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June 9, 1977
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Secret Latin America EG IONAL AND TICAL ANALYSIS State Dept. review completed Secret 127 RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :P79T00912A000700010010-1 LATIN AMERICA 9 June 1977 CONTENTS OAS General Assembly VII Convenes in Grenada Next Week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Jamaica: Deteriorating Economic Situation . . . . . 3 Argentina: Political Revival? . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Brazil: Political Maneuverings? . . . . . . . . . . 10 Uruguay: No New Political Ground Broken . . . . . . 12 Colombia: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Peru: Inter-Service Rivalry in Narcotics Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Mexico: Accelerated Communist Economic Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Cuban Chronology for May 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . 26 This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with oc- casional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : 8ri--P79T00912A000700010010-1 'tl`~II~~ ~~w~w~w III N Nii Nth ` Ij IIIIII II ~I~ I~IIIIII n'~ul l'xun~~ et OAS General Assembly VII Convenes in Grenada Next Week The huamn rights issue is bound to be the major topic of discussion at next week's OAS General Assembly meeting .n Grenada, even though there are other important matters Lo be considered. Many of the delegates still have res- orvations about holding the meeting in Grenada because of continued reports of poor facilities, water shortages, and typhoid fever outbreaks. None has decided to back out, however, and the participants seem resigned to C;rinn.inq and bearing some inconveniences. Most delegates are anxious to meet Secret..-lry of State Vance and get some insight into the Latin American poli- c:ies of the new US administration and its idea: for r.e- tructurinq the OAS. The majority of Latin Amorican countries have had little contact with high US admi.nistra- tion officials and, in general, have been confused by con- Llict.inq signals they have been receiving from Washing- :cn. RP ALA 77-013 9 June 1977 AjqjqpAMF~I tc R_I____ nnn7/03/0 CIA-RDP79T00912AOQ 700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/;:f:glA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET The human rights issue has been the core of the problem. There have been reports that the southern cone countries have been attempting to form a common front in opposition to the US on this issue. The foreign ministers of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and possibly Bra- zil, in fact, may meet before the conference convenes to talk over tactics and the possibility of raising inter- national terrorism as a counter-debate to human rights.. None of the countries is anxious to offend the US, how- ever, and protestations against Washington's human rights policy will probably be perfuctory, but emotional. Other topics on the General Assembly agenda include: restructuring the OAS, charter reform, cooperation on development and collective economic security, and edu- cational/cultural exchange programs. Bolivia's desire for an outlet to the sea and the Guatemala-Belize terri- torial dispute may be raised, but probably will be tabled with simple statements for the record. Panama may bring up the progress of the canal treaty negotiations, but a joint US-Panama report on the status of the negotiations probably will be agreed upon before the meeting. As it shapes up now, the General Assembly could bog down on human rights discussions. None of the partici- pants, however, wants a rankling debate. Most delegates want to get the Grenada meeting over with as quickly as possible and carry on the rest: of their business in Wash- ington or elsewhere. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/QTR(CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET Jamaica: Deteriorating Economic Situation The recent visit of Rosalynn Carter to Jamaica, coming as it did in the wake of a visit by a US techni- cal team to study the island's economic needs, will be interpreted by Prime Minister Manley's government as presaging substantial financial assistance from Washing- ton. Although Manley is currently following the advice of political moderates in seeking assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the industrial nations, sufficient financing is proving difficult, if not impos- sible, to obtain. If Manley's moderate stance fails to produce results in the coming months, we believe he will probably again turn to his radical advisers. The re- sult would likely have significant negative repercus- sions for US interests. Pressures for a bauxite tax in- crease would mount, and other nationalistic demands against US investments could follow. Jamaica faces a sharply tightened foreign exchange bind this year. Although the current-account deficit is declining sharply with the increase in bauxite and alumina sales and continuing import constraints, the capital ac- count will worsen. Higher debt servicing obligations, a further reduction in capital receipts, and continuing capital flight are the causes. Despite severe austerity measures and the probable receipt of an IMF loan, Jamaica still faces a foreign payments gap of about $90 million in 1977, mainly during the third quarter of the fiscal year. The battle among Manley's advisers over the govern- ment's approach to the economic crisis has so far passed through two distinct stages. The first stage culminated in January--about a month into Manley's second term--and represented a high-water mark for the influence of ruling RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0?V~-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET party radicals. Beholden to his young Marxist-oriented advisers for their help in his party's sweeping election victory in December, Manley named several of them to key ministries responsible for implementing social change. Then in a speech on January 19 Manley: --Announced a confiscatory tax policy aimed par- ticularly at the middle and upper classes. --Assigned the radical wing of his party, to- gether with some leftist university economists, the task of designing an emergency production program. --Said he was making overtures to the Soviet- dominated Council for Economic and Mutual As- sistance (CEMA) and would also look to the USSR for economic assistance. --Vilified the IMF and stated that his govern- ment would not sacrifice its social projects to meet IMF conditions. By late April, however, Manley had significantly altered course, and in the second round of the battle to determine government policy party moderates emerged the clear winners. Disappointed by the response from CEMA and by the failure of the radicals to devise a program that would get the economy moving, Manley rejected the radical's economic scheme. Turning once again to his more orthodox economic advisers, he submitted a plan in- tended to meet the stipulations of the IMF--expected to include devaluing the currency and slashing government spending. At the same time, party moderates--led es- pecially by Foreign Minister Patterson--began strenuously to oppose the radicals' efforts to expand their power base in the government and party. The radicals have been regrouping and waiting for an opportunity to prove to Manley that they are correct in contending that there has been no basic change in US policy toward Jamaica. They have taken pains to disso- ciate themselves from attempts to obtain assistance from the West. Although two leading radicals were named to the Jamaican team that consulted with the US economic RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 4 Approved For Release 2007/03/S0~6,RgJA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/=QQ E CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 mission, both absented themselves from every session. Moreover, the radicals have tried to undermine relations with the US by apparently planting a story in the press designed to raise false expectations concerning the amount of future US assistance. If the economic crisis worsens, the result will be heightened political instability. As Jamaicans ex- perience mounting unemployment, spiraling inflation, and unavailability of basic goods, Manley is likely to suffer a significant loss in popular support. As intra-party tensions increase, Manley will find it increasingly dif- ficult to hold his party together. Unless Jamaica can find more foreign financial help than is now in sight, Manley will have essentially two options in closing the remaining gap: to tough it out, or to again boost bauxite taxes. If he chooses the first option, Jamaica faces the prospect of having to slash imports from last year's depressed level by as much as 20 percent to $735 million in 1977. Severe payments problems would persist over the next few years, requiring continued stiff austerity measures--which would likely cause more political problems for the Manley government. We believe the odds are strongly against another bauxite tax increase as long as Manley believes further foreign financial assistance will be forthcoming. If this fails, he probably will turn to his radical advisers. A bauxite tax increase and other nationalistic pressures against US investments on the island could well follow. In these circumstances, relations with the US would de- teriorate rapidly. At the same time, Manley probably would seek closer relations with Cuba. Although. he apparently has been disappointed by the inadequacy of Soviet aid offers thus far, his attempt to lessen dependence on the US could also lead to increased overtures to the USSR. Moscow is un- likely to provide cash aid, although the Soviets have in- dicated some trade arrangement. could be worked out, prob- ably involving small purchases of bauxite and alumina. Even if Jamaica nails down sufficient foreign loans to cover its payments gap this year, it is important not to exaggerate the benefits for the US. Manley's domestic RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/0? 6R:F-C lA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/q?: eR44-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 goal of creating a "democratic socialist" society is ir- reversible.. The best Washington can hope for is to strengthen the moderates so that the process will take place within a framework that assures as little human dislocation as possible. Manley's commitment to aligning Jamaica with the third world is also unshakable. By persuading him that the US has an abiding interest in pursuing a relation- ship of mutual respect, we may well be able to deal with our differences in an atmosphere free from last year's undertones of fundamental hostility and avoid pushing him toward an identification with the more radical mem- bers of the! third world. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/(GcPWA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/0RA ifIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Argentina: Political Revival? Some Argentine politicians and prominent citizens are emerging from more than a year of near public silence with a variety of statements and proposals, all aimed at restoring political activity, which has been officially suspended since the March 1976 coup. Leaders of the Peronist movement, still the nation's largest political grouping, have become more vocal than at any time since the military takeover--although they have been carefully stressing that their aims are not political. Peronists belonging to a group whose purposes are ostensibly "cultural," as opposed to "political," have chosen an executive council which will oversee the writing of a statement evaluating the country's current overall situation. Among those undertaking the project are Italo Luder, Federico Angel Robledo, and Nicasio San- chez Toranzo, all of whom gained prominence during the presidency of the ousted Isabel Peron. Their evaluation, to be issued shortly, is expected to amount to a criticism of the present regime, particularly on the human rights score. Argentina's second largest party, the Radicals, mak- ing its first major statement since the military took over last year, has issued a call for the restoration of "all freedoms." Specifically, the party declared that the junta should lift its ban on the functioning of polit- ical parties. An influential journalist. recently proposed the es- tablishment of an organization to be called the "National Reorganization Movement." According to the proposal, the movement would form the basis of a government-sponsored single-party system. The proposal, however, plays down-- and perhaps would rule out--meaningful political partici- pation by the principal existing parties, the Radicals and Peronists. A variety of journalists have for some time put forth any number of political ideas and criti- cisms, but this latest one is the most pointed to date. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03%66F lA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET The junta's ban on all blatantly political activity never really achieved total success. Adherents of a variety of views have regularly maneuvered to gain in- fluence with the military in the hope that their respec- tive positions would take hold once the political r,!les are relaxed. Indeed, the officers themselves fully ex- pect such contacts and use them to advance their own political interests. The recent flurry of political verbiage, however, is the most concentrated effort as yet. For the current round of proselytizing to get as far as it has, two factors appear to have been essential. One is that a great deal of discussion and opinion-taking have been going on for some time within a number of in- terested political sectors? The other is that each of the ideas expressed, whether a criticism or a proposal, had at least the tacit support of some influential cur- rent of opinion within the armed forces. The political expression that has surfaced was not necessarily orchestrated byy the junta, but it does seem to have had beneficial results for the regime. Since it is firmly in control, the government can easily with- stand such criticism, particularly that emanating from the vanquished Peronists. But on another level, the out- pouring of opinions seems to have diverted attention from problem areas, such as subversion and the effects of the so-called Graiver case. Moreover,, the activity may give greater credibility to President Videla's stated desire for "dialogue" with representative civilian groups. He can point to the latest increase of political criti- cism and suggestions as proof of his government's willing- ness to listen. No one in or out of government seriously suggests that the latest developments presage an early return to any semblance of unfettered civilian politics. Indeed, the major parties probably do not want a rapid normaliza- tion, since they are simply not prepared? Nonetheless, it is clear that a new stage of political evolution, characterized by increasing public debate, has been reached and that a great outpouring of ideas is yet to come. It would be difficult for the military to reverse this proc- ess without arousing deep,, widespread resentment among the populace. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/h,pe#A-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0,, CR lA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 President Videla hopes to keep this process under control. If it proceeds too fast, hard-line critics may become fearful that the military's authority is being un- dermined and consequently step up their pressure on him. If the process is gradual, however, Videla will have de- prived his military critics of at least one excuse for opposing his tactics. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/ 1A-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET Brazil: Political Maneuverings? Brazilian Army Minister Sylvio Frot:a's recent high praise for army intelligence and security officers ap- pears calculated both to bolster the esprit de corps of the security service, at a time when student protests are provoking widespread concern, and to improve his own standing within the military. His remarks are es- pecially noteworthy for their political overtones be- cause Frota, as a four-star general, is eligible to be- come president under the current political guidelines and has been frequently mentioned as a possible succes- sor to President Geisel. In the past, Frota has been criticized by military conservatives for his steadfast loyalty to Geisel, es- pecially when he was charged with carrying out presi-? dential directives aimed at restraining the security services. Last year, when Geisel fired two senior army officials for their failure to prevent the deaths of civilians under military detention, it appeared that Frota had lost considerable standing within the high command for his failure to intercede. Frota's speech doubtless goes a long way toward erasing whatever ill-feeling toward him has lingered within the security services. It may also be viewed as an adroit maneuver at a time when Geisel has forbidden overt campaigning on the part of any generals. If Frota's comments were made with Geisel's ap- proval, however, they could be a signal that the govern- ment, angered by the continuing public opposition to its policies, believes that it. must invoke stronger secu-, rity measures. For the past two months, student agita- tion has spread nationwide in violation of official bans on protest demonstrations. So far, the police and mili- tary, clearly under government orders, have been remark- ably restrained in their response--confining their ac- tions to dispersing crowds, with tear gas and water jets and arresting demonstrators for only short periods. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 10 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 7Rf-ERDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0kGR -RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Nevertheless, there are growing reports that unem- ployed workers have joined the students and that they are receiving support from various Communist and left- wing groups, fueling fears of a subversive conspiracy. Frota's speech could well be the prelude to a more vio- lent crackdown in the near future. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/065 CI ERDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET Uru2u a: No New Political Ground Broken It is clear from the gist of a recent speech by President. Mendez that the Uruguayan government is un- likely to restore traditional democratic processes soon. Many Uruguayans had hoped that the President would dis- cuss the return of elections and political parties in a recent highly touted press conference. Despite advance billing by the government that it would be significant, the President's message mainly consisted of a long re- view of Uruguayan political history and philosophy. The speech resulted in harsh criticism of Uruguayan politi- cal policy by the media. Among the points Mendez made, however, the most note- worthy was a clear statement of the government's intention to give high priority to maintaining domestic security to the exclusion, for the time being, of political ac- tivities. The President's statement reiterated earlier declarations by military and other government officials that the survival of the nation takes precedence over the promotion of human rights. Mendez spoke in general terms on a number of polit- ical developments including constitutional reform, elec- tions, and political parties. He mentioned no timetable and it was obvious that no major political activities would be permitted in the near future. Instead, he talked of drafting a new political charter in lieu of reworking the present constitution. According to the President, the new document--to be developed by the government and subsequently submitted to the people for ratification-- will be based on several institutional acts put into effect following former president Bordaberry's ouster last June. Mendez said the government would facilitate the re- turn of "traditional" political parties--again, giving no date--but added that the activities of the parties would be regulated. "International parties" such as the Com- munists will be banned. According to the President, no elections will be held prior to 1981, the end of Mendez' RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 12 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CI - P79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0& J RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 mandate, and a thorough review of the efficiency of the electoral process will precede any move toward the res- toration of elections. Mendez broke no new ground in his speech, but reem- phasized points that have been made tiiiie and again by various government officials. The relative political inactivity of the government is more than a cooling-off period after the "soft coup" last June; it is a sign of a serious lack of leadership in Montevideo. Mendez, who is unpopular with many Uruguayans, is a figurehead execu- tive for the more than 20-member junta of generals. The Mendez administration amounts to a revival of Uruguay's old collegial system of government. Power is diffused among a large number of generals who, like the country, have no dominant leader. Consequently, the junta is un- able to move decisively or initiate new policy. An exception to Uruguay's current lack of leader- ship is the Fourth Army Division commander, General Gregorio Alvarez, who may emerge in some type of leader- ship position, especially if senior officers continue to retire on schedule over the next several months. Earlier rumors that the law would be manipulated to allow some more conservative senior officers to remain on active duty for political reasons appear to be unfounded. The ambitious Alvarez is popular among the people and the army. He has been labeled a political moderate and conceivably might work more rapidly toward political liberalization, especially if it appeared he could attain a top-ranking position. Alvarez is highly critical of the US, however, and a strong advocate of Latin solidarity against the US on the human rights issue. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :ELI fzbP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET CANAL ZONE. Barrpngqll Buenaventua NETHERLANDS ANTILLES VENEZUELA RP ALA 77-043 SECRET 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/0306R CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Colombia: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields Reports of the "world's largest" marijuana field in the Guajira region of northeast Colombia have focused official and public attention on the extent and sophisti- cation of cannabis prodiXcti.on in the country. Originally reported as 1,500 hectares, the marijuana fields, which are interspersed among other agricultural crops, are now estimated by officials at 200-250 hectares. Even with the lower estimate, the sector under cultivation is still extensive. Moreover, the report that some 300 farm workers were recruited from neighbor- ing areas to tend the fields, coupled with the discovery of irrigation facilities and modern agricultural imple- ments, is an indication of the commercial and highly pro- fessional aspect of the marijuana business in Colombia. Colombia has long been a, principal source of mari- juana supply for the US,market. Most of it is grown in the rugged Sierra Pleada Mountains in the departments of Magdalena and Cesar.; The Guajira, perhaps more in- famous as a center for contraband smuggling, also has a reputation for marijuan~ cultivation. There are no estimates on the amount of marijuana qrown in Colombia, but US Drug Enforcement Administration officials believe that 50- to 80-ton shipments of the drug are routine and that smaller 1- to 2-ton shipments may leave the country several times a day. Most of the mari- juana is stored clandestinely on commercial or private vessels which depart from Riohacha, Santa Marta, Barran- quilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean seaport cities. In addition, innumerable secret runways facilitate air smuggling. Virtually all of the Colombian marijuana is destined for the US market, entering through the east coast, Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico. The latest discovery in the Guajira generated a spate of news articles in Colombia calling for tighter narcotics controls. According to the executive secretary RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0Gt-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 of the National Council on Dangerous Drugs (NCDD), herbi- cides which had been considered for eradication of the marijuana field will not be used because of legal and political constraints and because the marijuana is inter- spersed with legitimate crops. Reportedly, some Colombian government agencies are looking into the possibilities of crop substitution and the development of industry in the Guajira as approaches to future marijuana control. In the interim, the military is apparently becoming involved in anti-marijuana operations in the area. Sim- ilar in design to the Mexican military's "Operation Con- dor," the Colombian armed forces now are reportedly con- ducting patrols to locate additional marijuana fields and manning road blocks and patrolling the coast to prevent the shipment of harvested plants. Considering the state of near anarchy in the volatile Guajira region, the military's participation will be es- sential for even a modestly successful operation against the marijuana growers and traffickers. Colombia's mili- tary establishment, however, dislikes police roles and may not be a willing participant in any government ef- fort directed against marijuana producers. Furthermore, given the feeling of futility in Colombia regarding the overall narcotics trafficking problem, it is unlikely that enforcement officials will be inclined to do much about the innocuously regarded marijuana. issue. The narcotics situation in Colombia. could become a minor campaign issue in next year's presidential elec- tions, but the state of the economy and unemployment will predominate. Even if government and enforcement officials were to respond positively to US initiatives regarding marijuana control in Colombia, problems and misunder- standings no doubt would develop over what Bogota doubt- lessly sees as an inconsistency between the US domestic policy of decriminalization for marijuana, and US efforts to convince foreign producers that marijuana is a dangerous drug. Regardless of its political ramifications, marijuana production remains a profitable endeavor for Colombians. Faced with increasing economic hardships, more and more campesinos are likely to sow the lucrative marijuana seed. There have already been reports that small-scale Sierra RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06~cd AT RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/gpCRgtI -RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Nevada coffee growers, who claim the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (FNC) is not passing on the unprecedented profits from the current high prices, are switching to marijuana cultivation. According to a news interview with a Colombian farmer, the cultivation of marijuana does not require the costly chemical agents needed to prevent coffee plant diseases. Furthermore, marijuana matures in six months while coffee takes three years to reach maturity. In the Sierra Nevada, marijuana brings 30,000 pesos ($820) per quintal or 100 kilograms. On the other hand, 125 kilograms of coffee, which constitutes a "load," is worth only 7,300 pesos ($200) in the Sierra, and there are innumerable difficulties involved in transporting it to the regional centers where the FNC is located. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0%EcJFA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET Principal Areas of Coca Cultivation .7 1 LIMA 0 E:AN *Quito ECUADOR BR A Z I L RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0%gM&rRDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0?Etii-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Peru: Inter-Service Rivalry in Narcotics Control Peru's Civil Guard is challenging the competence of the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) to act as the senior agency in enforcing drug regulations. The Civil Guard's attempt to gain a larger role in narcotics matters could further reduce current mediocre drug en- forcement activities and possibly affect recently pro- posed reorganizational plans designed to halt illicit coca production and to gradually eliminate all coca cul- tivation in Peru. The Civil Guard's maneuvering is partly due to the fact that the specific duties of each service are not clearly defined in the reorganizational proposals. Civil Guard officials insist that they have a role in large cities, where Peruvian Investigations Police offices are located, in addition to their usual duties in towns and rural areas. In mid-April the minister of interior, who has jurisdiction over both organizations, disapproved the Civil Guard's expansion attempts and ruled that the Civil Guard is to restrict its activities to its current jurisdiction. The issue, however, was not settled and the Civil Guard continues to press its claim. The most serious charges against the PIP's anti- narcotics activities are corruption and failure to RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0 P@FA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 SECRET prosecute major traffickers. While the Civil Guard takes the lead in making these accusations, similar charges were made in a series of narcotics-related arti- cles that recently appeared in Lima newspapers. In addi- tion, the National Coca Enterprise (ENACO), which is charged with controlling licit coca production, was ac- cused of malfeasance. The writers stated that ENACO's role in the key coca-growing regions of Huanuco and Ca- jamarca is largely decorative and that the organization devotes little effort to its primary duty of enforcing acreage and production allotments. The articles con- cluded that the repression of drug smuggling could not be allowed to remain solely in the hands of the Peruvian Investigations Police. Rather, they urged that this function be decentralized and expanded to include the Civil Guard. The commander of the Peruvian Investigations Police is aware that some of his personnel take bribes and that this provides a convincing argument for the Civil Guard in its expansion campaign. Nevertheless, the Civil Guard is making its own study of narcotics activi- ties and documenting cases of drug-related corruption involving PIP officers. This could aggravate the inter- service rivalry and further degrade Peru's narcotics control capabilities. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 20 Approved For Release 2007/03/0&~9RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 sS ERDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Mexico: Accelerated Communist Economic Activity An East German - Mexican agreement signed in May for joint production of precision instruments highlighted a continuing expansion of Mexico's economic relations with Communist countries. The accord reportedly marks the first such East German investment in a less-developed country and its first contract with Mexico. The East German ambassador to Mexico also announced that East Germany had provided a $20-million line of credit for Mexican equipment and machinery purchases. Al- though the terms of the credit were not made known, they probably will call for a 15 percent down payment, a 10- year repayment period, and up to two years grace at 6 percent interest. East Germany has extended $100 million of credits (over one half of that in the last 3 years) for machinery and equipment purchases to five Latin Amer- ican countries--Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, and Uruguay. Both the joint venture and the $20-million line of credit were probably steps taken to implement the eco- nomic cooperation agreement signed by Mexico and East Germany in February 1976. At that time, the East German vice minister of foreign trade called for several joint industrial projects in the steel and metal machinery in- dustries. The $20-million credit reportedly will be ap- plied to the expansion of Mexico's Altos Hornos steel plant and the Ciudad Sahagun industrial complex. Mexico also continued to assert its nonaligned po- sition elsewhere. It was announced in late May that Mexico and Yugoslavia will jointly invest in a furniture factory. Yugoslavia will provide technical assistance and possibly small amounts of aid for machinery purchases as well. Mexico also is considering a Romanian offer to provide technical assistance for the state of Aguascalien- tes' grape industry and is in the final stages of negoti- ations with Bucharest for a broad program in petroleum cooperation. In May, Czechoslovakia purchased Mexican RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 5 WI DP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 SE1h-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 tobacco, marking the first: known Mexican sale to Prague this year,,and China signed for its first: direct shipment of Mexican cotton for processing-in China. Although less than 1 percent of Mexico's trade is with Communist coun- tries, the volume: is expected to increase. RP AIWA 77-043 9 JUne 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 :sUk-f DP79T00912A000700010010-1 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 SEq~DP79T00912A000700010010-1 CUBAN CHRONOLOGY FOR MAY 1.977 May 1 May Day in Havana. Speech by Rober= Viega, member of PCC Central Committee, secretary general of CTC. 3 4 Representatives of Caribbean Communist parties meet in Havana to discuss area situation. Had attended May Day cere- monies in Cuba. Two American diplomats return from inter- viewing Americans in prison in Cuba. Twenty-four Americans in jail in Cuba, seven of them on political charges. Fidel Castro attends CTC reception in honor of foreign labor delegations at- tending May Day activities. Fidel Castro meets with Caribbean Com- munist delegations in Cuba for May Day ceremonies. :Havana Domestic Service carries item critical of Ambassador Young's speech at ECLA meeting in Guatemala. Cuban Foreign Trade Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font meets with Algerian President Boumediene in Algiers. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Prime Minister Manley in Kingston. He briefs Manley on Castro's trip to Africa. 6 Fidel Castro interviewed by Afrique-Asie. Big blast at China. Angola a non-negoti- able issue with US. "Partial lifting of embargo not enough". RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/06;EOA~RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0?E&-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 May 19 Carlos Rafae:L Rodriguez--in Moscow for the 81st meeting of the CEMA Executive Committee--meets with Chairman Kosygin. In an interview with Barbara Walters, Fidel Castro says Cuba stopped withdraw- ing troops from Angola in April because of French and Moroccan intervention in Zaire's Shaba Province. 20 Dominic Urbang, Chairman of Luxembourg Communist Party arrives in Cuba with delegation. Meets with Fidel Castro during visit. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Belgrade en route to Libya. Meets with Yugoslav Communist Party leaders at airport. Education Ministry inaugurates Cuban branch of the Russian Language Institute. Carlos Rafae:L Rodriguez arrives in Tripoli, Libya. 21 Manuel Pineiro, member of Central Com- mittee and head of America Department, meets with delegation from Colombian Communist Party visiting Cuba. 21 - 28 Cuba-Jamaica Intergovernmental Commission meets in Havana. Program of cooperation for the coming year is signed. 24 Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in Algeria. Meets with President Boumediene. Brings message from Castro. Gives Boumediene Castro's evaluation of situation in the area. Cuba and Ethiopia sign public health cooperation agreement. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/0e~CtIATRDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/00,;Cj-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 May 9 - 13 CEMA meeting on petroleum and gas indus- try held in Havana. 9 - 15 Week of solidarity with Palestinian peo- ple observed in Cuba. .11 Havana Domestic Service reports US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved amendment partially revoking trade em- bargo. Cuba and Canada sign fishing agreement. Permits Cuban fishing within Canada's 200 mile zone. Delegation from Venezuelan Communist Party meet with PCC group headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to discuss the international situation. 14 - 17 1.5 16 Fifth congress of National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) held in Havana. Congolese Workers Party delegation arrives in Cuba. Interview with Castro appears in Afrique- 4sie. Every attack against Angola is an attack against Cuba. "Consolidation of Ethiopian revolution important for Africa." 1.8 Representatives of Ethiopian and Cuban public health ministries open bilateral cooperation talks in Addis Ababa. Fidel Castro speaks to closing session of ANAP congress. "Growth is no longer romantic." "Party must have a policy on population." ],uz de las Nieves Ayres Moreno, a Chilean revolutionary, arrives in Havana. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 Approved For Release 2007/03/063'E&rTRDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/0%EI-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 May 26 International Day of Solidarity with African people held in Cuba. Council of Ministers Vice President Belarmino Castilla Mas meets with Jamaican Minister of Mines Dudley Thompson in Havana. 27 Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca receives new Libyan ambassador, Mr. Ali Sunni Al-Muntasir. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez returns from his visits to the USSR, Libya, and Algeria. 28 Cuban Communist Party delegation, headed by Central Committee member Facundo Martinez Vaillant received by Guinean President Sekou Toure. 31 Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, arrives in Cuba. RP ALA 77-043 9 June 1977 29 SECRET Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00912A000700010010-1