Palestinians with the Syrians is redefined and
resolved. Until such time, the Palestinians will resist a Lebanese
solution and will not attempt to control their Lebanese Leftist allies.
The Lebanese Left, on the other hand, is not likely to accept compromise
on the Palestinian issue which does not meet with the approval of the
Palestinians, since their continued existence and future role in the
Lebanese body politic depends to a great extent on a continued
alliance with the Palestinians. Although greatly weakened by recent
military setbacks and apparent non-support by the Arab governments
(with the possible exception of Libya and Iraq), the Palestinians remain,
nonetheless, a formidable force, which is able to exert pressure in
Lebanon and Syria. At this moment, they appear to be willing to reach some
understanding with the Syrians, an understanding which will guarantee
them a large measure of independence. They feel, moreover, that time is
on their side if the Syrian intervention in Lebanon continues much
longer. Yet it must be noted that, even if the PLO is crushed in Lebanon,
the Palestinian problem will not disappear. Instead, it may intensify
since the PLO, as they have often threatened, may launch a terror campaign
against real and perceived enemies, to include both international as well
as regional targets.
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Discussions I Iconcerning 25X1
the situation in Lebanon and possible ensuing scenarios began in
December 1975. Data collection proceeded on a large scale, and was to
include the latest up-to-date material available. The scenarios,
during the period covered by the contract, were revised to approximate
possible developments as changes occurred in the Lebanese crisis. The
last change in the set of scenarios took place on 1 June, when the
Syrian: government interjected its troops into Lebanon. The four
scenarios represent the authors' best estimate of a possible future
chronology of developments in Lebanon. The authors feel that the
first scenario is likely to be the one that will most closely approximate
the final denouement of the Lebanese crisis. However, taking into
account earlier surprises, the authors feel that the other scenarios could
approximate future developments in the crisis, should it be prolonged
beyond the fall of this year and thus, deteriorate further.
Data for this study was derived from the Arab newspaper sources--
An-Nahar, Ash-Sharg, and Al-Ahr.am--and from English sources-- An Nahar
Arab Report, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. Furthermore,
extensive interviews with leading Lebanese figures on both sides of the
aisle, and with Jordanian and Syrian officials, were conducted by one of
the authors.
Attention is drawn to the list of actors, acronyms and principal
leaders in the chart entitled "Political Actors in the Lebanese Crisis:
May 1976." Although they proliferate, especially on the Christian
side, it does show those principal figures who have vehicles to which
they could resort if a change of position was desired. Thus, Yasser
Arafat Ap no'egsFroQRe lass~a2LQa%4/9.V~~e.rC, ~~~~~ ~ 0 ter
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Bloc. It is important to understand in what capacity these leaders
have spoken and continue to speak, in order to better understand the
relative position of the different factions. The three charts which
follow are presented to further facilitate the task of the reader. The
first one shows the alignment of the factions in February 1975, just
as the crisis began. The second one, dated May 1976, depicts the
polarization of the factions; and here polarization is best represented
by the number of combatants that form the backbone of either extreme.
The third chart shows the alignment of forces after June 1, 1976, in
terms of pro-and anti-Syrian allegiance. It is important to note
in this last chart the fragmentation of the Left. It is this chart
that leads the authors to believe that the first scenario is the one
most likely to approximate the end of the Lebanese crisis.
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Arab Liberation Front
Amal
Armenian Traditional Leaders
Ba'ath, Iraqi Wing
Ba'ath, Syrian Wing
Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Druze Traditional Leaders
Fatah
Front for Freedom and Man
Hanshack
Independent Nasserist Movement
Lebanese Arab Army
Liberal Bloc
Lebanese Communist Party
Lebanese Independents
Lebanese National Liberation Army
Maronite Christian Traditional Leaders
Maronite League
Nahj
Na j j adah
National Bloc
New Druze Elite
New Greek Orthodox Elite
NewMaronite Elite
New Muslim Shiite Elite
Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces
National Progressive Forces
National Reform Movement
New Sunni Elite
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command
Phalanges
Palestine Liberation Army
Palestine Liberation Organization
Progressive Socialist Party
Saiqah
Shiite Muslim Traditional Leaders
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Sunni Traditional Leaders
Tashnag
The Left
The Right
Youth of All
*Member of Phalanges also.
POLITICAL ACTORS
ACRONYMS
ALF
AMAL
ATL
BIW
BSW
DPFLP
DTL
FATA
FFM
HAN
INM
LAA
LB
LCP
LI
LNLA
MCTL
ML
NAHJ
NAJ
NDE
NGOE
NME
NMSE
NOWF
NPF
NRM
NSE
PFLP
PFLP-GC
PHAL
PLA
PLO
PSP
SAI
SMTL
SSNP
STL
TAS
TL
TR
YA
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.THE LEBANESE CRISIS: MAY 1976
ACRONYMS PRINCIPAL LEADERS
ALF
AMAL
ATL
BIW
I BSW
DPFLP
DTL
FATA
FFM
HAN
INM
LAA
LB
LCP
LI
LNLA
ML
NAHJ
NAJ
NB
NDE
NGOE
NME
INMSE
NOWF
NPF
NRM
NSE
PFLP
"PFLP-GC
PHAL
1PLA
PLO
PSP
SAI
SMTL
SSNP
STL
TAS
TL
TR
YA
Zaid Haydar
Imam Musa Sadr
Papazian, Ablaghatian, Shader*
Ali'al-Khalil, Farouk Nuggadam, Abdel Majid Raf'i
Assim Qanso, A. al-Amin
Naif Hawatmeh
Kamal Jumblatt, Majid Arslan
Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Farouk Kaddoumi
All Maronite leaders except R. Edde
Yervant Darmerdjian (Financier, Dr. Varjabedian)
Ibrahim Kuleilat
LT A. Khatib, CAPT H. Awad, MAJ Ahmad Ma'mari
Camille Chamoun, Daniel Chamoun
George Hawi
AMAL, ATL, SMTL, NAHJ, M. Arslan, HAN, NGOE, TAS, STL
COL A. Barakat, Sulaiman Franjieh, Antoine Franjieh
P. Gemayel, C. Chamoun, R. Edde, E. Sarkis, C. Kassis,
Patriarch, S. Franjieh, A. Franjieh, M. Khoury,
Jean Aziz, P. Helou, C. Helou, Shaker Abu Sleiman
Charbel Kassis, Tanios Saba
Adnan Hakim
Raymond Edde
Kamal Jumblatt
Ghassan Tweini, Col M. Kana'an
C. Kassis, T. Saba, A. Gemayel,
B. Gemayel, D. Chamoun
Imam M. Sadr H. Awad, H. Kana'an
A. Khalil
Kamal Shatilla, Najah Wakim
----------------------------------
I. Kuleitat, A. Khatib
G. Habash, Wadi Haddad
Ahmad Gebril
P. Gemayel, A. Gemayel, B. Gemayel,
W. Hawi
Mousbah Boudeiri
Executive Committee
Kamal Jumblatt
Zuhair Muhsin
M. Hamade, K. As'ad, A. Ouseiran,
K. al-Khalil
Ina'am Raad, A. Saade, A. al-Ashkar
Mufti: S. Salam, R. Karami, R. Solh,
A. Dana, A. Hafez, T. Solh
Elias Sarkis
Rashid Karame
COL M. Nassif
COL G. Lahoud &
Ex-members of G-2
Nahj Deputies from
Fouad Shehab Era
NFP, NB
ML, LB, PHAL, LNLA
Ahmad Safwan
K. Jumblatt
I. Kuleilat
I. Raad
A. Saade
G. Habash
A. Gebril
A. Khalil
F. Muqqadam
A. M. Raf'i
Y. Arafat
S. Khalaf
F. Kadoumi
A. Khatib
G. Hawi
Babikian
A. Yeramian
Khanamerian
Ablaghatian
Papazian
Setian
Military
A. Ahdab, BG
F. Genadri, BG
G. Karam, COL
El Hajj, COL
G. Makhlouf, LTC
M. Abu al-Joude, BG
G. Gharib, COL
M. Mazbudi, COL
F. El Hajj, LTC
F. Abu Farhat, MAJ
H. Said, MG
S. Nassrallah, MG
M. Kana'an, BG
F. Racy, BG
J. Bustani, COL
F. Al-Khatib, COL
S. Assis, CAPT
Civilian
PHAL LI
STL SMTL
NGOE ATL
HAN TAS
NB NAHJ
ANAL M. Arslan
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na-.
National ~ Liberal Phalan es
Bloc Bloc P, Gesayel
R. Edde IC. th. A. Gemayel6. Chamoan B. Gemayel
W. Hai
Lebanese National
Liberation. AlF9
S. Franjieh
A. Franjieh
COL A. Barakat
20 - 25,000
Combatants
Traditional Leaders
P. Gemayel
C. Chamoun
K. Edde
E. Sarkis
C. Kassis
Patriarch
S. Franjieh
A. Franjieh
M. Khoury
Jean Aziz
P. Melon
C. Ilelou
Armenians
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholics
Remaining
Christian
Minorities
*Because of fighting in Zahldh(predominantly Greek Catholics), the neutral position of this community
has been compromised.
**The Palestine Liberation Army split with some units refusing to take order from Syria.
S - Tacit Support of Coup - not planners.
Phalanges
Lebanese Independents
Sunni Trad'l Leaders
Shi'ite Muslim Trad'1
Leaders
New Creek O thodox Elite
Armenian Trad'1 Leaders
R.-hack
Tashnag
National Bloc
Nahj
Anal
H. Arslan
National Reform Movement
Sunni Trad'l
Saigah/Palestine
Palestine
Lebanese Arab Army
Civilians
Military
Leaders/
M
li
Shi'it
Liberation Army**lj
Ba'ath Syrian
Liberation
Organization
Progressive Socialist Party
rian Social Nationalist
S
m
e
us
y
E. Sarkis
A. Ahdab, BG
Trad'1 Leaders
Wing
Party - I. Raad
R. Karami
Genadri
RG
F
Fatah
Lebanese Communist Party
Ex-Nahj
Deputies
,
.
G. Karam, COL
M
CIL
El Majj
S. Salem
R. Karami
Na
sserite
Popular Front
for the
Independent Masserist Movement
Youthof All
military
COL M. Massif
.
,
G. Makhlouf, LTC
M. Abu a1-Joude, BG
G. Gharib COL
R. Solh
T. Solh
0. Dana
A. Hafez
Organization-
Union of Working
Forces
Liberation of
Palestine
Popular Front
for the
Lebanese Arab Army
Ba'ath, Iraqi Wing
Fatah
t for the
F
l
COL T. Jalbou
COL G. Lahoud
and
f
M. Mazbdi, COL
F. El Majj, LTC
F. Abu Farhat, NAJ
E. As'ad
M. Bade
A. Ouseiran
K. Shatilla
N. Wakim
Liberation of
Palestine -
l Command
G
ron
ar
Popu
Liberation of Palestine
Popular Front for the
stine -
f P
l
i
Ex-members o
Nahj G-2
MG Banns Said, S.
MG Said Nassrallah, S
M. Arslan
enera
Arab Liberation
on o
a
e
Liberat
General Command
BG Houssa Kana'an, S
Front
Arab Liberation Front
BG Faiz Racy, S
COL Jules Bustani, S
COL Fauzi al-Khatib, S
10-15.000
Civilian
Combatants
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Scenario 1
"Syrian drive on the capital and occupation of all Leftist positions and
elimination of anti-Syrian Leftists."
In this Scenario, the initial commitment of Syrian forces to achieve
a cease-fire and restore security and stability is based on either of
two options:
1. A thrust aimed at occupying all Leftist positions and enclaves
no matter the cost;
2. A limited operation that will besiege Leftist and Palestinian
forces in three main enclaves--Tripoli in the north; Aley-Sidon-Western
Beirut triangle, while denying them use of the international airport,
the major Beirut-Sidon road, and the port of Sidon; and Tyre in the south,
thereby hoping to force the Leftist and Palestinian forces through
means of a prolonged siege to accept Syrian terms for ending the fighting--
while Syria resupplies and supports Rightist forces as a means of keep-
ing constant pressure on the Leftists and Palestinians.
Further, while Syria believes the recourse to non-Lebanese forces to
restore security and maintain stability in Lebanon to be necessary, the
entry of non-Syrian Arab forces, or foreign forces, into Lebanon to
perform that function is considered totally undesirable. Should such
non-Syrian forces enter Lebanon, it is expected that Syria will resort
to a series of measures which will in fact minimize the ineffectiveness
of these forces, thereby, convincing all parties to the conflict, both
internal and external, that Syria alone can restore security and stability
in Lebanon. Acting as it has with its Christian allies, Syria has closed
Beirut's international airport and seized all other major airports in the
country. Also the major ports of Tyre, Sidon and Tripoli have been
rendered ineffective, especially now that the Israeli blockade has been
imposed on the southern ports. Syria has also shelled and put out of
action the oil refinery at Sidon. The arrival of the logistical support
for an Arab peace force will have to be made through Syria, giving that
8
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country some control over this force. On the political and diplomatic
fronts, Syria has fought and continues to fight a delaying rear-guard
action aimed at undermining greater Arab government involvement, as
seen by the recent Syrian/PLO agreement, although as yet unimplemented,
which has succeeded in delaying Arab government interference.
Syrian Reasons for Intervention
On March 12,.1976, President Assad clarified his views on the
Lebanese crisis and laid down Syria's reasons for intervening in the
fighting. Assad made it clear that he does not consider the conflict
to be one that pits the Right against the Left, or progressives against
reactionaries, or one that pits those who demand reforms against those
who refuse to accept them. He views the crisis "as a conspiracy against
the people of Lebanon, and against the Palestinian revolution and
against the Arab nation as a whole." At various times in earlier
unofficial pronouncements, Assad accused the Palestinians of carrying
out a plot by certain Arab governments aimed at liquidating those who
opposed the American peace initiative in the Middle East. He made clear
that Syria felt that security and stability in Lebanon were more
important and urgent at the moment than the question of reforms and
changes in the Lebanese system, most of which had already been agreed
to by a majority earlier. He further warned the Palestinians to take
a neutral stand and to dissociate themselves from the Progressive
National Movement and Kamal Jumblatt (whom Assad considers responsible
for the latest round of fighting), and made it clear that although
Lebanon was an Arab problem, Syria alone bore the responsibility for
security and stability in Lebanon.
Let everyone know and understand that in this
region we have complete freedom of movement.
We can take any position we deem suitable; no
one can prevent us from doing so.l
The Syrian Plan
The Syrian Plan appears to be two-phased:
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1. Secure the election and installation of their favorite candidate,
Elias Sarkis, implement the reforms agreed to and radio broadcast
by President Franjieh (see below) and conclude a "Security
and Cooperation" agreement similar to the one concluded with
Jordan.2
2. Syrian forces acting on the request of the new Lebanese
president and cabinet of national unity would then assume two
roles:
a. disarm the population and help in the reunification and
reconstitution of the Lebanese army and security forces;
b. insure the implementation of the Cairo Agreement of 1969.5
The Syrian reasons for intervention and the Syrian Plan seem to
enjoy the support.of most of the internal parties to the conflict, with
the exception of the extreme Right ("Cedar Guard" and the Order of the
Maronite Monks), and some elements of the extreme Left. The extreme
Right, however, can choose to be overruled when it allows the Front for
Freedom and Man, of which it is a member, to speak for the Maronites
as a whole, and therefore, tacitly supports the Syrian move since the
Maronite Christian traditional leaders are in favor of the Syrian
initiative. The Left has fragmented over the Syrian military intervention,
with the al-Najjadah Party, Saiqah, the Ba'ath, Syrian Wing, and the
Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces, supporting the Syrians.
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Ina'am Raad wing) chose to take a
middle-of-the-road position, while the rest, to include all the Palestinian
guerrilla groups, condemned it. It is clear, however, that once the PLO
comes to terms with Syria, opposition to the Syrian role in Lebanon will
become negligible.
Domestic Effects
1., Greater Muslim Representation and Participation in Governmental
Process
On February 14, 1976, President Franjieh addressed a message to the
nation which embodies the new National Covenant. This National Covenant
was achieved after a series of meetings among traditional Christian
Maronite leaders, traditional Sunni Muslim leaders, and traditional
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Shiite Muslim leaders, to include Imam Musa Sadr and Syrian officials.
In essence, the new National Covenant makes the following points and
changes in the traditional structure:
(1) There will be equal representation by Muslims and Christians
in Parliament--54 to 54 deputies for each side. Presently, the Shiites
have only 19 deputies as opposed to 20 Sunnis. The new Covenant calls
for 9 additional Muslim deputies, of which 3 will be Shi'ite and 4 Sunni.
Two will be Druze, thus maintaining a 24 to 22 majority in favor of the
Sunnis, with the Druze increasing from the present total of 6 to 8 members.
(This point has not been fully accepted by the Shiites who want equal
representation with the Sunnis.)
(2) The Prime Minister will be nominated by Parliament rather than
by the President, as was the usage under the old National Covenant. The
authority of the President and the Prime Minister remains to be defined.
Most likely, the Prime Minister will be given more executive power
independent of consent of the President.
(3) A constitutional court will be created to pass on existing
laws, and a supreme court will also be created to try the President and
Ministers in case of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct.
(4) A new council will be established to supplement the present
Council of Deputies. It is not clear whether this council will be set
up to deal with economics in general, economic planning, or for the
economic development of districts.
(5) Confessionalism will be abolished from state employment. Future
governmental appointments will be made on the basis of specialization
and qualification.
(6) The document stressed the fact that "Lebanon is an independent,
free Arab country." Lebanon's Arab identity has never in the past been
so officially stressed.
(7) The presidency, premiership, and speaker of the House will
remain the preserve of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi'ites
respectively. On this issue, there seems to be some disagreement. Some
traditional Sunni Muslim leaders seem to feel that this should not be
specifically stated in the Covenant, but should follow the practice
adopted earlier in the previous National Covenant where this classification
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was tacitly accepted, thereby attempting to bridge the gap between
extreme Maronite demands that this be stressed'in'the Covenant and the
refusal of some traditional Sunni Muslim leaders to sign such a Covenant.
Prime Minister Karami stated that "one who is not bound by his word is
not bound by his signature."4
(8) Relationships between Palestinians and Lebanese will be strictly
regulated in accordance with the Cairo Accords; and Syria will act to
guarantee full implementation of this agreement. The Syrians feel "that
if the Cairo Agreement is implemented scrupulously, especially concerning
the ban on armed men walking in the streets and the withdrawal of heavy
weapons from refugee camps in Lebanon, some of the major causes of
friction between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians will be
removed."5
In a statement in February 1976, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the
Phalange Party, said that he accepted the Cairo Agreement of 1969 in
spite of himself so as to save the country from civil war. The Phalangists,
he stated, waited five years "accepting the most humiliating concessions
before taking a step."6
(9) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, there will be economic
and social reforms aimed at improving the lot of the Lebanese people.
But this would be left to the Cabinet of National Reconciliation or
Union to determine the portent of such reforms.
(10) Amendment of the citizenship clause, undefined as yet.
This new National Covenant, though, does not have the support of
the Progressive National Forces (PNF).Kamal Jumblatt has reiterated his
demands for a total laicization of the Lebanese political system and
has stated his opposition to the concept of consecrating the Presidency
of the Republic to the Maronite sect. Also, Mr. Jumblatt has stated his
opposition to the election of Elias Sarkis, because he feels that Sarkis
has the support of the Syrians and that the Syrians want to limit the
reforms of this new National Covenant. On the other hand, since the
election of Sarkis and in order to avoid a confrontation with him,
Mr. Jumblatt has moderated his position and has set two conditions for
cooperation with Sarkis: the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and the
implementation of reforms, even though minimal.
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The extreme Maronite!wing, as represented by the "Cedar. Guards"-
generally associated with the Maronite League and the Order of Maronite
Monks--rejected the following points in President Franjieh's document:
(1) Lebanon's Arab identity;
(2) repudiation of the Cairo Agreement and the rejection of a
Palestinian presence on Lebanese soil;
(3) sectarianism, demanding instead the total secularization of
the Lebanese state;* and
(4) opening up naturalization to non-Lebanese. They stated that
"Any civilized country allows 6% of its total population to be strangers,
whereas Lebanon has 57%."7 However, the Front for Freedom and Man,
which incorporates all the Maronite leadership of the country, to
include the Phalangists, is believed to hold similar views as regards
the new National Covenant as that of the Phalangists who praised it.
The Front for Freedom and Man believes that the new National Covenant
forms a suitable basis for national understanding.
Judging by the number of casualties on both sides, it would appear
that Lebanese Christian and Muslim losses have been light in comparison
to those of the Palestinians. In other words, most of the casualties
have been Palestinians; thus mutual hatred of the two major Lebanese
communities, generated by the number of lives lost, can be minimized.
In. terms of material losses, the Christians have suffered the most; but
they are. in a better position to recoup their losses once the fighting subsides.
Finally, since the Lebanese Left is split between pro- and anti-
Syrian factions, and is not broadly based, a Christian gambit to seek
partition will put the Sunni traditional leadership in a quandary. A
Lebanese Muslim state would be controlled by either Palestinians or
Leftists or a Druze leader (Kamal Jumblatt) who is bent on secularization.
These three options are not relished by the traditional Sunni leaders
and may impel them to seek some compromise with the Christian leadership
*A subtle difference exists between demands for the laicization of
the state and total secularization. By demanding total secularization,
the extreme Maronite wing hopes to put the Muslims on the spot since it
will abolish the religious courts and will allow interfaith--Christian-
Muslim--- marriages, especially the marriages of Muslim women with Christian
men which is expressly forbidden by the Qur'an. Thus, the extreme
Maronite wing hopes that the demands for laicization will be dropped by
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as can be seen by the recent meeting between Saeb Salam and.Bashir
Gemayel. This is also based on information that the relationship
between Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians in the western part of Beirut
has. begun to sour. Therefore, if one accepts the fact that Lebanese
Christian and Muslim casualties have not been catastrophic, that the
Christians are prepared to absorb their economic losses, and that tra-
ditional Muslim leaders have no option but to seek a compromise with the
Christians in order to preserve their positions, one can conclude that
reconciliation is still possible, especially if the Muslim community
will derive greater political gain from such a move, and if conservative
Arab governments, ie. Saudi Arabia, are prepared to finance the traditional
Muslim leaders in a bid to win back their electorate while, at the same
time, making reparations for Muslim economic losses.
One has to note that neither the Christians nor the Muslims have been
able to impose a military solution on the other, thereby enabling the old
formula of "no winner, no loser" to be used as a basis for compromise.
Moreover, it is likely that the traditional Christian Muslim leaders' will
use the Palestinians as a scapegoat, especially if the relationship of
the Muslim to the Palestinians continues to deteriorate, and continued
fighting between the Rightists and the Palestinians further weakens.the
latter. The beginning of this trend is evident if one considers the
fact that the crisis began as a Christian-Muslim fight, progressing to a
weftist-Rightist struggle, and now is portrayed as a Syrian/Rightist-
Palestinian conflict. In other words, the Lebanese Muslims are no longer a
prominent party to the conflict, which now pits Syria and its Rightist
allies against the Palestinians.
2. Reconstruction of a Lebanese Army, with Greater Muslim Repre-
sentation in the Officer Corps.
Plans for an expansion of the Lebanese Army to five or six brigades,
totalling 35- to 40,000 men, have been considered for the past four years.
It was felt that this would be sufficient to maintain internal security
in face of growing Palestinian/Leftist strength and would be a credible
by the Muslims if it means opening the secular Pandora's box. (For an
interesting explanation of a moderate Muslim's point of view on secular-
ization and laicization, see: Mahmasani Subhi, "A Legal Interpretation
of Secularism," Al-Hawadess (in Arabic), 23 April 1976, No. 1015, pp. 24-25.)
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deterrent to Israeli raids into Lebanon.* Several factors,. however,
affected the implementation of such a plan, such as the negative attitude
of Parliament to enact legislation creating the proposed army, and the
inability of the Lebanese army to attract volunteers, especially from the
Christian community.
In the past two years, the army found itself the constant subject
of criticism, especially from Muslim, Leftist, and Palestinian sources,
for doing little to defend southern Lebanon. and the Palestinian camps
.from Israeli attacks. A request by Premier Saeb Salam to General
Iskandar Ghanem, then army commander, for the Lebanese army to provide
cover for Palestinian infiltrators and for the defense of the Palestinian
camps, led to a break between Sunni leaders and the army command. Sub-
sequently, Sunni leaders demanded a greater say in decisions affecting
national defense policies and promotion within the army. More recently,
the Sunni Prime Ministers have taken for themselves the defense portfolio.
Also they have demanded that decisions affecting national defense be
referred to a body resembling the United States National Security Council,
in which greater Muslim representation gives the Muslims a greater. say.
This proposed National Security Council was supposed to limit the powers
of the president and the army commander in deciding matters affecting
national defense. The Muslim leadership, moreover, demanded the creation
of a Superior Officers Council, similar to the United States' Joint
Chiefs-of-Staff, in which the number of Muslim officers would be
increased.8 This Superior Officers Council would be responsible for
matters affecting the army itself in such areas as recruitment, armament,
equipment, promotion, strategy and tactics. This was seen as a way of
limiting the authority of the army commander in such matters since the
*It is recognized by the authors that Israel will not react passively to such
an increase in numbers and will attempt to pressure Lebanon, through the United
States, to keep the army to its former size. It may use the 45,000 figure as
justification for additional US military aid to Israel. This point will
be discussed further in Scenario 4B.
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army commander, the G-2, and the head of the Interior Security forces
are all Christian Maronites.
Because of the poor performance of the Lebanese army during the
Lebanese crisis and the ultimate disintegration of this army, Christian
confidence in the future role of the Lebanese army has evaporated. Thus,
it is unlikely that the army will attract many Christians to its ranks,
especially if the Syrians are going to have a say in its reconstruction,
rearmament, and re-equipment. The Christians would prefer that a new
Lebanese army be reconstituted along confessional lines, with Christian
units located in Christian areas and Muslim units located in Muslim
areas. 'Coordination between these units would be done at regiment,
brigade, and army headquarters levels. The Syrians do not seem to be
enthused about this plan since it will create a form of partition. Instead,
they seem to be recreating a new Lebanese army along its old lines of
mixed confessional units, as can best be ascertained by the "Vanguards
of the Lebanese Arab Army" now operating in Syrian-controlled areas of
Lebanon.
Most likely, once the cease-fire has taken place, the new Cabinet
of National Reconciliation will issue a general amnesty for all members
of the armed forces and Internal Security forces, and urge them to
rejoin their units. The amnesty may not cover principal commanders of
the Lebanese Arab Army (LT Ahmad Khatib) and the Lebanese National
Liberation Army (COL Antoine Barakat). While no official charges may
be brought against these two officers, a decision concerning their
fate will be postponed, in the hope that they may be encouraged to resign
their commissions. These two officers probably would be encouraged to
seek a political role by running as candidates for Parliament once the
situation in Lebanon stabilizes and national Parliamentary elections are
called.
The Syrians, furthermore, will implement the Muslim demands for a
National Security Council and a Superior Officers Council. Also, since
most of the Christian senior officers are likely to retire rather than
remain on active service, greater Muslim representation in the officer
corps will be assured since wholesale promotions from the ranks where
Muslims predominate will take place. The Syrians will, through Elias
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Sarkis, rely on the appointment of an army commander who is well disposed
toward Syria and who can maintain confessional balance in the army units.
This new army commander and the Superior Officers Council and most
brigade commanders will probably be drawn from the ranks of the old Naha
(politicians and officers associated with the-Fuad Shehab regime). It
is not clear at this moment whether the army commander will remain a
Maronite or whether, to achieve a confessional balance, the commander of
both the army and the Internal Security forces will be assigned to a
Maronite and a Sunni respectively or vice versa. Leading contenders for
either position are Colonel Michel Nassif, Colonel Ahmad al-Hajj (both
close associates of Elias Sarkis), and Colonel Gabriel Lahoud. Repre-
sentation in the Superior Officers Council and brigade commanders will
go to the former membersof the Nahj or those associated with it under
Presidents Shehab and Helou. It must be remembered that a number of
these officers fled and sought refuge in Syria when then Prime Minister
Saeb Salam brought charges of misconduct against them, and that Syrian
officials played a major role in the subsequent dismissal of these
charges and their reinstatement in the Lebanese army.
If a security cooperation agreement with Lebanon is signed, the
Syrians most likely will want to withdraw their forces from Lebanon as
quickly as possible and yet be assured that the regime of Sarkis is not
only stable and can maintain law and order in the country, but also
remains pro-Syrian. Thus, the Syrians can be expected to push for a
hasty reconstitution and expansion of the Lebanese army and Interior
Security forces and may encourage Shi'ite males, who belong to Imam Musa
Sadr's faction, and Christians to volunteer for service in the armed
forces. Should the Syrians encounter difficulty in attracting a sufficient
number of volunteers for either economic or financial reasons--the
limitation on the budget of the Lebanese government and low pay of
recruits--it is likely that they will push for a national draft using
their pay scale or that of French recruits as a formula which may help
them overcome the financial budgetary constraints which the Lebanese
government is likely to find itself in once the fighting stops.
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Equipment and armaments for this expanded Lebanese army will be
acquired from Syrian stocks, or the Syrians may approach one of the
oil-rich Gulf states to purchase the needed arms and equipment from
France for this new Lebanese army. In any event, the Syrians are
expected to have a say in its future.
3. The Palestinians in Lebanon.
It is clear from repeated Syrian pronouncements that they expect
the Cairo Accord of 1969 to be the instrument which regulates the
relationship of the Palestinians guerrilla movement with the Lebanese
authorities, and the Syrians as guarantors that the Accord will be
strictly observed by both sides.
It is equally clear that a number of Palestinian organizations--
PFLP, PFLP-GC, ALF--reject the Cairo Accord and have openly violated
its terms. Until the latest Syrian involvement in Lebanon, the Syrian
government has been able to rely on Fatah, Saiqah, and the DPFLP to
keep the "Rejectionists"* within bounds. However, since the Syrian
military intervention in Lebanon on June 1st, the split between Syria
and Saiqah on the one hand, and Fatah, PFLP, ALF, PFLP-GC, and DPFLP on
the other, has widened to the point where the Syrians have questioned
and refused to recognize Arafat as head of the Executive Committee of
the PLO.9
Although all Palestinian guerrilla groups with the exception of
Saigah joined forces with the Lebanese Leftists to actively oppose the
Syrian military intervention in Lebanon, it is clear that Syria considers
Fatah, the PFLP, and the ALF as the principal culprits. It is likely
that Syria will attempt to liquidate the ALF and the Ba'ath,Iragi wing
entirely, while trying to effect changes in the leadership of Fatah and
the PFLP. Because of a long standing history of friction between the
PFLP and the Syrians, George Habash will be obliged to move his opera-
*The Rejectionists are those groups which oppose a peaceful settle-
ment of the Palestine question. Originally, they were PFLP, PFLP-GC and
ALF.
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tions from Beirut to Baghdad or Tripoli (Libya). In all probability,
Yasser Arafat will be allowed to remain in Lebanon and to continue as
head of the PLO; but it is clear that Saiqah will have the upper hand
in Lebanon and will be used to keep Fatah, PFLP-GC, and the DPFLP under
control. As far as Lebanon is concerned, it is clear that Zuhair Muhsin,
the head of Saiqah, will be the paramount Palestinian leader.
Once a Syrian-approved Lebanese army is established, Saiqah,
therefore, will act to enforce adherence by the Palestinian camps to
the Cairo Accord with the support if-needed of this new Lebanese army.
In spite of the fact that the Palestinian camps of Tal Zaatar,
Jisr al-Basha, Dikwaneh, and Dbayeh east and northeast of Beirut have
been overrun by the Phalangists; in spite of the fact that Shatilla,
Bourj al-Barajneh, and Sabra camps south of Beirut have been emptied
because of Saiqah/Syrian shelling; in spite of the fact that the remain-
ing camps of Nahr al-Barad and Badawi near Tripoli, Mieh Mieh, Ayn al-,
Hilweh, and Nabatieh camps near Sidon, Wavell camp in the Bekaa, and
southeast Lebanon--Marjayoun, Nabatieh, Rashaya, and the Arkoub--have
been surrounded by Syrian troops or are within Syrian artillery range;
and in spite of the fact that the Palestinians have suffered high
casualty rates and their ranks have been depleted by migrations to
Syria, Jordan and the West Bank--they remain a formidable force, as can
be seen by the fighting in Sidon between the Syrian and Palestinian/
Leftist forces. They have fallen back on the major Lebanese cities of
Tyre, Sidon, Western Beirut, and Tripoli to make a final stand in what
appears to be a decision to engage the Syrians in house-to-house fighting,
which not only would be costly in human and material resources, but
would not be acceptable psychologically to the Arab masses. Obviously,
the Palestinians hope to use this tactic as a way of denying Syrian/
Rightist control over these major cities, a factor which would be vital
to a Syrian-imposed settlement. Furthermore, this tactic, coupled with
that of hit-and-run strikes against the Syrian forces, would give the
Palestinians/Leftists time which they believe acts in their favor, since
it is felt that a prolonged armed Syrian intervention in Lebanon will
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adversely affect the Syrian economy and Syria's development program, the
"Achilles' heel," they believe, of Hafez Assad.
One, moreover, has to consider the implications of Palestinian
terrorism aimed not only at Israel but at Arab governments as well. The
threat to use terrorism against Arab regimes already has been made. The
Palestinians hope that this threat will result in Arab pressures on the
Syrian government to modify its anti-Palestinian policy, to the extent
that it will give the Palestinians in Lebanon enough freedom from Syrian
control to be able to operate as they did in the past.
4. Fragmenting the Left
The fragmentation of the NPF actually began prior to the Syrian
military intervention, and was completed with the Syrian military,
intervention of June 1. An alignment of Leftist forces divided between
pro-Syrians and anti-Syrians reveals the following:
Pro-Syrian: Saiqah, Ba'ath, Syrian Wing, Syrian Social Nationalist
Party (Ashkar group), Nasserite Organization-Union of Working Forces
(Shatilla), the movement of Shi'ite leader Imam Musa Sadr (Amal),
Najjadah group (Adnan al-Hakim) and the Faruq Muqaddam group in Tripoli.
Anti-Syrian: Progressive Socialist Party, Syrian Social Nationalist
Party (Ina'am Raad), Ba'ath, Iraqi Ming, Lebanese Communist Party,
Independent Nasserist Movement, Lebanese Arab Army, Youth of All, new
Sunni elite, new Muslim Shi'ite elite, new Druze elite, and the Druze
traditional elite. It is expected that Syrian influence on the regime
of Elias Sarkis will result in support for pro-Syrian forces and in the
fragmentation of anti-Syrian forces. Once the Palestinian guerrilla
groups are brought under control (see above), and the Lebanese army is
reconstituted, the National Progressive Forces will be deprived of much
of its fire power. Because of the ideological split, it is expected
that a secret war will continue between the Ba'ath, Iraqi wing and the
Ba'ath, Syrian wing, and Syrian/Sarkis pressure during the forthcoming
elections will attempt to deprive the Ba'ath, Iraqi wing of its two
deputies--Raf'i (Sunni) and A. Khalil (Shi'ite)--and insure the election
of a Shi'ite replacement more in line with Musa Sadr group (Amal) and a
Sunni more in line with Karami's new alliance with Faruq Muqaddam.
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The Independent Nasserist Movement in the person of its leader,
Ibrahim Kuleilat, will be given the choice of shifting sides, thereby
supporting the Syrian/Sarkis regime in exchange for a seat in Parliament,
or, if not, being isolated. Most observers feel that he is likely to
change sides and seek a formalization of his role as a Lebanese deputy.
In other words, it is expected that he will be amenable to being brought
into the system. 10
The Ashkar wing of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party reconciled,
too, with the Syrian Ba'ath Party.11 Even the Ina'am Raad faction is
not entirely opposed to the Syrian intervention; but because of its
ideological platform, it supports instead a joint Iraqi/Syrian/PLO/
Lebanese rapprochement and a concerted effort to bring the Lebanese
crisis to an end, within what it refers to as the Greater Syria concept.
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) poses the greatest problem
for the Syrians. Kamal Jumblatt acts both as a traditional Druze
leader, bringing to the PSP a large Druze following, and as a prominent
Socialist leader who attracts both Christian and Muslim followers from
within the intellectual/student/blue collar worker groups. In part,
Kamal Jumblatt's rise to power is due to the failing health of Majid
Arslan, the other traditional Druze leader, and the unwillingness of
Sulaiman Franjieh and previous ex-presidents to promote prominent Druze
alternate leaders from the upper nobility (mashayik), such as the
Talhouks and the Ala'muddins. Recently and since the Syrian military
intervention, Majid Arslan, with the apparent support of the Syrians,
has begun to reassert his claim to Druze leadership by bitterly and
openly criticizing all who oppose the Syrian intervention. 12
If Kamal Jumblatt and the PSP can be split from the other component
members of the National Progressive Forces, and if the regime of Elias
Sarkis chooses to support other Druze leaders during the forthcoming
Parliamentary elections (when and if they do take place), then it is
obvious that Kamal Jumblatt's power would be reduced. If the Druze
community concludes that his continued leadership is likely to creat
for them hardship, both political and economic, it is expected that they
21
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will shift their allegiance to new Druze leaders (see preceding paragraph),
more amenable and more closely aligned with the new order of things in
Lebanon. Certainly, it is evident that the Syrians are determined to
crush Kamal Jumblatt.
5. Redistribution of Wealth, with Emphasis on Shi'ite and Sunni
Regions
To win over the Sunnis and to insure continued Shi'ite support,
both the Syrians and Elias Sarkis will insist on giving the predominantly
Shiite and Sunni areas of Lebanon--the Akkar, Hermel, Nabatieh/Marjayoun
regions and the areas abutting the Israel border--priority. Elias Sarkis
is on record as strongly favoring a concerted effort for the implementa-
tion of an economic and social modernization plan for these areas which
will emphasize road building, schools, electrification, hospitals,
irrigation projects, and technical assistance to farmers. Since the
independence of Lebanon, the Akkar region and the Hermel have been on
the fringes of Lebanese society, and have been plagued with continuous
low level turmoil. Through development, it is hoped that dissension
will decrease or cease in these regions. Reforms and the much needed
development of the southern and eastern regions of Lebanon, however, will
be slow in coming.
6. Greater Government Control of the Economy: Banking, Services,
Construction and Business Institutions
Although the banking sector which has turned Lebanon into a
commercial and financial center has been seriously affected, surprisingly
banking and business circles believe that the damage is not irreparable
and the prospects are favorable for a return to its previous position _
once the fighting has stopped. The following reasons are given for this
optimistic view:
(1) The absence of a suitable substitute. In the 17 months of
fighting, several non-Arab centers (Athens, Teheran, and Istanbul) and
some Arab cities (Cairo, Bahrain, Kuwait, Amman, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi)
have not developed as suitable replacements for Beirut, because of one or
more of the following factors:
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Political stability, liberal banking and commercial
legislation without restrictions on external opera-
tions, good hotel accommodations, regular communica-
tions services, extensive air connections to other
cities, a developed infrastructure, and acceptable
social and leisure amenities.13
(2) The level of social sophistication. This, in comparison to
the above mentioned alternative cities, is-"held in very high regard by
foreign concerns, and according to some international businesses and
banking concerns, past experience has taught them that this 'precious'
element is found in the Middle East only in Beirut. J4
(3) The stability of the Lebanese pound. With its gold and
foreign hard currency coverage, the Lebanese pound has never during the
course of the crisis depreciated in value more than 9.8%. "It was
noted in Beirut that the exchange rate of the dollar remained remarkably
stable." 15
(4) Lebanese adaptability. In the past, the Lebanese laissez-faire
and entrepreneurial spirit has been connoted with latent materialism.
However, the propensity of the Lebanese to adapt to difficult conditions
are considered a major factor in whatever hopes there are for a speedy
reconstruction. 16
The banks, nevertheless, face serious problems:
(1) The inflow of capital deposits has come to a complete stand-
still after reaching a ceiling of LL9.4 billion in the summer of 1975.
Since then an estimated LL1.2 billion has been transferred abroad.
(2) Banks have been unable to extend usual credits and facilities
to the private sector. Many businessmen have used their overdraft
privileges and, in the process of continued fighting and destruction,
have been unable to turn over this money at the necessary rate to make
repayment of loans and interest possible. In the case of a fairly large
number of these trading institutions, the only options open to them would
be bankruptcy, receivership or a moratorium on repayment. In any case,
and especially where bankruptcy is declared, the collateral used by
these trading institutions (normally real estate) is so depressed that
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the banks will suffer great losses, even if they choose to foreclose.
This is more likely to affect the smaller and purely Lebanese-owned
banks than it is the major ones. The Central Bank, in its turn, will
have to decide whether to support these smaller banks or see them
closed.
(3) Most banks including the large ones favor a moratorium on
payments and receipts, to be concluded jointly between them and the
Central Bank Governor. However, the Central Bank has made it clear
that it is opposed to restrictive legislation concerning withdrawals,
transfers, payments, and receipts since this would "preclude any return
to normal financial conditions in the country for a prolonged period of
time,"17 and would seriously affect the chances of Lebanon returning
to its previous position as an important financial and commercial
center. A compromise appears possible since most of these banks have
continued to operate through their branches in either the Christian or
Muslim areas of Lebanon (only the headquarter offices in the banking
district of Beirut have closed). Some of them have either opened
branches in some of the Arab countries mentioned above or in France or
Belgium, or have operated internationally through affiliates. Thus, a
compromise would seem to be more psychologically than financially
motivated, the purpose being to convince the banks that stability has
returned and that they could begin to operate out of their Beirut head-
quarters once again. All of this is predicated on stability, a restora-
tion of basic services, such as telephones, telex, and air travel, and
resumption of efficient electric and water supplies, the clearing of
garbage, and the availability of apartments, schools, and other such
amenities.
It appears that the Syrians are very interested in having Beirut
resume its traditional banking and financial role. Furthermore, most
of the bankers are optimistic, since Elias Sarkis, as Governor of the
Central Bank, was instrumental in streamlining the banking system in
Lebanon in the aftermath of the Intra crisis and the rash of bank failures
that followed. Elias Sarkis is known as a proponent of efficient and
18
responsive banking.
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As far as the other sectors are concerned, the government, in early
winter, had undertaken a program to revitalize agriculture, industry,
tourism and the construction business. It voted LL100 million to be
given
to the Banque de Credit Agricole Industriel et Foncier
for distribution in the form of 20-year loans to those
whose houses and buildings have been damaged or
destroyed. A ceiling of LL100,000 has been set for
such loans; two percent interest will be charged for
loans up to LL40,000, and six percent will be levied
for loans ranging between LL40,000 and LL100,000.
The Council of Ministers decided during the first
week of March that LL400 million will be given to the
Banque Nationale pour le Development Industriel et
Touristique for long-term loans (with equally low
rates of interest) for 'economic institutions' and
universitiet9to enable them to become operational
once again.
It is clear that these were pitifully low figures, given the capital
asset loss of LL20 billion; and given the recent devastation in the
wake of the fighting which took place after March 1976, it is clear
that something more drastic is needed. Nonetheless, the key indicator
of Lebanon's chances of overcoming its economic crisis is the ability
of the banking system to come back.
Businessmen in general do not admire Elias Sarkis since it is
known that he favors tighter controls over business and supports stringent
plans to reform the internal revenue system of Lebanon with the view of
securing an equitable return on the profits of Lebanese businessmen.20
However, because of the economic crisis, such reforms will be planned
but not executed until Lebanon has recovered some of its commercial elan.
To impose such measures now would frighten the commercial community and
push it to turn their temporary headquarters in all parts of the world
into permanent headquarters.
Locally, the Lebanese businessmen most likely will adopt very guarded
and hesitant measures. They will want to assess the Syrian role in
Lebanon, the results of the parliamentary elections, and the ability of
the government to provide security. Thus, in the first year or so after
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the fighting comes to an end, they will attempt to liquidate whatever
remaining stocks are available in safe warehouses, while maintaining
fluidity. In part, their unwillingness to resume normal trade (import)
is based on the fact that it will take the port of Beirut and shipping
companies months to sort out the problems arising from it being closed
to shipping which made it necessary to divert goods to alternate ports. Also",
the prolonged crisis has reduced the buying power of the average
Lebanese which, in turn, has altered both their buying patterns and
habits in terms of priority. Finally, these businessmen will have to
await the return of close to half-a-million Lebanese who represent a
substantial market.
The above factors will exacerbate the economic problems of a new
cabinet. Most of the revenues of the state come from customs, and a
reduction in imports will deprive the government of the needed
revenues to' deal with a rebuilding process. Also, a reduction of trade
and the maintenance of a liquid position will mean a continued rate of
high unemployment, which in turn, will affect both the social and
political fabric of the country.21
7. Controlled Press
Controls over the press and effective censorship were greatly
reduced under the regimes of Presidents Helou and Franjieh, although two
rules were enforced: criticism of Arab countries, and attacks on Arab
leaders and the offices of the Lebanese presidency and premiership.
These two censorship rules were, nonetheless, by-passed by the press by
reprinting, verbatim, critical reports from the wire services of other
papers, or by resorting to the Lebanese subterfuge of writing between
the lines.
A survey by one of the authors of well-known Lebanese editors,
politicians, businessmen, high government functionaries, and army officers,
revealed a tendency to blame the press for exacerbating the conflict.
Cited were: the multiplicity of newspapers with practically no raison
d'etre and no real readership, whose existence depended on subsidies
from a number of Arab states; irresponsible editorializing and editors;
rumormongering; and inaccurate reporting of facts which bordered on
deliberate slanting.
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Given the above, given the fact that the press controls had been
strictly enforced during the Nahj regime of President Shehab, and given
Syrian propensity to deal harshly with opposition. newspapers--as can be
judged by the Saiqah attacks on al-Muharrir and Beirut--coupled with
the strict control: of their own press, it is likely that press controls
will be reestablished during the Sarkis regime, and that a number of
anti-Syrian papers, especially those being funded by the Ba'ath, Syrian
wing, will be driven out of business by the imposition of strict rules
concerning ownership, sources of revenue, board of directors, size of
paper (8-14 pages as a minimum), etc. Newspapers such as.an-Nahar,
al-Aural (Phalanges),. al-Hayyat (Shi'ite), Orient-Le Jour, Daily Star,
al-Anwar, and ash-Sharp (Ba'ath, Syrian wing) will continue to operate,
but will in all probability have to be very restrained even when resort-
ing to "writing between the lines."
Regional and Systemic Effects
Unsure of Egyptian motives, suspicious of Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger's willingness to bring about a solution to the Israeli-
Syrian conflict and the Palestinian problem, convinced that the step-by-
step approach has run its course, and fearing an Israeli preemptive
strike, Syria moved, with the signing of the second-stage disengagement
agreement between Egypt and Israel, to create new facts. These facts
are designed to reduce Israel's military options and afford Syria some
measure of security against an Israeli preemptive strike, wrest the-
initiative from Egypt, pressure the United States, Israel and the inter-
national community into exerting greater efforts toward an overall
settlement, and create a viable economic and political entity which
could compete on an equal footing with its perceived adversaries (Iraq)
and friends in the region.
1. The Lebanese Crisis and the Palestinians
From the start, the Syrian government maintained that the conflict
in Lebanon was connected with the Sinai Agreement and with attempts to
weaken it politically and militarily.* This explains its continued
*Hafez Assad stressed these points in a lengthy speech he gave in
Damascus in July (See: FBIS-MEA, Vol. V, No. 141, 21 July 1976), p. H-3.i
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assertion that Lebanon is essential to Syrian security. Furthermore,
the Assad regime believed that bhe solution to the crisis rested on
political and constitutional arrangements which would preserve the
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. To
achieve these goals, Syria professed neutrality and offered to mediate.
However, initially, Syria did, in fact, align itself with the Leftists
in Lebanon. Most of the arms and ammunition found in Leftist stock-
piles came from Syria.
Syria's motives for supporting the Leftists were: to weaken the
Christian Rightists, thereby reducing them to a level of parity with
the Muslim Leftists so as to make the reform of the political system
attainable, and to induce all parties to accept Syria's mediation efforts,
thereby boosting its influence in Lebanon. This policy, however, did
not work because it increased the power of the Leftists, who became
increasingly uncompromising. The Rightists, on the other hand, feeling
their power at. an ebb, began to talk of partition.
Syria opposed the partition plan and expressed its position to
U.S. Undersecretary of State Alfred Atherton during his visit to
Damascus in December 1975. At the same time, it became alarmed when
certain. extremist groups among the Leftists escalated the fighting,
with what was believed to be Iraqi backing. If unchecked, escalation,
President Assad believed, would certainly lead to partition, an action
that would serve Israel strategically and ideologically. 22 Furthermore,
partition would frustrate Syria's Eastern Front defense strategy. To
press home the point against partition, the Syrian Foreign Minister
made a statement in which he said: "Lebanon was part of Syria, and we
shall annex it back following any real attempt to divide it."23 This
statement infuriated many Lebanese. Syria, however, was not actually
seeking to annex Lebanon; instead, it was only iterating its opposition
to partition.
Syria's plan of action regarding the Lebanese crisis took an
important turn after former French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville,
who came to Lebanon to mediate, suggested to President Assad that he
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invite the leader of the Phalangist Party, Pierre Gemayel, to Damascus
to discuss with him the Rightists' position. The Leftists condemned
the Syrian invitation. Syria, nevertheless', felt that it was time for
a more balanced role. Gemayel's interests coincided with those of
President Assad on many points, but especially on one, namely: that
if the Christians were to be weakened further in.Lebanon, the Muslim
majority would gain the upper hand, a factor that would not serve the
interests of the Syrian President and his minority Alawite ruling group.
Therefore, the preservation of the Christian position in Lebanon would
maintain a religious balance and would keep Muslim power within definable
limits. To this end, Syria forwarded a reform plan and peace initiative
which Gemayel accepted.
Syria's efforts to, bring about a cease-fire was initiated when the
alliance of progressive forces (Leftists and Palestinians) seemed to be
scoring significant military victories over their opponents. Yet
Leftist leadership was willing to opt for a cease-fire and a reform
program. Although Syria's program incorporated most of the Leftists'
demands, their leaders accepted it with reservation.24 However, when it
became evident that Syria was opting for a military stalemate, Jumbl.att
reactivated the battlefield, and announced his intention to control
Mount Lebanon "from Zghorta rthe president's hometowre to Jezzin fthe
electoral limits of Jumblatt's constituency,] "76 That statement created
a definite turning point in Syria's position toward the Leftists and
Palestinians.
Syria began to introduce into Lebanon some military units to enforce
its determination to stop the fighting. As differences between Syria
and Jumblatt increased, the Palestinians moved to consolidate their
hands with the latter's Progressive Forces. Increasingly, the Palestinians
were drawn into the conflict between Syria and Jumblatt. Syria, however,
would not tolerate a strong alliance between the Leftists and the Palestinians
in Lebanon, which would tend to undermine its interests. On June 1, 1976,
the Syrian army moved into Lebanon.
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2. The Emergence of Syria as a Regional Factor
Securing both flanks of the Golan is, at best, a defensive move.
Lebanon is not expected to become a confrontation state,. and Jordan will
participate in a war only if attacked. But it is nevertheless true that
these initiatives have reduced Israel's options to a frontal assault
across the Golan, unless broadening the conflict does not worry Israel.
The linkages being established between Syria and Jordan and
between Syria and Lebanon also have important economic and political
ramifications. From an economic point of view, all. three countries
stand to benefit from tourism, the unimpeded cross-border trade and
increased employment opportunities which can, in accordance with the
development plans of all three countries, help reduce the manpower
drain. Lebanon, however, may yet'gain the most, since a return to the
status quo ante as a banking, commercial, tourist, and communication
center will also benefit Syria and Jordan. Furthermore, politically
these linkages will benefit all three. Jordan will no longer be singled
out as the "arch-enemy" of Arab unity and will be able to play a
moderating role and become the best window to the West that Syria can
expect to find. Syria will be in a better position to stave off any
potential challenge from Iraq, and may regain the pivotal role enjoyed
by it in the Eastern part of the Arab world in the late 1940s and early
1950s.* Lebanon, on the other hand, with its Syrian connection, will
be able to achieve the Arab image which, in turn, may make more
profound internal structural changes in the political/confessional system
unnecessary.
*It is only in the eastern part of the Arab world (geographic
Syria or the Fertile Crescent) that the absence of a clearly dominant
state has led to a power struggle between Syria and Iraq. This power
struggle is further complicated by the ideological split in the Ba'ath
Party. Iraq's new-found wealth and its population--twice that of Syria--
could have led to Iraq's emergence as the dominant power in the region.
A Syria linked to Jordan, Lebanon, and a Palestinian entity will be in
a better position to resist being dominated by Iraq.
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It is perhaps the regional/international diplomatic implications
of these Syrian links, and their effect on the future of an overall
settlement, that are most crucial. A breakthrough in the apparently
stalemated Israeli-Syrian negotiations and the Israeli-PLO impasse is
now, at least, hypothetically possible. Syrian army, PLA units loyal
to Syria, and Saiqah intervention in the Lebanese crisis has weakened
the Rejection Front and strengthened the PLO faction seeking a settlement.
It has equally placed the PLO under Syrian tutelage. Syria, therefore,
holds the key to the Palestinian problem.26
Because of the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement, a rapprochement
between Jordan and the PLO can be expected. This, in turn, may allow
the PLO to be amenable to participation in a reconvened Geneva
Convention as part of a Jordanian delegation, or, if rapprochement has
evolved into merger, as part of a Jordanian-Syrian delegation. With
Syria as the guarantor, the PLO could accept an Israeli-Jordanian
settlement that would restore the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan, with
the understanding that elections in the West Bank and Gaza soon after
would determine the political structure of.the kingdom. In any case,
the impasse over mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO would be
sidestepped, and Israel's insistance that Jordan be the negotiator
would have been met. The future of the West Bank and Gaza--whether it
remains united with Jordan or becomes a separate Palestinian entity--
should not pose a problem to Israel, since in any case it would be linked
to the envisaged Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese entente; and, as such, both
Jordan and Syria would, in fact, take the responsibility for the behavior
of that Palestinian entity and underwrite its existence. In concrete
terms, such an approach would mean that this new entity would not need
the trappings of a new state, i.e. an army, nor would it necessarily
mean that Palestinians now living in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and other
Arab states would be forced to return en masse to the West Bank and Gaza,
thereby creating a lebensraum problem. Economically, this Palestinian
entity would be more viable as a result of its links to the Jordanian-
Lebanese-Syrian entente and would benefit from common trade, tourism,
and services.
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3. Syria and Egypt
The Lebanese crisis and the Syrian intervention in Lebanon seem
to have brought Egypt and Syria together, after an estrangement which
began with the Egyptian-Israeli second stage disengagement agreement.
Both have had to reconsider and moderate their positions.
Initially, the Syrians set out to isolate Egypt, hoping thereby to
convince that country, Israel and the United States.that Egypt could
not be the sole country through which the American peace initiative
could be launched. Syria set out to prove that it could, despite the
second stage disengagement agreement, create tensions in the area which
would force Egypt to either reconsider its adherence to that disengage-
ment agreement or be isolated. Further, it set out to prove that Egypt
could not, without Syrian acquiescence, be Israel's sponsor in the Arab
world. In the process, Syria found out that its intervention in
Lebanon strained its resources and tainted its credibility in a number
of Arab capitals. Moreover, that Israel, specifically, and the United
States, in general, had to be convinced before acquiescing that the
Syrian intervention was a constructive move which would enhance the
chances for peace in the area. In dealing specifically with the
Palestinians, Syria came to realize that it had to secure Eygptian
neutrality, if not support, if it was to succeed.
The Egyptians, on the other hand, realized that there was little
they could do for Lebanon in the face of a determined Syrian drive
short of setting in motion a chain of events which could boomerang. The
Egyptians, who initially supported the Lebanese Right when Syria was
supporting the Left, shifted to side with the Left as Syria began to
side with the Right. However, the Egyptians were quick to realize that
a Syrian debacle in Lebanon could topple the regime of President Assad,
thereby behooving them to face a new regime in Syria which was either
aligned with Iraq, or worse, with Libya, both supporters of a Rejectionist
policy. Thus, a compromise had to be worked out. Saudi Arabia, unhappy
with the split between Egypt and Syria and fearful of the turmoil this
bipolarity would engender, was the only Arab country with enough clout
and acceptable to both that could act as mediator.
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Although it is too early to comment on the chances of a lasting
Syrian-Egyptian realignment, it is clear at this moment that the Riyadh
conference of 23-24 June, attended by the foreign ministers of Egypt
and Syria, did produce the necessary compromise. Egypt would accept
the Syrian role in Lebanon and Syrian tutelage over the Palestinians,
if it were not too drastic, in return for Syrian-Egyptian coordination
on issues affecting a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Thus, Egypt, in the pursuit of peace, has the support of Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, and the PLO with which to counteract Libya, Iraq, and, to a
lesser extent, Algeria and the Soviet Union.
4. The United States,?West Eurape,,Egypt, and Syria
Although the Riyadh compromise averted a Syrian-Egyptian bipolarity
with all of the serious consequent ramifications of that bipolarity for
U.S. policy, the United States, nonetheless, faces a number of dilemmas:
(1) it can no longer rely on Egypt alone in its pursuit of a settle-
ment and ignore the Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese-PLO entente; (2) it can
no longer pursue territorial adjustments in the Arab-Israeli conflict
without giving weight to the creation of a Palestinian entity; and (3)
Egypt. cannot be the only major recipient of economic and technological
assistance.. Given the increasingly smaller foreign aid bills, the
United States will either have to give the Syrian entente a portion of
what was targeted for Egypt (pleasing neither in this case), or seek
European cooperation, with European aid targeted for the Syrian entente
while the United States concentrates on Egypt.
France and West Germany are likely to be the two West European
countries which the United States can approach in a plan involving
economic assistance to the countries of the Syrian entente. Because of
France's traditional links with Syria and Lebanon, because France
appears anxious to be of some assistance in solving the Lebanese crisis,
and because President Assad appeared anxious to demonstrate to France
that he is the protector of the Lebanese Christians (having postponed
his trip to France in March of 1976 when the crisis erupted anew), French
economic aid to both Syria and Lebanon will be forthcoming. The West
Germans, to a lesser degree (and after some consultation with Israel),
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appear willing to consider a plan which involves economic aid to the
countries of the Syrian entent.27 United States' prodding in that
direction could enhance the chances of ameaningful German economic
contribution for the development of these countries.
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Scenario 2
"A Syrian military intervention, but peace remains elusive."
This Scenario envisages the following:
1. Unwillingness of the Syrians to use further military pressure to
bring the Leftist enclaves of Tripoli, Sidon-Aley-West Beirut, and Tyre
under control;
2. The Syrians. would remain militarily in place--occupation of the
Bekaa, and the isolation of the above-mentioned enclaves;
3. The maintenance of close links between Lebanese Rightists and
the Syrians;
4. Opening of the mountain roads from the Christian area into the
Bekaa and thence into Syria;
5. A continued sea blockade and interdiction of weapons, ammunition,
and fuel destined for the Leftist/Palestinian forces; and
6. Repairs to water, electrical and communication services in the
enclaves remains in disarray.
This Scenario does not envisage the Arab League or some Arab states
playing an effective role in mediating the differences between Rightist/
Syrian-Leftist/Palestinian forces. But it does envisage continued Rightist/
Syrian pressure, short of military operations, on Leftist/Palestinian forces
in the latter's enclaves.
Domestic Effects: De Facto Partition
1. The Christian/Syrian-held area.
a. Political. Although all parties, to include Leftists, are
expected to more or less adhere to the new National Covenant and deny any
intention to partition Lebanon, it is clear that two or three administrations
will begin to function independently from one another. Among the Christians,
it will be a triumvirate of Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, and President
Franjieh. In all probability, the Syrian/Christian plan will be to keep
Franjieh in power until his term expires as president of Lebanon. An attempt
will be made, then, to have Elias Sarkis installed in the hopes that the
isolated Left will accept him in a face-saving formula to break out of their
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isolation and thereby end the hostilities. Should the Left refuse to parti-
cipate in the confirmation ceremonies, or should it be impossible for Parlia-
ment to convene, then Sarkis would remain the President-elect and not have his
position jeopardized, since the term of Parliament has been extended for only
one more year. This would clearly be a maneuver on the part of the Syrian/
Rightist forces to bring about the eventual installation of Elias Sarkis,
thereby keeping the constitutional process going. Fighting, of course,
will continue since the new president will command no army or security
forces; for the forces that are presently fighting in Lebanon act indepen-
dently of his constitutional powers. The political reforms described in
the first Scenario would continue to be the basis of the Rightist plat-
form for a new Lebanon, although the economic/military situation as described
in this Scenario would favor the Christians, who would be less inclined
toward additional compromises in an effort to placate the Left. In the
Bekaa area, where the Syrian army is maintaining law and order, Imam Musa
Sadr would constitute the political authority and would also be expected,
at least verbally, to adhere to the new National Covenant and would support
the installation of Sarkis.
b. Military. The reconstitution of the Lebanese army would
remain a moot issue. The Syrians-would continue to try to attract former
Lebanese soldiers and officers to their "Vanguards of the Lebanese Arab
Army." If they are successful in attracting sufficient numbers, it can
be expected that the "Vanguards" would operate in Syrian-controlled areas
and would constitute the nucleus of the security forces which could be
placed at the disposal of Elias Sarkis if he is installed. Elias Sarkis
may, in turn, develop this security force into a new Lebanese army through
the aegis of the former Nahj officers. Thus, it could serve the purpose
of excluding undesirable elements, such as Ahmad Khatib or Antoine Barakat,
without having to take a decision concerning these men or others who
defected and joined one side or the other.
With the clearing of the Christian-held area and the Bekaa of Leftists
and Palestinians, the front lines are likely to stabilize. The dividing
line in Beirut would remain, with sporadic fighting continuing. The Beirut
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to Damascus road as far as Sofar will constitute a dividing line also,
separating the two areas, with occasional fighting taking place. Not
much fighting is expected in the heartland of the Christian redoubts,
although military preparedness would continue as a first priority.
c. Economic. With the opening of the mountain roads from the
Christian heartland into the Bekaa and from there to Syria, supplies and
limited trade will begin alleviating the deprivation of the Christian-
held area. These roads are expected to facilitate the movement of goods
.and people to and from Syria for eight months of the year. In winter,
the maritime lines to Cyprus will provide the needed supplies and transit
facilities. Although conditions in the Christian area will be far from
normal, the quality of life in this area will improve drastically.
The banks would continue to operate through their branches and
affiliates in Arab and European capitals, with Damascus providing the
necessary telecommunications back-up. In a sense, those Lebanese banks
which have established branches in Amman would benefit most since distances
between the Christian-held area and Jordan are minimal. In other words,
a number of Lebanese in the Christian-held area who have access to Damascus
and Amman will use Amman as a safe haven for monies needed for trade in
the Arab world and as a transfer point to European countries and/or the
United States. Lebanon, however, will not resume its place as a banking
center under this Scenario, but would be relegated to branch status, while
headquarters are moved elsewhere.
d. Social reforms. The reforms mentioned in the first Scenario
would not be implemented in the absence of a functioning national govern-
ment, and the different regional leaders will have the choice of allocating
whatever meager resources they may have in order-to alleviate the most
pressing needs. In all probability, hospital and public health services
would be those most emphasized in the Christian-held area, while schools
and aid to farmers would become the primary concern of Imam Musa Sadr in
the Bekaa.
2. The Leftist/Palestinian-held areas
a. Political.. As in the Christian/Syrian-held areas, the
Leftist/Palestianian leaders in all probability will continue to deny
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partition as an objective and would continue to support most-of the
reforms described in the new National Covenant. Nonetheless, power
in these areas would be in the hands of Kamal Jumblatt and Yasser.
Arafat, who may establish administrative bureaucracies of their own.
The Leftist/Palestinian forces will face a dilemma when President
Franjieh's term of office comes to an end. They can come to terms with
Elias Sarkis and use his installation as a face-saving formula which
would enable them to reach an understanding with the Syrians; or they
could refuse to accept him until such time as an agreement is reached
with the;Rightist/Syrian forces, amenable to their desires. Much will
depend on the military and economic situation and the presence or absence
of effective Arab support. At the moment of writing, this kind of
accommodation appears unlikely, and thus, one has to project that Elias
Sarkis will remain president-elect until such time as conditions favor
settlement of the.crisis, especially since Sarkis has made it known
that he wants to be president of all Lebanese and not just of one faction.
As part of the pressure., which is resulting in adverse economic
conditions, civilians in these enclaves will begin to leave for safer
havens, which in this case will be either the Bekaa, Syria or Tyre.28
This kind of population migration will tend to weaken the Leftist/Pales-
tinian leaders by depriving them of their "water" and strengthen potential
pro-Syrian leaders among them, since living in the Bekaa or Syria will
ipso facto mean a shift of allegiance. Kamal Jumblatt, expecially, may
find himself being challenged by new Druze leaders, such as the Talhouks
and the Ala'muddins. In all probability, pressure on Kamal Jumblatt
from his Druze constituency will be increasing as conditions continue to
deteriorate. His Druze constituency will probably demand that he either
come to terms with the Syrians and split from the Palestinians or leave
the country and make room for Druze leaders who could reach an accommodation
with Syria.
Reference is made to Chariman Mao's comments on guerrilla warfare in
which support comes from the people or "water".
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b. Military. The cessation of military pressure by Syrians
and Christians would give the Leftists a much needed respite. However,
once a military venture of this nature winds down, desertions are likely
to increase. Therefore, it will become more difficult to find recruits,
especially if the civilian population of these enclaves have migrated
to Syria, the Bekaa, or the Tyre region. Furthermore, the Palestinians,
having suffered the most casualties, will find it difficult to draw upon
the reserves on which they normally could count from Syria and Jordan.
Thus, their posture will remain weak. Therefore, given the high casualty
rate among the Leftist/Palestinian forces, the desertions, the interdiction
of ammunition and war materiel, and the destruction of the oil refinery
at Sidon, it is clear that the Leftist/Palestinian forces could not regain
the initiative.
c. Economic. The economic situation in the enclaves will
continue to worsen to the point where all forms of trade will cease.
Even grocery stores and bakeries will be forced to shut down for lack of
supplies. "In Bourj Abu Haidar, one of the most populous [Muslin? quarters,
a grocer, his shelves empty except for a few packages of spaghetti and
some soap, explained that he used to rent a truck for $15 to drive to
southern Lebanon to buy merchandise. Today, a truck costs $100 a day,
if he can find one."29 The shop keeper went on to say that his customers
"could not afford the prices, he would have to charge" and so he was closing
his business.
As civilians leave their areas because of this deterioration, pre-
sumably taking their money with them, the banks in these areas, which
had continued to function, will also shut down for lack of personnel
and the needed banking capital to justify continued operation. Thus,
the enclaves are likely to turn into ghettos.
d. Social reforms. No social reforms are possible, given the
prevailing situation in the enclaves.
Regional and Systemic Effects
1. Syria and the Palestinians
The Syrians' objective in this Scenario is to split the Leftists
from the Palestinians, thereby weakening the former and forcing the
latter to accept Syrian tutelage. In this case, and as a compromise,
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it is likely that the Syrians will agree to Yasser Arafat remaining as
head of the PLO, in exchange for PLO adherence to the proposed unified
Syrian/Palestinian military command. Thus, the Syrians will have achieved
their Eastern Front objective but would have fallen short of replacing
Palestinian leadership with one that is truly pro-Syrian. In this case,
Zuhair Muhsin is not expected to replace Yasser Arafat as head of the PLO,
although Saiqah will dominate the Palestinian movement in Lebanon.
Furthermore, Syria will not be able to bring about rapprochement
between the PLO and Jordan, and thus will not be in a position to deliver
the Palestinians to a Geneva Conference or some other international
conference to settle the. Palestinian question. This may prompt the Jor-
danians to reassess their relationship with Syria to the extent that
they may show a renewed interest in direct contacts with Israel vis-a-vis
an eventual arrangement of the West Bank issue.
The Palestinians on the other hand would have survived and could
begin to maneuver again between those Arab states supporting the
"Rejectionist" line and those favoring a peace settlement. In other
words, the PLO will have to be represented at a peace conference as the
sole representative of, and negotiator for, the Palestinian people.
2. Other
Reassessment by Jordan of its position vis-a-vis Syria will have the
effect of strengthening Iraq in its competition with Syria for leadership
of the region and will probably result in closer relations between that
country and Saudi Arabia.
Egypt, as a result of the Jordanian reassessment, will emerge anew
as the pivotal Arab country in the settling of the Arab-Israeli conflict
United States-Western European interest in Syria, in the absence
of a Syrian/Jordanian/Lebanese entente, will decrease, since the Syrian
regime will be unable to bring the Palestinians to the conference table.
However, support will be given to the Assad regime so long as its moderate
stance continues.
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Scenario 3
"Regional intervention, resulting from an Arab League Conference or an
Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting"
This Scenario envisages:
1. The reluctance by Rightist forces to the stationing of troops
other than Syrian in Lebanon;
2. The retreat of Syrian forces into the Bekaa area, as demanded
by the Leftists;
3. The postioning of Arab League forces between the combatants
following the main dividing line that roughly goes from the port of
Beirut to the Avenue Bshara al-Khoury to the old Beirut-Damascus road
as far as Zahleh; and
4. The holding of discussion among all parties to the conflict.
Domestic Effects: De Jure Partition
1. Political. All participants will attend the conference designed
to settle the Lebanese crisis, and will claim adherence to an unparti-
tioned Lebanon. Furthermore, most will be supportive of the new National
Covenant; but differences will necessarily arise since both factions
have fall-back positions. In the absence of a powerful internal or
external force which could impose a compromise, it is likely that no
agreement will be reached on a number of issues, such as secularization
versus laicization, the reconstitution of a Lebanese army, and the
Palestinian presence and role in Lebanon.
Most likely the Christians will demand either the maintenance of the
confessional system as embodied in the new National Covenant, or total
secularization of the State. The hopes of the Christians in falling back
on this hard-line position are:
a. That a fight will erupt between the Shi'a and Sunnis over
the number of representatives which each community will have in the new
Parliament. The Sunnis are slated to maintain a 24 to 22 majority over
the Shiites and, with some Syrian support, the. Shi'a may demand equality.
b. That the Muslims will reject total secularization, since
it will mean the abolition of religious courts and the personal status
laws, which follow the internal dictates of the religions concerned.
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The Christians, because of the question of secularization, will be in
a better position to push either of two proposals which will affect the
future of Lebanon: federation or confederation. In the Lebanese context,
a clear distinction is made between a confederation and a federation.
Federation implies union between separate independent states, such as was
undertaken by Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen under the UAR; confederation is
viewed as a union between various regions of a country. In a confedera-
tion, there would be one army, one foreign policy and a dominant central
government; but in a federation each state will have its own army,
its own laws, its own government, with a weak central federal administra-
tive structure.
The confederal concept being considered will split Lebanon into
three "statelets": Mount Lebanon (Byb].os, Koura, Bshirre, Zghorta,
part of the Akkar, Zahleh, and Jezzine), North Lebanon (Tripoli, Myneh,
part of the Akkar, the Hermel, Baalbek, and north Lebanon), and South
Lebanon (western Bekaa, Hasbaya, Rashaya, the Teen Valley, and all of
south Lebanon with the exception of Jezzine). Beirut, which would be
the seat of the confederate government, will have a special legal status.
Each statelet would have a prime minister, a government, and a municipal
council. The confederation government of Beirut will be composed of
municipal, social, and sectarian councils, with each religious sect
having two representatives on the sectarian council. All three councils
will have the legal power to look into the constitutionality of laws.
Beirut, furthermore, will have its own governor. A confederal legislative
council is also envisaged, with one representative for every 25,000
citizens. At the confederal government level, too, each statelet will
be represented by three ministers. Finally, a confederal army would be
created, with each statelet "providing a certain number of soldiers."30
In all probability the Christian Rightists would favor a federation.
The principal reasons for opting for this governmental system are numerous.
The reconstitution of the army along confederal lines would make it
predominantly Christian. The Christians, being the wealthiest Lebanese
group will be called upon to contribute the largest amount toward the social
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and economic development of the other two statelets without benefiting
proportionally from such contributions. Moreover, the question of Arab
sponsorship of these statelets will play an important part in the Christian
decision. Since a Syrian withdrawal would be a result of Arab pressure,
it could be assumed that Iraq and Libya would sponsor the South Lebanon
statelet, a sponsorship that would be totally unacceptable to the Chris-
tians with their strong relationships with Syria. Then, too, the continued
presence of Palestinians in either the North Lebanon or South Lebanon
statelets, freed from the constraints of the Cairo Accords, will also be
unacceptable to the Christians. Finally, the Christians will favor fed-
eration because it will mean continued isolation of the southern region.
Federation still would envisage union among the three statelets, but
each would have its own army, its own government, its own laws, and its
own municipal councils. A unified foreign policy and foreign repre-
sentation, however, may be pursued. Under this federal plan, the armies
of the Rightist and Leftist factions would be turned into statelet armies,
and the present Rightist and Leftist leaders will be the ruling elites
in their respective statelets. In the northern region, the dominant
elite would be the Shj.'ite element, headed by Musa.Sadr, whose relations
with Syria are symmetrical to those of the Christians.
The Muslim Leftists and their Palestinian allies would, in all
probability, prefer a confederal set up, but would not be in a position
to enforce it, nor would they consider enforcing it if they could because
of the formidable Christian-Shi'ite alliance. Regardless, the secular
issue would not be a factor, since the Sunnis and Shi'ites of North and
South Lebanon will reject the proposal made by Kamal Jumblatt to make
Lebanon a secular state.
2. Military. The reconstitution of a Lebanese army as envisaged
in the first Scenario is not likely to occur. In the case of a'confed-
eracy, each party will contribute a certain number of soldiers and offi-
cers. This will lead to de facto imposition in the army of confession-
alism, since the allegiance of the soldiers will be to their region (the
statelets), and not to the confederal government. In the case of the
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federal system, there will be three separate armies, whose rank and
file will be drawn from the members of the former Lebanese army, and
therefore, will, de facto and de ure, consecrate the confessional
breakdown.
3. Economic. The ties of the Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon
statelets to Syria and, through Syria to Jordan and the world, will
probably lead to a faster rehabilitation and reconstruction of these
two regions than would take place in South Lebanon. These two regions,
in fact, will benefit more from the Syrian/Jordanian entente than would
South Lebanon. South Lebanon, with links to Iraq and Libya, may receive
more economic aid than the other two statelets, but its development would
be slower since that region is the least developed.
Banking will resume in a Beirut that will be either the capital
of a federated or a confederated state. The banks' branches, though,
in the three regions, will expand to equal or surpass central head-
quarters in Beirut. What will happen is that the central Beiruti head-
quarters will be used for international trade, while the branches will
attract the day-to-day transactions. In a federal system it is expected
that the branches in either Ashrafieh, Jounieh, or Byblos will, in fact,
become the principal headquarters, since the Christians are more likely
to enact the kind of liberal banking laws that international banks seem
to want, and the quality of life in these areas also will be more
attractive to foreigners.
4. Social reforms. In a confederated set up, an equitable social
development plan is likely to be hindered by considerations mentioned
above. In a federal system, each region will determine its own priorities.
The Mount Lebanon statelet is more apt to be the most advanced, since
it has been the primary beneficiary of previous Lebanese Christian-domin-
ated regimes.
5. The Palestinians. Although the PLO will have lost control of
Palestinian camps in Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon and will not be able
to readily call upon its Palestinian resources in Syria and Jordan,
nonet!.eless, it is a fact that most of the leadership will :remain in
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tact and will not be replaced as a result of Syrian pressure and inter-
vention. Yasser Arafat will continue as head of the PLO and will not be
replaced by Zuhair Muhsin. However, challenges from within the guerrilla
ranks are expected. Since it is already obvious from a number of
Palestinian pronouncements that serious tactical and strategic mistakes
were committed by the leadership, it is likely that new faces will
emerge, and these will tend to be more radical than the present leaders.
6. The Lebanese Left. Kamal Jumblatt and other prominent Leftist
leaders, by the interjection of Arab forces, will be able to survive in
the South Lebanon statelet. Here, too, though, challenges will be
forthcoming from both the Druze and Sunni communities, which will
suffer because of the isolation of the southern Lebanon statelet in
either a confederation or a federation. The program of the Progressive
Socialist Party (PSP), which among other points includes a secular state,
will not be enforceable, although a socialist regime may emerge since
the southern Lebanon statelet is the least developed, has the highest
concentration of Lebanese communists, and has the PSP as the major
political party whose leaders favor socialist egalitarianism.
Regional and Systemic Effects
1. As explained in the second Scenario, Syria will no longer
provide the only key to a Palestinian solution. It will be unable to
deliver the Palestinians to a conference held to determine the fate of
the Palestinians. Instead, Egypt once again will have a say in determining
their future and will formulate, with the Syrians,, a settlement policy.
2. Bipolarity in the Middle East in this Scenario will not emerge.
Both Syria and Egypt will be forced to cooperate in any future settle-
ment plan. This point was made in the previous Scenario.
3. Lebanon will not emerge as a support state. The Eastern Front
envisaged by Syria in Scenario 1 will not be completed since the Lebanese
army will not be reconstituted according to Syrian plan and the Syrian/
Jordanian/Lebanese entente will have been shaken. Nonetheless, it is
expected that, in a federal system of government, the Syrians will equip
the armies of Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon to enable them to resist
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any military pressure which may arise from the South Lebanon statelet,
which, in turn, will have close links with Iraq and Libya.
4. Lebanon's links with Syria will not be uniform. Mount Lebanon
and North Lebanon will develop a form of psychological, economic, and
military dependency upon Syria. Further, these two statelets will depend
upon Syria for their security. Trade, commerce, and tourism between
these two statelets and Syria will increase, and one should expect the
port of Tripoli to become the principal port which will serve Syria,
providing it special facilities in terms of free zones, interstate
transit rights, etc. The association, therefore, of the Mount Lebanon
and North Lebanon statelets with Syria will be beneficial to all parties
concerned and will be at the expense of the South Lebanon statelet,
which will have few relations with its more powerful neighbor to the East.
5. The effects of the developments described above on the systemic
will be negligible. Syria will continue to be of interest to the United
States only so long as a moderate Damascus regime remains interested in
a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Americans, in
turn, continue to pursue an initiative in a settlement.
6. Aid in the form of financial assistance will be forthcoming
from a variety of sources. Mount Lebanon will, in all probably, receive
aid from France, West Germany, the Vatican, and to a lesser extent, from
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. North Lebanon will, in all probability, receive
aid from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait; whereas South Lebanon will benefit
from Libyan, Iraqi, and to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti
assistance. The United States is expected to try to be even-handed,
and thus, will aid all three regional statelets. The Mount Lebanon and
North Lebanon statelets, however, can be expected to receive the lion's
share of private international investments, since they can provide the
services, facilities and social climate which the international and
multinational corporations require.
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"A Syrian withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, because of internal and
external pressure on Syria, results in the Leftist/Palestinian forces,
with renewed Iraqi and Libyan support, gaining the initiative, and
through military action, seriously threaten the Rightist/Christian
strongholds, thereby creating the fear of a Leftist/Palestinian take-
over.of Lebanon and the implications it will have for Israel's northern
border. The border threat, coupled with the links of the Leftists/
Palestinians with the Rejectionist Arab states, encourages Israel to
intervene militarily. Israeli troops occupy southern Lebanon through
a limited engagement, culminating in international intervention through
the United Nations."
It must be presumed that in this Scenario, a general Arab-Israeli
war is not desirable for all parties concerned and, therefore, a fifth
Arab-Israeli war does not ensue. It must also be assumed that the
United Nations will demand the pull back of Israeli troops and that
Israel will agree, on the condition that all non-Lebanese forces are
withdrawn from Lebanon; and a United Nations force is placed on the
Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli. border, empowered to supervise the withdrawal
of non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.
Domestic Effects
1. A cease-fire is imposed.
It is very likely that both factions will heed a call for a cease-
fire, since none of the parties want to appear supportive of Israeli
"aggression." To induce the Christian/Rightists to accept a cease-fire,
the Leftist forces will agree to president-elect Sarkis being installed
as president, as soon as President Franjieh resigns. The Christian/
Rightist forces will, in an effort to appear conciliatory, put pressure
on President Franjieh, since the installation of Elias Sarkis, their
candidate, will be seen as a favorable turn of events.
2. The Lebanese Left and Right agree to the new National Covenant.
The new president is likely to call for a round table conference to
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discuss the formation of a government of national emergency, and to
select a foreign minister, to be dispatched to the United Nations
where he will coordinate the Lebanese position with that of the Arab
states.
Both the Right and the Left will attend the conference and accept
the Christian demand that the new National Covenant form the basis of
an understanding of reconciliation among all factions. The Christian
demand will be accepted, since the presence and purpose of Israeli
troops in southern Lebanon will be well understood by the Left, and
refusal by the Left to compromise may result in further Israeli advances,
culminating in the partial occupation of most of the territory forming
the stronghold of the Leftist/Palestinian forces, to include Sidon. Also,
since the initial Israeli thrust will have weakened the Leftist/Palestinian
forces, it is unlikely that the Leftist/Palestinian faction will want
to be caught between a Christian hammer and an Israeli anvil. Further-
more, the Palestinians will have to agree to Israeli demands that their
forces be withdrawn from Lebanon, since it appears that the Israeli
intervention will not lead to a general war.
3. Most actors agree to the presence of French military forces
under the aegis of the United Nations to maintain law and order until
the Lebanese security forces and army are reconstituted along the lines
of the compromise agreement.
Since the withdrawal of Palestinian forces, and in the absence of
a Lebanese army and security force to maintain law and order, and in
the hopes that the French military presence will protect the Left now
that it is deprived of its Palestinian ally, the Lebanese Leftists
will agree to the stationing of French forces in Beirut and along the
flash points. In all probability, the Lebanese army will then be
reconstituted along the lines of the compromise reached in Scenario 1.
Some important differences in this Scenario to the previous one are
that the Syrians will have less say in the selection of those officers
that would have been assigned to sensitive posts, the size of the new
Lebanese army (less than 45,000), and strategy and armament.
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4. Palestinian camps and control of these camps in Lebanon.
With the fighting elements of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
withdrawn, the question of who will control these camps will have to
be resolved. Most likely, they will initially be controlled by United
Nations forces stationed in Lebanon, until such time as Lebanese
security forces can assume control as they did prior to the Cairo Accord.
The compromise between Left and-Right on this issue will be easier to
reach since most of the Palestinian camps in the Christian strongholds
already have been overrun and the others rendered impotent, as a result of
the Syrian military intervention. The Christians most likely will
agree to a Leftist demand that the security forces controlling the
camps be under the direct command of the president.
5. Redistribution of wealth in favor of Sunni and Shiite regions.
This topic was amply covered previously in Scenario 1.
6. Greater government control of the economic banking and
business institutions.
This topic was covered previously in Scenario 1.
7. The press would be controlled.
This topic was fully covered. in Scenario 1.
Regional and Systemic Effects
1. The Eastern Front.
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory, when coupled with the
withdrawal of all Palestinian forces to include Saiqah, and the station-
ing of United Nations troops on the Israel-Lebanon border, frustrates
the Syrian plan for an Eastern Front stretching from Ras an-Nakoura to
Aqaba. Also, the fact that the size of the Lebanese army will probably
not reach the Syrian desired level of 45,000, and that the Syrians will
not have as great a say in the selection of Lebanese officers, means
that the ability of Syria to use Lebanon as a deterrent on the basis
of the size of its army and its equipment and the willingness of its
officers to cooperate will be greatly reduced.
2. Syria and the Palestinians.
In all probability, elements of the PLA will be redeployed to their
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former points of departure: Ayn Jallut Brigade to Egypt, Qadisiyya to
Jordan, and the Hittin Brigade to Syria; the DPFLP and PFLP-GC forces
will probably be stationed in Syria, since the leaders of these groups
tended to be pro-Syrian and reluctantly joined Fatah after the Syrian
intervention; Saigah, under Syrian control from the beginning, will
return to its bases in Syria, too; the remnants of the ALF will, in all
probability, journey to Iraq. The PFLP and Fatah pose a greater
problem. The remaining forces of the PFLP will not be allowed to enter
Syria while Fatah forces will be permitted only if Yasser Arafat
agrees to strict Syrian'control. Therefore, the PFLP probably will
move to either Iraq or Libya, with the latter as a more likely choice,
while Fatah leadership will accede to Syrian demands. Fatah headquarters,
though, will be moved to Cairo. In essence, therefore, Syria will have
acheived control over most of the Palestinians and will be in a position
to pursue its policy of reconciling the PLO/Fatah with Jordan in prepa-
ration for a peace conference. The presence of the ALF in Iraq and
the PFLP in Libya increases the capabilities of these two countries to
undertake activities which will be aimed at preventing a peace conference
and threaten those Arab leaders who favor such a peace conference.
Thus, a limited wave of regional and international terrorist acts can
be anticipated.
3. The Syrian/Jordanian Entente.
The Syrian/Jordanian entente is not likely to be shaken by the turn
of events in Lebanon and the subsequent non-completion of the Eastern
Front. Since Syria will emerge from the crisis with most of the
Palestinian forces under its control, and with its intention to sponsor
a PLO/Fatah-Jordanian reconciliation, cooperation between Jordan and
Syria is likely to continue. The credibility, however, of the Eastern
Front will be greatly jeopardized, and military cooperation between the
two countries most likely will be curtailed.
4. Lebanon and the Syrian/Jordanian Entente.
The Lebanese, and especially the Christians and Shi'ites, will
continue to cooperate with the regime of Hafez Assad, since psycho-
logically both the Christians and the Shi'ites are dependent on Syria
for their security. Also, cooperation is likely to continue since
the economic realities of a war-ravaged Lebanon dictate cooperation
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in such fields as tourism, construction, transit rights, and trade.
Finally, the installation of Elias Sarkis as president and his pro-
Syrian attitude and that of the former members of the Nahj, will
guarantee good relations with Syria.
5. The Lebanese crisis at the United Nations.
Although it is understood that the Israeli intervention would not
result in a fifth Arab-Israeli war, and that Israel would pull back if
conditions were met, the Arab states would, in an effort to save face
and induce the Palestinians into withdrawing their forces from Lebanon
to comply with Israeli demands, insist that the whole Arab-Israeli
issue, especially the Palestinian problem and Israeli colonization of
the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the El-Arish areas, be discussed
anew. To the extent that Syria may have been able to effect a recon-
ciliation between the PLO/Fatah and Jordan, this could be a propitious
time to have peace initiatives resume, especially when it appears that
the question of mutual PLO-Israel recognition will have been side-stepped
and that Jordan, thus, would be able to act as a negotiator for the
Palestinians. If Syria cannot effect the reconciliation between the
PLO/Fatah and Jordan, it appears that Israel will agree to a recognition
of the newly-elected West Bank Palestinian leaders as temporary valid
negotiators for all the Palestinians, in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal
from some parts of the Golan as a prelude to a full peace conference, at
which all parties, then, could be seated. In other words, the presence
of United Nations troops on the Lebanese-Israeli and Israeli-Syrian
frontiers will not complicate the issue, but rather, will give Israel
a greater sense of security.
6. International economic assistance.
Lebanon probably will benefit most from this turn of events in terms
of economic assistance. France, because of its historic links with
Lebanon and the presence of its troops on Lebanese soil, would be able
to assist Lebanon the most. Iraqi and Libyan aid also will be forth-
coming, although in a curtailed fashion to ensure that the Lebanese
government, and especially the Christians, adhere to the new National
Covenant. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, because of their investments
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in Lebanon and because of an interest in having that country resume
its position as a banking, commercial, and service center, will also
contribute. The Shah of Iran has stated that he, too, will contribute,
with the understanding that the money will go for the economic and
social development of areas predominantly inhabited by Shi'ites.
Syria and the Syrian/Jordanian entente also will be the focus of
French and West German assistance. The economic subsidies from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia will be resumed and, because of the good relations that
now exist between Hafez Assad and King Hussein and the Shah, some
economic assistance will be forthcoming from Iran. The United States,
in an attempt to keep an even-handed policy, also will feel compelled
to contribute to Lebanon and the Syria/Jordanian entente, to the slight
detriment of Egypt, but not at the level as projected in Scenario 1.
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Scenario 4B
"The conditions which led to an Israeli intervention in' Scenario 4A are
presumed to apply to Scenario 4B, with the exception that Israel refuses
to withdraw from Lebanese territory as demanded by the United Nations.
It is also presumed in this Scenario that the Israeli advance will be. to
the Litani River, which corresponds to the yet to be defined Israeli
Red Line."
Domestic Effects
The effects of an Israeli advance to the Litani River will be similar
to those discussed in Scenario 4A (Domestic Effects) but will differ on
several points. In the first place, the guerrilla forces will not have
to agree to evacuate Lebanon and will be concentrated in the area between
the Litani River and the Beirut-Damascus road, thereby constituting a
first-line of defense. Secondly, the Israeli unwillingness to evacuate
Lebanon will put the Christians in a quandary. Although the Israeli
invasion will have relieved pressure on them, it would be difficult for
the Marionites to publicly acquiesce to a permanent or quasi-permanent
Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory. This inability to publicly
acquiesce will, in turn, make reconciliation between the opposing factions
in the Lebanese crisis easier since Israel will once more be the country
on which all Arabs seem to agree--the common enemy. The Christians, further,
will be unable to demand that the Palestinians evacuate Lebanon or even
abide by the Cairo Accords of 1969, so long as they have publicly accepted
the fact that Israel is an aggressor.
Moreover, the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon
will ipso facto turn Lebanon into a confrontation state. This will mean
that Lebanon most likely will have to accept partnership in any future
Arab-Israeli conflict. The effect of this factor on the domestic front
also will facilitate reconciliation between Christians and Muslims since
it will have fulfilled another of the Muslim demands. Nonetheless, the
Christians will be in a better position to secure for themselves minimal
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changes in the political structure of the country since their cooperation
will be deemed necessary by the Muslims.
it must be pointed out, however, that the Maronites will secretly
be quite. pleased with the Israeli occupation, since it will reduce the
number of Muslims in a newly delineated Lebanon minus its southern
extremity and therefore give the Maronites a majt.ority. The Maronites,
furthermore, will blame the invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon
on the Palestinians and the Arab Rejectionist Front.
Although it is expected that a refugee problem may arise from an
Israeli occupation, those refugees who will move north mainly will be
Palestinians located in and around Tyre. Since the Lebanese of southern
Lebanon appear to be receptive to the limited Israeli "open door" policy
initiated during the past few months, a large number may opt to remain,
especially if Israel encourages them to do so; and it will be to Israel's
interest to encourage them to stay, since an anticipated resumption of
Palestinian guerrilla activity across the Litani River will have to target
the Lebanese population of southern Lebanon before it can reach the Israeli
settlements in northern Israel. In other words, Israel will seek to turn
the Lebanese population of southern Lebanon to its advantage the way they,
have done so with the Druze population of Israel.
The Christians most likely will not allow Palestinian or Muslim
Lebanese refugees to cross into their enclave of Mount Lebanon, thereby
creating a form of de facto partition. They will probably use the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon to strengthen their enclave by encouraging
the Christians residing in the area situated between the Litani River and
the Beirut-Damascus road to emigrate. Then, too the occupation of southern
Lebanon will be used as an excuse to move most industries and commerce/
banking northward because of the proximity of Beirut and the area between
the Litani River and the Beirut-Damascus road to Israeli retaliatory raids.
1. Political. The Christians will probably attempt to formalise
the de facto partition by suggesting federation or confederation similar
to what was presented in Scenario 3 (Domestic Effects; Political).
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2. Military. The Christians most likely will use the Israeli occu-
pation as justification for the creation of an army composed of home or
territorial guard units. In other words, they will suggest that the
existing militias be constituted as territorial guards, since these
militias have been and will be recruited. from their respective Christians
and Muslim areas, and because-of their knowledge of'their?own terrain, will
be better able to defend it against anticipated Israeli attacks. Most
likely this proposal will be agreed to by the Leftists/Palestinians and
Muslims, but especially the Palestinians, since it will afford them a
greater degree of freedom to continue to operate against Israel than would
an integrated Lebanese army. A compromise will be made and accepted by
both factions regarding coordination. Coordination between these two
territorial armies will be made at higher headquarters, brigade or army
levels, for the purposes of general policy, strategy, and arms acquisi-
tions.
Regional and Systemic Effects
1. Syria and Israel. In general the Israeli invasion of Lebanon will
weaken the regime of Hafez Assad and compel him to seek reconciliation
with the Rejectionists. However, Syrian reaction to an Israeli invasion
and occupation of Lebanon will depend on whether the Israelis occupy all
of the region, or whether the Israelis occupy only the littoral and the
southern extension of the Lebanons (the mountain ranges) thereby leaving
the southern extremity of the Bekaa and the Lebanese slopes of Mount Hermon
as a no man's land between the Israeli and Syrian armies. In the first
instance, the Syrians will be presented with a serious military problem
since total occupation will enable Israeli forces to flank the Syrian
defenses in the Golan. The military threat will be judged to be so great
by the Syrians that they may have to acquiesce to the positioning of
Iraqi troops in Syria, an act which will not only present problems for
the Syrian Ba'ath but will also greatly increase tension in that area,
since Israel is not likely to relish Iraqi troops on its border.
In the second instance, with the establishment of a no man's land,
the Syrians may have more time in which to maneuver diplomatically between
55
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Iraq and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Egypt and the United States
on the other.
2. Syria and Jordan. The effects of the Israeli occupation of
southern Lebanon on the envisaged Syrian-Jordanian entente will be positive
and reinforcing, especially in the second instance mentioned above, since
Syria will attemp to use King Hussein's good offices to seek United States
pressure on Israel for withdrawal. It will in a sense give Hussein much
greater say in matters affecting the Syrian-Jordanian entente and will
enable him to become a greater moderating influence, especially if it
appears that the United States is responding to Hussein's appeal for action.
King Hussein's future, in fact, will depend very much on United States
action, since inaction will gradually propel Syria into the arms of Iraq
which, in turn, means trouble for Jordan.
3. Syria and Egypt. Syria will have to draw closer to Egypt
in either of the above instances, since it will need Egypt and Egyptian
good offices to seek United States pressure for an Israeli withdrawal or
Egyptian military participation in a fifth war should events deteriorate
drastically. The Sadat regime will, in turn, be weakened if the United
States fails to secure Israel's withdrawal since it will signal to the
Egyptians the inability or unwillingness of the United States to exert
the necessary pressure, not only to secure an Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon but also an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Pressure by the Egyptian military circles on the Sadat regime to restore
good relations with the Soviet Union will intensify and will be solidly
based on the argument that Egypt has to arm itself in an attempt to
liberate its Israeli-occupied territory now that the United States appears
unwilling or unable to pressure Israel into greater concessions. As a
first step, Egypt must seek a rapprochement with Libya as a means of tapping
into Soviet weaponry and spare parts now in the Libyan arsenal.
4. The Palestinians. The Israeli move into and occupation of southern
Lebanon will once more enhance the position of the PLO since Syria and, to
a lesser extent, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, will have to strengthen them in
case of the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli confrontation. The
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Palestinians themselves will use the Israeli occupation as justification
for their struggle against that state, and will use the Lebanese situation
to seek greater support for themselves in the Third World countries and
the Eastern Bloc. The Rejectionists among the Palestinians will be strength-
ened and a renewed wave of world-wide terrorism must be expected.
5. The United States and Western Europe. It can be expected that
both the United States and Western Europe will be greatly affected by
the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon and the resultant
threat of a possible fifth Arab-Israeli war. Western Europe, and especially
France, will demand the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from
Lebanon, and may go along with an anticipated call by Arab states at the
Security Council for sanctions against Israel. The United States may find
it difficult to balance its refusal to accede to a call for sanctions and
its role as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A refusal to
go along with sanctions as a means of pressuring Israel will be perceived
by the Arabs as the end of American "even handedness," thereby seriously
jeopardizing the recent gains made by the United States in the Arab world.
But a United States acceptance of sanctions surely will antagonize Israel,
and render it more unwilling to consider further retreat from Arab occupied
territories. It may deprive the United States of whatever leverage it now
has over Israel, especially if the government of Prime Minister Rabin
falls and is replaced by an Israeli government of national unity in which
the Likud and the Mapai hawks will come to exercise a greater influence.
On the other hand, one has to expect that Israel will not withdraw
from Lebanon as a result of United Nations pressure, but may agree to do so
in return for greater United States aid.
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p. 1
1An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 16 (19 April 1976), p. 2.
2An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 14 (5 April 1976), p. 1.
3An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 16 (19 April 1976), p. 2.
4An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 7 (16 February 1976), P. 1.
5Ibid.
6An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 6 (9 February 1976),
7An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 9 (1 March 1976),
p. 1.
8An Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 6, No. 49 (8 December 1975), p. 3.
9Washington Post, May 29, 1976, p. A-9; An-Nahar Arab Report,
"Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 23 (7 June 1976), p. 2.
10 Interview by P. Jureidini with a former member of the Lebanese
Duexieme Bureau.
11Ash-Sharp (Beirut), 22 April 1976, p. 3.
12An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 24 (14 June 1976), p. 2.
13An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 6
(9 February 1976), p. 1.
14Ibid_, p. 2.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 11 (15 March 1976),
p. 2.
18Elias ad-Dirty, "Elias Sarkis: The Heir-Apparent to the Era of
the Amir," An-Nahar Files, No. 9 (in Arabic), An-Nahar Publishing House,
1970, np.
19An-Nahar Arab Report, "Economics & Oil," Vol. 7, No. 11 (15 March 1976),
p. 2.
20Ad-Dirry, Op. Cit.
21 Discussions by P. Jureidini with Lebanese businessmen in Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, and Paris, France.
22An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 2 (12 January 1976), p. 1.
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"An-Nahar Arab Report, "Chronology," Vol. 7, No. 3 (19 January 1976),
p. 1.
24An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No..7 (16 February 1976), p. 1.
25An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 13 (29 March 1976), p. 2.
26 An-Nahar Arab Report, Vol. 7, No. 6 (9 February 1976), pp. 1-2.
27Based on discussions between P. Jureidini and Bonn, West German
officials.
28New York Times, July 12, 1976, p. 6.
291bid.
30The Middle East, "Moves Toward Confederation," No. 20 (19 June 1976),
pp. 1-2.
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