LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Assessment
Center
Latin America
Review
28 September 1978
Secret
RP LAR 78-008
28 September 1978
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LATIN AMERICA REVIEW
28 September 1978
CONTENTS
Chile: Pinochet's Anniversary Speech and
the Constitutional Controversy . . . . . . . .
Although only a few provisions of the
new Chilean constitution have become
public, they highlight the country's
basic ideological division and under-
line the fact that the coming plebi-
scite on the draft document could be-
come a major crisis for the Pinochet
regime in its transition to civilian
government.
Ecuador: Presidential Election Back
on Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
After 10 weeks of uncertainty, Ecuador's
presidential election appears to be going
ahead again following a decision by top
military leaders to ignore charges of
widespread fraud in the initial round on
16 July.
Castro's Visit to Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . 11
On his first foreign trip of 1978, the
Cuban President visited the USSR, Ethio-
pia, and Algeria and also made an airport
stop in Libya.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Chile: Pinochet's Anniversary Speech and the
Constitutional Controversy
This study is based on the few provisions publicly available
of the new Chilean constitution. The analysis of the impending
constitutional plebiscite--a major step contemplated by the Pinochet
regime in its transition to civilian government--is obviously tenta-
tive. When all of the draft constitution's provisions are released,
a more complete and precise consideration will be possible.
In his speech marking the fifth anniversary of the
overthrow of the Allende government on 11 September,
President Pinochet outlined the latest and, as yet, most
definite plans for the transition from military to civil-
ian government. According to Pinochet, a new constitu-
tion, prepared under his guidance, would bt-N. submitted to
voters next year, but elections would not be held until
1985. Initial reaction to the speech has focused on the
long interval before civilian rule. Probably of greater
significance, however, is the developing controversy over
the Pinochet constitution, which differs markedly from
Chile's 1925 constitution. Pinochet intends to submit
the new constitution for approval in a national plebi-
scite, some possible outcomes of which could produce
serious, even critical problems for the regime. Whether
Chileans accept or reject the new charter, the Pinochet
constitution and the opposition to it disclose once again
the political consequences of the regime's perception of
the profound cleavage in Chilean politics.
The Approach to a New Constitution
In his lengthy speech, often polemical in tone,
Pinochet dealt with more than the transition to civilian
rule. As he has in the past, he defended the legitimacy
of the coup and the moral mandate of his military regime,
reviewed its progress, highly praised its economic per-
formance, and covered a wide range of domestic and inter-
national issues. He met head-on many of the past and
present criticisms of his administration and its policies
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President Pinochet (white jacket) and junta members on fifth anniversary of the military coup
and boldly raised some thorny matters, most notably the
Letelier case. All in all, it was a long and strongly
worded defense of his embattled regime in its continuing
struggle against the forces and ideologies allegedly
manifested in the overthrown Allende administration.. In
that struggle, Pinochet claims to enjoy majority support
against his opponents. His claim will. be put to an im-
portant test when Chilean voters are given the chance to
accept or reject the regime's constitution--a controver-
sial document, one of whose major purposes is to prevent
legally another Allende-type government.
According to Pinochet, the vote on the new constitu-
tion will begin a three-stage process leading to civilian
rule:
In stage one, the Chilean people next year will
be asked to approve the new constitution,
drafted by experts chosen by the junta and pre-
pared under Pinochet's guidance.
In stage two, lasting six years, Chile will be
ruled by a, transitional government in which
political power will be shared with legislators
appointed by the junta.
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-- In stage three, reached in 1985, a civilian gov-
ernment will be elected under the rules of the
new constitution.
About the return to civilian rule, the regime per-
ceives two imperatives: it must re-establish a civilian
political system, and secondly, that system must be in-
vulnerable to the political assaults of the forces and
ideologies that caused the "trauma" of 1973.
The strong emotion behind the view that a "safe"
constitution is a critical necessity was displayed in
Pinochet's anniversary speech by his characterization
of the Allende regime and his description of the circum-
stances surrounding its removal: "a totalitarian Marxist-
Leninist oppression aimed at implementing a Communist
tyranny. . . those who tried to annihilate forever the
basic principles of Chilean nationality." This harsh
rhetoric, which included the phrase "civil war," is meant
to remind regime supporters of the irreconciliable dif-
ferences between those who still support the deposed ad-
ministration and those who approve its overthrow. In
this "we" and "they" division, "they" cannot be simply
regarded as an opposition party in a democratic system--
"they" are the enemy, and a constitutional system must
be constructed that will prevent them from coming to power.
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As a consequence, the military regime has given con-
siderable time and thought to the writing of the new con-
stitution. For nearly five years, a Constitutional Reform
Commission--appointed by the junta and guided by Pinochet--
has labored on a draft. Many Chileans, including members
of the opposition, would agree that the constitution of
1.925 had serious weaknesses and needed. revision, partic-
ularly, to prevent the election of a president by a minority
and to make it impossible for a chief executive to impose
unconstitutional acts. Although there is little opposi-
tion to the writing of a new constitution, there has been
considerable questioning of its specific terms. This
controversy sharpened when the reform commission finally
presented its 306-page draft to the military junta and
details began to leak out. It is this-basic document--
with some revisions--that will be submitted to Chilean
voters next year. As yet, the regime has refused to re-
lease the complete text, but some copies have evidently
moved outside the inner circles, and sketchy newspaper
accounts have appeared.
The Content of the Constitution
Although only general conclusions are now possible,
the Pinochet constitution seems to be a mixed document,
prepared with an eye to its acceptability by the Chilean
people. It contains a great deal of the constitution of
1925, and it makes some unobjectionable revisions of
former weaknesses. But it also goes beyond this to new
concepts that are not likely to meet universal approval
in Chile. It does not eliminate political parties in
favor of corporatist representation, and it does not pro-
vide for the indirect election of the president--two
rightwing possibilities that have been rejected. In the
definitional jungle where these terms serve polemical
purposes, it will certainly be labeled "democratic" and
"anti-democratic," both inside and outside Chile.
At the national level, the new constitution provides
for a government of limited powers separated between
president, congress, and a Constitutional Tribunal. A
fourth, specialized power also exists--a new institution
called the Council of National Security, composed of the
president, selected military leaders, and the presidents
of the Senate, the Supreme Court, and the Central Bank.
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In a system of universal suffrage, the president--
whose position is greatly strengthened vis-a-vis the
legislature--is to be directly elected by a majority
vote (made necessary by the provisions of a runoff elec-
tion) for a single term of eight years. In a bicameral
legislature, the Chamber of Deputies will number 150;
with the probable but still-undecided abolition of the
old proportional representation system, each deputy will
represent a single-member district. The Senate will
have 45 members, 30 directly elected nationwide and 15
appointed by the president or given automatic membership
as ex-officeholders of high rank. The third branch of
government, the Constitutional Tribunal, will have ex-
tensive and important powers including declaring laws
unconstitutional; mediating conflicts between the presi-
dent and congress; and judging whether words or deeds
fall into one of the categories--like "totalitarian"--
to be proscribed by the constitution. Most of its mem-
bers, all lawyers, will be appointed by the Supreme
Court, but some will be named by the president and the
Senate. The Council of National Security, a kind of
watchdog body, seems to have the power to investigate
any individual, group, or authority whose actions it
believes constitute a threat to the security of the na-
tion.
Opposition may develop to some of these provisions,
but it certainly will not be fundamental in nature. Sure
to provoke strong controversy, however, is the new
catchall provision that could be widely used to limit
speech and action. Explicitly noting that it differs here
from the more permissive constitution of 1925, the regime's
new document forbids "any act by persons or groups in-
tended to propagate doctrines aimed against the family,
advocate violence or a totalitarian conception of society
or of the state . . . or is founded in class war, or is
against the dignity or the rights that emanate from human
nature." Specific prohibitions of behavior under this
provision would follow decisions of the Constitutional
Tribunal. This extraordinarily broad language seems
sure to enlarge the focus of the constitutional debate.
Those who wrote this provision certainly intended it to
proscribe the Chilean Communist and Socialist parties,
but opponents can reasonably ask whether the provision
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could not be used to ban other parties as well. One
argument to be made is that such a provision is simply
not workable.
Further hostility to the new constitution will pre-
dictably be engendered by the rights it grants to private
property and to the free enterprise system as well as
the limitations it imposes on the rights of unions. The
Pinochet regime is quite explicit in its disdain for the
alleged statist economic failures of the two previous
administrations and in its conviction that only a market
economy can guarantee a prosperous Chile. It obviously
intends to provide a constitutional advantage to its
preferred economic system. In Chile, where leftist
parties polled almost 44 percent. of the vote in the
1973 congressional election, there are many partisans of
strongly opposing viewpoints.
Although the right to form unions is clearly granted,
they may not intervene in politics, and the right to
strike is prohibited in public employment and in certain
vital industries. In the rest of the private sector,
labor unions must first go to compulsory bargaining and
arbitration, and the right to strike does not seem to be
unambiguously granted. This still seems to be a matter
to be decided by a supplementary labor law or by con-
stitutional interpretation. Through a number of provi-
sions, the constitution tries to prevent the influence
of political parties or other organizations, especially
unions and professional groups.
Constitutional Controversy
This brief selection of a few elements of the avail-
able text cannot adequately summarize or interpret a com-
plex document. What is politically significant is that'
parts of it have aroused considerable negative opinion.
Complaints are being voiced not only about the substance
of the regime's constitution but about the plebiscitary
process to ratify it. A group of opposition experts,
many of them Christian Democrats, has even begun to pre-
pare an alternative constitution.
Taking note of the criticism, Pinochet has made ex-
plicit the regime's determination to stick to its stated
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course. He pointed out that the present draft will be
examined by a consultative body, the Council of State;
following that, the junta will make a final analysis,
and with the technical help of the Constitutional Reform
Commission, it will approve the final product. Respond-
ing to those "who are worried about the course of the
draft constitution," Pinochet said the government would
"welcome every idea or suggestion aimed at improving it.,,
Nevertheless, even if the regime is disposed to be fair
and open to outside suggestions, it is extremely improb-
able that it will materially change the basic concepts
of its constitution.
The regime will have a great deal riding on the
coming plebiscite. When speaking of the transition
stages, Pinochet seemed to assume that the new constitu-
tion would be ratified. If it is not, it would be a
great source of embarrassment for the regime. Defeat
of the carefully constructed "safe" constitution would
imply approval for a more liberal one. In Pinochet's
view, this could only lead to the acquisition of power
by the type of enemy the military was forced to overthrow
in 1973. Voter rejection of the regime's constitution
could thus create a crisis for the Pinochet government
more severe than anything it has yet had to face.
As yet, there are no signs the regime sees any
great risk in permitting the plebiscite. It apparently
believes it enjoys high civilian support, a perception
perhaps colored by the success of its plebiscite victory
last January. Then, 75 percent voted against the UN
resolution condemning the human rights situation in
Chile. Though the choice was forced upon the voters,
the election seems to have been totally honest. It was
also a great and unexpected victory for Pinochet, who
spoke of the vote as "legitimizing" his regime. Pino-
chet's position in the forthcoming constitutional plebi-
scite will not be assisted by the nationalistic bias of
the earlier vote, however, and a negative outcome is
possible.
Even if the regime wins the plebiscite, but only by
a small margin, problems will remain. Given only slight
approval, what kind of legitimacy will the Chilean people
accord to the new constitution and its political system?
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A big regime victory--say well over. 60 percent--would
leave Pinochet with the fewest problems, although the
country?s basic ideological split would still remain.
Somewhere in the voting process the regime may esti-
mate that it is going to lose; it may then call off the
election or try to win by fraudulent means. Either action
would,also cause serious difficulties.
At present, there can only be speculation on the
outcome of the plebiscite. Many estimates--often con-
tradictory--are made about regime support; all lack a
solid, current basis. Thus, the vote will not only pro-
vide a severe test for the junta, but will also tell a
great deal about, the basic attitudes of the Chilean
people after five years of military rule.
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Ecuador: Presidential Elections Back on Track
After 10 weeks of uncertainty, Ecuador's presiden-
tial elections appear back on track following a decision
by top military leaders to ignore charges of widespread
fraud in the initial round on 16 July. The decision
substantially increases the likelihood that populist
Jaime Roldos--opposed by many officers because of his
close association with their archfoe Assad Bucaram--will
become the country's next President.
A council of general officers--hurriedly convened
on 26 September to review fraud charges made the previous
evening by Supreme Electoral Tribunal president Arizaga--
unanimously voted to continue the election process. The
council accepted the resignations of members of the tri-
bunal, indicated that replacements would be named, and
announced that legislative elections would be held at the
same time as the second presidential round. A date has
not yet been set for the next round.
Arizaga's claims of fraud--which were largely trumped
up--were part of a plot by Supreme Council member General
Duran and Government Minister Jarrin to frustrate Roldos'
drive for the presidency by canceling the elections.
Although the conspiracy had the support of a number
of high-ranking officers, the Guayaquil oligarchy, and
the conservative wing of the Radical Liberal Party, it
was widely exposed in recent weeks by civilian political
leaders and the media.
Although completion of the vote count by a new tri-
bunal and the organization of legislative elections could
provide time for further plotting, it appears that the
major crisis of this election has now passed. It also
seems likely that the voice of the Ecuadorean voters--who
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gave Roldos a 31-percent plurality in the first round and
probably will back him overwhelmingly in the second--will
ultimately be heard. F77 I
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Castro's Visit to Ethiopia
Cuban President Fidel Castro visited the Soviet
Union, Ethiopia, and Algeria on his first foreign trip
of 1978. He also made an airport stop in Libya. During
the evening of 11 September, while attending a Spanish
Embassy reception hosted by visiting Prime Minister
Suarez, the Cuban leader announced his "im_nediate" de-
parture for Ethiopia. Castro apologized to Spanish news-
men for not being able to see Suarez off at the airport.
(For security reasons, Castro's departures are usually
announced after the fact by the Havana press.)
The Whistle Stops
Castro first stopped--briefly--at the airport in
Moscow, where he talked with Soviet Premier Kosygin and
party secretary Kapitonov. The Soviet press character-
ized their talks as "warm and friendly." This press re--
port was the first indication that the Cuban delegation
contained many high-level officials, including top for-
eign policy adviser Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. After his
seven-day stay in Ethiopia, Castro made an unexpected
stop of a few hours in Tripoli, where he and Colonel
Qadhafi discussed Castro's Ethiopia trip--probably, in-
cluding the Eritrea situation--and denounced the Camp
David meeting. Although Castro and Qadhafi have had
their differences in the past, the two leaders apparently
patched up their quarrel last year, and Castro probably
saw a convenient opportunity to join the anti-Sadat band-
wagon by making an appearance in a radical Arab capital.
That same day, the Cuban President arrived in
Algiers. He stayed long enough for a discussion and
dinner with President Boumediene, with whom Castro has
a good personal relationship. The Algerian leader's
opinions are not always appreciated, but Castro seems to
respect him and knows that he needs Boumediene's support.
to maintain his position within the nonaligned movement.
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In the past, the two have clashed over what Boumediene
sees as Cuba's growing role in the polarization of
Africa. The Algerian President has also complained that
Cuba appears to be a stalking horse for Moscow.
(Boumediene could not have been reassured of Cuba's in-
dependence of the Soviet Union when Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez took off for Moscow from Algiers while the
rest of Castro's party left for home.)
The Ethiopian Visit: The Main Event
On Castro's first visit to Ethiopia in March 1977,
he failed to bring Ethiopia and Somalia to an agreement
and was not able to prevent the war that erupted that
summer. Cuban combat troops played a major role in the
fighting in the Ogaden region, and we estimate that there
are now between 1.5,000 and 16,000 Cuban troops in the
country.
The Cuban President was the guest of honor at the
festivities surrounding the fourth anniversary of the
military overthrow of Haile Selassie. He was made an
Castro in Ethiopia with Colonel Mengistu
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honorary citizen of Addis Ababa, was given Ethiopia's
highest decoration by Chairman Mengistu, and watched a
military parade. When Mengistu addressed the crowd in
Revolution Square, he put in a plug for two favorite
Cuban political causes--evacuation of the US naval base
at Guantanamo and independence for Puerto Rico--and made
another gesture to Cuban and Soviet political sensitivi-
ties by being unusually critical of China.
The visit was a busy one for guests and hosts alike.
The two leaders visited People's Militia training camps--
where Cuban military instructors are stationed--as well
as hospitals and village celebrations. They toured the
sites of several joint Ethiopian-Cuban military successes
during the Ogaden campaign, including the town of Jijiga,
where the Ethiopians staged a large military exercise.
During the week-long visit, Castro and Mengistu
probably discussed:
-- The future role of Cuban troops in Ethiopia.
Mengistu is aware that the military situation
in the southern part of Ethiopia is very fluid,
but he also knows that Castro does not want
Cuban combat soldiers to get involved in Eri-
trea. There have been rumors on the cocktail,
circuit in Addis Ababa that the Cubans have
already withdrawn some troops from Ethiopia.
-- Plans for increasing Cuba's civilian aid to
Ethiopia. Havana press, for example, reported a
three-hour meeting devoted to strengthening co-
operation in social services and economic/
technical assistance.
Concurrently with the independence celebrations,
Addis Ababa played host to an international conference
focusing on the "struggle" of Arab and African peoples
against "imperialism." Speaking to the opening session--
with the coleaders of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front,
Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, in attendance--Castro
told his audience that "it was not Cuba, but its accusers,
who opposed a just solution in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and
Africa generally." He and Mengistu later met with Mugabe
and Nkomo to discuss how best to aid the Patriotic Front
guerrillas.
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Peru:* The convocation of a civilian constituent assem-
bly-in July was a significant step in President Morales
Bermudez's plan to return constitutional rule to the
country by 1980. Despite some obstructions created by
far-left assemblymen, this body will be able to draft a
constitution that is acceptable to the ruling military.
Further steps in the political transition may be delayed,
however, until substantial progress is made in solving
Peru's financial crisis. A full. transition to civilian
government is therefore unlikely much before the end of
1980, and because of the economic uncertainties fa ing
Peru, even this timetable may be too optimistic.
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