THE IMPACT OF FOOD UNCERTAINTY AND SCARCITY ON THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00889A000800150001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: PAPER

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THE IMPACT OF FOOD UNCERTAINTY AND SCARCITY
ON THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Office o Political Research
September 1976
NOTE: In keeping with the International Functional Staff's
responsibility for the assessment of major global problems,
consideration is being given to a systematic study of how the
US and the international system are likely to be affected by
the world food supply and demand situation over the next decade
or so. This working paper contains a tentative look at some
relevant issues, a provisional conceptual framework, and some
preliminary hypotheses. The judgments expressed are solely
those of the author. The paper is not for attribution or cita-
tion and does not represent an official CIA or OPR view. Com-
ments are most welcome and may be addressed to the author at
room 3E63, CIA Headquarters Building,
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)
STAT
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THE IMPACT OF FOOD UNCERTAINTY AND SCARCITY
ON THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Doubts about the ability of world food supply (production
plus carry-over stocks) to keep pace with demand (physiological
needs of an expanding population plus desires born of affluence)
have given rise to food uncertainty. The allocation and use of
the world's agricultural resources, heretofore almost exclusively
a function of economic and market forces, consequently has entered
a process of politicization that would become particularly conten-
tious in a period of actual food scarcity.
The US cannot avoid being affected by this process as the
disposition of its agricultural bounty inevitably becomes both a
domestic and an international political issue. As the world's
preeminent food exporter the US seemingly stands to realize sig-
nificant gains from increasing international dependence on its
exportable surpluses. Two potential sources of international
influences are:
--economic strength produced by income from foreign food
sales,
--political leverage provided by discretionary allocation
of food exports.
Assuming US policies conducive to the realization of these
potentials, food-resultant economic strength might be the more
serviceable source of international influence during food uncer-
tainty, but food-derived political leverage could become paramount
in a period of food scarcity.
The impact of food uncertainty and scarcity will pose chal-
lenges as well as opportunities. Food-related strength and lever-
age can help the US deal with disruptions to the international
system, but there are limits to the influence they can furnish.
How the US might use food-related strength or leverage is, moreover,
likely to be greatly affected by the dynamics of internal conflict
between political pragmatism and humanitarian inclinations.
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THE IMPACT OF FOOD UNCERTAINTY AND SCARCITY
ON THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Whether, when, and to what extent world food production
will significantly and persistently fall short of demand
is unclear. The international political implications of
this uncertainty already are being felt, however, and the
potentially pervasive impact of food scarcity warrants
anticipatory attention. The US seemingly stands to realize
significant gains from increasing international dependence
on its agricultural resources, but the politicization of
food distribution will bring challenge as well as oppor-
tunity. Domestic political and economic preferences may
have to be reconciled with new international realities.
National self-interest and political pragmatism, moreover,
are likely to conflict with moral ideals and humanitarian
inclinations.
Prospects for Supply and Demand
Land,. fertilizer, and known technology already are being
employed at near optimum levels in the US, and only marginal gains
in food production appear attainable within the next decade.
Improving application of agrotechnology promises to increase out-
put significantly in the Soviet Union, but the potential for prog-
ress is most dramatic in the developing nations.
The wide gap in per acre yield between farms in the developed
and developing countries can be narrowed by inputs of technology
and fertilizer, and much land remains to be brought into production.
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But there are considerable economic, political and cultural
impediments to fulfillment of the physical possibilities. The
high cost of energy and fertilizer, inefficient land tenure
patterns, disincentives to production caused by policies aimed
at keeping food prices down in the burgeoning cities, and reluc-
tance by national leaderships (who tend to define modernization
in terms of industrial development) to expend limited resources
on agricultural infrastructure are examples of these kinds of
constraints. There also are instances where poor agricultural
practices followed in efforts to quickly increase output are'
going to have severely counterproductive consequences.
Technology and climate figure heavily in the outlook for
supply. New food production techniques such as those involving
hydroponics and single-cell proteins could be of great importance
if their large scale use becomes both technically and economically
feasible. A fundamental world climate change that. impacted
negatively on traditional food sources, however, might more than
offset such technological gains. Climatologists hold widely
varying opinions on the direction, pace, and permanence of climate
change, and there is no consensus about the interaction of natural
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and man-made causes. Most knowledgeable observers agree, though,
that we would be unwise to count on a continuation of the climate
of the recent past, which has, in the long view, been unusually
stable and favorable for agriculture.
Yearly production, of course, is not the sole component of
world food supply. Available carry-over stocks must also be
tallied. Depleted grain stocks currently are being rebuilt in
the US and elsewhere--even in India. The generally strong agri-
cultural performance making this possible, however, has also helped
dissipate an international sense of urgency about the future.
Immediate production sufficiency tends to breed complacency about
long-term trends, and prospects for the early establishment of an
international grain reserve system (or even an international system
of nationally-held reserves) now appear dim.
Supply will continue to vary from year to year, but aggregate
world demand for food keeps rising. With population increasing at
an unprecedently high rate from the largest base in human history
there are some 80 million additional people to feed each year,
mostly in the poorer developing countries. Young people who have
yet to reach child bearing age provide a built in momentum that
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will keep the populations of these countries expanding for decades
after they achieve--if indeed they do achieve--replacement level
fertility.
Demand is not merely a function of numbers of people and
physiological requirements, it also involves human wants and tastes.
As their disposable incomes rise, people tend to seek variety in
their diets and to make them richer in protein, e.g., through
'increased consumption of meat. The availability and price of the
food items people want regulates their ability to indulge these
desires. The impact of affluence on demand, therefore, is depen-
dent on supply, economic conditions generally, and on choices
made by national leaders (especially those in charge of centrally
planned economies).
Uncertainty and Scarcity
Whether, when, and to what extent food supply will fall short
of demand cannot be forecast with precision. Yet it is clear that
widespread doubt about maintenance of the precarious supply-demand
balance has given rise to world food uncertainty, and this in itself
has important international political ramifications.
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World food uncertainty is a situation in which a significant
number of nations, to varying degrees, cannot take for granted
their ability to produce or procure enough food to meet--in the
case of populous poorer countries--basic subsistence requirements,
or--in the case of more affluent nations--desired nutritional
standards. A period of food uncertainty may involve much malnutri-
tion, some starvation, and even a few instances of famine. It may
or may not be followed by actual food scarcity: that is, a period
in which world food production regularly falls significantly short
of demand, there are insufficient reserve stocks to fill the gap,
and the consequences--for some at least--are correspondingly more
severe.
What, then, might the advent of food uncertainty and the
prospect of food scarcity mean for the US and the international
system?
A World of Food Uncertainty
There are important differences in how nations perceive and
respond to food uncertainty. Poorer food deficient countries are
prone to view the world food "problem" as one of inequitable
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distribution and consumption rather than shortage. The affluent
nations' absorption of a disproportionate share of world resources
thus is identified as the cause of the problem, and solutions are
articulated more in terms of "distributive justice" than increased
production.
The poorest and most populous food deficient nations, those
whose ability to produce or procure enough food is most dubious
in a period of uncertainty, are likely to become increasingly
resentful toward those in the developed world--especially in the
developed Western world--whom they blame for their plight. Colonial
legacies of commercial crops, international encouragement of modern-
ization through pursuit of comparative advantage and participation
in the world market economy, and the easy availability--until quite
recently--of surplus US grain on concessionary terms that discour-
aged domestic production are some of the factors cited in support
of the contention that the poorer countries have been deceived and
abused. To at least some in the developing world, therefore, the
food situation is a manipulative device for keeping them in their
place; advocacy of population control by developed nations is
selfishly motivated; and pressure on food deficient developing
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countries to increase agricultural productivity is a ploy to
disrupt industrialization and modernization plans. The spread
of these kinds of beliefs in a period of food uncertainty would
impede cooperative international efforts to increase food supply.
Food uncertainty already is having some disruptive inter-
national consequences. It is, for example, helping to strain
the international economic order as food deficient nations that
export industrial raw materials begin to perceive an additional
reason for pressing efforts to improve their terms of trade.
Alleged inequities of the global grain trade are coming under
fire from the poorest countries. They may agitate for price
preferences or other arrangements to compensate for their disad-
vantageous position. Bitter controversy could arise, both within
and among nations, over the morality of feeding grain to livestock
while some people go hungry or starve.
Food uncertainty could also complicate the achievement of
international agreement on global issues such as marine resource
conservation and pollution abatement. Nations with immediate
worries about feeding themselves are likely to be less concerned
with the ecological effect of fishing or other food producing
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activity even when the result is injury to their own long-run"
interests. Food deficient nations could also attempt to make
their cooperation in various international endeavors contingent
on assurances of adequate food supplies. International efforts
to deal with food uncertainty might become a key intersection
in North-South/East-West relations. The Soviets have tended to
use international gatherings on food issues as opportunities to
stroke the frustration and resentment of the poor and direct it
against the West.
Uncertainty and the US
As the world's preeminent food exporter--and the major producer
likely to be least affected by adverse climate change--the US seems
assured of deriving some significant benefits from increased foreign
dependence on its agricultural resources. A period of food uncer-
tainty means a high and relatively steady demand for US exports, and
income from foreign food sales produces economic strength. The
extent to which this food-resultant economic strength is transformed
into international influence will depend on whether other nations
perceive the US to be using it in a way that enhances US ability to
exercise military, economic, or political power.
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The possession of plenty amidst uncertainty provides the US
with another potential source of international influence: leverage
derived from discretionary allocation of agricultural exports, i.e.,
the ability to decide to whom to sell or give food. The derivation
and utility of this food-derived political leverage is not inevit-
able, but it should not be assumed that constraints imposed by mutual
national dependencies and the interconnection of international issues
preclude its employment. The importance of food-derived leverage
will depend on the interplay of a number of complex considerations.
Fluctuating levels of food uncertainty will affect the utility
of food-derived leverage. Preoccupation with food supply will vary
from time to time and place to place. A good harvest or two in a
particular nation or region will tend to ease concern about the future
and decrease susceptibility to food-derived leverage, especially if
some stockpiling is accomplished. Different degrees of dependence
on US production will also play a role. Food-derived leverage stands
to be most effective when applied to nations that are vulnerable,
rather than merely sensitive, to an interruption in imports from the
US. The distinction between vulnerability and sensitivity is con-
ditioned by such factors as the use to which the imports are put
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(e.g., human consumption or livestock feed), the nation's capacity
to produce more, its wherewithal to purchase substitutes (provided
they are available), and its ability to simply do without. Attitudes
of national leaderships toward high prices, shortages,hunger, and
popular discontent determine the degree to which imports from the
US are considered essential, and hence the nation's relative sus-
ceptibility to food-derived leverage. It is important to recognize
that for some nations malnutrition, starvation, and even some famine
might be neither unusual nor particularly disruptive politically.
The effectiveness of food-derived leverage during food uncer-
tainty will also depend on the kinds of attitudes or behaviors it
seeks.to induce, i.e., on the degree of conflict between the outcome
sought by the US and the preferences of those upon whom the leverage
is brought to bear. The things the US might want most to affect
with food-derived leverage--e.g., political philosophies, development
strategies, population policies, attitudes toward resource use and
environmental protection--probably are those least amenable to such
influence. Except perhaps for the poorest and most populous countries,
needs for US food in a period of uncertainty are unlikely to be criti-
cal enough to make asymmetrical quid pro quos, i.e., long-term
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non-reversible changes in basic national domestic or foreign
policies, achievable with food-derived leverage. Attitudes or
behavior on less fundamental issues, e.g., transitory policies
or specific tactical disputes, should be more amenable to the
use of food-derived leverage. In these kinds of cases, however,
the objective might not always be worth the cost in resentment
engendered among those to whom the leverage was applied.
The utility of food-derived leverage will also be affected
by abilities of other nations to bring countervailing leverage
to bear on the US through, for example, exploitation of US depen-
dence on a particular import. Countervailing leverage might also
arise from another nation's strategic location, political alignment,
membership in the nuclear club, or status as a super or regional
power. To the extent that the US covets stability in the inter-
national system and perceives upheaval as potentially inimical to
its interests, the spectre of famine could itself give rise to
countervailing leverage.
The US in a World of Food Scarcity
Movement from food uncertainty to an apparently interminable
period of actual scarcity would increase the potential for US
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ascendency. Income from foreign food sales would reflect rising
real prices, with a concomitant jump in food-resultant economic
strength and potential international influence. But there would
be limits to this potential, since income from food safes would
cease to produce a net increase in economic strength as rising
food prices forced customers to curtail purchases of other US
exports.
The utility of food-derived leverage would be greatly enhanced.
Needs for imports from the US-in a period of food scarcity would be
increasingly permanent and essential. With heightened competition
for available supplies and the exhaustion of alternative suppliers,
food-derived leverage might be capable of affecting the basic national
policies of a widening circle of nations.
Increased challenges and dangers would accompany these oppor-
tunities, however. Antipathy between rich and poor nations would
intensify as disparities in wealth began to spell the difference
between life and death, especially if the affluent continued to
indulge their desires as well as meet their basic needs. The inter-
national economic order would be subjected to tremendous stress as
food deficient countries struggled to increase their export earnings
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in order to remain capable of paying for agricultural imports. If
spiraling prices were to force more and more nations out of the
bidding for available supplies, there would be mounting pressure
for the replacement of market distribution by an "equitable" inter-
national allocation system.
Should anxiety give way to desperation the US might have to
contend with international disruption caused by misguided attempts
at climate control, the use of force, foraging populations, and
perhaps even with nuclear or terrorist-style blackmail. It would
take more than food-derived leverage to cope with problems of this
order.
Implications for US Policy
The allocation and use of the world's agricultural resources,
heretofore almost exclusively a function of economic and market
forces, has with the advent of food uncertainty entered a process
of politicization that would become particularly contentious in a
period of food scarcity. The US cannot avoid being affected by this
process as the disposition of its agricultural bounty inevitably
becomes both a domestic and an international political issue. As
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principal custodian of an object of intense international competition,
moreover, the US could find its agricultural marketing system the
target of manipulation and be caught in the middle of a potentially
explosive dispute in which it would stand to make enemies no matter
what course it chose.
It therefore seems essential for the US to understand the rela-
tionships among its agricultural resources, national interests, and
foreign policy goals. It is especially important that these connections
be viewed in the broad context of the domestic economy, the link between
food production and energy consumption, and the long-term impact of
production and export maximization on the environment and the ecological
systems upon which food production depends.
The potential utility of food-derived leverage as a source of
international influence is meaningless unless the US is willing to
use such leverage as an instrument of its foreign policy and possesses
the capability to do so. These matters transcend the political
unpalatability of ad hoc export embargos; they involve fundmental
US attitudes about agriculture, economics, morality, and foreign
policy. Power to apportion available resources between domestic
consumption, sale abroad, and foreign aid is, of course, presently
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shared by the government, private institutions, and market forces.
The same holds true for allocation among potential customers. Current
long-term commitments and political relationships with traditional
buyers help define the boundaries of flexibility.
The idea of having to consciously decide which nations to feed
is not particularly attractive. In a period of prolonged uncertainty
or actual scarcity, however, it would become increasingly apparent
that discriminatory allocation is inevitable when demand exceeds
supply, and that the international marketplace is a mechanism that
allocates food only to those who can afford to pay for it. Popular
pressure for a change in this state of affairs would likely be con-
siderable. Thus, moral inclinations and the international political
challenges posed by uncertainty and scarcity may both militate strongly
against continued sharing of allocation decision making power with
private and market forces. While the domestic political interplay
that may ultimately lead to an increased government role must obviously
remain beyond the scope of a study by this agency, it does seem likely
that the international politicization of food distribution will sooner
or later cause the US (perhaps, but not necessarily out of a desire
to employ food-derived leverage) to extend and regularize government
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control over the disposition of agricultural resources. The US
would then have to make conscious allocative decisions, and
(assuming any resulting disincentives to US producers did not sig-
nificantly reduce supplies available for export) food-derived
leverage would, sought or not, have become a reality.
Prospects for Strength and Leverage
For reasons mentioned earlier, however, food-derived leverage
stands to be only marginally useful during food uncertainty, at
least vis-a-vis the nations and issues the US might want most to
influence. During uncertainty, moreover, the US may still lack
extensive control over the allocation of its food exports. Food-
resultant economic strength might be a more serviceable source of
international influence, if US policies are conducive to this con-
version. During food uncertainty, in other words, income from
foreign food sales that helps make the US appear more powerful may
be more significant than the choosing of customers.
In a period of food scarcity, on the other hand, the US assumedly
would have secured more control over the disposition of its food
exports, and the highly integrated societies of food deficient developed
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countries might make them particularly susceptible to food-derived
leverage. Rising income from foreign food sales, meanwhile, might
no longer be producing a net increase in economic strength. Food-
derived leverage could thus become the paramount source of food-
related influence. The ability to decide to whom to sell and on
what terms, would, in other words, become more important than the
economic strength flowing from the sale.
Food-derived leverage would be useful, however, only so long
as governments remained capable of making and enforcing decisions.
If the impact of food scarcity were to be so disruptive as to cause
the international system to descend into chaos, the very factors
giving rise to food-derived leverage would render it futile.
A FINAL NOTE
Within the US, food uncertainty and scarcity could cause con-
siderable conflict between prevailing conceptions of national self-
interest and political pragmatism on the one hand, and moral ideals
and humanitarian inclinations on the other. This dichotomy seems
likely to permeate debate on issues such as the degree to which the
US should press its unique advantage; the nations upon-and purposes
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for which food-derived leverage should be brought to bear; and to
which nations and in what order and proportion food exports should
be allocated. In so doing, it would heavily influence how the US
might use its food-related strength and leverage.
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