THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 10, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
Secret
The USSR
31ONAL AND
I TICAL ANALYSIS
Secret
RP ASU 77-002
10 February 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 Approved For Release 2004/07/1r,4tft-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
THE USSR
10 February 1977
Soviet Push for Renewed Middle East
Peace Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25X1
25X1A
This publication is prepared by the USSR Division, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. The views presented are the personal judgments of analysts on signifi-
cant events or trends in Soviet foreign and domestic affairs. Although the analysis
will center on political matters, it will discuss politically relevant economic or
strategic trends when appropriate. Differences of opinion will sometimes be aired to
present consumers with a range of analytical views. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to
RP ASU 77-002
10 February 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07? 4R ETA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 Approved For Release 2004/07/1rj-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
25X1A
Soviet Push for Renewed Middle East Peace Conference
The Soviets continue to push for the early resump-
tion of the Middle East peace conference in Geneva,
which they maintain is the only avenue to successful ne-
gotiations. This position reflects both their concern
that they will again be excluded from the negotiating
process and their eagerness to play a leading role in
that process--a role guaranteed by their position at the
conference as co-chairman with the US.
Soviet concern about their participation in peace
talks was reinforced when the Egyptians began their so-
called peace offensive without consulting the USSR and
when Egypt and Syria reached a rapprochement without
Soviet participation. The Soviets view both develop-
ments as part of a possible US-Saudi plot to conduct
negotiations outside the Geneva framework and to ex-
clude the USSR.
While anxious to prevent such a development, the
Soviets have been limited in their ability to respond.
They cannot openly voice disapproval of a broadly stated
Arab peace offensive without appearing obstructionist,
nor can they attack a rapprochement between Egypt and
Syria when they ostensibly support Arab unity in the
struggle against Israel. They have therefore voiced
their support for the Geneva forum more vigorously in
order to demonstrate their own leadership role and to
warn of the consequences of proceeding without them.
The Soviets have used several methods to indicate
that they must be included in the negotiating process.
They have frequently noted both publicly and privately
that step-by-step diplomacy is no longer possible and
that comprehensive talks at Geneva represent the only
approach with a chance of success. More concretely
they notified the United Nations last December that
they would not pay their 1975-76 assessment for support
RP ASU, 77-002
10 February 1977
-1-
Approved For Release 2004/0i/~~R EEIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
SECRET
25X1X
of the United Nations emergency forces, specifically
those forces designated to police Phase II of the Sinai
disengagement accords. They asserted that the disengage-
ment talks had been conducted outside the Geneva frame-
work, that they had not been involved, and that they
therefore did not bear any responsibility to support the
accords. Clearly, the message being delivered was that
the USSR does not intend to recognize or support similar
subsequent agreements either. Finally, Soviet efforts
to improve their relations in the Arab world with such
radical, anti-settlement forces as Libya and Iraq, are
a reminder that the USSR is in a position to assist
those who would disrupt unsatisfactory negotiations.
To balance their warnings, the Soviets have simul-
taneously conducted a seemingly positive diplomatic
campaign designed to demonstrate that they should play
a leadership role in peace talks. Recently, Soviet lead-
er Brezhnev voiced positions which, while not new, sug-
gest a more accommodating position. Brezhnev stated in
a speech on January 18 that "Israel of course has the
right to state independence and secure existence, but
the Arab people of Palestine have a similar right."
While the formal Soviet position has always included
recognition of Israel's right to exist, Soviet leaders
have generally played down this recognition, highlight-
ing instead their backing for the Palestinian cause.
Their desire to move toward Geneva requires some gesture
toward Israel, however. Brezhnev's statement has since
been treated by the Soviet press as a constructive ap-
proach to the Middle East problem. A Soviet academi-
cian stated that Brezhnev's speech represented a "con-
cession, a gesture of good will to Israel and the United
States."
25X1X
In a similar gesture
Brezhnev agreed that there were extremists within the
Palestine Liberation organization who would not recog-
nize Israel, but that "we will show them that this step
is necessary." This statement again conveyed the im-
pression that the Soviet Union is prepared to play an
active and constructive role in pushing for a settle-
ment.
RP ASU 77-002
10 February 1977
Approved For Release 2004/08LMECIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 Approved For Release 2004/07/169gDP79T00912A000100010002-6
Brezhnev's statements are reminiscent of the Soviet
proposal last October calling for a return to Geneva
and adding a fourth condition for a Middle East settle-
ment to the standard Soviet three (withdrawal of Israeli
forces to the 1967 borders, recognition of a Palestinian
state, guaranteed security and borders for all nations
in the area). To these were added a call for an end to
the state of war in the Middle East. This was undoubt-
edly designed to convey good will on the part of the
USSR, as well as to put pressure on Israel, which has
long called for a formal end to the state of war as
part of any settlement.
On the surface, these episodes suggest an aggres-
sive Soviet diplomacy aimed at leading the Middle East
toward an equitable settlement. In fact, they reflect
the continuing Soviet effort to walk a careful line be-
tween trying to appear a leader and being careful not
to get out in front of the "confrontation states" (par-
ticularly Egypt and Syria) with respect to either the
framework or substance of the talks. Although they
have hinted they will be flexible, the Soviets have in
fact avoided taking any positions which might be criti-
cized by these countries. Although they sometimes have
been vague in their statements about the crucial ques-
tion of Palestinian participation at Geneva, they have
both reaffirmed their view that the Palestinians must
be represented from the beginning of the conference and
steadily maintained that this is ultimately a matter
for the Arabs to decide. In short, it seems likely
that they will continue to follow the position of the
"confrontation states" on all important substantive mat-
ters and, at the same time, try to project the appear-
ance of innovation and leadership and er re that Ge-
neva remains the forum for negotiations. 25X1
RP ASU 77-002
10 February 1977
Approved For Release 2004/07'ig9'JIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010002-6