THE USSR SUPPLEMENT REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 24, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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The USSR
Supplement
GAN
TICAL ANALYSIS
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THE USSR
SUPPLEMENT
24 March 1977
Gandhi's Defeat: New Problems for
the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ryabov's New Job as Party Defense 25X1A
Industry Chief Confirmed
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This publication is prepared by the USSR Division, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. The views presented are the personal judgments of analysts on signifi-
cant events or trends in Soviet foreign and domestic affairs. Although the analysis
will center on political matters, it will discuss politically relevant economic or
strategic trends when appropriate. Differences of opinion will sometimes be aired to
present consumers with a range of analytical views. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles or to
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Gandhi's Defeat: New Problems for the USSR
The defeat of Indira Gandhi poses serious problems
for the USSR. As Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko pri-
vately noted in June 1975, India has held a special po-
sition in Soviet foreign policy since the India-Pakistan
war of 1971. The essential ingredients of the Indian-
Soviet relationship have been their mutual anti-Peking
and, to a lesser degree, anti-Washington positions as
well as Moscow's willingness to back Indian policy on the
subcontinent. The USSR views its Indian policy as a
way to increase its own influence and balance that of
China's in South Asia and the third world. A key ele-
ment in Soviet calculations has been Gandhi's personal
commitment to continued good relations with Moscow.
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re to win
ion eprives the Soviet Union of its strongest
supporter in official Indian circles and raises the pos-
sibility of a shift in Indian foreign policy detrimental
to the USSR.
Even before the recent election, frictions had be-
gun to appear in Soviet-Indian relations. There are
indications that in early 1977 the Soviets feared Tudi
might become another
On the Soviet side, these tensions were largely
the result of Moscow's growing frustration over its
inability to translate military aid into political lev-
erage. Although the USSR is India's major arms supplier,
it has often been unable to mold Indian policy to its
liking. It was not able to stop India from reestablishing
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relations with Peking. The Indians have refused to
accept the Soviet concept of a regional, collective
security pact in Asia. Moscow and New Delhi remain at
loggerheads over law of the sea issues. Although the
two governments agree on the need for a demilitarized
Indian Ocean, the Indians have refused to yield to So-
viet arguments on nuclear nonproliferation. Both Mos-
cow and New Delhi oppose a US base on Diego Garcia, yet
the Indians have used the threat of such a base to wran-
gle more concessions from the Soviets while refusing to
grant them more port facilities.
At the same time, conservatives within Gandhi's
Congress Party and among the opposition have become in-
creasingly concerned over Soviet exploitation and domi-
nance. The fact that the Soviet Union supplied 75 per-
cent of India's military aid in 1976 and has tried in
the past to use its aid to influence Indian policies has
worried Indian policymakers. Moreover, the Indians have
expressed dissatisfaction in the past over the Soviets
refusal or inability to provide more sophisticated arms.
Last year India investigated the possibility of purchas-
ing Western aircraft, but financial considerations stood
in the way. In late 1976, however, India purchased the
right to manufacture a French air-to-air missile, more
advanced than the Soviet model it now produces.
At the same time, the Indians have expressed con-
cern over what they perceive to be an increasingly one-
sided economic relationship.r
on rupee-ruble valuation, an issue that could greatly
raise India's debt.
t o repayment o e is to the USSR results
in a ne outflow of resources to the Soviet Union. In
addition, the USSR has refused to accept Indian arguments
As Indian industry has developed, India's needs
its appeal.
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an nnhiRt;natPd and not easily filled by the Soviets.
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to expand the range of imports Soviet trade credits cov-
ored to include basic design concepts, spare parts, and
industrial raw materials.
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The Soviets have been aware of many of these mili-
tary and economic problems and moved to alleviate some
of them in 1976. They agreed to sell the Indians 70
MIG-2lBs and the right to manufacture them. In mid-
1976, they announced they would trade crude oil, a hard
currency earner for Moscow and a dear commodity for New
Delhi, for Indian pig iron, a product with few interna-
tional markets that the Soviets do not urgently need..
In the fall of 1976, the Soviet announced they would
supply India with 200 tons of heavy water for its nuclear
program.
In a sense, the Indians had the Soviets over a bE.r-
rel. The USSR had made such a heavy investment in India
that it could hardly turn its back on Indian requests
for more aid, and if some aspects of their relationship
with New Delhi bothered them, they could at least rest
easy, assuming that difficulties would be resolved as
long as Gandhi was in charge.
tnougn n is will probably continue to rely on Soviet
military aid, the new government will no doubt try to
lessen its overall dependence on Moscow and expand its
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relations with Europe and the US. Even before the elec-
tion there were indications that members of Gandhi's own
cabinet favored such a policy. During the election,
Moraji Desai, head of one of the four parties that com-
prised the anti-Gandhi Janata coalition and a leading
candidate to become prime minister, expressed doubts over
the wisdom of the Indian-Soviet treaty of 1971.
The Soviets may hope that the opposition coalition
that defeated Gandhi's Congress Party will splinter into
quarreling factions. One unfortunate possible side ef-
fect of such an event, from the Soviet perspective, is
that this could weaken India's position on the subcon-
tinent, a situation that could only work to the benefit
of Peking.
The Soviets may console themselves, however, with
the fact that the departure of Gandhi need not necessarily
lead to improved Indian relations with the US. The new
regime may continue India's policy of opposing a base on
Diego Garcia, although this problem may be alleviated
by recent changes in the US position on Indian Ocean
bases. Indian nuclear policy will probably present prob-
lems for both Moscow and Washington, because members of
the Janata leadership have for sometime advocated a nu-
clear weapons program for India.
The Soviets will probably try to increase contacts
with members of the new government while continuing to
support and encourage the CPI. On March 22, Izvestia
blamed Gandhi's defeat on her failure to assess popular
sentiment correctly, policy excesses, and her refusal
to work with the CPI. At the same time, Moscow will no
doubt try to mend its fences with India's neighbors.
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
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Ryabov's New Job as Party Defense Industry Chief Confirmed
linking CPSU Secretary Yakob P. Ryabov to the So-
viet missile and space program, a further indication
that he has taken over Ustinov's duties as party secre-
tary in charge of defense industries.
Ryabov was promoted to the Central Committee secre-
tariat last October,
party secretary in charge of defense industries is a
member of the Defense Council and supervises 8 to 10
defense industry ministries through the Military-Indus-
trial-Commission.
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confirmed that Ryabov has in fact assumed the
r-aL-19-um-rvi-si-na Sovipt.- _nAr~p and missile artivi
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