LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 7, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Latin America
Review
7 September 1978
State Dept. review completed
Secret
RP LAR 78-005
7 September 1978
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
7 September 1978
CONTENTS
Nicaragua: Scenarios for Somoza's Sudden
Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
In the unlikely event of President Somoza's
precipitate departure from power--through
natural death, assassination, or resigna-
tion--a variety of courses could develop in
the process of filling the immense power
vacuum he will leave behind.
Panama: Torrijos Takes a Half-Step Back. . . . . . 6
Panamanian strongman Omar Torrijos' an-
nouncement last week that he will relin-
quish his post as Chief of Government and
not seek the presidency still leaves him
in de facto control as commandant of the
National Guard.
Bolivia: Pereda and the Election Game. . . . . . . 9
The issue of rescheduling a national elec-
tion continues to keep President Pereda on
the defensive, underlining the fact that his
hold on power remains tenuous.
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Colombia: Drug Control Effort May Lead to
Border Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The government's intention to step up drug
control operations in the Guajira region of
northeastern Colombia could bring an unfavor-
able reaction from neighboring Venezuela,
since the area is the locale of a longstanding
and emotional border dispute.
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Nicara ua: Scenarios for Somoza's Sudden Departure
With the political conflict in Nicaragua approaching
complete polarization, the prospect for an internally gen-
erated compromise along moderate lines is increasingly re-
mote. We continue to believe that over the coming months,
barring an unforeseeable shift in events or involvement by
an outside force, President Somoza will probably be able
to remain in power. He will not be able to end the cycle
of determined and sometimes violent opposition, but nei-
ther are his opponents likely to topple his government.
In light of the highly fluid situation, predictions of
such eventualities are clearly speculative, and other pos-
sibilities deserve examination. Chief among these other,
less-likely scenarios is Somoza's precipitate departure
from office--through death, assassination, or resignation.
Somoza's sudden absence from the scene would leave
an immense power vacuum. Present circumstances suggest
that an unanticipated void would most likely be filled
by the National Guard or the Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front (FSLN), the two elements with the physical
Major Anastasio President Anastasio
"Tachito" Somoza Somoza Debayle
General
Jose R. Somoza
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might to prevail in an unsettled atmosphere. Somoza's
death or assassination would favor a Guard takeover,
while his precipitate resignation would suggest circum-
stances in which the Sandinistas could carry the day.
In short, his unstructured departure would simply com-
pound the polarization and make succession by one of the
extremes more likely.
Natural Death
In the event of Som.oza's sudden natural death, his
power structure--family, National Guard, Liberal Party--
would move to protect its interests through continued
control of the government. This could best be achieved
through constitutional succession because pro-Somoza
elements control such a process and can ensure that it
operates in their favor, and it will give a facade of
legitimacy and is probably the only hope of minimiz=ing
adverse reaction from the US and the world.
The National Guard would be the power broker.
Somoza's son, Major Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza, and his
half-brother, General Jose R. Somoza, would abide by the
constitutional ban on their taking office, but they would
effectively hold real power. The facade of legitimacy
would be thin because the constitution has been a Somoza
tool, and it would produce a puppet president. Never-
theless, this would be preferable to outright circum-
vention or alteration of the constitution, which the
Somozas probably recognize would help galvanize the op-
position.
The Minister of Government would take over the of-
ficial reins of government, and Congress--60-percent
controlled by Somoza's Liberal Party---would convene and
name a substitute president to serve out the term. Senate
President Pablo Rener is a likely candidate.
Given the current unstable situation in Nicaragua,
this process might have difficulty proceeding in orderly
fashion. Of the various ways Somoza might leave office,
however, natural death would probably have the least
galvanizing effect on his opponents and would offer the
best opportunity for the Somoza power structure to per-
petuate itself.
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Even if challenged, the Somozas and the Guard would
probably try to see it through constitutionally, while
acting unilaterally and independently to keep order and
control. Pro-Somoza civilian politicians might try to
defuse the situation by negotiating with the opposition,
perhaps to come up with a coalition government. But the
Guard might perceive opposition participation in a suc-
cessor government as a threat to its interests or as a
sign of the inability of Liberal politicians to maintain
authority. The National Guard might, therefore, subvert
the process and impose an alternative succession: a
military junta, a mixed civilian-military regime, or a
military chief of government.
Assassination
If President Somoza were assassinated, the circum-
stances would probably differ only in degree. The sur-
viving Somozas and the Guard would still seek to pre-
vail, but angered by the assassination, they would per-
haps be less concerned with the cosmetics of the suc-
cession, and a more forceful counter-subversion effort
could be expected. Neither Jose R. nor Tachito would
be as insistent on Guard restraint in dealing with the
opposition as is the current President, and more human
rights abuses would probably result. Moreover, there
would be even less inclination to permit the moderate
opposition a voice in government affairs.
Over the longer term, the prospects that either
Jose R. or Major Somoza would retain de facto authority
are uncertain. Jose R.--although acting commander of
the Guard--is regarded more a short-term successor be-
cause of age, poor health, and a lack of intelligence
and ambition.
Tachito, on the other hand, has the ability and
probably the inclination to fill his father's shoes. He
is only 26 years old, however, and has only been a member
of the Guard for a few years, so that he has not had the
opportunity to develop the loyalty that his father and
uncle enjoy. He may also have engendered some jealousy
among senior officers because of his occasionally brash
ways and his privileged position. He is nonetheless
clearly building a base of personal loyalty not only in
the junior officer corps but with enlistees through his
position as commander of the Infantry Basic Training
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School. It is only a question of time before his suc-
cession is secured. Certainly, the leadership of the
Guard expects another Somoza to continue the line of
succession and,, over time, Tachito is clearly the chosen
one. In an immediate crisis, Tachito might well play a
key :Leadership role, even, though acting through Jose. R.
Resignation
Somoza's resignation could come about under any of
a variety of circumstances. Clearly, what follows de-
pends on the conditions that lead him to step down.
Ideally, he would be persuaded that an orderly departure
based on a compromise with the opposition offers the
best chance of averting the extremes of a military take-
over or a victory by the Marxist FSL,N.
Given Somoza's determination to hold on, however,
it would most probably take concerted Sandinista attacks
coupled with mass civil uprisings and a withdrawal of
US support to force him from power. If Somoza were to
flee Nicaragua under such circumstances, it would spur
his activist opponents forward in hopes of delivering
the coup de grace to the existing power structure. At
the same time, Somoza's supporters in the Guard and
Liberal Party, deserted by their leader, would be de--
moralized. Presumably, Jose R. and Tachito and most of
the leadership of the regime would join him in exile,
though pockets of resistance could forra in Managua.
Although moderate opposition leaders might then
step onto the stage and attempt to wrest control of the
movement from those in the streets, the Sandinistas
would clearly have the advantage. By virtue of their
weapons, their more cohesive leadership, and their pop-
ularity and image as the only opposition force capable
of taking direct action, they would be in the best
position to marshal the armed masses. The Sandinistas
are the heroes of the youths who will be in the streets
and occupying the government buildings. In the immediate
aftermath, the FSLN might even turn directly to Cuba for
material aid and guidance in consolidating its position.
The FSLN?guerrillas might wish to establish the
facade of a broad-based coalition government in order to
present an image of legitimacy, but they would have
little incentive to relinquish to moderates the control
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of a breather to draw together with the other remnants of
Somoza's government. At that point, circumstances might
have so deteriorated that their only hope for survival
would be to negotiate with the moderate opposition to
form a compromise successor government. The moderate
opposition might be motivated to agree out of fear that
nothing else could halt a takeover by the radicals.
In short, it ought to be apparent to the Guard and
to the moderate opposition that their interests would be
served by averting an Armageddon. The problem with this
more moderate scenario is that all this ought to be ap-
parent to these groups and Somoza now, but it has not
won by their guns and their youthful followers. The
FSLN has fought for 15 years to wrest power from Somoza
and is not likely to hand it over to opposition poli-
ticians who are basically moderate, capitalist, and un-
sympathetic to the FSLN's revolutionary cause.
Somoza could conceivably resign under less drastic
circumstances; he could see the writing on the wall be-
fore there was a mass civil uprising in Managua. He
could relinquish power to the Guard leadership, which
would still feel deserted, but which might have enough
moved any of them to the bargaining table.
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Panama: Torri.os Takes a Half-Step Back
Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos' announcement
last week that he will relinquish his post as chief
of government---his term expires on 11 October--and
not seek the presidency still leaves him in de facto
control as commandant of the National Guard. General
,y. Torrijos could backtrack on his decision, but a lower
profile for both himself and the military would prob-
ably suit the Panamanian strongman personally and po-
litically for the moment. The move increases the
possibility that Torrijos could be a presidential
candidate in direct elections in 1984 or sooner, how-
ever, since there would be fewer image problems than
if he had occupied the top spot for 16 uninterrupted
years.
Torrijos' Decision
The key to Torrijos' grip on power since 1968 has
been his position as commandant of the National Guard,
and he apparently intends to retain that post indefi-
nitely. Torrijos' simultaneous "proposal" that Education
Minister Royo become the next president--to be elected by
the legislative assembly in October--leaves little doubt
as to who will be calling the shots.
Several factors could have motivated Torrijos' de-
cision. He has never cared for the ceremonial and
bureaucratic aspects of the presidency, which tend to
inhibit his freewheeling style. Moreover, by retiring
from his post as chief of government, Torrijos would
meet one of the opposition's complaints about the special
constitutional powers granted him in.1972. This could
facilitate the government's dialogue with opposition
parties about a new political opening. The post of Chief
of Government was established as a special six-year
"transition" provision of the 1972 constitution, and
Torrijos' continuance would have required a constitu-
tional amendment that would have spotlighted his all-
encompassing powers.
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In keeping with his efforts to foster a new image,
Panama's leader also announced that the National Guard
would "pull back" from the top level of government.
While the Guard has been constitutionally recognized as
a fourth branch of government since 1972, it has primar-
ily exercised an oversight role in national policymaking.
Only one cabinet minister, for instance, is a military
officer. With the canal treaties settled and their im-
plementation requiring greater inputs of technical ex-
pertise, the military can well afford to assume a lower
political profile at the national level.
Nevertheless, this is unlikely to change Torrijos'
practice of bypassing the civilian structure, such as
calling upon intelligence chief Lieutenant Colonel
Noriega for a variety of domestic and foreign policy
tasks. Furthermore, the Guard functions as the govern-
ment's political arm at the provincial and local level,
and will continue to do so. Relaxing his hold on day-
to-day responsibilities will be difficult for Torrijos,
since all decisions have been passed to the Panamanian
strongman for the past 10 years.
Toward Political Freedoms
The extent of liberalization remains unknown, but
in some areas Torrijos is continuing to loosen domestic
controls. The commission on political reform, composed
of government representatives and some opposition party
delegates, recently proposed that Torrijos' 505-man leg-
islative assembly be retained, but also that a popularly
elected National Legislative Commission be formed. The
present Legislative Commission has such law-making power
as now exists, but almost all of its members are appointed
by Torrijos. A second proposal would provide for a direct
presidential election, which Torrijos has said he would
not oppose in 1984.
These still fuzzy recommendations are far from being
implemented. Even so, their mere consideration--like
Torrijos' decision five months ago to allow political
exiles to return--shows that as long as his ultimate
authority is unchallenged, the General will allow do-
mestic politicking. His overall political plan exists
only in his head, however, and--like the man--is subject
to quick changes.
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Outlook
The legislative assembly could still "draft"
Torrijos for president in response to the "popular will."
Several organizations under the control of the pro-gov-
ernment Communist Party have already called for Torrijos
to retain his post. This does not indicate a Machia-
vellian scheme on Torrijos' part, since progovernment
organizations can be expected to request Torrijos' con-
tinued leadership as a matter of course.
The choice of the left-leaning Royo as president,
however, will disquiet the business community. So far,
Panama's entrepreneurs are undecided whether to speak
out, especially since they are unsure of Torrijos' real
plans. In addition, while the Royo candidacy is un-
settling, businessmen have accepted far worse from
Torrijos in the past..
Torrijos may expect that his vice presidential
choice--the conservatively oriented head of the National
Bank, Ricardo de la Espriella--will strike a balance.
With the recent departure of the influential moderate
Minister of Planning Barletta for a job in Washington,
however, the administration's leftist advisers appear
even more prominent.
If substantial opposition to Royo develops--which
does not seem likely at this stage-?-Torrrijos is capable
of backtracking. In making his announcement, for example,
the Panamanian. leader stated that the acceptance of Royo
rested solely with the assembly. Aside from his effort
to embellish the legislature's nonexistent authority,
there was an element of truth in Torrijos' suggestion
that his announcement was not necessarily final. None
of the General's decisions is ever set in concrete.
While Royo's candidacy is more than a trial balloon,
Torrijos has once again held himself above the process
so that, if necessary, he can reverse himself without any
significant loss of personal prestige.
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Bolivia: Pereda and the Election Game
The issue of rescheduling a presidential election
continues to dominate the political scene in Bolivia as
opposition parties and ex-President Banzer try to force
President Pereda's hand. All major political parties
have rejected Pereda's earlier offer to hold an election
in January 1980. Instead, they are demanding that he
set a firm date now for an election in the first half of
next year and that he initiate major electoral reforms.
So far, Pereda has refused to be bound by a specific
timetable--especially one that would immediately make
him a "lame duck"--although he has reiterated his in-
tention to lead the nation toward democracy. This tac-
tic may buy Pereda the time he needs to strengthen his
administration, but his hold on power remains tenuous.
A joint communique issued on 23 August by repre-
sentatives of the major political parties incorporates
criticisms and suggestions voiced by international ob-
servers immediately following the abortive national
election two months ago. Specifically, the parties in-
sist on replacing the individual ballots that were used
for each political party with a single-sheet, multi-
color, color, multi-insignia ballot in order to reduce fraud
and voter manipulation. In addition, the communique ad-
vocates "democratic expression" for all minority par-
ties--including extremist groups--reinstitution of a
system of proportional representation in Congress, in-
creased opposition representation on the national elec-
toral court that oversees the election, and an ending
to the prohibition against labor leaders running for
office. This last provision could enable Juan Lechin,
the highly popular leader of the tin miners, to return
from exile and seek the presidency.
These recommendations, if adopted and conscien-
tiously applied, would reduce irregularities and prob-
ably make future elections more democratic, especially in
La Paz and other major cities. Elsewhere in the country,
however, geographic and cultural isolation inhibits both
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3
the communication and enforcement of electoral reform
measures. The poverty and illiteracy of Bolivia's pre-
dominantly Indian population make it highly susceptible
to bribes and threats by local political bosses.
In spite of these conditions, Pereda has been placed
on the defensive by the opposition parties which have
not. only seized the initiative but have enlisted inter-
national sentiment in favor of democracy. If he fails
t.o deliver a constructive response, he will find it more
difficult to build support for his government at home
and to get badly needed international loans and other
economic assistance.
Former President Banzer, whom Pereda forced out of
office in a bloodless coup in July, has also been play-
ing the election game. Although ostensibly retired from
political life, Banzer told a group of reporters last
month that he favors a presidential election sometime
next year. Banzer proposed that no ex-president or vice
president, and no active or "semiretired" military offi-
cer be eligible to run for office. While this proposal
would disqualify both Banner and Pereda, it would also
eliminate all leading opposition candidates who partici-
pated in the last election and is therefore highly un-
likely to be accepted. Banzer's apparent purpose in
making such an impractical suggestion is to keep his
name before the public and to be able to claim that he
tried to take the high road of statesmanship only to
have this course rejected by the political parties.
In any event, there is no evidence that the major-
ity of officers in the Bolivian military, upon whom en-
forcement of the laws ultimately depends, are committed
to electoral reforms or that they favor the idea of
holding a national election anytime soon. Nevertheless,
the focus on elections seems to have kept Pereda off
balance and susceptible to pressure by his opponents.
In the month and a half since he came to power, he has
not taken any initiatives that have inspired public con-
fidence nor has he defined his policy objectives. His
failure to put the election issue behind him only rein-
forces the image of a weak and indecisive government
that lacks the support of those not directly connected
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Colombia: Dru Control Effort May Lead to Border Tension
The Colombian Government has requested US logistic
support to carry out drug control operations in the
Guajira region of northeastern Colombia. In a recent
meeting with US Ambassador Asencio, Defense Minister
General Camacho reiterated the intention of the new ad-
ministration to act forcefully against drug trafficking.
He repeated President Turbay's proposal to Secretary
Blumenthal for a dramatic show of force by interdicting
or destroying aircraft illegally entering the Guajira
Peninsula. He added that a battalion of troops was
available to carry out the operations in the region but
that the government needed fuel, spare parts, and so-
phisticated communications and radar equipment. Camacho
assigned the armed forces commander, General Sarmiento,
to work with US personnel in drawing up a program of
action and a budget.
The Colombians are obviously intent on demonstrating
their commitment to curb drug trafficking in an area
that has become a major center for marijuana cultivation
and cocaine export. They do not appear to be taking
into consideration, however, the reaction of neighboring
Venezuela to what, in effect, would be the militariza-
tion of an area that figures prominently in a longstand-
ing and emotional border dispute between the two nations.
The Guajira Peninsula and adjacent offshore territories
have been the subject of conflicting claims since the
late 1880s, and the ill-defined border area has fre-
quently been the scene of minor skirmishes.
The Venezuelan military have traditionally viewed
their Colombian counterparts with suspicion. Many
Venezuelans accept as an article of'faith that Colombia
harbors aggressive intentions on oil-rich western Vene-
zuela. They will regard any abnormal increase in
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military strength along the border as potentially hostile.
Moreover, Venezuela is now in the throes of a closely
fought general election campaign that could provide a
forum for a renewal of anti-Colombian feelings, particu-
larly if one of the major parties senses that political
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VENEZUELA-CUBA-1JSSR. An oil swap arrangement between
Caracas and Moscow is now being fully implemented. On
19 August, the Soviet petroleum supplier, NAFTA, sent
the first shipment of crude oil to Venezuela's customers
in Spain. At the same time, a subsidiary of the Vene-
zuelan State Petroleum Company began lifting Venezuelan
heavy crude for Cuba. Under terms of the bilateral
agreement agreed to this summer--an "agreement in prin-
ciple" had been initialed when President Perez visited
Moscow in November 1976--Venezuela is to provide a por-
tion of Cuba's crude oil requirements, and the Soviets
will deliver a like amount for Venezuela's European mar-
ket. Thus far, almost 500,000 barrels of Venezuelan
crude have been delivered to Cuban ports. Shipping
schedules indicate that the Venezuelans are adhering
to a once-a-month delivery schedule. If this rate con-
tinues, Venezuelan crude oil deliveries to Cuba will
reach approximately 10,000 barrels daily--about 8 per-
cent of Cuba's daily crude requirements.
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