THE USSR REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 21, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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The USSR
JL ANALY
Secret
209
RP ASU 77-008
21 April 1977
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THE USSR
21. April 1977
CONTENTS
Evidence That Marshal Ogarkov.
Is the Top-Ranking First Deputy
Minister of Defense . . . . 1
Soviet Policy in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . 4
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This publication is prepared by the USSR Division, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. The views presented are the personal judgments of analysts on signifi-
cant events or trends in Soviet foreign and domestic affairs. Although the analysis
centers on political matters, it discusses politically relevant economic or strategic
trends when appropriate. Differences of opinion are sometimes aired to present
consumers with a range of analytical views. Comments and queries are welcome.
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Evidence That Marshal Ogarkov Is the Top-Ranking First
Deputy Minister of Defense
Reports in Krasnaya Zvezda on February 23 and March
18 indicate that Marshal N. V. Ogarkov is the ranking
first deputy minister of defense in the Soviet military
hierarchy. Both reports listed Ogarkov ahead of Marshal
V. G. Kulikov, Ogarkov's predecessor as chief of the
General Staff and now commander in chief of the Warsaw
Pact joint armed forces. This contrasts with the way in
which Kulikov had been given pride of place in the an-
nouncement of their reassignments on January 8 and in
the announcement of their promotions to their present
ranks on January 14.
The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces
has been listed ahead of the chief of the General Staff
when the two had appeared together since the creation of
the Warsaw Pact command. This rule was followed even
when the Warsaw Pact commander in chief was the more
junior of the two in his date of rank as a Marshal of
the Soviet Union or in his number of years as a first
deputy minister. The most extreme case occurred during
1967-1971, when Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky was listed
ahead of Marshal M. V. Zakharov even though Zakharov en-
joyed seniority both in date of rank and in years as a
first deputy minister of defense.
The decision to list Ogarkov ahead of Kulikov is
particularly striking because Kulikov enjoys seniority
as a first deputy minister and is the only man who has
ever held both the top post in the Warsaw Pact command
and the top post at the General Staff. When viewed in
this light, the recent protocol listings indicate that
Kulikov's transfer is a setback for his personal ambi-
tions. He has relinquished a position of greater au-
thority without having taken at least a nominal step up-
ward in the military hierarchy.
The placement of Ogarkov ahead of Kulikov may have
been partly due to Ogarkov's close personal ties to
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Defense Minister Ustinov. Kulikov has reportedly been
on less than close terms with Ustinov since the latter's
appointment as defense minister a year ago, and this may
have been another contributing factor. It seems unlikely,
however, that the decision to break with a tradition that
has been followed since 1955 was prompted solely by the
relationships among the three main figures.
The move may have been designed to clarify Ogarkov's
position as the top-ranking first deputy under Ustinov
with the primary responsibility for national security
matters. The chief of the General Staff plays a key role
in determining the Soviet position on SALT questions,
whereas the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces
probably has relatively little influence. While the
Warsaw Pact commander in chief undoubtedly contributes
to the Soviet deliberations on the MBFR negotiations,
the chief of the General Staff probably has the primary
role in coordinating the views of the Soviet force com-
ponents and integrating them with the views of the other
Warsaw Pact member states.
It is also possible that Ogarkov's hand is being
strengthened to make it easier for him to prod his col-
leagues in the High Command on such matters as making
more efficient use of resources. Ogarkov is believed
to favor the adoption of modern methods of weighing
alternatives and establishing priorities, and he may be
equally in favor of the rapid introduction of automated
command and control systems and other technological in-
novations. If so, he will need all the support he can
muster in order to persuade other senior military lead-
ers--for example, General I. G. Pavlovsky, the deputy
minister commanding the ground forces--to abandon their
foot-dragging on such matters.
The decision in favor of a new pecking order within
the High Command may have been prompted in part by con-
cern over the succession problem facing the Soviet lead-
ership. Brezhnev and 5 of the 14 other top Soviet lead-
ers are already 70 or older, and a change at the top
could trigger a series of moves, including the transfer
of Defense Minister Ustinov to an even more important
post--perhaps as successor to Premier Kosygin. It is
also possible that Ustinov, who will be 69 in October,
will soon leave the scene.
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In either event, the Soviet leadership will be hard
pressed to find another civilian as qualified as Ustinov
for the top post at the Defense Ministry and might hand
the job back to a professional soldier. In the past,
Kulikov would have been regarded as the top contender
for the job, and he may now have the inside track despite
the change in the pecking order. If so, the decision to
list Ogarkov ahead of Kulikov may have been intended to
reduce speculation over the possibility that Kulikov is
being groomed to take over Ustinov's post. It could also
be designed to enhance Ogarkov's credentials, if only be-
cause he appears to be the man on the scene at present
whose approach to defense matters seems to be most like
Ustinov's.
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Soviet Policy in the Middle East
Recent political and diplomatic initiatives by the
Soviets with respect to the Middle East should be viewed
in the context of chronic Soviet concern that they will
again be excluded from the negotiating process and thus
suffer a further decline in position in the area. These
initiatives are largely a reaction to US efforts to move
peace talks forward rapidly--and, the Soviets fear,
unilaterally. The Soviets have reaffirmed their strong
endorsement of the Geneva Conference, in which they have
an established role as co-chairman with the US, and are
directing their energies toward promoting early resump-
tion of the conference and heading off any other approach
to the issue.
In recent weeks, the Soviets have conducted their
own offensive designed to counter US moves and demon-
strate the USSR's essential role in negotiations. To
this end, they have conducted a series of meetings and
consultations paralleling those in the US. The visit of
PLO leader Arafat to Moscow, for example, occurred at
the same time that Egyptian President Sadat was in the
US. The high-level Soviet reception of Arafat was clearly
an attempt to emphasize Soviet leverage in the negoti
ating process.
In conjunction with their political moves, the So-
viets have recently made a major effort to project an
innovative image with respect to the substance of the
issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute. This effort was
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heralded in Brezhnev's trade union speech of March 21,
in which the Soviet leader laid out detailed Soviet pro-
posals for a settlement. These proposals have subse-
quently been reinforced both publicly and privately by
Soviet spokesmen.
The most significant shift in the Soviet position
has been on the question of Palestinian participation
from the beginning in the Geneva Conference. This shift
was probably prompted by Soviet recognition that this
issue is an obstacle to the reconvening of the confer-
ence and therefore provides an incentive to negotiate
outside the Geneva framework. In addition, the Soviets
have reportedly felt somewhat isolated on the question
because they perceived that both the Egyptian and Syrian
Brezhnev's trade union speech and subsequent Soviet
commentary have suggested that the Soviets might also be
flexible on the issue of final borders for Israel. While
stipulating that Israel must withdraw to its 1967 bor-
ders, the Soviets have indicated that final borders
could be determined following such a withdrawal, sug-
gesting that these borders might differ somewhat from
those of 1967. To bolster this impression, several So-
viet officials have subsequently indicated that minor
adjustments might be possible. At the same time, the
Soviets have denounced the concept of "defensible bor-
ders" for Israel, charging that this is simply a cover
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for Israeli refusal to return strategic territories
occupied in 1967. The Soviets contend that the only
equitable approach to the matter of security is to have
temporary demilitarized zones on both sides of the es-
tablished borders.
Other positions endorsed by the Soviets include
guarantees of a peace settlement either by the UN
Security Council or by the USSR, US, Britain, and France,
a plan reportedly designed specifically to exclude China.
The Soviets also maintain that the state of war between
Israel and the Arabs should end when the last Israeli
soldier is withdrawn from occupied Arab territory and
that peaceful relations should then be established. They
support the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza
and on the West Bank.
While stressing their own leadership role in peace
talks, the Soviets have simultaneously criticized recent
US efforts, specifically President Carter's recent refer-
ences to "defensible borders" and the desirability of a
"homeland" for the Palestinians. On the question of a
"homeland," they have charged that the Palestinians al-
ready have a "homeland" and do not need a major power
to assign it to them. Similarly, they have accused
Sadat of adhering to US and Israeli positions. While
trying to undermine possible unilateral US moves toward
a settlement, the Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the
desirability of Soviet-US cooperation in working toward
the Geneva Conference. They have suggested, for example,
that the May meeting between Secretary of State Vance
and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva will contribute
to this effort.
The Soviets will undoubtedly continue to stress
their own role in the negotiating process in coming
weeks. It is likely that their level of activity will
keep pace with that of the US as they strive to demon-
strate their equal status and role. They will probably
continue to highlight their own ability to contribute
constructively to the negotiating process and will re-
main critical of initiatives undertaken unilaterally.
At the same time, the Soviets will want to demonstrate
the necessity of including them in the peace talks by
communicating their ability to obstruct progress toward
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such talks. Their strong support of Arafat remains an
important means to this end. Therefore, while they
will probably continue to push for Palestinian modera-
tion, they will simultaneously continue to promote the
Palestinian cause and seek to er Arafat.
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Secret
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