LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 4, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Latin America
DIA review(s)
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
AND
NAL
ICAL AN
ARCT-1TVAT, RECORD
PLE. ; a I; :'N TO
AGINCY Aitcp iV : i,
Secret
131.
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LATIN AMERICA
4 August 1977
CONTENTS
Guatemala-UK: Rowlands' Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mexico: Possible Cabinet Shuffle . . . . . . . . . . .4
Colombia: Narcotics Meeting With
President Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nicaragua: Political Effects of
Somoza's Illness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Paraguay: Minority Opposition
Groups Recognized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Peru May Receive Additional Tanks . . . . . . . . . . 18
South America: The Andean
Naval Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by.
the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc-
casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and
from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are
welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
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MEXICO o
Qi
ICO
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Guatemala-UK: Rowlands' Visit
In a joint communique issued last week, Guatemalan
leaders and British Minister of State Rowlands agreed to
continue negotiations on Belize and to work for a further
reduction of tensions. No substantive progress was made
on territorial cession; evidently, negotiators on each
side were waiting for their counterparts to make the
first move in following up on proposals advanced earlier
last month in Washington. An unprecedented feature of
coy the communique was a Guatemalan pledge to take into
account the vital interests of Belize.
Rowlands informed US officials that he would make
no effort to sell a territorial cession in the area of
the Moho River--presumably either to Belizean Premier
Price or to the London government--until he had firm
Guatemalan acceptance. A member of the Guatemalan ne-
gotiating team contended that. his government had been pre-
pared to pursue the territorial question and was disap-
pointed when no discussions developed.
he augeru ad-
ministration would rather pass the issue on to a new ad- 25X1
ministration next July than face blame for an unsatisfac-
tory settlement. Guatemala's chief negotiator, Foreign
Minister Molina, is already becoming a regular target
for domestic critics of the government's handling of the
Belize question.
Considering Guatemala's recent press campaign calling
for withdrawal of the British reinforcements that were
rushed to Belize in early July, Rowlands was surprised
the Guatemalans did not press him on the point. He expects
the additional troops to leave in a few months, but he
does not want their departure to appear to be a conse-
quence of his visit to Guatemala.
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President Laugerud seemed more concerned about in-
ternational opinion than British troops. He asked Row-
lands to help head off another UN resolution in the fall
supporting immediate independence for Belize. He showed
similar concern over discussion of the Belize question
in other international forums as well as among the Com-
monwealth nations.
At the same time, Laugerud has inaugurated his own
international campaign to court hemispheric support. On
July 20, ministers of defense from Honduras, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua, and a representative from Costa Rica met
in Guatemala City to reiterate their general backing for
Guatemala. The presidents of these Central American
countries will reportedly meet in mid-August to repeat
the pledge. Foreign Minister Molina is touring Central
America this week and Guatemalan Vice President Sandoval
r_- is visiting five southern cone countries, also seeking
support.
Sandoval has been characteristically belligerent in
statements on Belize, contending that Guatemala will
settle the issue by July 1978--through force, if not by
negotiation. The Guatemalan government has been following
a similarly aggressive line in the domestic press, con-
tinuing to demand withdrawal of British reinforcements.
Privately, the Guatemalans are more reasonable on the
troop presence, and are starting a TV program evidently
designed to prepare the Guatemalan public for a compro-
mise territorial settlement.
This bellicose press treatment has also been critical
of recent US policy. The presidential press secretary
reportedly suggested that US restrictions on arms sales
f to Guatemala reflected Washington's support for Belize
rather than its concern for human rights questions. He
also implied that the US had a hand in the seizure in
Barbados of a planeload of ammunition destined for Gua-
temala.
The press campaign criticizing the UK and the US
may be little more than blustering for the sake of na-
tional pride. The Laugeru.d administration has shown in-
terest in having the US participate in a "predetermined
mediation" of the Belize matter--Guatemala and the UK
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would work out a settlement, which the mediators would
advance as their own. A compromise proposed by impartial
mediators would presumably be more palatable to the
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Mexico: Possible Cabinet Shuffle
President Lopez Portillo will probably change some
of his cabinet ministers and agency heads before the
end of the year, perhaps in conjunction with his annual
report to congress on September 1. This would not be
unusual during his first year in office, and only
changes in the economic team would have major policy
implications. Nevertheless, the reshuffling could re-
sult in a good deal of political jockeying and a re-
alignment of channels of influence.
Lopez Port.illo is reportedly evaluating the indi-
vidual performances of his cabinet ministers, and there
have been widespread rumors in Mexico all summer that a
cabinet shuffle will result. There have been only a few
lower level changes to date. The most prevalent rumors
include:
--Changing the "economic cabinet" to establish more
uniformity in outlook and permit more coordinated
policy.
---Removing holdovers from the regime of former
president Echeverria to dispel lingering public
suspicion that Lopez Portillo is not entirely his
own man.
---Replacing Secretary of Government. Reyes because
his health is poor.
---Reorganizing PEMEX, the government petroleum
agency, through the creation of a. Secretariat of
Energy to reduce labor's influence on drilling
and production and to remove PEMEX from the
nominal control of the Secretariat of National
Patrimony.
---Replacing several top administrative officials who
have performed poorly or who are out of step
politically.
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d
3
3
The rationale for replacing Echeverristas is reason-
able. As far as we know, the former president has ap-
parently tried to influence Lopez Portillo on only one
occasion--the decision not to return property expropri-
ated last year from Sonora landholders--and Echeverria
has since departed the political scene to serve as
representative to UNESCO. Nevertheless, the suspicion
persists that he sways Lopez Portillo through contacts
in the administration.
The prime candidate for replacement, according to
the rumor mill, is Secretary of Education Munoz Ledo.
He served as labor secretary and as head of the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) under Echeverria.
He is one of the few recognized leftists in the admin-
istration, however, and his removal could antagonize
that wing of the political spectrum.
Other officials who could be shifted because of
links to Echeverria are Carlos Sansores Perez, presi-
dent of the PRI; Augusto Gomez Villanueva, president
of the Chamber of Deputies; and Hugo Cervantes del Rio,
head of the Federal Electricity Commission. Arsenio
Farell, director of Mexico's social security system, has
also been mentioned, but his position is probably more
secure because of his close personal friendship with
Lopez Portillo.
The rationale for changes in the economic cabinet
is questionable. It stems from the persistent belief
that Lopez Portillo's economic advisers are divided into
opposing camps: on the one hand, the fiscal conserva-
tives or "moneymen," led by Finance Secretary Moctezuma,
Bank of Mexico chief Romero, and Nacional Financiers
"
head Ibarra; on the other, the spenders or
structural-
ists" (hitherto called "Cambridge school"), led by Pro-
gramming and Budget Secretary Tello, National Patrimony
Secretary de Oteyza, and Commerce Secretary Solana. Be-
cause these two groups give the President conflicting
advice, the story goes, he is unable to devise a con-
sistent, coordinated economic policy.
There are two weaknesses in this argument: evidence
suggests Lopez Portillo likes to hear opposing views and
diverse policy recommendations; and what appears to be
inaction or drift in economic policy may be intentional
and inherent in the austerity measures imposed on Mexico
by the International Monetary Fund.
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Carlos Tello, secretary of programming and budget,
is most often mentioned as a candidate for replacement.
If, as rumors suggest, he is replaced by a conservative
5 such as former finance minister and current ambassador
to the US Hugo Margain, it would seem to signal a dis-
tinct policy commitment to the austere conservative meas-
ures espoused by the Bank of Mexico and the IMF. De-
spite these persistent rumors, Lopez Po:rtillo entrusted
Tello with the most potentially powerful economic post
in the government, and there are no firm indications that
the President is dissatisfied with his performance to
date. Commerce Secretary Solana's name also crops up
because of reported suspicions that he is not handling
trade policy as effectively as he should.
The Government Secretariat is the most powerful
cabinet office and customarily serves as a stepping stone
to the presidency. Because his parents are Spanish, Reyes
is ineligible to become President, but this would prob-
ably not be the case with his replacement. For politi-
cal rather than policy reasons, it would be a key change,
7 and the jockeying will be considerable. Possible suc-
cessors to Reyes are Chiapas Governor Jorge de la Vega
Dominguez, Foreign Secretary Santiago Roel, and Labor
Secretary Pedro Ojeda. Agrarian Reform Secretary Jorge
Rojo evidently believes he will get the nod, but his
eligibility may have been damaged by the President's
decision to scrap Rojo's proposed settlement of the Son-
ora land expropriation affair.
The rationale for a shakeup at PEMEX--that reorgan-
ization and creation of an energy Secretariat will help
.insulate PEMEX from political pressures and turnover as
well as reduce labor influence--is reasonable. Director
Diaz Serrano has reportedly said that he might be re-
placed by long-time PEMEX technocrat Alfonso Bernache
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and would then join the Lopez Portillo cabinet, pre-
sumably as head of a new energy ministry. There have
been no recent rumors regarding this scenario, however,
Finally, there are a number of agency heads who
will reportedly be replaced for varying degrees of in-
competence or for political reasons. Some of these
are Francisco Javier Alejo, :head of the Sahagun Indus-
trial complex; Rosa Luz Alegria, a subsecretary of
Programming and Budget; and Francisco Vizcaino Murray,
head of the National Nuclear Energy Institute.
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Colombia: Narcotics Meeting with President Lopez
A US delegation met with
President Lopez in Bogota last
/ month to discuss the problem
of narcotics-related corrup-
tion among Colombian govern-
ment officials. The meeting---
which was preceded by a series
of discussions, briefings, and
V2---media coverage of drug traf-
ficking in Colombia--marks
another stage in what appears
to be steadily improving rela-
tions in joint drug control
efforts between Washington
and Bogota. Political con-
straints, however, may serve
to limit Lopez' effectiveness
in dealing with the drug prob-
lem.
President Lopez
President Carter's offer to provide President Lopez
with evidence compiled by US agencies on official corrup-
tion in Colombia was unprecedented. Lopez, who is deeply
concerned about the narcotics problem, was receptive to
the demarche and very candid during the meeting. After
hearing information on cases involving ministerial and
judicial officials, military and law enforcement person-
nel, and other high-level figures, Lopez stated that he
planned to set up an elite civilian law enforcement unit
to cope with crime and corruption in Colombia. Further-
more, he pledged that finding some way to solve his
country's drug problem would be a priority issue during
his final year in office.
Lopez outlined some of his intentions regarding
reform of Colombia's judicial system. He explained
that he had in mind adopting US procedures in which
attorneys, rather than judges, would investigate and
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prosecute cases. Lopez also stated that he is consider-
ing stationing a narcotics liaison officer in Miami to
work with officials of the US Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration in investigating Colombian drug smugglers.
Lopez' stated commitment to improve narcotics en-
forcement in Colombia may facilitate certain bilateral
drug-control efforts. A direct assault on the problem
of corruption, particularly at higher levels, is un-
likely, however, having just weathered a serious scandal
that threatened his political position, Lopez will be
very reluctant to risk another public outcry against
his administration by focusing attention on corrupt of-
ficials.
Furthermore, his loyalty to the ruling Liberal
Party will prevent him from saying or doing anything
that would jeopardize the party's chances in the elec-
tion next year. Lopez' predicament is made all the
more difficult because the Liberal Party's leading con-
tender for the presidency is Julio Cesar Turbay--who is
alleged to be involved with drug traffickers.
The extent to which Lopez can address the drug issue
is further circumscribed by the fact that he will soon be-
come a "lame duck." After the primary slated for February,
the relationship between Lopez, his party, and the other
major political institutions is likely to undergo sig-
nificant changes as public attention shifts to the Lib-
eral Party candidate and power begins to slip inexorably
from the President's grasp.
In the face of diminishing authority, Lopez may
prove unable to follow through on many of his intentions
regarding narcotics control. Even in mid-term, when his
political strength was presumably at its peak, Lopez
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seemed powerless to institute effective measures to cope
with student unrest, kidnapings, rampant crime, and guer-
rilla activity--all of which have since continued to es-
calate.
In fact, many former Lopez supporters believe he has
failed to do much about a wide range of social, politi-
cal, and economic goals to which he assigned high prior-
ity. The question of corruption, perhaps the main im-
pediment in efforts to resolve the country's other ills,
is not likely to be seriously addressed, much less
solved, during Lopez' final months in office. At best,
Lopez may be able to set some machinery in motion that
will be continued by his successor.
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Nicaragua: Political Effects of Somoza's Illness
Nicaragua's President Anastasio Somoza was flown
to the Miami Heart Institute on July 28 following a heart
attack four days earlier. Reports on his condition are
favorable, and a caretaker executive has been designated
according to constitutional
provisions. Somoza named his
half-brother, General Jose R.
Somoza, as acting chief of the
National Guard, thus entrust-
ing him with the real behind-
the-scenes power during his
absence.
These arrangements will
probably suffice if the Presi-
dent's absence lasts only a
few weeks and if his condition
improves enough in the mean-
time to indicate a gradual re-
sumption of the executive func-
tions following his return.
At best, however, Somoza will
have to delegate some of his
activities to others, since resuming his usual heavy
work schedule, even after several months, seems unlikely.
If his recovery is slow or his absence prolonged, pres-
sures will increase for invoking further constitutional
provisions leading to his replacement.
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Nicaragua's Political Health
Nicaragua, with almost no real experience in demo-
cratic government despite constitutional forms, is more
vulnerable than most modern states to such a high-level
illness. Real power lies with the Somoza family, the
Liberal Party, and the National Guard.
For all practical purposes, Nicaragua has been
governed for over 40 years as a Somoza family estate;
while there are a number of wealthy families, none even
7 approaches the Somoza family in size of its fortune or
the extent of its business interests.
The Liberal Party, which has progressively fallen
under the Somoza family control and patronage over the
past four decades, has grown stronger, outdistancing its
traditional rival, the Conservative Party--the only legal
opposition. The Conservatives have been weakened by in-
tra-party squabbles and are no longer capable of making
a respectable showing at the polls. There is also a
small coalition of non-legal miniparties, including the
1 Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party. A Cuban-oriented
guerrilla group, the Sandinist National Liberation Front
(FSLN), has been severely weakened, but retains some capa-
bility for occasional terrorist acts.
The National Guard, whose support is necessary for
the continuence of any regime, is even more a creation
of the Somoza family than the Liberal Party. The coun-
try's only military force, it was founded by President
Somoza's father and came under the direction of the cur-
rent President in 1956 when his father was assassinated.
It is deceptive, however, to assume that anyone with
the Somoza name has extensive institutional support.
Neither of the most prominent second-echelon Somozas--
half-brother Jose or son Anastasio--are acceptable to
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the Liberal Party or to the National Guard as long-term
leaders. Moreover, while President Somoza has managed
to keep all the financial, political, and military reins
in his own hands, other members of the family are eager
to take over management of the business empire.
Constitutional Succession
Since there is no vice president, the minister of
government assumes administrative direction of the gov-
ernment during the president's temporary absence from
duty. Antonio Mora was appointed to this caretaker po-
sition when Somoza left for Miami. If the president's
absence extends for more than three months, or if he be-
comes unable to make major policy decisions, Congress
must appoint as a replacement one of its own popularly
elected members; during a congressional recess, a person
chosen by the president from three previously nominated
by Congress would be installed. In case of permanent
incapacity, death, or resignation, this appointee com-
pletes the president's term of office. (Somoza's term
ends in 1981.)
At the moment, Somoza appears completely capable of
making the major executive decisions, leaving Mora to
handle the day-to-day running of the government. If
Somoza's condition should worsen and the next step be-
came necessary, Pablo Rener, president of the Senate,
is the odds-on favorite to replace him. He would prob-
ably be largely a figurehead, receiving behind-the-scenes
instructions from the Somoza family, the military offi-
cers, and Liberal Party leaders.
The Outlook
Although the rumor mill spawned reports of coup
plotting and opposition plans as soon as Somoza's hos-
pitalization became known, most opposition groups, in-
cluding the FSLN, reportedly have adopted a passive at-
titude, waiting to see if constitutional provisions will
be followed. The constitutional succession will very
likely be adhered to, at least for the present, but res-
tiveness will increase with the length of Somoza's inac-
tivity. It would not be surprising if opposition groups
soon began clamoring for Somoza's replacement, claiming
that he is indeed incapacitated.
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The real drama, however, will be played backstage.
The present arrangement will probably last for several
months, as long as Somoza is able to make the major de-
cisions, but it could come unglued at the first hint of
a serious setback. General Jose Somoza would probably
not survive long as head of the National Guard. Both
General Gustavo Montiel, finance minister, and General
Samuel Genie, the Guard's intelligence chief, would have
a strong voice in the selection of a presidential re-
placement and would figure prominently in a power strug-
gle within the National Guard.
Whoever emerges as the new political leader would
very likely make noises about holding elections on sched-
ule. There is nothing in Nicaragua's history, however,
that would lead one to be optimistic that a real demo-
cratic government will emerge there in the foreseeable
future--with or without Somoza.
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Para ua Minorit 0 osition Groups Recognized
The government recently passed over leaders of
Paraguay's two major opposition parties and granted
official recognition to the heads of minority factions.
Asuncion's decision shatters the illusion of a legiti-
mate opposition which was part of the government's elabo-
rate scheme to provide a facade of democracy for the
Stroessner regime. The ousted leaders have started an
international campaign to call attention to themselves
as victims of political and human rights' abuses.
The Liberal and Radical Liberal parties, after
years of mutual recrimination, agreed early this year
to work together against a move by the ruling Colorado
Party, which is dominated by President Stroessner, to
amend the constitution to allow him to retain office
for life. The parties publicly condemned the amendment
and, in a move to embarrass the President at home and
abroad, withdrew from the constitutional convention.
Although the parties' common cause had little ef-
fect on the course of the amendment, it did encourage
them to regroup as the Unified Liberal Party (PLU), a
move opposed by dissident factions in each party.
The dissident groups held their own conventions
and elected separate directorates who applied for of-
ficial recognition to the Central Election Board, which
is dominated by the Colorados. The board ruled that
the bylaws of the parties did not provide for unifica-
tion--they did not prohibit it, either--and gave the
official nod to the dissident groups. The PLU is now
in limbo for two years because, by law, new political
organizations must wait that long before fielding candi-
dates.
The government's interference no doubt contains
an element of retaliation by Stroessner for the parties'
earlier attempts to embarrass him. The incident also
demonstrates Asuncion's apparent lack of concern about
its human rights' reputation abroad. The government
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is now hedging on an earlier commitment to the US to
allow an on-site inspection by the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission. This latest move further weakens
Paraguay's ability to point, to a representative opposi-
tion to quiet its critics.
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Peru May Receive Additional Soviet Tanks
Peru may receive up to 100 Soviet T-62 medium
tanks by the end of the year, according to the US de-
fense attache in Santiago, Chile. This would be the
first time a South American country has received such
a recent model tank.
Last week, a high-ranking Chilean military officer
informed the attache that one T-62 was already at the
military academy in Lima. Soviet advisers may be train-
ing Peruvian personnel in the operation and maintenance
of the tank. The T-62 is the most advanced tank now
being exported by the USSR to developing countries.
The arrival of T-62s probably would lead to an in-
crease in the number of Soviet military technicians in
Peru; there are about 80 there now. Peru's maintenance
capabilities have not kept. pace with the sophistication
of Soviet weaponry entering the country.
The T-62 tanks may be part of an arms order placed
in January during a Peruvian government delegation's
visit to Moscow. That agreement, which calls for de-
liveries of equipment valued at a minimum of $125 mil-
lion, includes unspecified radars, MI-6 helicopters,
and 24 to 36 AN-26 transports. The USSR apparently ex-
tended the same liberal repayment terms that it had
offered in 1976 for Peru's purchase of SU-22 aircraft--
a 10-percent downpayment, payments over 10 to 20
years, and 2-percent interest.
In May, the US defense attache in Lima reported
that the Peruvian army had decided to purchase enough
T-62s for two battalions, one to be stationed in the
north. opposite Ecuador and the other in the south near
Chile. Peruvian forces reportedly are increasing the
size of their tank battalions to 46 or 47 tanks each.
The purchase of 100 tanks would fill out these units
and allow for spares.
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Peru already has more than 300 Soviet T-55 medium
tanks as the frontline armor weapons of its ground units.
A T-62 purchase could represent an attempt by Peru to
circumvent maintenance problems on the T-55s. The
T-62 has a larger main gun but does not differ radically
from the T-55. Peru probably would also have mainten-
ance problems with the T-62s.
Since 1973, the USSR has signed agreements with
Peru for more than $650 million worth of arms--70 per-
cent of the total value was arranged during the past
3 year. Arms orders include modern equipment for both
the Peruvian army and the a:Lr force. Moscow has de-
livered this year at least $250 million worth of arms
under these agreements, including 26 SU-22 fighter-
bombers, 20 T-55 tanks, and surface-to-air missiles.
Arrival of this additional foreign arms consign-
ment at a time when Peru is having acute economic
problems will further exacerbate Peru's difficulties
in negotiating badly needed balance-of-payments loans
3 from the International Monetary Fund and commercial
,foreign lenders.
RP ALA 77-051
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`South America- The Andean Naval Balance
the naval balance be--
t.weer., Peru and its tieigh-
bors, Chile and f':cuador,
will be a factor in any
confrontation in this area.
Ch_Lle has a relatively
proficient 1 .eet. buL it i
ground and air sLrengt-h IS
inferior to LiiaL of P(-!i-u.
In addiLion, Ecuadorgs
navy is much s)aalle-r.. than
the Peruvian L lent .
NAVAL BAlAN
Pcr i de Fcuarlor
Navy rrlarlpower 10/r00 100 3,9211
(of whI.))
Mai nir, manpower ( 0)) 1100 1,0711
I.irlht cruisers
lnsn oyers
Fr,u es
tiul -i ,rines
Arlq,hlbl01151 rH11
ow rrs
Chilean submarine "O'Brien" recently acquired from the L ritish
tU' A151\
;I Au cr u
-051
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Lima's naval force would probably be hard pressed
to counter Chile's fleet. The Peruvians could probably
defend some major cities along their long coastline but
could probably not conduct offensive operations for more
than a few days.
The Peruvian navy is planning additional purchases
from West European suppliers, Lima will acquire four
frigates equipped with the highly capable Exocet surface-
to--surface missile system during the years 1978-81. Two
of the frigates are under construction in Italy, and the
others will be built in Peru under Italian supervision.
In 1978 and 1979, France will deliver six patrol boats
fitted with the Exocet missile. The navy is the only
branch of the Peruvian armed forces not employing Soviet
equipment and has no plans to do so.
The Peruvian navy has the largest submarine force
in Latin America and can also conduct proficient air-
borne antisubmarine operations. To improve its future
amphibious capabilities Peru is increasing its marine
corps to 5,000 men; this augmentation will reportedly
be completed within the next few months.
Peruvian naval capabilities are diminished by
shortages of spare parts and a lack of highly trained
personnel. The deployment of the force--almost all
Peruvian combat ships are :based in Callao, near Lima--
makes them vulnerable to a single strike.
Chile
The Chilean navy can offer strong resistance against
Peruvian operations and can probably stage limited
marine landings in Peru. Its principal sources of
strength are the professionalism of the officer and
NCO corps, high-quality training programs, and its
logistic system.
Current budgetary limitations prevent major acqui-
sitions of naval weapons. The navy probably will buy
only some missile patrol boats during the next few
RP ALA 77-051
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 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7
years. Chile, however, has a limited capability to
manufacture naval equipment; some small craft, for
example, can be built without foreign supervision.
The diversity of Chile's ship inventory has led to
problems of long-term supply. The Chilean navy also
lacks an effective minesweeping capability.
Ecuador
Ecuador's navy is by far the weakest in the Andean
states. This force could offer only token resistance
against Peru and is unable to conduct large operations
for a sustained period of time. Ecuador, however, could
join forces with Chile and confront Lima with a two-front
war--especially in view of recently increasing military
cooperation between the two countries. If this occurred,
Lima would probably divert a few ships northward to
counter any possible Ecuadorean naval move.
Although the navy does not rate highly in inter-
service competition for defense funds, some fleet mod-
ernization is under way. Quito has bought two diesel
submarines and ordered three missile attack boats from
West Germany, one of which has arrived.
The Ecuadorean navy's few strengths are largely a
result of personnel policies. The navy experiences
little personnel turnover and the proficiency of the
marine corps is considered high.
Poor maintenance procedures have left the fleet
with only a few operational combatants, greatly impair-
ing capabilities and resulting in few multi-ship exer-
cises. Naval operations are limited to functions such
as regulation of fishing, administration of the weather
and hydrographic service, and control of river and port
facilities.
RP ALA 77-051
4 August 1977
:22
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Secret
Secret
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