LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
27
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 26, 2007
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 4, 1977
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7.pdf1.39 MB
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Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Secret Latin America DIA review(s) completed. State Dept. review completed AND NAL ICAL AN ARCT-1TVAT, RECORD PLE. ; a I; :'N TO AGINCY Aitcp iV : i, Secret 131. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET LATIN AMERICA 4 August 1977 CONTENTS Guatemala-UK: Rowlands' Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Mexico: Possible Cabinet Shuffle . . . . . . . . . . .4 Colombia: Narcotics Meeting With President Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Nicaragua: Political Effects of Somoza's Illness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Paraguay: Minority Opposition Groups Recognized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Peru May Receive Additional Tanks . . . . . . . . . . 18 South America: The Andean Naval Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by. the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc- casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence and from other agencies within the Intelligence Community. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 MEXICO o Qi ICO Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET Guatemala-UK: Rowlands' Visit In a joint communique issued last week, Guatemalan leaders and British Minister of State Rowlands agreed to continue negotiations on Belize and to work for a further reduction of tensions. No substantive progress was made on territorial cession; evidently, negotiators on each side were waiting for their counterparts to make the first move in following up on proposals advanced earlier last month in Washington. An unprecedented feature of coy the communique was a Guatemalan pledge to take into account the vital interests of Belize. Rowlands informed US officials that he would make no effort to sell a territorial cession in the area of the Moho River--presumably either to Belizean Premier Price or to the London government--until he had firm Guatemalan acceptance. A member of the Guatemalan ne- gotiating team contended that. his government had been pre- pared to pursue the territorial question and was disap- pointed when no discussions developed. he augeru ad- ministration would rather pass the issue on to a new ad- 25X1 ministration next July than face blame for an unsatisfac- tory settlement. Guatemala's chief negotiator, Foreign Minister Molina, is already becoming a regular target for domestic critics of the government's handling of the Belize question. Considering Guatemala's recent press campaign calling for withdrawal of the British reinforcements that were rushed to Belize in early July, Rowlands was surprised the Guatemalans did not press him on the point. He expects the additional troops to leave in a few months, but he does not want their departure to appear to be a conse- quence of his visit to Guatemala. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET President Laugerud seemed more concerned about in- ternational opinion than British troops. He asked Row- lands to help head off another UN resolution in the fall supporting immediate independence for Belize. He showed similar concern over discussion of the Belize question in other international forums as well as among the Com- monwealth nations. At the same time, Laugerud has inaugurated his own international campaign to court hemispheric support. On July 20, ministers of defense from Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, and a representative from Costa Rica met in Guatemala City to reiterate their general backing for Guatemala. The presidents of these Central American countries will reportedly meet in mid-August to repeat the pledge. Foreign Minister Molina is touring Central America this week and Guatemalan Vice President Sandoval r_- is visiting five southern cone countries, also seeking support. Sandoval has been characteristically belligerent in statements on Belize, contending that Guatemala will settle the issue by July 1978--through force, if not by negotiation. The Guatemalan government has been following a similarly aggressive line in the domestic press, con- tinuing to demand withdrawal of British reinforcements. Privately, the Guatemalans are more reasonable on the troop presence, and are starting a TV program evidently designed to prepare the Guatemalan public for a compro- mise territorial settlement. This bellicose press treatment has also been critical of recent US policy. The presidential press secretary reportedly suggested that US restrictions on arms sales f to Guatemala reflected Washington's support for Belize rather than its concern for human rights questions. He also implied that the US had a hand in the seizure in Barbados of a planeload of ammunition destined for Gua- temala. The press campaign criticizing the UK and the US may be little more than blustering for the sake of na- tional pride. The Laugeru.d administration has shown in- terest in having the US participate in a "predetermined mediation" of the Belize matter--Guatemala and the UK RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET would work out a settlement, which the mediators would advance as their own. A compromise proposed by impartial mediators would presumably be more palatable to the RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET Mexico: Possible Cabinet Shuffle President Lopez Portillo will probably change some of his cabinet ministers and agency heads before the end of the year, perhaps in conjunction with his annual report to congress on September 1. This would not be unusual during his first year in office, and only changes in the economic team would have major policy implications. Nevertheless, the reshuffling could re- sult in a good deal of political jockeying and a re- alignment of channels of influence. Lopez Port.illo is reportedly evaluating the indi- vidual performances of his cabinet ministers, and there have been widespread rumors in Mexico all summer that a cabinet shuffle will result. There have been only a few lower level changes to date. The most prevalent rumors include: --Changing the "economic cabinet" to establish more uniformity in outlook and permit more coordinated policy. ---Removing holdovers from the regime of former president Echeverria to dispel lingering public suspicion that Lopez Portillo is not entirely his own man. ---Replacing Secretary of Government. Reyes because his health is poor. ---Reorganizing PEMEX, the government petroleum agency, through the creation of a. Secretariat of Energy to reduce labor's influence on drilling and production and to remove PEMEX from the nominal control of the Secretariat of National Patrimony. ---Replacing several top administrative officials who have performed poorly or who are out of step politically. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET d 3 3 The rationale for replacing Echeverristas is reason- able. As far as we know, the former president has ap- parently tried to influence Lopez Portillo on only one occasion--the decision not to return property expropri- ated last year from Sonora landholders--and Echeverria has since departed the political scene to serve as representative to UNESCO. Nevertheless, the suspicion persists that he sways Lopez Portillo through contacts in the administration. The prime candidate for replacement, according to the rumor mill, is Secretary of Education Munoz Ledo. He served as labor secretary and as head of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) under Echeverria. He is one of the few recognized leftists in the admin- istration, however, and his removal could antagonize that wing of the political spectrum. Other officials who could be shifted because of links to Echeverria are Carlos Sansores Perez, presi- dent of the PRI; Augusto Gomez Villanueva, president of the Chamber of Deputies; and Hugo Cervantes del Rio, head of the Federal Electricity Commission. Arsenio Farell, director of Mexico's social security system, has also been mentioned, but his position is probably more secure because of his close personal friendship with Lopez Portillo. The rationale for changes in the economic cabinet is questionable. It stems from the persistent belief that Lopez Portillo's economic advisers are divided into opposing camps: on the one hand, the fiscal conserva- tives or "moneymen," led by Finance Secretary Moctezuma, Bank of Mexico chief Romero, and Nacional Financiers " head Ibarra; on the other, the spenders or structural- ists" (hitherto called "Cambridge school"), led by Pro- gramming and Budget Secretary Tello, National Patrimony Secretary de Oteyza, and Commerce Secretary Solana. Be- cause these two groups give the President conflicting advice, the story goes, he is unable to devise a con- sistent, coordinated economic policy. There are two weaknesses in this argument: evidence suggests Lopez Portillo likes to hear opposing views and diverse policy recommendations; and what appears to be inaction or drift in economic policy may be intentional and inherent in the austerity measures imposed on Mexico by the International Monetary Fund. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET Carlos Tello, secretary of programming and budget, is most often mentioned as a candidate for replacement. If, as rumors suggest, he is replaced by a conservative 5 such as former finance minister and current ambassador to the US Hugo Margain, it would seem to signal a dis- tinct policy commitment to the austere conservative meas- ures espoused by the Bank of Mexico and the IMF. De- spite these persistent rumors, Lopez Po:rtillo entrusted Tello with the most potentially powerful economic post in the government, and there are no firm indications that the President is dissatisfied with his performance to date. Commerce Secretary Solana's name also crops up because of reported suspicions that he is not handling trade policy as effectively as he should. The Government Secretariat is the most powerful cabinet office and customarily serves as a stepping stone to the presidency. Because his parents are Spanish, Reyes is ineligible to become President, but this would prob- ably not be the case with his replacement. For politi- cal rather than policy reasons, it would be a key change, 7 and the jockeying will be considerable. Possible suc- cessors to Reyes are Chiapas Governor Jorge de la Vega Dominguez, Foreign Secretary Santiago Roel, and Labor Secretary Pedro Ojeda. Agrarian Reform Secretary Jorge Rojo evidently believes he will get the nod, but his eligibility may have been damaged by the President's decision to scrap Rojo's proposed settlement of the Son- ora land expropriation affair. The rationale for a shakeup at PEMEX--that reorgan- ization and creation of an energy Secretariat will help .insulate PEMEX from political pressures and turnover as well as reduce labor influence--is reasonable. Director Diaz Serrano has reportedly said that he might be re- placed by long-time PEMEX technocrat Alfonso Bernache RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECR ET and would then join the Lopez Portillo cabinet, pre- sumably as head of a new energy ministry. There have been no recent rumors regarding this scenario, however, Finally, there are a number of agency heads who will reportedly be replaced for varying degrees of in- competence or for political reasons. Some of these are Francisco Javier Alejo, :head of the Sahagun Indus- trial complex; Rosa Luz Alegria, a subsecretary of Programming and Budget; and Francisco Vizcaino Murray, head of the National Nuclear Energy Institute. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Colombia: Narcotics Meeting with President Lopez A US delegation met with President Lopez in Bogota last / month to discuss the problem of narcotics-related corrup- tion among Colombian govern- ment officials. The meeting--- which was preceded by a series of discussions, briefings, and V2---media coverage of drug traf- ficking in Colombia--marks another stage in what appears to be steadily improving rela- tions in joint drug control efforts between Washington and Bogota. Political con- straints, however, may serve to limit Lopez' effectiveness in dealing with the drug prob- lem. President Lopez President Carter's offer to provide President Lopez with evidence compiled by US agencies on official corrup- tion in Colombia was unprecedented. Lopez, who is deeply concerned about the narcotics problem, was receptive to the demarche and very candid during the meeting. After hearing information on cases involving ministerial and judicial officials, military and law enforcement person- nel, and other high-level figures, Lopez stated that he planned to set up an elite civilian law enforcement unit to cope with crime and corruption in Colombia. Further- more, he pledged that finding some way to solve his country's drug problem would be a priority issue during his final year in office. Lopez outlined some of his intentions regarding reform of Colombia's judicial system. He explained that he had in mind adopting US procedures in which attorneys, rather than judges, would investigate and RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 prosecute cases. Lopez also stated that he is consider- ing stationing a narcotics liaison officer in Miami to work with officials of the US Drug Enforcement Adminis- tration in investigating Colombian drug smugglers. Lopez' stated commitment to improve narcotics en- forcement in Colombia may facilitate certain bilateral drug-control efforts. A direct assault on the problem of corruption, particularly at higher levels, is un- likely, however, having just weathered a serious scandal that threatened his political position, Lopez will be very reluctant to risk another public outcry against his administration by focusing attention on corrupt of- ficials. Furthermore, his loyalty to the ruling Liberal Party will prevent him from saying or doing anything that would jeopardize the party's chances in the elec- tion next year. Lopez' predicament is made all the more difficult because the Liberal Party's leading con- tender for the presidency is Julio Cesar Turbay--who is alleged to be involved with drug traffickers. The extent to which Lopez can address the drug issue is further circumscribed by the fact that he will soon be- come a "lame duck." After the primary slated for February, the relationship between Lopez, his party, and the other major political institutions is likely to undergo sig- nificant changes as public attention shifts to the Lib- eral Party candidate and power begins to slip inexorably from the President's grasp. In the face of diminishing authority, Lopez may prove unable to follow through on many of his intentions regarding narcotics control. Even in mid-term, when his political strength was presumably at its peak, Lopez RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET seemed powerless to institute effective measures to cope with student unrest, kidnapings, rampant crime, and guer- rilla activity--all of which have since continued to es- calate. In fact, many former Lopez supporters believe he has failed to do much about a wide range of social, politi- cal, and economic goals to which he assigned high prior- ity. The question of corruption, perhaps the main im- pediment in efforts to resolve the country's other ills, is not likely to be seriously addressed, much less solved, during Lopez' final months in office. At best, Lopez may be able to set some machinery in motion that will be continued by his successor. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Nicaragua: Political Effects of Somoza's Illness Nicaragua's President Anastasio Somoza was flown to the Miami Heart Institute on July 28 following a heart attack four days earlier. Reports on his condition are favorable, and a caretaker executive has been designated according to constitutional provisions. Somoza named his half-brother, General Jose R. Somoza, as acting chief of the National Guard, thus entrust- ing him with the real behind- the-scenes power during his absence. These arrangements will probably suffice if the Presi- dent's absence lasts only a few weeks and if his condition improves enough in the mean- time to indicate a gradual re- sumption of the executive func- tions following his return. At best, however, Somoza will have to delegate some of his activities to others, since resuming his usual heavy work schedule, even after several months, seems unlikely. If his recovery is slow or his absence prolonged, pres- sures will increase for invoking further constitutional provisions leading to his replacement. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1.977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Nicaragua's Political Health Nicaragua, with almost no real experience in demo- cratic government despite constitutional forms, is more vulnerable than most modern states to such a high-level illness. Real power lies with the Somoza family, the Liberal Party, and the National Guard. For all practical purposes, Nicaragua has been governed for over 40 years as a Somoza family estate; while there are a number of wealthy families, none even 7 approaches the Somoza family in size of its fortune or the extent of its business interests. The Liberal Party, which has progressively fallen under the Somoza family control and patronage over the past four decades, has grown stronger, outdistancing its traditional rival, the Conservative Party--the only legal opposition. The Conservatives have been weakened by in- tra-party squabbles and are no longer capable of making a respectable showing at the polls. There is also a small coalition of non-legal miniparties, including the 1 Moscow-line Nicaraguan Socialist Party. A Cuban-oriented guerrilla group, the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN), has been severely weakened, but retains some capa- bility for occasional terrorist acts. The National Guard, whose support is necessary for the continuence of any regime, is even more a creation of the Somoza family than the Liberal Party. The coun- try's only military force, it was founded by President Somoza's father and came under the direction of the cur- rent President in 1956 when his father was assassinated. It is deceptive, however, to assume that anyone with the Somoza name has extensive institutional support. Neither of the most prominent second-echelon Somozas-- half-brother Jose or son Anastasio--are acceptable to RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 /W the Liberal Party or to the National Guard as long-term leaders. Moreover, while President Somoza has managed to keep all the financial, political, and military reins in his own hands, other members of the family are eager to take over management of the business empire. Constitutional Succession Since there is no vice president, the minister of government assumes administrative direction of the gov- ernment during the president's temporary absence from duty. Antonio Mora was appointed to this caretaker po- sition when Somoza left for Miami. If the president's absence extends for more than three months, or if he be- comes unable to make major policy decisions, Congress must appoint as a replacement one of its own popularly elected members; during a congressional recess, a person chosen by the president from three previously nominated by Congress would be installed. In case of permanent incapacity, death, or resignation, this appointee com- pletes the president's term of office. (Somoza's term ends in 1981.) At the moment, Somoza appears completely capable of making the major executive decisions, leaving Mora to handle the day-to-day running of the government. If Somoza's condition should worsen and the next step be- came necessary, Pablo Rener, president of the Senate, is the odds-on favorite to replace him. He would prob- ably be largely a figurehead, receiving behind-the-scenes instructions from the Somoza family, the military offi- cers, and Liberal Party leaders. The Outlook Although the rumor mill spawned reports of coup plotting and opposition plans as soon as Somoza's hos- pitalization became known, most opposition groups, in- cluding the FSLN, reportedly have adopted a passive at- titude, waiting to see if constitutional provisions will be followed. The constitutional succession will very likely be adhered to, at least for the present, but res- tiveness will increase with the length of Somoza's inac- tivity. It would not be surprising if opposition groups soon began clamoring for Somoza's replacement, claiming that he is indeed incapacitated. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 14 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 d The real drama, however, will be played backstage. The present arrangement will probably last for several months, as long as Somoza is able to make the major de- cisions, but it could come unglued at the first hint of a serious setback. General Jose Somoza would probably not survive long as head of the National Guard. Both General Gustavo Montiel, finance minister, and General Samuel Genie, the Guard's intelligence chief, would have a strong voice in the selection of a presidential re- placement and would figure prominently in a power strug- gle within the National Guard. Whoever emerges as the new political leader would very likely make noises about holding elections on sched- ule. There is nothing in Nicaragua's history, however, that would lead one to be optimistic that a real demo- cratic government will emerge there in the foreseeable future--with or without Somoza. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Para ua Minorit 0 osition Groups Recognized The government recently passed over leaders of Paraguay's two major opposition parties and granted official recognition to the heads of minority factions. Asuncion's decision shatters the illusion of a legiti- mate opposition which was part of the government's elabo- rate scheme to provide a facade of democracy for the Stroessner regime. The ousted leaders have started an international campaign to call attention to themselves as victims of political and human rights' abuses. The Liberal and Radical Liberal parties, after years of mutual recrimination, agreed early this year to work together against a move by the ruling Colorado Party, which is dominated by President Stroessner, to amend the constitution to allow him to retain office for life. The parties publicly condemned the amendment and, in a move to embarrass the President at home and abroad, withdrew from the constitutional convention. Although the parties' common cause had little ef- fect on the course of the amendment, it did encourage them to regroup as the Unified Liberal Party (PLU), a move opposed by dissident factions in each party. The dissident groups held their own conventions and elected separate directorates who applied for of- ficial recognition to the Central Election Board, which is dominated by the Colorados. The board ruled that the bylaws of the parties did not provide for unifica- tion--they did not prohibit it, either--and gave the official nod to the dissident groups. The PLU is now in limbo for two years because, by law, new political organizations must wait that long before fielding candi- dates. The government's interference no doubt contains an element of retaliation by Stroessner for the parties' earlier attempts to embarrass him. The incident also demonstrates Asuncion's apparent lack of concern about its human rights' reputation abroad. The government RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 ].6 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 is now hedging on an earlier commitment to the US to allow an on-site inspection by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. This latest move further weakens Paraguay's ability to point, to a representative opposi- tion to quiet its critics. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Peru May Receive Additional Soviet Tanks Peru may receive up to 100 Soviet T-62 medium tanks by the end of the year, according to the US de- fense attache in Santiago, Chile. This would be the first time a South American country has received such a recent model tank. Last week, a high-ranking Chilean military officer informed the attache that one T-62 was already at the military academy in Lima. Soviet advisers may be train- ing Peruvian personnel in the operation and maintenance of the tank. The T-62 is the most advanced tank now being exported by the USSR to developing countries. The arrival of T-62s probably would lead to an in- crease in the number of Soviet military technicians in Peru; there are about 80 there now. Peru's maintenance capabilities have not kept. pace with the sophistication of Soviet weaponry entering the country. The T-62 tanks may be part of an arms order placed in January during a Peruvian government delegation's visit to Moscow. That agreement, which calls for de- liveries of equipment valued at a minimum of $125 mil- lion, includes unspecified radars, MI-6 helicopters, and 24 to 36 AN-26 transports. The USSR apparently ex- tended the same liberal repayment terms that it had offered in 1976 for Peru's purchase of SU-22 aircraft-- a 10-percent downpayment, payments over 10 to 20 years, and 2-percent interest. In May, the US defense attache in Lima reported that the Peruvian army had decided to purchase enough T-62s for two battalions, one to be stationed in the north. opposite Ecuador and the other in the south near Chile. Peruvian forces reportedly are increasing the size of their tank battalions to 46 or 47 tanks each. The purchase of 100 tanks would fill out these units and allow for spares. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 SECRET Peru already has more than 300 Soviet T-55 medium tanks as the frontline armor weapons of its ground units. A T-62 purchase could represent an attempt by Peru to circumvent maintenance problems on the T-55s. The T-62 has a larger main gun but does not differ radically from the T-55. Peru probably would also have mainten- ance problems with the T-62s. Since 1973, the USSR has signed agreements with Peru for more than $650 million worth of arms--70 per- cent of the total value was arranged during the past 3 year. Arms orders include modern equipment for both the Peruvian army and the a:Lr force. Moscow has de- livered this year at least $250 million worth of arms under these agreements, including 26 SU-22 fighter- bombers, 20 T-55 tanks, and surface-to-air missiles. Arrival of this additional foreign arms consign- ment at a time when Peru is having acute economic problems will further exacerbate Peru's difficulties in negotiating badly needed balance-of-payments loans 3 from the International Monetary Fund and commercial ,foreign lenders. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 `South America- The Andean Naval Balance the naval balance be-- t.weer., Peru and its tieigh- bors, Chile and f':cuador, will be a factor in any confrontation in this area. Ch_Lle has a relatively proficient 1 .eet. buL it i ground and air sLrengt-h IS inferior to LiiaL of P(-!i-u. In addiLion, Ecuadorgs navy is much s)aalle-r.. than the Peruvian L lent . NAVAL BAlAN Pcr i de Fcuarlor Navy rrlarlpower 10/r00 100 3,9211 (of whI.)) Mai nir, manpower ( 0)) 1100 1,0711 I.irlht cruisers lnsn oyers Fr,u es tiul -i ,rines Arlq,hlbl01151 rH11 ow rrs Chilean submarine "O'Brien" recently acquired from the L ritish tU' A151\ ;I Au cr u -051 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Lima's naval force would probably be hard pressed to counter Chile's fleet. The Peruvians could probably defend some major cities along their long coastline but could probably not conduct offensive operations for more than a few days. The Peruvian navy is planning additional purchases from West European suppliers, Lima will acquire four frigates equipped with the highly capable Exocet surface- to--surface missile system during the years 1978-81. Two of the frigates are under construction in Italy, and the others will be built in Peru under Italian supervision. In 1978 and 1979, France will deliver six patrol boats fitted with the Exocet missile. The navy is the only branch of the Peruvian armed forces not employing Soviet equipment and has no plans to do so. The Peruvian navy has the largest submarine force in Latin America and can also conduct proficient air- borne antisubmarine operations. To improve its future amphibious capabilities Peru is increasing its marine corps to 5,000 men; this augmentation will reportedly be completed within the next few months. Peruvian naval capabilities are diminished by shortages of spare parts and a lack of highly trained personnel. The deployment of the force--almost all Peruvian combat ships are :based in Callao, near Lima-- makes them vulnerable to a single strike. Chile The Chilean navy can offer strong resistance against Peruvian operations and can probably stage limited marine landings in Peru. Its principal sources of strength are the professionalism of the officer and NCO corps, high-quality training programs, and its logistic system. Current budgetary limitations prevent major acqui- sitions of naval weapons. The navy probably will buy only some missile patrol boats during the next few RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 years. Chile, however, has a limited capability to manufacture naval equipment; some small craft, for example, can be built without foreign supervision. The diversity of Chile's ship inventory has led to problems of long-term supply. The Chilean navy also lacks an effective minesweeping capability. Ecuador Ecuador's navy is by far the weakest in the Andean states. This force could offer only token resistance against Peru and is unable to conduct large operations for a sustained period of time. Ecuador, however, could join forces with Chile and confront Lima with a two-front war--especially in view of recently increasing military cooperation between the two countries. If this occurred, Lima would probably divert a few ships northward to counter any possible Ecuadorean naval move. Although the navy does not rate highly in inter- service competition for defense funds, some fleet mod- ernization is under way. Quito has bought two diesel submarines and ordered three missile attack boats from West Germany, one of which has arrived. The Ecuadorean navy's few strengths are largely a result of personnel policies. The navy experiences little personnel turnover and the proficiency of the marine corps is considered high. Poor maintenance procedures have left the fleet with only a few operational combatants, greatly impair- ing capabilities and resulting in few multi-ship exer- cises. Naval operations are limited to functions such as regulation of fishing, administration of the weather and hydrographic service, and control of river and port facilities. RP ALA 77-051 4 August 1977 :22 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/11/26: CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010005-7